

THE AMERICAN WAR

(CONCLUDING VOLUME)

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HISTORY
OF
THE AMERICAN WAR

LIEUT.-COLONEL FLETCHER

SCOTS FUSILIER GUARDS

VOL. III.

THIRD AND FOURTH YEARS OF THE WAR

(CONCLUDING VOLUME)



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OF

THE THIRD VOLUME.



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HISTORY

OF

THE AMERICAN WAR.

THE THIRD YEAR.

CHAPTER I.

THE RIOTS AT NEW YORK.

THE TRIUMPH of the Federal arms at Vicksburg, and the no less important, although less decisive success at Gettysburg, mark a period in the war which deserves especial notice; inasmuch as from it dates a renewed impulse on the side of the assailants, and a corresponding increase of the power of the central government in the North—a power disputed by the democrats, and threatened with diminution when the armies met with disaster, and when the apparent hopelessness of the struggle led a large portion of the population to anticipate peace rather as the result of treaty than as the goal of military success.

As if to test its power, or perhaps to avail itself of the warlike feelings induced by recent victories, the Federal government resolved to put in force the provisions of the Act which had received the sanction of Congress in March 1863; and accordingly took measures to raise an additional number of troops, to that already furnished, by a conscription among the population of New York.

The lists were prepared, the boxes from which the names were to be drawn were ready, and on the 11th July the draughting commenced in the ninth congressional district of the city; as, in order to avoid unnecessary excitement, the ceremony had been fixed to take place in the several districts on different days.

On the 11th no disturbance occurred; the people were quiet, and appeared ready to submit to whatever fate the wheel of fortune might award; and on the following day the lists were published, and those whose names had been drawn received the first intimation of their lot. The 12th July was Sunday, and during that day men discussed the event which, although long talked of, had taken most by surprise. They disputed the legality of the Conscription Act, they avowed that the manner of carrying it out was unfair, they inveighed against the exemption of the rich from the perils of the war by the payment of 300*g*; and passing from the act and its working, they diverged to debates on the objects and conduct of the war. They felt, vividly enough, the evils it had brought on the poorer classes by increasing the price of life's necessities, and those who, standing at the corners of the streets, or congregated in rooms set apart for the meetings of the trades unions, eagerly discussed its effect on themselves, had little sympathy with the proposed objects of the struggle. The working classes of New York (many of whom are Irish and Germans) hated the negro, looking on him with the prejudice of race, as also with the jealousy resulting from his competition in the labour market, and, caring as little for the maintenance of the Union as for the aims of the Abolitionists, they regarded only the hardships which the carrying out of

the Conscription Act would involve on themselves and their families.

Such were the feelings of the lower orders of New York, whilst it may be surmised that there were those among the better classes who were not unwilling to see the discontent against the Republican party (as represented by Mr. Lincoln's government) expressed in a manner which would carry more weight than mere words.

So passed Sunday the 12th, and on the 13th the draughting recommenced ; but early in the day a crowd had collected round the office in the Third Avenue, and commencing with the usual proceedings of mobs, broke the windows, and then entering the building dispersed the superintending officers, only too glad to escape further violence. They destroyed the balloting boxes, tore up the lists, and pouring turpentine on the floor set fire to the house, which was quickly in a blaze. The fire companies hurried up, but the mob, although cheering them, prevented them from using their engines, and with the usual inconsistency of turbulent assemblies allowed the neighbouring houses to share the fate of the office, whilst they assisted the inhabitants to preserve their lives and to remove their property.

After this display of power, the crowd marched hither and thither, joined by what may well be termed the dangerous classes of a large city. Women mingled with the men, inciting them to fresh deeds of violence. The offices of unpopular newspapers were attacked, and the houses of men known to favour the war or who had been enriched by government contracts sacked and gutted. The mansion of Mr. Opdyke, the mayor, was with difficulty saved, and when night closed in the city of New York was in the hands of a turbulent mob.

Fires were blazing forth in various quarters, alarm bells were ringing, and the shouts of tumult and the cries of the sufferers made night horrible, and seemed to afford an earnest of what the morrow might bring forth.

On the 14th the riot recommenced. The special objects of the hatred of the mob were the negroes, who, when they showed themselves in the streets, were pursued, and in many instances barbarously murdered; shops and stores whose proprietors were blacks were destroyed, and the Orphan Asylum for Negro Children burned. A few troops brought from Staten Island endeavoured to restore order, and, with loss of life on both sides, successfully dispersed the mobs wherever they came in contact with them; but the rioters tore up the street railways, for the double purpose of preventing the transport of troops either from the country or within the town, and of furnishing themselves with weapons; they also broke into the armourers' stores, seizing rifles and ammunition; and had any leader shown himself capable of directing operations, the riot might have taken the form of a formidable insurrection.

Happily for New York no such man appeared. The better classes, ashamed of the acts of the rioters and of the condition of the city, fearful of the danger to property, and sensible of the disgrace of submitting to the direct action of the Federal government, and to the presence of Federal troops who were prepared to act should the State authorities fail in securing peace, formed themselves into bodies for the restoration and maintenance of order. The governor of the State, Mr. Seymour, arrived in the city, and proclaiming that the question of the legality or illegality of the Conscription Act should be referred to the proper tribunals, endeavoured

to separate those who really supposed that they were fighting in defence of their rights from the men who had joined the tumult for purposes of devastation and of plunder.

The State militia was brought back from Pennsylvania; the police supported by the military performed its duties efficiently; many of the rioters, satisfied by the proclamation of the governor, and ashamed of their companions, returned to their homes; and on the arrival of an unofficial message from Washington announcing the suspension of the draught, so large a number of the malcontents forsook the ranks of the mob, that the danger of insurrection, which at one time appeared imminent, was felt to have abated, and it remained for the proper conservators of order to deal with the tumult.

Notwithstanding, Governor Seymour considered it necessary to place the city under martial law, and the troops which had arrived were so disposed as to prevent and suppress the acts and power of the mobs which continued to roam through the streets. There were several combats, and many lives were lost; among others Colonel O'Brien, who had taken an active part against the rioters, fell a victim to their fury; but by the morning of the 17th the city was proclaimed to be quiet, and business, which had been hindered if not wholly stopped for four days, was resumed.

So completely was tranquillity restored, that a proclamation issued by the provost-marshal-general to the effect that the draughting would recommence failed to create any fresh disturbance. The danger had passed. The better classes, averse to violent proceedings, and fearing the injury to life and property which would ensue from insurrection, preferred to await the

action of the law, and with the hopefulness which characterises Americans, trusted that some method might be found for solving the difficulty other than the dangerous expedient of civil strife. The turbulent classes were overawed; the State troops, assisted but not superseded by the Federal forces, occupied the city; the traces of the riot were removed; and New York assumed its ordinary aspect of business and pleasure.

Notwithstanding the opposition it had met with, the Federal government maintained its purpose, and preparations were made for carrying out the draught not only in New York, but in the other cities of the Eastern States which had shown signs of discontent and disaffection. But it was at New York that the chief struggle might, it was felt, reoccur, and thither the government proceeded to despatch all the disposable forces which could be spared from the frontiers. General Dix, who was esteemed a good officer, and although known to be a firm supporter of the government was yet respected by its political opponents, was sent to command the Federal troops. Every means was employed to overawe the city. The open places were occupied by cavalry, artillery, and infantry, and the bay and rivers patrolled by armed vessels, which were so stationed as to command the streets with their guns. Arrangements were likewise made for the conveyance by water, in armed steamers or under escort, of any detachments of troops needed at particular points, whilst the trains from Washington brought to the city regiments from the Army of the Potomac, with whose services the success at Gettysburg, and the retreat of Lee to the Rappahannock, enabled Meade temporarily to dispense.

But irrespective of these formidable preparations to prevent armed opposition, conciliatory measures were also taken to preserve peace. The representations of Mr. Seymour that the numbers required from the city of New York had been improperly estimated, and were in excess of the fair proportion, were allowed to be true; and in six districts from which the total quota of men required was 26,299, a reduction of 13,999, or more than one half, was sanctioned. Whether this decrease in the demand was the result of conviction of a previous error, or whether it was allowed as a species of compromise, is a point on which it is difficult to form an opinion; but taking into consideration the danger which threatened the nation in the hostile attitude of her greatest city, together with the asseveration of the provost-marshal of the correctness of the numbers specified in the first demand, it may be fairly supposed that although unwilling openly to yield its point, the government was glad to prevent violence by timely concession. In this it was assisted by the action of the city authorities, who voted a large sum of money to enable such poor persons as might be draughted and should be unwilling to serve to purchase substitutes; and partly in consequence of the formidable preparations for the repression of violence, partly owing to the measures of the city authorities, and the assurance of the governor that the legal right of conscription would be tested in the proper courts, the days fixed for the drawing of the lots passed off quietly. The large force under General Dix, increased in consequence of his representation that the State troops could not be relied on, was kept at hand, but was not required, and the danger which threatened the internal peace of the Northern States subsided, and finally disappeared.

The government and the party opposed to State rights had gained a partial victory; the opposition had lost ground, and their cause had been injured by the character and conduct, as well as by the failure, of the dissentients from the draught. The triumph of the armies during the summer and the anticipated victories of the autumn had strengthened the hands of Mr. Lincoln and his cabinet, and had brought to a satisfactory conclusion difficulties which had threatened to increase to formidable dimensions, and which it must be allowed had been met with a mixture of firmness and conciliation creditable to those who formed the central government.

The legality or illegality of the Conscription Act subsequently became a question on which the judges in various courts delivered contradictory opinions—opinions which seem to have been influenced by their views on the much mooted question of the extent of State rights. In both the Federal and Confederate States these judgments appear to have been strained to meet the exigencies of the case; and as Mr. Lincoln was sustained by the judges of the United States Circuit Courts in his refusal to allow the validity of appeals against the legality of a forced draught, so was Mr. Davis supported in the issue of the proclamation by which he set in motion the powers given him by the Conscription Act of 1862.

Almost simultaneously with the enforcement of the conscription in New York, a far more sweeping edict was put forth by the President of the Southern Confederacy, who in view of the necessities of the public defence called out and placed in the military service all white men resident in the Confederate States, between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, not legally exempted, directing

them to repair after enrolment to the conscript camps established in the several States.

That this act was necessary, and that in the summer of 1863 the armies were greatly in need of men to fill their ranks, might be gathered from the proclamations of President Davis and General Lee, if it had not been already shown by the results of the campaign of Vicksburg and by the almost total withdrawal of the garrison from Richmond for the support of the Army of Virginia. General Lee freely acknowledged to his want of men, and pointed to the too prevalent crime of absence without leave of both officers and men from the army under his command;* whilst President Davis in a stirring address issued on the 1st August, 1863, conjured his fellow countrymen to make a supreme effort to gain their freedom, and disregarding the ties of family and home to repair to the camps and to the armies. He told them that 'victory was within their reach; that they needed but to stretch forth their hands to grasp it; and that if those who had been called to the field by every motive that could move the human heart, would but promptly repair to the post of danger, and stand by their comrades now in front of the foe, the armies of the Confederacy would be so strengthened as to insure success.' He continued as follows, and his words give a clue to the difficulties of the Confederate generals:—'The men now absent from their posts would if present in the field suffice to create numerical equality between our force and that of the invaders, and when (he proudly asks) with any approach to such equality have we failed to be victorious? I believe that but few of those absent are

* See General Lee's Address to the Army of Virginia, page 36. *Rebellion Record*, vol. vii.

actuated by unwillingness to serve their country ; but that many have found it difficult to resist the temptation of a visit to their homes, and the loved ones from whom they have been so long separated ; that others have left for temporary attention to their affairs, with the intention of returning, and then have shrunk from the consequences of their violation of duty ; that others again have left their posts from mere restlessness and desire of change, each quieting the upbraidings of his conscience by persuading himself that his individual services could have no influence on the general result.' Mr. Davis concluded his proclamation by a decree of amnesty and pardon to all officers and men who should rejoin from absence before the expiration of twenty days, and by an appeal to the wives, mothers, sisters, and daughters of the Confederacy to use their all-powerful influence in aid of this call, to add one crowning sacrifice to those which their patriotism had so freely and constantly afforded to their country's altar, and to take care that none who owed service in the field should be sheltered at home from the disgrace of having deserted their duty to their families, to their country, and to their God.

Thus did the President of the Confederacy boldly state his wants, their causes, and their remedy ; and thus did he call on the people of the South to sustain him under the disasters of the summer, and to support him against the perils of the autumn.

Already were the guns of the besiegers thundering against the forts of Charleston ; and whilst from North, West, and South, Meade, Rosecrans, and Grant pressed back the armies of the frontier, Gillmore threatened by land and water the defences of the great seaport of the Confederacy.

CHAPTER II.

SIEGE OF CHARLESTON.

NO CITY in the Confederacy, not excepting Richmond, had become the object of so much hatred to the Northern people as the city of Charleston. There had the first shot of the war been fired; there had been offered the first insult to the flag; and there had been planned the secession from the Union, which, commencing with South Carolina, had spread through the thirteen States of the Confederacy, threatening the dissolution of the great American nation. Hitherto all efforts to wreak vengeance on the devoted city had been baffled, the land forces had been defeated and repulsed from James Island, and the boasted monitors had been found incapable of coping with the batteries of Sumter and Moultrie. But, with the pertinacity which has characterised the Northern people during the long continued struggle, a fresh attack was determined on, and it was hoped that the combined forces, naval and military, would effect what each separately had failed to accomplish.

General Gillmore, renowned for the capture of Fort Pulaski, was called to Washington to consult on the proposed plan; and it was then determined that whilst the main attack should still be made by the navy, the military force should seize and hold Morris Island,

and having there established batteries, should aid in the reduction of Fort Sumter.* To command the naval force Admiral Dahlgren was appointed in succession to Admiral Dupont, whilst the troops were placed under the orders of General Gillmore. At the commencement of July these officers repaired to their commands, and the following plan of attack was approved of:—First, to make a descent upon, and obtain possession of the south end of Morris Island. Secondly, to reduce by siege Fort Wagner on that island, and distant from Fort Sumter 2,600 yards. Thirdly, from the position thus gained to demolish Sumter, and afterwards co-operate with the fleet when it should be ready to move in with a heavy artillery fire. Fourthly, to enter the harbour with the monitors and ironclads, remove the channel obstructions, run past the batteries on James and Sullivan's Islands, and reach the city.† Such was the programme of attack, in which it will be seen that the chief burthen of the preliminary operations was to fall on the army, whilst the *coup de grace* was to be given by the navy.

The force at General Gillmore's disposal, collected‡ and entrenched on Folly Island, numbered a little under 17,500 men, and it was determined, with the help of the ironclads, to make a descent on the southern end of Morris Island on the 9th of July, and from thence to proceed to the attack of Fort Wagner. As a preliminary measure batteries were secretly erected among the woods on Folly Island,

* Vide General Halleck's Report, Nov. 15, 1863.

† See General Gillmore's Report.

‡ General Gillmore states in his Report that in May the Federal force numbered 11,000, but that in July the total force collected on Folly Island from Ossebau Sound and Edisto was 17,463.



and about 2,000 men under General Strong were embarked in small boats, and directed to make their way at high tide, through Folly River, into Lighthouse Inlet; at the same time that a detachment of coloured troops under Colonel Higginson was to ascend the North Edisto River, and cut the Charleston and Savannah rail, thereby preventing the arrival of reinforcements to the besieged.

All was ready by day-break on the 10th of July. Colonel Strong's brigade, having reached its position, was concealed among the long marsh grass in Lighthouse Inlet; the batteries on Folly Island opened fire; and four monitors, taking up a position off Morris Island, enfiladed the Confederate batteries commanding the inlet.* The force mustered for the defence of the southern end of Morris Island numbered about seven hundred Carolinian infantry and two companies of artillery, together with the garrisons of Fort Wagner and Battery Gregg; and whilst the chief command was held by General Beauregard, the more especial conduct of the defence was intrusted to General Ripley.

After two hours of heavy firing from the batteries, orders were sent to General Strong to land. These were promptly obeyed; the batteries were assaulted and captured, and the skirmishers pushing forward rapidly drove the enemy back to the defences of Fort Wagner, following him to within musketry range of the work. But the weather was intensely hot, the troops were exhausted, and the assault on the fort was delayed until the following day. On the other hand, during

The author is much indebted for the account of the attack on Morris Island and siege of Fort Wagner to the reports of the Confederate General Ripley, and to those of General Gillmore.

the 11th two fresh regiments reached Morris Island to reinforce the garrison, and preparations were completed for a vigorous resistance.

At daybreak the assault was made, the seventh Connecticut forming the storming party, supported by the seventy-sixth Pennsylvania, and ninth Maine. The approach to the fort was across a narrow neck of land, between the sea and a marsh, and along this causeway in line, as far as the ground would admit, the leading regiment commenced its march. On its approach to

* The following description of Fort Wagner is taken from General Gillmore's Reports. The strength of the work and the difficulties of besieging it are naturally put prominently forward. 'Fort Wagner was an enclosed work, and occupied the entire breadth of the island, extending from high water mark on the east to Vincent's Creek and the impassable marshes on the west, presenting to us a front of over three times the average development that could, by taking advantage of all the available firm ground, be given to the head of our approaches. As we neared the work this ratio reached as high as ten to one. Its faces were mutually defensive, and were completely and thoroughly flanked. It had an excellent command and a bold relief. It was provided with a sluice gate for retaining the high tides in the ditch. It was constructed of compact sand, upon which the heaviest projectiles produced but little effect, and in which damages could be easily and speedily repaired. It was known to contain a secure and capacious bomb-proof shelter for its entire garrison, and to be armed with between fifteen and twenty guns of various calibres, nearly all bearing upon and completely covering the only approach to it, which was over a shallow and shifting beach of scarce half a company front in many places, subject to frequent overflows by the tides, and swept by the guns of not only Fort Wagner itself, but of Battery Gregg, Fort Sumter, and several heavily armed batteries on James Island. It was seen both in flank and reverse by numerous heavily armed batteries of the enemy. Its communication with Charleston being in the hands of the enemy, and entirely practicable to him during the night time, its armament and garrison could be easily maintained at the maximum standard of strength and efficiency.'

the defences, the fire from the enemy's out pickets gave the alarm; and as the defenders hastened to occupy their posts on the parapet, the assailants breaking into the double made a rush for the fort.

Gallantly did the Connecticut regiment cross the glacis and leap into the ditch; they essayed to climb the parapet, but, safely stationed behind its shelter, the defenders shot them down; the supports, shaken by the fire, did not come up in time,* and orders were given to retreat. Then the defenders renewed their fire with terrible effect, and the narrow strip of land between the fort and the Federal lines was strewed with the dead and dying. Of the garrison but few perished, but the loss on the Federal side was heavy.†

Having learned to his cost the strength of Fort Wagner and the pertinacity of its defenders, General Gillmore proceeded to attempt its reduction by artillery fire. In the sand of Morris Island he erected his batteries, the work often injured and deluged by heavy storms which flooded the magazines. The monitors in the mean time kept up an almost continuous engagement with Forts Wagner and Gregg, enfilading the approaches to the rear of Wagner, and forcing the Confederate generals to relieve and reinforce the garrison at night.

Owing to the constant exposure of the men to the incessant fire, and the consequent terrible anxiety

Captain Gray's Report, vol. vii. *Rebellion Record*. Also *New York Tribune* account, which is very ably written.

† General Ripley states that the Confederate burying parties interred over 100 of the enemy inside their lines, and captured 130 prisoners; their own loss being but two officers and ten men killed and wounded. On the other hand General Gillmore, to quote his own words, says:—'Our loss in both actions, that of the 10th and 11th, will not vary much from 150 men killed, wounded, and missing.' So great are the discrepancies between the two accounts.

of continuously facing death—owing also to the confinement and heat of the bombproofs under a hot July sun, the frequent change of the troops forming the small garrison had become an absolute necessity. Notwithstanding, the weariness of passive resistance told greatly on the men, although it was varied by occasional sallies and by an engagement which resulted in the withdrawal of a detachment of Federals from James Island. Still, the batteries progressed, the Ironsides and the monitors crossed the bar, and it became apparent that a second assault might be anticipated. Not only to indirect signs were the defenders indebted for this knowledge; for some time they had deciphered and read the Federal signals, and the orders from the ships to the army and *vice versa* were as intelligible to the signal men at Sumter as to those for whom they were intended. Thus preparations to receive the looked-for assault were completed, and upon General Taliaferro, renowned on many a hard fought field, was the honourable and dangerous post conferred of commanding the fort.

About mid-day on the 18th July the Ironsides, the monitors,* and wooden gunboats opened what may truly be termed a *feu d'enfer*, whilst the batteries stretching across the narrow neck of land from the sea to the marsh continued the semicircle of fire.† The guns from Wagner, Sumter, and Gregg responded but feebly and at long intervals, whilst the garrison of Wagner, ensconced in the casemates, awaited with anxiety but with determination the consequences of this awful

* The iron-clad fleet consisted of the Montauk (flagship), the Ironsides, Catskill, Nahant, Weehawken, and Patapsco.

† The distances of the land batteries from the fort were from 1,460 to 1,920 yards. General Gillmore's Report.

bombardment, to be followed without doubt by as fierce an assault. All through that long summer's day were shot and shell hurled upon the devoted fort. A column of smoke caused by the explosion of the shells hung over its ramparts ; its flag, shot away early in the day, had been replaced by the red battle flag, which as it fluttered in the breeze was the only sign of movement that could be descried from the Federal lines. Various were the conjectures hazarded among the troops and spectators : some said the fort had been abandoned, whilst others augured ill from the ominous silence, and talked of the terrible musketry fire awaiting the assailants when they had masked by their advance the covering batteries.

At dusk General Seymour's division paraded for the assault, the monitors withdrew, and the sound of their huge guns was replaced by the still louder peals of thunder which rolled across the evening sky. Amidst the war of the elements the troops mustered on the beach. General Strong commanded the first brigade, to be led by the 54th Massachusetts regiment, negro ; Colonel Putman the second, and General Stevenson the third. About 7.45 P.M. the leading brigade advanced, the negroes formed in line in front. As they issued from the entrenchments, the guns from Wagner, Gregg, Sumter, and the batteries from James and Sullivan's Islands opened, whilst a portion of the Federal batteries were masked by the advance. Through this terrible fire the regiments forced their way ; and although the 54th were shaken and thrown into some disorder, they reached the ditch, and there blacks and whites together, wading through the slush and water, tried to mount the parapet ; but the fierce Southern troops, men from the Carolinas and Georgia, exasperated to the highest

degree by the sight of the negro regiment, rising from their bomb-proofs, and pouring in deadly rifle bullets, engaged the assailants hand to hand ; and pierced with bayonets and sword thrusts, shot down by the rifle and torn by the shells from Fort Sumter, the corpses of the New Englanders and their comrades the negroes fell headlong and rolled in a mingled heap of dead and wounded into the ditch. Up came the second brigade ; but although a lodgment was effected in one of the angles, it could not withstand the onset of the defenders. Strong and Putman were killed or mortally wounded ; nearly all the superior officers had fallen ; darkness, rendered more hideous by the overhanging thunder cloud, increased the confusion ; the third brigade did not arrive to the rescue ; and to the brave men who had accomplished half their task lay the choice of surrendering or of making their way back to their own lines through the shot and shell. The latter course they chose ; and as the defenders, cheered by their success, poured on them a concentrated fire, to which it is said were added the deadly missiles from their own supporting batteries, the remnants of the two brigades, many of their number falling at every step, retreated rapidly out of range.

The assault had signally failed ; the loss in officers and men had been very terrible ; the leading brigade was brought out of action by a major, the 54th Massachusetts regiment by a lieutenant ; whilst of the defenders 174 were killed, wounded, and missing, amongst whom were several officers.

The result proved to General Gillmore that the capture of Fort Wagner, not to be attained by assault, could only be expected from the operations of a regular siege. The heavy fire from the ironclads, the nine

thousand shot and shell (for such was the number estimated by General Taliaferro as having been rained into the fort) had produced little injury excepting as regarded the outward appearance of the work. The heavy shot had buried themselves harmlessly in the sand, and the shells, making on bursting a momentary crater, had inflicted no damage in the thin and shifting soil. The garrison, secure in its bomb-proofs, had sustained little loss from the artillery fire, but, exposed during the long day to its harassing effects, were aroused almost to madness when the time came for meeting the enemy face to face.

To an attack by open force now succeeded regular approaches. The first parallel, commenced immediately after the assault, was completed on the 23rd July, and the second parallel was established by flying sap during the same night. Here were placed the breaching batteries destined to bombard Fort Sumter. But the task of bringing the guns and ammunition into the trenches was one of difficulty and danger; the working parties were exposed to the guns from Wagner, and to the more deadly Whitworth rifles with which the 20th South Carolina and Charleston volunteers were armed: consequently all operations were confined to the night.

Whilst the military were engaged in this work, the navy did not remain idle. The ironclads frequently engaged Fort Sumter, and on the 25th July injured by their fire the works at Wagner. But they were unable to prevent the garrison from receiving during the night stores, ammunition, and guns, or to hinder the regular reliefs which the strain of continued exposure rendered necessary to all ranks, from the general to the drummer.*

* The successive generals in command of Fort Wagner during the end of July and beginning of August were:—Brigadier-General

Two ten-inch guns were transported to the fort and placed in battery during the first week of August, and the boats of the Charleston navy continually plying during the night between Morris and James Islands kept open the communication, which was now rendered too dangerous for steamers to attempt.

At this period of the siege it was thought by General Gillmore and Admiral Dahlgren that it would not be necessary to sap up to Fort Wagner, but that Sumter might be destroyed from the positions already occupied, and that the complete investment of Morris Island might be established by picket boats.* Consequently whilst the third parallel was commenced, every effort was strained to prepare the breaching batteries in the second parallel to commence the bombardment of Sumter over the defences of Wagner.†

Taliaferro, Brigadier-General Hagood, Brigadier-General Colquitt, Brigadier-General Clingman, Colonel Keitt.

* *Vide* General Gillmore's Report. The same authority, confirmed by General Ripley, states that a partially successful attempt was made to illuminate the water near Cumming's Point (Battery Gregg) by means of the calcium light at a distance of 3000 yards, causing the Confederates to withdraw their steamers and to discontinue the relief for the night.

† Enumeration of the batteries and the distances from Fort Sumter in yards :—

2 8-inch Parrott rifles	3513
3 100-pounder 6·4 inch do.	3447
2 do. do.	3428
2 8-inch do. do.	3938
2 80-pounder Whitworths }	
1 8-inch 200-pounder	4172
1 do. do. }	4272
2 100-pounders }	
2 do.	4278
1 10-inch 300-pounder	4290

General Gillmore's Report.

On the 17th August nearly every battery was complete, whilst the fleet having tested the ranges of its guns was in readiness to co-operate. The plan of attack arranged between General Gillmore and Admiral Dahlgren was that the former with his heavy breaching batteries should direct his attention solely to Fort Sumter, whilst the latter with the ironclads should keep down the fire from Wagner and prevent the fort from interfering with the guns in the second parallel. How that plan was carried out will now be seen.

Before daylight on the 17th a few shots fired at working parties from Wagner provoked a return from the lighter guns in the third parallel; but as the sun rose clear and bright there was stillness on either side: the day was calm, the sea smooth, and nothing broke the quiet of the summer's morning save the ripple plashing on the beach. It was only for a few minutes that this tranquillity lasted. One gun from the breaching batteries gave the signal, and soon every battery opened. Clouds of vapour hung over the Federal lines, the air seemed filled with the peculiar shrieking noise made by the rifled bullets, and Sumter was almost hidden from view by the smoke from the bursting shells and by the dust rising from her shattered ramparts * At 9.25 A.M. the ironclads† came into action, directing their fire against Wagner, Gregg, and Sumter. Not, however, until a quarter before 11 A. M. did Colonel Rhett, commanding at Sumter, reply, and then principally from his barbette guns, which overlooked the decks of the monitors. At midday the action was at its height; the roar of the guns heard by the citizens of Charleston was awful.

* The batteries opened on Sumter at a distance of from $2\frac{1}{4}$ to 3 miles.

† Six ironclads and six wooden gunboats.

Wagner, Gregg, and Sumter, assisted by Moultrie and the batteries of the inner line of defence, were doing their best against the tremendous armament brought to bear on them, whilst the riflemen in Fort Wagner harassed the artillerymen as they worked their guns.

Soon after 12 o'clock the Catskill, which had been engaged with Fort Wagner, was observed to get under weigh and to steam out of action; her commander, Captain Rodgers, had been killed, shattered, together with his paymaster, by the iron plates of the pilot house driven in by a heavy shot. About 1 o'clock P.M. the remainder of the fleet withdrew; the men were tired out, and, scarcely able to endure the stifling heat of the monitors, required rest and refreshment. The garrison of Wagner, profiting by this partial cessation of the action, commenced the work of repairing the sea defences, and of remounting a heavy gun, so that on the return of the ironclads in the afternoon the fort was enabled to reply to their fire as vigorously as during the earlier portion of the day. But Fort Sumter had no rest: until 7 P.M. the land batteries continued to play on her, and the effect of the shot and shell began to show itself in the injury inflicted on the north-west face, and in the disablement of many of her guns.

On the 18th the action was renewed by land and sea; but the fire from the ironclads was less accurate, owing to the roughness of the water in the harbour. The flag of Sumter had been repeatedly shot away, but had been as often replaced, the men risking their lives to rehoist it, regardless of the danger they incurred. During the 19th and 20th of August the bombardment was renewed, principally from the land batteries, whilst the engineers pushed forward the sap towards Wagner. Fort Sumter had now the appearance of a heap of ruins;

many of her guns had been dismounted, many removed; but the garrison still held the post, having suffered very slightly from the heavy fire.* The inner line of defences, extending across James Island by Fort Ripley and from thence towards Sullivan's Island and Fort Moultrie, had been strengthened, whilst Forts Wagner and Gregg remained almost uninjured.

Notwithstanding the slight effects of the bombardment, General Gillmore saw fit to demand the surrender of Fort Sumter and of the works on Morris Island, threatening, if the demand was not complied with, to bombard the city. To carry out his threat he had established a battery in the marsh on his extreme left, in which was mounted an eight-inch Parrott gun, named by the soldiers the Swamp Angel; and he hoped by this means, at a distance of 3000 yards, to send shells into the city. The summons was despatched from his lines on Morris Island on the 21st August, but, owing to delays, did not reach General Beauregard's headquarters until 11.15 P.M., who, finding that the despatch was unsigned, refused to receive it, and directed it to be returned. Before an answer could reach him, and whilst the citizens of Charleston, unsuspecting any danger, were sleeping, the bombardment had commenced; and at 1 A.M. the first shell burst over the city. Terrible was the consternation: the sleepers, awakened suddenly, started from their beds and hurried half dressed into the streets; many sought the railway station, others the open country; whilst the fire-engines, running

* During the four days' bombardment the casualties at Fort Sumter were 1 private killed, and 18 officers and men wounded. On the 17th July, 612 shots were fired at the fort, of which most struck. On the 18th, 19th, and 20th the fort was struck 1268 times on the outside, and 781 times on the inside.

hither and thither, prepared to extinguish the conflagration which was expected every moment to break out. General Beauregard sent an indignant remonstrance against what he alleged was the barbarity of bombarding the city, without reason, and without due notice to non-combatants. He threatened retaliation should the fire be continued without due notice; and should General Gillmore see fit to renew the useless and cruel bombardment, he demanded time for the withdrawal of the inhabitants. To this Gillmore answered that the inhabitants, aware of the near vicinity of the enemy, ought to have left the city previously, but that he would give them until 11 P.M. on the 23rd before he renewed the bombardment.

At the expiration of the time the Marsh Angel recommenced the fire, but, happily for the city of Charleston, burst at the thirty-sixth discharge, and thus disappointed the expectations of the violent war-party in the North, who, exulting over the threatened destruction of the fair city, applauded an act which, if justifiable by the laws of war, was one which few officers would desire to have recourse to.

In the meanwhile the sap was diligently pushed forward. On the night of the 21st August the fourth parallel was established within one hundred yards of the rifle pits, which formed an outwork to the fort. On the 26th these entrenchments were carried by General Terry at the point of the bayonet, and the fifth parallel was completed within 240 yards of the main work. During this period the ironclads had maintained an intermittent bombardment of Forts Wagner, Gregg, and Sumter, but had been unable to pass the barriers which prevented their entrance into the inner harbour; and whilst General Gillmore complained of the delay and

of the inability of the fleet to keep down the fire of Wagner, Admiral Dahlgren pointed out the impossibility of employing his boats to remove the obstructions whilst Sumter was still held by a Confederate garrison, and whilst Moultrie continued to flank the entrance to the harbour with its guns.*

To use General Gillmore's own words: 'The dark and gloomy days of the siege were now upon us; our daily losses, although not heavy, were on the increase, whilst our progress became discouragingly slow, and even fearfully uncertain.' The men were becoming discouraged—the difficulties of their task seemed to increase; from Wagner and from James Island so harassing a fire was kept up on the working parties that the sap could only be proceeded with at night, and even then the bright harvest moon rendered the operation hazardous. As the head of the sap approached the ditch, the guns from the Ironsides could only be worked with extreme caution; whilst, on the other hand, the Confederate batteries on James Island were obliged to cease firing, lest, in endeavouring to strike the working parties, they should send their shot into the fort. Nevertheless the progress of the besiegers, although slow, was continuous, and the last days of the heroic resistance were approaching.

* *Vide* correspondence between General Gillmore and Admiral Dahlgren, published with General Gillmore's Reports. About this time General Gillmore appears to have suffered from the indiscretion of newspaper reporters. He writes or telegraphs thus to the admiral:—

' *Morris Island*, Aug. 21, 1863.

'I am going to send all the newspaper reporters to Hilton and keep them there. Will you do the same with those you have in the fleet?'

The admiral replies that he thinks this course will be difficult.

Putting forth his whole strength, General Gillmore determined, *coûte qui coûte*, to possess the comparatively small work which for so long a time had defied his efforts. He resolved to demolish the bomb-proofs which sheltered the garrison, and for this purpose brought forward his mortars into the fifth parallel, trained some of his heavy breaching batteries on the fort, engaged the services of the Ironsides, and enlarged his advanced trenches for the reception of sharp-shooters. Without cessation was this fresh bombardment to continue; no rest, even during the usual hours of darkness, was to be given to the garrison; and the calcium lights were to turn night into day, so that the work of destruction should be unintermittent.

At daybreak on the 5th September this last and most terrible bombardment commenced. For forty-two consecutive hours it continued: seventeen siege and cohorn mortars unceasingly dropped their shells into the work, over the heads of the sappers and guards of the advanced trenches; thirteen heavy Parrott guns, 100, 200, and 300 pounders, fired at short, though regular intervals; whilst during the daytime the new Ironsides kept up an almost incessant stream of 11-inch shells from her eight broadside guns, exploding them within or over the work, and vigorously searching every part of it excepting the subterranean shelter.*

The garrison suffered severely: they were forced to keep strict watch lest an assault should be attempted under cover of this fire, and many were consequently obliged to leave the shelter of the bomb-proofs. Over 150 casualties occurred during the 5th and 6th,† and

* See General Gillmore's Report, quoted almost verbatim, from *At Daybreak to Shelter*.

† *Vide* Gen. Ripley's Report, from which are quoted the following

it became evident that the fort must either be abandoned, or its brave garrison be sacrificed. The former course was adopted, and measures were accordingly taken to effect the withdrawal of the troops. To accomplish this, transport steamers were collected under convoy of the Confederate ironclad steamer Charleston between Forts Sumter and Johnson, and boats were prepared to convey the garrisons of Forts Wagner and Gregg from Cumming's Point. Orders were at the same time sent to Colonel Keitt, commanding at Wagner, to blow up the magazine, to spike the guns, and to retire his men.

At 9 P.M. the evacuation was commenced under the still undiminished fire of the enemy's batteries, and was concluded by midnight. The whole of the garrison with the exception of about seventy were withdrawn, many of the guns were spiked, and the destruction of the works would have been even more complete, had the magazines exploded and produced the desired effect; but the matches failed to do their work, and with the enemy's sappers actually on the crest of the parapet it was impossible to allow of delay sufficient to

reasons which induced the evacuation of Forts Wagner and Gregg:—
'Batteries Wagner and Gregg had now been held under a continued and furious cannonade by land and sea for fifty-seven days; two assaults had been signally and gloriously repulsed; the enemy had been forced to expend time, men, and material most lavishly in his approaches; but at this time he was within a few yards of the salient; most of the guns of the fort were injured; transportation and supply had become most difficult with the insufficient means at our disposal; the possibility of throwing heavy reinforcements in time to resist an assault by the enemy's overwhelming forces issuing from his trenches only a few yards distant, out of the question; and the practicability of keeping troops in sufficient strength on the island for the purpose, under the furious cannonade from land and sea, without protecting shelter, scarcely less so.'

ascertain the cause. With but little interference from the enemy the evacuation was completed, and on the morning of the 7th, the very day for which the assault had been ordered, General Gillmore entered Batteries Wagner and Gregg, obtaining as trophies of his success twenty-five pieces of ordnance. Then Forts Moultrie and the James Island batteries opened on the abandoned works, compelling the new garrison to work hard to repair the ruined ramparts.

At this time Admiral Dahlgren, supposing that the fall of the Morris Island works would necessitate the abandonment of Sumter, sent to Major Elliott, who with a detachment of infantry held the ruins, which no longer required an artillery garrison,* demanding the surrender of the fort. After communication held with General Beauregard, the answer that Admiral Dahlgren might have Sumter when he could take and hold it was returned. Accepting the challenge, at 6 P.M. the ironclads steamed forward to the attack, and during that evening and the following day the bombardment continued, being principally directed against the batteries on James and Morris Islands, which flanked the fort. At 1 A.M. on the 9th an attempt was made to obtain possession of Sumter by storm, and a combined naval and military force endeavoured to effect a landing from boats. But Major Elliott, waiting until the enemy had approached within a few yards of the southern and eastern faces, poured in so close a fire of musketry, hand grenades, and heavy stones, that such of the crews

* Fort Sumter having been held during the siege and cannonade by the 1st South Carolina Artillery under Colonel Rhett until its armament had been disabled, and the services of the artillerymen being elsewhere required, the commanding general determined that it should be held by infantry.—*General Ripley's Report.*

as had already landed and had escaped instant death sought refuge among the *débris* and surrendered. Five boats, twelve officers, and one hundred and nine men were captured, together with the flag, said to be the same that Major Anderson had been permitted to take from the fort two years and a half ago, and which thus a second time fell into the hands of the Secessionists.*

With this failure the more interesting period of the siege of Charleston terminated. The bombardment of the forts and city was occasionally renewed, but the enemy never succeeded in penetrating within the inner lines of defence, or in hoisting his flag on the ruined walls of Fort Sumter, until, like the rest of the Confederacy, the city of Charleston, following the fate of the state, fell before his overpowering force.

Whether we consider the gigantic scale on which the sieges of Forts Wagner and Sumter were conducted, evidenced by the enormous guns employed, and by the formidable naval force, from which so much had been expected, but by which comparatively so little had been accomplished, or whether we turn our eyes towards the heroic defence of Fort Wagner, where in an earthwork, which outwardly presented little appearance of strength, the garrison had endured fifty-one days of open trenches, and an almost incessant bombardment from land and sea, and when we reflect on the pertinacity with which Sumter was held, even after all its guns had been dismantled, we shall be forced to acknowledge that, considered either in relation to the vastness of the material employed, the novelty of the weapons of offence, or the obstinacy of the assailants and assailed,

* There seems to be some doubt whether the flag captured was the identical flag: the Confederates asserting the fact, the Federals denying it.

the siege of Charleston will take rank among the most memorable of modern times.

The defence of Fort Wagner cannot be considered as the defence of an isolated work—it resembled rather the efforts made to hold the outwork of some great fortress open to communication with the rear. The garrison was frequently relieved and reinforced; and in admiring the courage of its defenders, it is fair to remember that the same men were not continually employed, but that as the enemy's working parties in the trenches were regularly relieved, so were also the detachments which defended Wagner. It was the garrison of Charleston fighting with the army and navy of Gillmore and Dahlgren; it was the battle between the ironclads and the earthworks, in which it must be acknowledged that the latter had the advantage; for to the land force far more than to the ships was their ultimate reduction due.

The soil of which the ramparts of Wagner was constructed was especially adapted to the resistance of shot and shell; the sand gave way on the impact, and then fell back, filling up of itself the holes made by the projectiles, whilst the low level and swampy nature of the spit of land in front of the work rendered the construction of the trenches and the formation of the batteries extremely difficult. To sap up to the glacis of the work was no ordinary task of engineering skill, exposed as the head of the trench was to a flanking fire; but it was an enterprise requiring even more skill and calm courage to remove the garrison when the sap had reached that point, and when the reality of a fearful bombardment and the expectation of a fierce assault were sufficient to try the nerves of the bravest and best disciplined troops.

It is said that the constant exposure to death had the effect of sobering, and rendering peculiarly amenable to the influences of religion, the soldiers employed to garrison Wagner and Sumter, and that the services of the chaplains of the army were much appreciated during the intervening periods, when the reliefs on James Island, after doing duty in the forts, were awaiting their turn for a renewal of the dangerous service. But on the other hand a proof is exhibited of the manner in which man's nature adapts itself to even the most extraordinary circumstances, by the indifference with which the inhabitants of Charleston, after the first terror, regarded the shells sent at intervals into the city from Morris Island.

Much was at that time said of the renowned Greek fire with which General Gillmore was to destroy that nest of traitors, but it was soon found that its effects had been greatly overrated, and that although occasionally a house or houses might be injured, yet that no expectation of a general conflagration could be entertained. Many of the shells fell in the open parts of the city, where the great fire had raged two years previously, and exploded without doing injury to the remaining houses.

In an intermittent and inefficient bombardment ended the last attempt to capture Charleston from the sea. The boasting of the Northern press and the hopes of the people terminated, and were soon forgotten. Other scenes and other enterprises drew away men's attention from the seaboard, and the events of the West eclipsed in interest the operations on the coast. It is to that quarter that we must now turn; and having finished the narrative of the great attack on

Charleston, must follow the course of events which succeeded, and resulted from that other great siege which on the banks of the Mississippi had terminated so disastrously for the Confederate, so triumphantly for the Northern cause.

CHAPTER III.

THE WESTERN CAMPAIGN.

EVEN previous to the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, and the consequent opening of the Mississippi to the Federal gunboats, there had been little combination of movements between the Confederate forces of the trans-Mississippi department and those defending Tennessee and Mississippi. The great distances, the absence of means of communication, and possibly the peculiarities in character of the inhabitants of the frontier States, had tended to isolate the trans-Mississippi armies from those of the rest of the Confederacy; and if such had been the case whilst the course of the great river remained in the hands of friends, it became much more noticeable when the difficulties of transporting troops and stores across the Mississippi were increased by the watchfulness of the Federal gunboats. Therefore, although bloody battles and important operations characterised the campaigns of Louisiana and Arkansas, and although the generals of the Confederacy continued to hold the larger portions of these States, and the great State of Texas, yet their movements exercised little influence on either the attack or defence of the country east of the Mississippi. Thus, whilst Bragg, forced back to the frontiers of Alabama, was making a firm stand on the mountains above Chattanooga,

and whilst Johnston was endeavouring to diminish the evil effects of the loss of Vicksburg, by hindering a further advance into Mississippi, the two armies of the trans-Mississippi department were engaged in protecting the line of the Arkansas River in the north, and in the south in defending south-western Louisiana from the garrison of New Orleans.

As, previous to the fall of Vicksburg, a futile effort had been made to relieve the garrison of that town by an attack on the Federal camp at Milliken's Bend so had General Taylor* endeavoured to cause the withdrawal of Banks's troops engaged in the siege of Port Hudson by a bold advance against Brashear City and the neighbourhood of New Orleans. Into the maze of lakes, streams, and swamps, he had led his wild recruits from Texas, and by the successive capture of Plaquemine, Donaldsonville, and Thibeaudeauville, had succeeded in isolating, and in finally making prisoners, the garrison of Brashear City. He, however, failed, notwithstanding these temporary successes, in drawing off troops from Port Hudson, and, when that place surrendered, was in turn forced to retreat with such plunder as he could secure towards the frontiers of Texas.

His brave, but undisciplined, troops were but little fitted for the regular operations of war; trained in continual skirmishes against the Indians, and resembling their savage foes in many of their characteristics, the horsemen of Texas were formidable adjuncts to an army, but were unreliable as its principal arm. Their western education fitted them for many of the requirements of war; hardy and inured to fatigue as the Indians, they needed little of the *impedimenta*

* Son of a former President of the United States.

usually attending armies; carrying with them or capturing cattle, they compelled them to follow the line of march and to swim the many rivers which intersect south-western Louisiana, whilst, quickly adapting themselves to the necessities of the service required, they either acted as irregular cavalry, or, manning boats and steamers, waged a species of naval warfare among the streams, lakes, and inland waters. But the wild and untrained character of these Texans rendered their discipline difficult, and their courage led them to independent fighting, rather than to the combined movements of regular troops.

Retiring towards the Texan frontier with his prisoners and spoils, General Taylor evacuated Brashear City, which was reoccupied by the Federals, and became one of the principal outposts to New Orleans.

Such was the condition of affairs in south-western Louisiana. In the northern part of the theatre of the war in the trans-Mississippi States, and nearly contemporary with the movements of General Taylor, an effort had been made on the very day of the surrender of Vicksburg to surprise and capture the fort and garrison of Helena, with the objects of drawing off troops from the siege of Vicksburg, of possibly securing a point on the Mississippi from which communication might be opened with its eastern bank, and of destroying a position which threatened, although at some distance, Little Rock, the capital of the State.

The attacking forces under General Holmes, comprising one division of infantry under Price and Marmaduke's cavalry, arrived near Helena on the evening of the 3rd July. The Federals, under General Prentiss, occupied the place, holding the forts and entrenchments erected on the neighbouring hills and ridges.

The garrison had been expecting an attack for some days, and slept on their arms awaiting a preconcerted signal, to repair immediately to their posts. At 4 A.M. on the 4th of July the gun which was to give notice of the enemy's approach boomed through the camp, and the infantry and artillery hastened to man the lines. Price's skirmishers were seen approaching, and soon the full force of his attack was felt at the centre battery in front of Fort Curtis, the key of the position.

Unable to bring forward his artillery with sufficient rapidity, Price, with two infantry brigades under Parsons and McRae, pressed onwards, disregarding the flanking fire of a battery on his left; he succeeded in driving back the infantry which protected the battery and in capturing the guns; but the artillerymen, although compelled to yield ground, had spiked one of the guns, and carried away with them the friction primers, thereby rendering the battery useless to the enemy. Although disappointed in his hope of turning the captured guns against the fort in the rear, Price resolved to continue the attack, relying on Fagan's brigade, which had been detached to assault and carry the batteries on his left. But unsupported by artillery, and exposed to the terrible fire of Fort Curtis and the batteries on the flanks, from which Fagan had now been repulsed, Price's men wavered, and at length retreated, leaving many of their numbers dead, and losing heavily in prisoners, who were cut off and surrounded in a ravine through which they were endeavouring to retire. Fagan had also been driven back with great loss, and General Holmes, considering the further prosecution of the enterprise to be hopeless, ordered Price to yield his previous conquest and to retreat.

No pursuit was attempted, but in the assault of the

works, and during the repulse, the Confederates lost heavily, far more heavily than their opponents, who were covered by breastworks, and were assisted by a powerful artillery. From sixteen hundred to two thousand men in killed, wounded, and prisoners, of which the last furnished a large item, attested the severity of the misfortune, and bore evidence of the gallant but unsuccessful attempt at assaulting fortified lines without the assistance of artillery.* The Federal loss was slight, numbering according to their own estimate two hundred and thirty.

The battle of Helena was the last serious attempt of the armies of the trans-Mississippi to establish themselves on the Mississippi River. Subsequently their operations were confined to the defence of their own especial territory, much of which they were compelled shortly afterwards to resign. Pressed on the upper Arkansas River by General Blunt, and on the lower by General Steele, they were forced to yield Fort Smith and Little Rock, and to retire south of the line of the Arkansas River.

On the 1st August General Blunt entered Fort Smith, on the frontier of Arkansas and the Indian territory, and early in the same month General Steele, having organised a force at Helena, advanced against Little Rock. The expedition was planned and carried out with intelligence and vigour; moving up the White River, under an escort of gunboats, Steele established hospitals and a dépôt at Duvall's Bluffs, and from thence, covered by Davidson's cavalry division, advanced

* Both Federal and Confederate accounts agree in saying that little, if any, of Price's artillery were brought into action. No mention is made of Marmaduke, who does not appear to have taken part in the engagement.

through a difficult country to Brownsville. Roads through swamps had to be constructed, bridges to be thrown across the numerous streams, and the natural obstructions to the march proved greater than those offered by the enemy.

On the 26th August, Marmaduke's cavalry were driven from Brownsville, and the army, being reinforced from Memphis, marched on the Arkansas River. Striking it below Little Rock, Steele ordered Davidson to cross by means of a pontoon-bridge to the right, or southern, bank, and, marching westwards, to threaten the enemy's right and rear, whilst he in person advanced on the defences of the town.* The plan succeeded; Price, fearing lest his retreat should be cut off, retired on Archidelpia, and Marmaduke's cavalry, after holding the town to allow sufficient time to set fire to the steamers and bridges, followed the main army. On the 10th September Steele entered Little Rock, having accomplished the purpose of his enterprise with comparatively slight loss.

General Price was much censured for thus abandoning Little Rock, and giving up to the enemy the fertile plains of the Arkansas River, the most cultivated district of the State. Through the autumn and winter of 1863-1864, he retained his head-quarters at Archidelpia, the barren country between the Ouachita and the Arkansas River becoming the scene of almost daily skirmishes of cavalry, from whose raids the inhabitants suffered more than the belligerents. Both sides plun-

* General Steele states that the numerical strength of his army which marched from Ashley's Mills on the Arkansas to Little Rock was 7,000. Confederate accounts place it at 15,000. General Price's forces comprised about 7,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry under Marmaduke.

dered and despoiled the denizens of this neutral tract, over whom the protection of neither army could extend. Within the lines of Federals and Confederates, non-combatants were unmolested, and their safety cared for, General Steele gaining, by his humane conduct towards a conquered population, the esteem even of his enemies.*

Thus were the Federal conquests extended from the frontiers of Missouri to the line of the Arkansas River. The experience gained in the Vicksburg campaign had not been thrown away, and the systematic advance on intermediate points, the successful combination of the naval and military forces, together with the engineering labours of the troops, all evinced a marked improvement on the operations of the western armies at an earlier period of the war, and showed that the generals had learnt both theoretically and practically important lessons in the art of war.

From St. Louis to Little Rock, from Nashville to Chattanooga, had the Confederates been steadily pushed back; the Mississippi River had been opened through its whole course, and the first steamer which, for more than two years, had navigated the extent of its waters from St. Louis to New Orleans arrived at the latter city on the 16th July. Grant was in the meantime engaged in improving the conquest of Vicksburg by operations against Yazoo City and Jackson, and the combined forces of Rosecrans and Burnside threatened to carry the war from Tennessee into the Gulf States.

It has been already shown how the movements of the armies of Mississippi and of Tennessee affected each

* The author is much indebted to General Walker, who commanded a division of the Confederate trans-Mississippi army, for valuable information respecting some of the incidents of the campaigns in that department.

other, and therefore, before returning to the latter, it will conduce to a connected narrative to follow up the operations which resulted from the fall of Vicksburg.

Immediately after that event, Sherman, with four *corps d'armée*, marched against the covering army under Johnston, and, after an engagement with the rear-guard at Bolton, reached the vicinity of Jackson, where a line of fieldworks, extending from the neighbourhood of the Pearl River on the right, and enclosing in a semicircle the western side of the town, opposed his further progress. A repulse, with considerable loss, of General Lauman's division, on the right of the Federal line, which had advanced somewhat incautiously against the enemy's works, taught Sherman that Johnston intended to make a stand, either with the object of holding the town or of covering his retreat across the Pearl River. Unwilling, therefore, to risk anything by an assault against the fortified lines, Sherman determined to await the arrival of his ammunition trains previous to opening fire with his heavy artillery. Thus was time given to Johnston to complete his arrangements for the passage of the Pearl River, and on the night of the 16th of July, by the light of the burning stores, his rear-guard crossed the river, and took the road to Meridien. Sherman's troops entered the town, and, partly by the hands of the retreating army, partly by those of the advancing Federals, the ill-fated capital of Mississippi perished, affording in her blackened ruins a monument of the desolation of war and a type of the miserable condition to which the once flourishing State of Mississippi had been reduced.*

* The following extract, taken from a letter published in the *Chicago Tribune*, gives some idea of the condition of the State of Mississippi after the second advance of Sherman's troops:—'The

With the recapture of Jackson, and the occupation, by a combined naval and military force, of Yazoo City, the summer campaign of the Federal army of the Mississippi ended. The troops required rest, and supplies of men and stores were necessary before an advance could be made into the interior of the country to a distance from the gunboats and transports. But whilst the Confederate armies of Virginia and Tennessee preserved their efficiency, and threatened not only to maintain an obstinate defensive strategy but at any moment to carry the war into the border States, offensive operations in Mississippi were necessarily suspended. The whole resources of the North were required to preserve the supremacy of the Federal arms in Tennessee, and to prevent a renewed invasion of Pennsylvania and Maryland, scarcely yet freed from the presence of Lee's armies. Therefore for a time the campaign in Mississippi ceased, and events which threatened to inaugurate a series of disasters to the Federal cause in Kentucky acquired a preponderating importance.

On the Cumberland River General Morgan had collected a force, composed partly of veterans who had served under him in many a bold foray, and of others who, attracted by his exploits, or influenced by the hope of plunder, thronged to his standard. Watching him, near Jamestown, was a strong body of Federal

country between here (Vicksburg) and Jackson is completely devastated. No subsistence of any kind remains. Every growing crop was destroyed, when possible. Wheat was burned in the barn, stack, or wherever found. All subsistence was brought off or destroyed. Live stock was used or brought away everywhere. General Sherman asserts that the people must inevitably leave, be fed by the Federal government, or starve.'

cavalry, but neither did the deep river which separated him from his proposed scene of operations nor the threatening forces of his antagonist, prove a barrier sufficient to repel his fiery energy. He built boats, and partly by their assistance, partly by swimming, crossed the Cumberland, and with little opposition seized Columbia.

From thence on the 4th July he marched on Greenbrier Bridge, where Colonel Moore in command of a considerable body of Federal troops was entrenched. To a demand to yield the position, Moore returned the answer, that the 4th July was a bad day to talk about surrender, and that he must therefore decline. An attack was immediately commenced ; but the Federal officer showed both courage and talent, and succeeded in driving back his assailants. Foiled in his attempt on Greenbrier Bridge, Morgan continued his march to Lebanon, where a similar refusal to surrender was returned by Colonel Hanson, commanding the garrison. Morgan then ordered a bombardment of the place, but perceiving that little effect was produced, commanded his cavalry to charge into the town. At the head of one of the leading regiments, young Tom Morgan, the General's brother, rode, and fell whilst cheering on his men. The soldiers, exasperated by his death, renewed their efforts, the fight was continued in the streets, and it was only when the houses were fired, in which Colonel Hanson still continued to hold out, that he surrendered. Plunder and destruction ensued ; Morgan's senior officers endeavoured to stop the evil, but the men's passions had been roused, and the usual bitterness of war had been increased by the animosity of civil strife ; Kentuckians were fighting against Kentuckians,

and private vengeance sought gratification under the guise of zeal for the public good.

At length order was restored ; a portion of the prisoners were paroled, and the remainder hurried on to Springfield, as the Federal cavalry were already driving in the out-pickets. Little favour did Morgan meet with in northern Kentucky, and the want of discipline among his troops showed itself in acts of plunder which the general himself and his leading officers deeply regretted.* Pressed by the cavalry force which followed closely in his rear, and unassisted by the inhabitants of the country, Morgan formed the bold resolve of crossing the Ohio, and carrying the war into the hitherto peaceful State of Indiana. Effecting a passage near Brandenburg (below Louisville), he marched into the heart of the enemy's country, destroying railways and telegraphs, and collecting plunder of both public and private property. The home guards and State militia, hastily assembled, tried to bar his progress, but were brushed aside and routed by men accustomed to encounter far more formidable opponents. Ohio and Indiana were in confusion and alarm ; troops were hastily assembled, the river was patrolled by gunboats, and obstructions thrown across the roads by which the Confederates were expected to advance. The cavalry which had continued to follow in their rear, threatened to cut off their retreat, and Morgan perceived that only the rapidity of his movements could save him from being crushed by overwhelming numbers. Turning towards the river, he threatened Cincinnati, and, marching round the city, sought to cross the Ohio, into Western Virginia, near Pomeroy.

* See the journal of Lieut.-Colonel Alston, chief of the staff to General Morgan, published in the *Rebellion Records*, vol. vii.

But from all quarters troops were converging; the cavalry under Colonel Shackleford had never relaxed in the pursuit, and a considerable body of men under General Judah was marching northwards from Cincinnati. The militia and home guards watched the fords, obstructed the roads, and barricaded the towns and villages, whilst gunboats assisted in the conveyance of troops, and fired on any detached parties of the enemy which showed themselves near the banks. Worse than all, Morgan's men, encumbered with plunder, and scattered over a wide extent of country, could offer but little resistance to an organised attack.

About thirty-five miles above Pomeroy, near an island named Buffington, an attempt was made to swim the river, but the *Moose*, a gunboat which had hastened up from Cincinnati, quickly silenced the field guns brought up by Morgan, to cover the passage, and Judah and Shackleford coming up, he abandoned the attempt, and endeavoured to force a passage higher up, at Belleville. A few horsemen escaped by swimming, but the main body continued the retreat, which had now almost degenerated into a flight, up the left bank of the Ohio. Still pursued by constantly augmenting forces, the greater portion of Morgan's men was captured, and although the general, with a few of his officers, and some troopers, succeeded for a time in eluding their pursuers, they were eventually driven to take refuge on a steep bluff, where the several detachments sent in pursuit closed round them, and compelled their surrender.

Thus terminated Morgan's bold raid; from the very commencement it had been characterised by a want of the success so marked in his operations of the pre-

vious spring. The failure at Greenbrier Bridge, and the desperate resistance of the garrison at Lebanon, showed that the Federal officers and men were far better prepared to meet him than during his earlier raids, whilst the conduct of the Kentuckians proved that indifference had changed to hostility, and that the majority of the population of the northern portion of the State were unfriendly, if not to the cause, at least to the irregular troops which supported it. The conduct of Morgan's men tended to increase this feeling, and the character of their operations in Indiana and Ohio assimilated more nearly to the acts of guerilla bands than to those of regular troops.

The loss to the Confederacy of the services of so bold a leader, and of so considerable a body of men (numbering about 1,700), received but a feeble compensation in the possible delay occasioned in the march of Burnside's army, assembled for a campaign in eastern Tennessee, or by the *éclat* attached to a raid into Ohio. Every man was required to fill the ranks of the western armies of the Confederacy, and although Morgan's enterprise may be admired for its boldness of design and execution, it must yet be regarded as a disaster to the cause which it intended to advance.*

* General Morgan and his superior officers, in violation of the usual laws of war, were treated not as military prisoners but as felons, and were confined in the Penitentiary of Ohio, from which they subsequently effected their escape.


CHAPTER IV.

BATTLE OF CHICAMAUGA.

WHILST Morgan's bold raid drew men's attention to the banks of the Ohio, and whilst his capture aroused the enthusiasm in proportion as it calmed the apprehension of the North, the main army of the West, under Rosecrans, was steadily pursuing its southward course, sometimes engaged in repelling the opposition of men, but more continuously applying itself to overcome the obstacles which nature offered to the march from Murfreesborough to the banks of the Tennessee.

Chattanooga was the objective point. It was there that the lines of rail from Nashville, Memphis, Knoxville, and from the Southern cities of the Atlantic, united; there were the workshops which supplied these rails with rolling stock, and there was the gate which commanded the south-western entrance into eastern Tennessee, and the navigation of the upper waters of the Tennessee River. For these reasons was Chattanooga, or rather the surrounding mountains, a strategic object which an assailing army would endeavour to seize, and which the defenders of the more southern States would put forth their whole strength to hold.

At an earlier period of the war detachments of Federal troops had occupied the right bank of the Tennessee River, and had even directed their artillery



against the town, but, as has been already shown, had been compelled to retire by the great flank movements of Bragg and Kirby Smith into Kentucky. To guard against a renewal of these tactics, and to support the movement of Rosecrans, Burnside's army had been assembled on the Ohio, and, after the catastrophe which terminated Morgan's raid, had been put in motion towards eastern Tennessee. Thus, whilst Rosecrans was repairing rails and constructing roads across the southern extremity of the Cumberland Mountains, Burnside, marching by Williamsburgh and Montgomery, and drawing together the Federal troops of Kentucky, was entering eastern Tennessee by the main road to Kingston.

He met with little opposition. The overwhelming forces of the North necessitated the concentration of the Confederate armies and the consequent abandonment of many outlying, although important, stations; thus Kingston was undefended, and Knoxville, the chief town of eastern Tennessee, was evacuated, whilst General Buckner, moving down the Tennessee River, united his comparatively small force with Bragg.

These tactics were the necessary consequences of the circumstances under which the South were fighting; but whilst they partially remedied the deficiency of numbers, they yet tended to increase that deficiency by allowing the occupation of vast tracts of country by the enemy's forces, and consequently permitting them to influence the population by force and persuasion against the supremacy of the Confederate government. In the mountainous and unfertile districts of eastern Tennessee the inhabitants had never engaged heartily in the Southern cause, and Burnside's troops, composed partly of men from that portion of the State, were

welcomed rather than repulsed by the population of Knoxville. As the Confederate generals abandoned the several border States, they lost much of their recruiting ground, the attachment of the men being principally engaged towards their proper State rather than to the Confederacy as a whole. Thus nearly the whole of Tennessee by the retreat of Bragg and Buckner had been given up to the Federals; and although it was hoped that a turn of the tide might again allow of a fresh occupation of both Tennessee and Kentucky, and although the important pass of Cumberland Gap was still retained by a strong detachment, yet the autumn campaign of 1863 opened badly for the South, and seemed to portend a further limitation of her frontier.

By his advance on Kingston, Burnside had cut off two of Buckner's brigades from the main army, viz. Jackson's, in northern Tennessee, and Frazier's, holding Cumberland Gap. The latter had indeed been ordered to evacuate the works at the gap, and to join Buckner's retreating force, but this order had been rescinded, and directions had been sent to hold the position as long as might be possible. Commanding as it did one of the principal roads into Kentucky, its importance at an earlier period of the war had been incontestable; and although by Burnside's march the position had been turned, and its value diminished, yet it was thought that the presence of a considerable body of troops threatening the left rear of the Federal army would induce Burnside to delay his junction with Rosecrans until they could be disposed of.

Such was the fact. Burnside detached Shackleford to invest the pass from the Tennessee side, whilst De Courcy marched against it from Kentucky. Frazier,

who was in command of the garrison, seeing that he was surrounded, and despairing of successfully resisting the force brought against him, surrendered on the 9th September without firing a shot; thereby incurring severe reproach from President Davis, who spoke of the event as a disaster which laid open Eastern Tennessee and South-eastern Virginia to hostile operations; and which broke the line of communication between the seat of government and middle Tennessee.

Notwithstanding the loss attending the surrender of men, *prestige*, and of an important position, the retention of Cumberland Gap, even for a short time after Buckner's retreat, had not been wholly useless. Burnside had been diverted from the most important object of his advance, for in place of connecting himself with Rosecrans, and of co-operating with him, he had allowed himself to be drawn into North-eastern Tennessee when the presence of every available soldier was required at Chattanooga.

On the mountains which formed the last barrier to the advance of the invaders into the seaboard States, the Confederate government had determined that an obstinate stand should be made. Bragg had been reinforced by a detachment from the Army of Mississippi, the cavalry recruited in the open country round Rome had been brought to the front, and every preparation made to contest the passage of the range of mountains which interposed between the Federals and the plains of Georgia.

The position taken up by the Confederate army was on the southern or left bank of the Tennessee; and the only serious obstacles which presented themselves to the march of the Federals north of that river were such as were occasioned by the nature of the country.

After the advance of General Rosecrans to the western

slopes of the Cumberland Mountains, it had been his first object to repair the rail and roads to Nashville, and to establish intermediate depôts at Tullahoma, McMinnsville, and Winchester ; and so, having formed a base of operations south of Nashville, and being satisfied of the security of his left flank by the advance of Burnside, he commenced the passage of the Cumberland Mountains.

This chain, which divides the waters flowing into the Cumberland from those which form the tributaries of the Tennessee, runs in a south-westerly direction from the frontiers of Virginia and Kentucky to Northern Alabama. On the confines of Tennessee, Georgia, and Alabama, the Tennessee River forces a passage through the range, and, issuing from the mountains, enters a plain and wooded country. Near these gates, as they may be termed, the Sequatchie River flows into the Tennessee through a narrow valley, and it was by this valley, and by the rail and roads which, leaving the mountains to the east, touch the Tennessee River at Stevenson, that the three corps composing the army under General Rosecrans received orders to advance.

On the 16th August the march commenced ; the left under Crittenden entered the Sequatchie Valley, covered on the extreme left by cavalry, whilst the centre and right, under Thomas and McCook, leaving the more mountainous country on their left, reached the right bank of the Tennessee River, near Battle Creek, and Stevenson. This preliminary movement was accomplished by the 20th August, and measures were at once taken to repair the trestle bridge at Bridgeport, and to construct rafts and boats for the passage of the river. By the 4th of September the preparations were completed ; Crittenden moved down the Sequatchie Valley,

McCook, and Thomas crossed the river; and the cavalry were pushed forward to Look-out Valley, and threatened the approaches to Rome and the lines of communication of the Confederate army.

The position of Bragg at Chattanooga was thus rendered untenable; he occupied a mountainous and barren country; his communication with the east by the Knoxville rail was severed by Burnside's advance, by which he was also deprived of the resources of Eastern Tennessee; and the passage of the Tennessee River by Rosecrans threatened the rail and roads which afforded means of communication with his depôts at Rome and Atlanta. To hold Chattanooga, and at the same time to meet the forces which were threatening his left rear, was impossible; to cross the river and to operate against Crittenden's detached corps, was a movement so hazardous, that nothing but direst necessity could justify it; and, therefore, to retreat from Chattanooga was the only course that could reasonably be pursued.

This course General Bragg decided to adopt; and on the 7th September he evacuated Chattanooga, which was occupied without opposition by Crittenden's corps. The retreat was made by the road to Lafayette, at which village the main body of the army was concentrated. Thither had Buckner brought a portion of the army of Eastern Tennessee; there were stationed* D. Hill's corps and Walker's divisions of the Army of Mississippi, whilst Polk's corps, forming the rear, watched the banks of Chicamauga Creek, near Lee's and Gordon's Mills, and Pegram protected the Atlanta railway with his cavalry.

But not entirely to the Army of the West was the

* General D. Hill had been transferred from the Army of Virginia to take the place of General Hardee, employed on other duties.

defence of the mountain barrier entrusted. From Virginia, from the banks of the Rapidan, was Lee's companion-in-arms and most illustrious Lieutenant hastening with his trusted divisions. Longstreet, with Hood and McLaws, was on his way to Atlanta, and whilst the Northern newspapers were debating whether Lee was preparing to make another dash on Washington, that general was weakening his army by sending to the West twelve thousand of his best troops.*

Pressed, as was the Confederacy at this time, in Virginia, at Charleston, from the Mississippi, and in Tennessee, and unable to muster the necessary forces to withstand the invader at each point, without drawing from other places where the blows threatened to be less severe, she was forced to take advantage of the temporary lull in Virginia to reinforce the Western armies for the coming battle. Her system of railways enabled her to do this, and the worn rails, and almost broken-down cars and engines, were yet able to convey slowly over the vast distances which separated Richmond from Atlanta, Longstreet's two divisions.

It was, however, before the arrival of this reinforcement, that an opportunity seemed to present itself to General Bragg to crush in detail his opponent's converging columns. As will be remembered, Rosecrans's army was divided into three corps, separated from each other not only by a considerable extent of country, but also by the spurs of the mountains, which extend in a south-westerly direction from Chattanooga, and form the continuation of the Cumberland range on the left bank of the Tennessee River. These mountains or hills, resembling somewhat in their appearance the Jura range, are

* Viz., Hood's and McLaws's divisions, and Alexander's battalion of artillery.

divided into parallel ridges, separated by streams flowing into the Tennessee. Of these, the westernmost ridge is named Racoon Mountain, between which and Look-out Mountain runs Look-out Creek. To the east of Look-out Mountain is Mission Ridge, at the foot of which, and between it and the most eastern range, called Pigeon Mountain, flows Chicamauga Creek.

It was by the road which crosses Mission Ridge and Chicamauga Creek, that General Bragg had retreated; and it was at Lafayette, about 25 miles from Chattanooga, that he had concentrated his army. Considering him, therefore, to be facing Chattanooga, he had Crittenden's corps in his front, Thomas, entangled among the mountain defiles, on his left, and McCook, separated by a hilly and forest country from Thomas, on his left rear. Rosecrans had committed the error of dividing his army in the presence of the enemy, and of subjecting himself to the danger of defeat in detail. He had believed too implicitly the reports of spies and deserters, who represented that Bragg was retreating in all haste and confusion, and had consequently incurred the risk arising from despising his enemy.

Bragg saw the error, and hastened to profit by it. But now was shown the ill effects of a want of union among the generals. Unlike the Army of Virginia, that of Tennessee had not the implicit confidence in its commander-in-chief which animated all ranks in the troops under Lee's command. Neither had the success, nor the personal character of General Bragg, enabled him to attain that happy result, so important in every army, so essential among troops bound but loosely together by ties of discipline. There were jealousies among the subordinate generals, and the orders of the Commander-in-Chief were not obeyed with that readi

ness, which the union of military discipline with personal affection insures, but which is seldom attained solely by the former agency.

To cut off Thomas among the mountain defiles was General Bragg's design, and having done so, to fall in succession on Crittenden and McCook. With this intent, he gave verbal orders to General Hindman to take his division to a point on the Lafayette Road (named Davis's Cross-roads), and there to await Cleburne's division of D. Hill's corps, with which two divisions he (Hindman) was to advance on Thomas, encamped at the foot of Look-out Mountain. Orders were at the same time sent to General D. Hill to despatch at once Cleburne's division to the same point. To this plan, however, D. Hill objected; he alleged that Cleburne was sick, and that the passes had been so completely blocked by felled trees and other obstructions, that the movement was impracticable. In consequence of this hesitation or disobedience General Bragg hastened to direct Buckner to undertake the duty assigned to Hill.

Buckner moved forward rapidly, and joined Hindman a few miles from Davis's Cross-roads. Cleburne, supported by Walker (of the Army of the Mississippi), proceeded to occupy a position between the Federal column under Crittenden and that under Thomas; and the remainder of the Confederate army was closed up in and around Lafayette, to support the attack, and to check any attempt at a counter movement on the part of McCook on the left, and Crittenden on the right.

Such was the position on the 10th September; the action was to commence at daylight on the 11th by an attack on Thomas by Hindman, who was to be supported by an advance of Cleburne on his rear and left flank. That the plan miscarried, is alleged by General

Bragg to have been owing to Hindman's dilatory movements, and the consequent opportunity afforded to Thomas of withdrawing from his exposed and isolated position to the mountain passes. It may, however, be fairly doubted whether the exact and rather complicated movements contemplated by General Bragg were possible of execution with troops and generals whose discipline was not perfect, and in a country so accentuated and difficult as that enclosed among the ridges of the Cumberland Mountains.

The movement failed, McCook closed in towards Thomas, and the two effected a junction with Crittenden on the left bank of Chicamauga Creek. Neither had the plan of crushing Thomas succeeded, nor had General Polk fulfilled his part of the programme in falling on Crittenden. It therefore remained for General Bragg to attempt by battle what he had failed to accomplish by strategy.

In front of him was the whole Federal army of the West, whilst under his command were the troops who had fought at Murfreesborough, the army of Eastern Tennessee, a considerable portion of that of Mississippi, and the advanced brigades of Longstreet's corps. On the night of the 18th September, few either in the Northern or Southern camps could doubt that the morrow would witness one of the most important battles of the war, and one which might possibly decide the fate of the Western States of the Confederacy.

The Federal army under Rosecrans was divided into three corps, of which McCook's, of three divisions, formed the right; Thomas's, of four divisions, the centre; and Crittenden's, with nearly three divisions, the left; whilst a reserve, under General Granger, guarded the communications with Chattanooga. The concentration

of the army had been made on the eastern slope of Mission Ridge, and on the left bank of the Chicamauga, but not on the direct road from the Confederate headquarters at Lafayette to Chattanooga. Thus there seemed to be danger lest Bragg, having withdrawn his divisions, detached for the purpose of operating against Thomas and Crittenden, should turn the left of the Federal army and interpose between it and Chattanooga.

Foreseeing the probability of such an attempt, and warned by the results of a *reconnaissance* pushed forward from Granger's reserve towards Ringgold, Rosecrans prepared, on the evening of the 18th, to take ground to his left, by passing by divisions from the right along the rear, and, whilst still continuing to hold the crossing of the Chicamauga at Lee's and Gordon's Mills, to extend his front towards Rossville, instead of along the upper waters of the Chicamauga; thus placing Lee's Mills on the right of the line, whereas, previous to the flank-march, it had been on the left. It was under cover of Crittenden's corps, which remained stationary, holding Lee's Mills and the left bank of the Chicamauga, that the movement was carried out; first Thomas, and then McCook, marching along the Rossville Road in his rear.

During the time that this change of front, rendered dangerous by the proximity of the Confederate army, was in progress, Bragg was earnestly employed in bringing forward his rapidly arriving reinforcements, and in placing in position the detached divisions of his army. The concentration of the troops from various localities, and from different armies, had confused the organisation and rendered necessary fresh dispositions in the commands of corps. On the 18th of

September, a portion of Hood's division of Longstreet's corps reached the front, and on the same day Walker, with two divisions, and Stewart, commanding a division of Buckner's corps, covered in front by Forrest with the cavalry, advanced to the Chicamauga, and seized a bridge (Alexander's), and two fords, below Lee's Mill, bivouacking on the night of the 18th between the river and the Lafayette and Rossville Roads. Thus the passage of the Chicamauga was secured, and during the 18th, and early morning of the 19th September, the greater portion of the Confederate army crossed the river.

The two armies now occupied the valley, which was soon to become famous as the battle-field of Chicamauga. The Federal line, its right resting on Lee's Mill, extended along the lower spurs of Mission Ridge, holding the road between Lee's Mill and Rossville; the Confederates, adapting their formation to the sinuosities of the river, occupied the thickly-wooded and oak-timbered plain of the Chicamauga. The Confederate right wing was under General Polk, and included Walker's corps of two divisions (Liddell's and Gist's), with Cheatham's division in reserve. The centre was formed of Stewart's division, and the left commanded, previous to Longstreet's arrival, by Hood, not yet recovered from the wound he had received at Gettysburgh, comprised the divisions of Bushrod Johnson, Hood (under Law), Preston, and Breckenridge—Cleburne's division of Hill's corps, McLaws's of Longstreet's, and Hindman's division, had not as yet reached the field.

General Bragg's intention had been to attack the Federal left, and endeavour to sever the communication with Chattanooga, but Rosecrans's flank movement in a

great measure disconcerted these tactics, and rendered a modification of the plan necessary. Before the arrangements of the Confederate general had been completed the action was brought on by the enemy, and resulted from the advance of a brigade of Thomas's corps, which, encountering the Confederate cavalry pickets, and their supports, drove them back towards the river. To withstand the pressure, Gist pushed forward the remainder of his division ; and Walker, becoming aware of the serious nature of the engagement by the heavy firing, ordered Liddell to advance. Thus the front line of the Confederate right wing became engaged. Liddell pressed forward with great gallantry, and drove back Baird's and Brannan's divisions of Thomas's corps, together with Johnson of McCook's corps ; Stewart's division also moved to the attack, and encountered the left division of Crittenden's corps under Palmer and Van Cleve.

The artillery of the Federals played with terrible effect on the advancing troops, and their more extended line, overlapping the attacking divisions, wrapped them within its fire. Still the Confederates continued to press forward. Cheatham brought up the reserve of the right wing, and the Confederate line was extended farther to the right. On the other side, Reynolds's division of Thomas's corps came into action, and the remaining two divisions of McCook's corps were hurried forward. Success inclined to the side of the South, the Federal right was hard pressed by Hood, and as the sun was setting, the gallant Cleburne (termed the Stonewall of Bragg's army) marched over the hotly contested battle-field, on which Cheatham's men lay thickly strewn, and, although for a moment staggered by a heavy musketry fire, pressed forward impetuously to

the attack. Reynolds's, Palmer's, and Van Cleve's divisions were driven back in confusion, the centre of the Federal line appeared to be broken, when Brigadier General Hazen, having collected the scattered guns of several batteries, placed them in a commanding position, and poured so deadly a fire into the Confederate ranks, that the advance was checked, and the increasing darkness put an end to the battle.

The Confederates had gained ground ; they were on the road to Chattanooga, and having forced back their opponents from the river, had compelled them to bivouac in a country almost destitute of water. The tactics of the battle-field had been very simple. The Confederates had attacked along their whole line, bringing up fresh divisions, as either the great losses or the want of ammunition compelled the foremost troops to cede ground. The Federal general had acted principally on the defensive, and, when his infantry showed signs of giving way, had prevented disaster by the use of a powerful artillery. The wooded country, and other causes, which seem to have prevailed in nearly every battle of the American War, prevented the supervision of the generals commanding in chief, and caused the battle to resemble rather the separate contests of divisions than the united efforts of the component parts of a large army. The result was indecisive ; and on either side, as men lay on the bloody ground, wearied out with their efforts of the previous day, it was felt that the battle of Saturday, the 19th, was only a prelude to a more awful contest which awaited the contending armies on the approaching Sabbath.

Near midnight Longstreet arrived at Bragg's headquarters with McLaws's division, and was at once

placed in command of the left wing of the Confederate army, Polk retaining that of the right. A fresh disposition was at the same time made of the troops. Under Polk were placed the divisions of Breckenridge, and Cleburne (of Hill's corps), together with Cheatham's divisions, in successive order from the right, with Walker in reserve. Under Longstreet were Stewart, Hood, Hindman, and Preston, with Bushrod Johnson and McLaws as a second line; his force being composed of his own and Buckner's corps.

Orders were issued from General Bragg's headquarters that the attack should commence at daybreak by an advance of the right wing, and should be taken up in succession along the whole line; but, either owing to a mistake in the disposition of the troops, or, as was alleged by General Bragg, to some negligence on the part of Polk, the action did not begin before 10 A.M.

In the meantime Rosecrans, foreseeing the probability of a renewal of the battle on the morning of the 20th, had made his dispositions to meet the attack. He had assembled his corps' commanders at head-quarters on the evening of the 19th, and had received their reports and issued orders for the following day. To Thomas was allotted the command of the left wing, with which he was to cover the road to Rossville and Chattanooga; on his right was McCook, and in reserve on the slopes of Mission Ridge were two divisions of Crittenden's corps. As, during the battle of the 19th, the divisions of the several corps had become somewhat intermixed, so on the morning of the 20th portions of McCook's and Crittenden's corps found themselves separated from their respective corps commanders, and in position under Thomas's command. Thus, commencing on the left of the line was Baird's division, then Johnson

(McCook's corps), then Palmer (Crittenden's corps), and on Palmer's right, Reynolds ; Brannan's division being in support to the right rear. These divisions constituted Thomas's command. Under McCook, on Thomas's right, was Negley's division, and thrown back towards Mission Ridge, Sheridan's and Davis's divisions. The two divisions of Crittenden's corps, under Van Cleve and Wood, were held in reserve in the angle formed by the wings under Thomas and McCook.

Such was the disposition of the Federal force on the early morning of the 20th. It was anticipated that the principal attack would be made on the Federal left, and as the retention of communication with Chattanooga was of vital importance, and as Thomas reported that his line did not sufficiently extend in that direction, Negley was ordered to march his division from the centre to the left of the line, and a general movement was directed from the right towards the left, in order to fill the space vacated by Negley, and to concentrate troops in the direction where danger appeared most imminent. It was whilst this movement was in progress that the battle commenced.

During the night and early morning, the Confederate pickets had heard the sounds of the axe, and knew well that each succeeding hour would add strength to the breastworks which Thomas was erecting, and which it would cost many men to storm ; but the first hours of daylight passed away, and it was not until between 9 and 10 A.M. that Hill's corps' was in readiness to advance. Then Breckenridge with three brigades moved forward, and shortly afterwards Cleburne, supported by Walker, followed up the attack on his left. They drove in the Federal pickets, and falling on Baird's division, pushed it back over the Chattanooga road, and were only checked

by Johnson coming up in support. Walker's division was now in turn brought up to support Cleburne, who was heavily engaged with Palmer and Reynolds. Assault after assault followed rapidly on each other, the assailants and assailed showing equal courage; but the latter, strongly posted and assisted by the breastworks thrown up during the night, repulsed every attack. Cheatham in vain led forward his division to the assistance of Walker and Cleburne, no efforts could break Thomas's line; and, after two hours of continuous fighting, the Confederates, wearied by their exertions, withdrew from the attack.

Thus did failure attend the right wing of Bragg's army; but in the meantime the left, under Longstreet, was operating with far other results; his right division, under Stewart, had indeed followed the fortunes of the right wing and had suffered repulse; but the remainder of Buckner's corps and Longstreet's veterans from the Army of Virginia advanced with almost unwavering success. Bringing forward their left, they embraced within their lines the Chattanooga Road, and whilst pressing heavily on Sheridan's and Davis's divisions,* interposed between the two wings of the Federal army, by availing themselves of the gap in the line caused by Negley's transfer from the centre to the left.

Rosecrans in person was directing the movements of Crittenden's corps in this part of the line; he was hastening forward Wood with Van Cleve in support, to fill up the gap between his wings, when the Confederates rushed in,† and advancing firing through the woods,

* Under General McCook commanding the corps.

† In General Halleck's report this catastrophe is stated to have been occasioned by a misconception of orders on the part of General Wood.

where the Federal artillery was of little avail, they threatened the right flank of Thomas's corps under Reynolds and Brannan, at the same time that they drove back Wood and Van Cleve in their front, and overwhelmed Sheridan and Davis on their left. In person Longstreet led his men forward, ably seconded by Kershaw* and Hood. Never did the soldiers of the Army of Virginia do better service, and they found worthy comrades in those of Hindman and Preston; the troops under the latter general, although for the first time seriously engaged, yet vied in courage and steadiness with the most experienced veterans.

Wood and Van Cleve, harassed by contradictory orders and attacked whilst in the act of manœuvring, gave way, Sheridan's and Davis's divisions retired in confusion, Rosecrans himself, surrounded by the fugitives, hastened to Chattanooga to take measures for the security of his long supply train and of the pontoon bridges over the Tennessee; and the battle on the side of the Federals seemed lost. But now, when victory appeared ready to greet the Confederates, and when rout and defeat seemed to threaten their opponents, the gallant division leader, Hood, fell severely wounded, and the consequent change in commanders caused a slight hesitation and delay. This short respite was of the utmost service to the Federal army. Fresh reinforcements reached Thomas's brave corps. General Granger, warned by the heavy firing, with true soldierly instinct, had brought up his reserves from Rossville, and formed on Thomas's right; portions of Van Cleve's and Negley's division had also added to the numbers of the Federal left wing, and firmly holding the spurs

* Kershaw was in command of McLaws's division.

of Mission Ridge, Thomas prepared to resist the onset of Longstreet's victorious troops. The battle had continued during the whole day, and the sun was approaching the west, when Longstreet again advanced. The Virginians and Hindman's division formed the first line, but were met with such steadiness that even these gallant troops for a moment wavered; but Preston brought up his division, and the right wing of the army, under Polk, advancing after its long inaction, carried the breastworks from which in the morning it had been repulsed; and marching up the slopes of Mission Ridge discovered the whole Federal army in retreat.

But not in confusion did Thomas's corps retire. Ably seconded by his subordinate generals, he selected and held positions to cover the road; and once, when threatened on the left turned to bay, and repulsed the assailants. The bold attitude of the Federal left wing, and the fear of compromising the success he had already gained, restrained General Bragg from following up the victory which had so unexpectedly crowned his arms, although Longstreet, with higher genius or more fiery enthusiasm, saw the opportunity, and, until restrained by the orders of his superior, prepared to pursue the retiring columns, so that the retreat might be converted into rout.*

That he might have done so, there appears sufficient

* At 9 P.M. General Longstreet, seated on the stump of a tree, dictated orders to his divisional commanders to collect stragglers, and to be ready to continue the pursuit in four hours' time. He and his staff then lay down to rest, but almost immediately received a command to repair to General Bragg's head-quarters. On reporting himself to the commander-in-chief, and informing him of the preparations he had made, he was directed to countermand all orders for pursuit, as General Bragg was unwilling to move until he had received the reports from the cavalry. (Conversation with an officer of General Longstreet's staff.)

evidence : nearly half of the Federal army had been completely defeated, and was hastening in confusion towards the Tennessee; the remainder had been repulsed by the concentrated strength of the Confederates, and, after a brave resistance, was retreating with one, if not both flanks exposed ; but Bragg's orders were peremptory; and notwithstanding Longstreet's expressed opinion, the pursuit ceased. The conquerors were contented to collect the trophies of victory, whilst they failed to seize on its true advantages ; and the battle of Chicamauga offered another example of lost opportunities and unimproved advantages.

Thomas retired to Rossville, where he remained during the 21st, harassed, but not seriously incommoded, by the Confederate cavalry ; and on the evening of that day continued his retreat without molestation to Chattanooga. Bragg slowly followed, and on the 23rd appeared in front of the Federal lines, which Rosecrans had strongly entrenched.

Thus for the present closed the operations which followed the passage of the Tennessee. Partial success and partial failure had attended both armies, and never was the axiom better exemplified, that war is a succession of blunders, and that he who makes fewest wins, than in the short campaign which resulted in and included the battle of Chicamauga.

The division by Rosecrans of his army into three corps, separated by long intervals from each other, was an error which seemed to offer advantages to the Confederate general, of which he was fully aware, and on which he was prepared to seize. General Bragg's combinations for that object were good, but a defect in the composition of his army prevented him from reaping the advantages which the errors of his opponent

and his own dispositions seemed to present. There appears to have been a want of complete accord between the limbs of the army and its head ; and the difficult operations which resulted in the defeat of Pope at Manassas, and of Hooker at Chancellorsville, were not destined to be imitated by the army, which, although comprising in its ranks as brave men, and perhaps as able generals as that of Virginia, was not imbued with the spirit which animated all grades, from the general to the private soldier, who served under Lee.

General Rosecrans retrieved his first error by uniting his forces on the banks of the Chicamauga ; and by his dangerous but successful flank march on the night of the 18th September, in the presence of the enemy, attained a sufficiently advantageous position to cover Chattanooga. On the 19th his troops fought with determination, and during the night which followed the action evinced their usual obstinacy and perseverance in holding and strengthening their position. The great mistake which led to disaster on the following day, seems to have been the attempted transfer of Negley's division from the centre to the left, thereby causing a weakness in the line which the enemy was not slow to recognise, and under Longstreet's guidance was enabled to turn to advantage. The overwhelming energy with which Longstreet crushed the Federal right wing, turned the tide of success which in the morning appeared to incline in favour of Rosecrans. Here Thomas's firmness, and the opportune arrival of portions of Granger's reserve, diminished, and, for a time, hindered, the threatening disaster ; but why Granger was allowed to remain at Rossville during the morning, without orders, and with discretionary power to join the army when and

how he should see fit, has not as yet been clearly explained.*

It will probably strike any attentive critic of the battle of Chicamauga that, from whatever causes it may have arisen, little direct supervision over either army was exercised by the Commanders-in-Chief. The battle was fought by the generals commanding the wings; and it must be acknowledged that General Bragg's intervention at the close of the day prevented a victory from being converted into a crowning success.

The departure of Rosecrans from the field on the defeat of his right wing, offers a parallel to M'Clellan's expedition to the James River when his rear columns were yet engaged in White Oak Swamp; but in both instances the character of the generals would save their conduct from the imputation of any unworthy motives, and would lead to the belief that the course they pursued was dictated by a desire to fulfil their duty in the manner most consistent with the welfare of their armies.

On both sides the chief honour was awarded to subordinate generals. Among the Federals, Thomas was justly acknowledged to have prevented a terrible disaster, by his courage and by the firmness with which

* General Rosecrans, in his report as published in the *Rebellion Record*, vol. vii. page 225, Documents, uses the following expression regarding the arrival on the field of General Granger :—' The moment was critical. Twenty minutes more and our right would have been turned, our position taken in reverse, and probably the army routed. Fortunately, Major-General Granger, whose troops had been posted to cover our left and rear, with the instinct of a true soldier and a general, hearing the roar of battle on our left, and being beyond the reach of orders from the general commanding, determined to move to its assistance.'

he maintained his ground: whilst in the Confederate army Longstreet was unanimously greeted as the conqueror at Chicamauga: his march from Virginia, offering a parallel to that famous march of the Consul Nero in the second Punic war, brought, at a most critical time, reinforcements which placed the two armies on an equality in point of numbers, whilst it infused into the ranks of the Western troops that vigour which frequent successes had generated in the soldiers of Virginia.*

Dearly did the Confederates pay for their victory, and on either side the list of the killed and wounded of the two days' battles was long.† General Bragg owned to the loss of two-fifths of his army; three brigadier-generals had been killed, and Hood, who had already been deprived of an arm at Gettysburg, endured the amputation of a leg on the second day's battle of Chicamauga. The Federal loss had been equally severe. Fighting on the defensive, and under partial cover, the troops had been less exposed on the 19th, and morning of the 20th, than their opponents; but this advantage had been more than counterbalanced by the slaughter which attended a defeated army. Many guns were captured by the Confederates,‡ and vast quantities of arms

* In his evidence before a Court of Enquiry, General Rosecrans states that he believes he was outnumbered by nearly two to one at the battle of Chicamauga. But he calculated Johnston's, and Longstreet's reinforcements at from 40,000 to 50,000 men, whereas they probably did not exceed 25,000.

† Captain Chesney estimates the loss on the side of the Confederates at 12,000 and on that of the Federals at 16,000 men. *Campaigns in Virginia and Maryland*, vol. ii. page 173.

‡ General Rosecrans owned to the loss of thirty-six guns. General Halleck, in his report, estimates the Federal loss in killed, wounded, and missing, at 16,351.

were collected on the field ; but these trophies of victory feebly compensated for the error which allowed the defeated army to retire almost unmolested to Chattanooga.

The Confederate nation and the Western army allotted the chief blame of this failure to General Bragg ; but President Davis, always unwilling to yield to popular clamour, and firm in his principle of supporting his generals, refused to listen to these complaints ; and, retaining General Bragg in command, removed General Polk, to whom the Commander-in-Chief attributed the delay in the attack on the 20th. Whilst acting thus, President Davis paid a high tribute of respect to General Polk, assuring him that his appointment to a new field of duty, alike important and difficult, would be the best evidence of his appreciation of his (General Polk's) past services, and expectation of his future career.

In the Federal army there were also important changes consequent on the battle. General Rosecrans was relieved by General Thomas, whilst Generals M'Cook, Crittenden, Negley, and Van Cleve were removed from their commands pending the results of courts of enquiry. On the other hand, General Granger was promoted, and a consolidated corps, formed of the 20th and 21st army corps, placed under his orders.

CHAPTER V.

BATTLES OF MISSIONARY RIDGE.

THE rapidity with which American troops recover their *morale*, however rudely shaken, was exemplified by the conduct of the Army of the Cumberland after the battle of Chicamauga.

On the 23rd of September, when General Bragg reached the vicinity of Chattanooga, he found his opponent so strongly entrenched that he preferred the plan of investing his position and if possible of reducing him to the necessity of retreat by cutting off the supplies, to an attack against his lines by open force. He therefore posted his batteries and stationed his riflemen on Look-out and Raccoon Mountains, so as not only to command the direct road from Chattanooga to Bridgeport along the southern side of the Tennessee River, but also to hinder, if they could not entirely prevent, the traffic by the other road on the northern bank. By these means he forced Rosecrans, and, when he had resigned his command, Thomas, to transport the necessary supplies for his army over the mountains in his rear by long detours. At the same time he took measures to intercept this source of supply by directing Wheeler and Forrest to operate against the depôts of the army on the Nashville railway.

The former of these officers, having eluded the

Federal cavalry who were guarding the fords of the upper Tennessee, crossed the river thirteen miles above Chattanooga, and, after capturing and burning supply waggons in the Sequatchie Valley, surprised the garrison of McMinnville, and advanced on Murfreesboro. But the Federal General M'Crook, having been made aware of Wheeler's movements, collected a considerable force of cavalry, and, marching rapidly, threw himself into the town. Finding that he was not sufficiently strong to attack, Wheeler withdrew, and continually skirmishing with M'Crook, retired on the Tennessee and recrossed the river. During this attempt of Wheeler, Forrest had likewise crossed the Tennessee, and had intercepted the line of rail between Nashville and Bridgeport; but not being in sufficient strength permanently to hold his position, had also been forced to withdraw.

In the meantime, news of the disaster at Chicamauga had reached the Federal government, and energetic measures were at once taken by General Halleck to relieve the Army of the Cumberland, hemmed in at Chattanooga. Grant, who, since his success at Vicksburg, had risen high in the estimation of the northern people, was appointed to the command of the West; a concentration of troops which had, previous to the battle of Chicamauga, been commenced, was hurried on with renewed vigour. Hooker, with the 11th and 12th corps (23,000 men) of the Army of the Potomac, already on his way to protect the lines of communication of the Army of the Cumberland, was now ordered with all speed to Bridgeport.* Schofield and Pope were directed to send

* In the report of the Secretary of War, dated November 2nd, 1865, the following allusion is made to Hooker's march:—'The transfer of the 11th and 12th corps, from the Potomac to the Tennessee, was an almost unexampled operation at the time. General

every available man from their respective commands to the line of the Tennessec,* and the Army of Tennessee and that of Mississippi were put in motion towards the mountains of Georgia.

To rescue the Army of the Cumberland from its perilous position without ceding Chattanooga was the purpose of General Grant (the new Commander-in-Chief of the West). He was aware of the difficulties of the task, but recognised the importance attached to its fulfilment; for more and more plainly had it become apparent that the true gate of entry into the Southern States on the Atlantic sea-board was to be found in the mountains surrounding Chattanooga, and that the Rome and Atlanta railway furnished the best means of access into the heart of Georgia.

During these movements of concentration on the side of the Federals, General Bragg's army remained on the ground which its victory had temporarily secured, suffering, but in a minor degree to the enemy, from the difficulties of transportation occasioned by seven miles of bad road intervening between the railway station and the camp, and from the dangerous condition of the railway itself. On its left flank, a force mainly composed of cavalry, under Generals Stephen D. Lee, Roddy, Forrest, and others, guarded the approaches from Corinth; and in Tennessee, and the confines of Western Virginia, General Samuel Jones endeavoured to draw away Burnside from the direction of Chattanooga by a threatening movement against his left flank.

Hooker's command contained 23,000 men, and was accompanied by its artillery and trains, baggage and animals, and accomplished the distance from the Rapidan, in Virginia, to Stevenson, in Alabama, a distance of 1,192 miles, in seven days, crossing the Ohio twice.'

* See General Halleck's report of operations in 1863.

The approach of winter, and the consequent heavy rains, hindered, but did not prevent, the march of the armies: both sides were prepared to renew the struggle; but the palm for activity must be awarded to the Federals; and the able strategy conceived by General Halleck, and carried out by General Grant and his lieutenants, prognosticated, and in the end secured, complete success.

Immediately on the news reaching Grant of the battle of Chicamauga, he ordered Sherman to send one of his divisions to the assistance of Rosecrans,* and a few days later Sherman himself, with the remainder of his corps, embarked in steamers for Memphis. McPherson remained to protect Vicksburg, and by an aggressive movement against Canton succeeded in preventing Johnston from covering the left wing of Bragg's army, or from manœuvring in the direction of Corinth.

At Memphis Sherman found orders from General Halleck (the Commander-in-Chief), directing him to repair the rail and road between Memphis and Corinth, and to march with all speed to Athens (Alabama). With his accustomed energy he immediately put his divisions in motion, and after overcoming some slight resistance offered to his progress at Colliersville, arrived at Iuka. From thence he detached General Blair, with two divisions, to drive the enemy from Tuscumbia, which

* This order was given by General Grant before he received the appointment of Commander-in-Chief of the Western armies, therefore probably he was only the channel of communication between Halleck and Sherman. General Halleck states in his report, 'that owing to the absence of telegraphic communication between Washington and General Grant, who was sick at New Orleans, the first orders for concentration sent by him before the battle of Chicamauga did not reach their destination in time to admit of the Western armies being united, as designed by General Halleck.'

was effected after a severe engagement, where the Confederate general, Forrest, was wounded.

In the meantime, Sherman had succeeded Grant in the command of his former district (i.e. that of Tennessee), and whilst retaining his head-quarters at Iuka, made such dispositions of the troops as would ensure the protection of the rail between Memphis and Tuscumbia, whilst its further repairs were continued by the advanced divisions. But on the 27th of October a messenger arrived, who had floated down the Tennessee River to Tuscumbia, bringing a despatch which changed the aspect of affairs.*

Sherman was directed to abandon the work on which he was engaged, and to march immediately on Bridgeport. Matters had changed in the vicinity of Chattanooga: the danger which had menaced the Army of the Cumberland had disappeared; reinforcements had arrived; a new rout for supplies had been opened; and the troops recovered from the effects of the defeat at Chicamauga, and, infused with fresh energy, were again ready to resume the offensive.

Before the removal of Rosecrans from the command of the army, preparations had been made to open a road from Bridgeport along the southern banks of the Tennessee, and thus to establish a connection between Hooker's force and the main army. These preparations were continued by Thomas, who directed his chief engineer, General W. F. Smith, to survey the banks

* The message was as follows:—‘Drop all work on the railroad east of Bear Creek; put your command toward Bridgeport, till you meet orders.’ To quote the words of General Sherman's report:—‘Instantly the order was executed, and the order of march was reversed, and all columns directed to Eastport, the only place where I could cross the Tennessee.’

of the Tennessee, so as to plan and facilitate a combined movement between Hooker's force and the army under his immediate command. On receiving General Smith's report, Thomas determined to seize by surprise the mouth of Look-out Valley and the neighbouring heights, at the same time that Hooker should advance along the railway by Whiteside and Wauhatchee.

On the 26th of October Hooker reported that he was ready to move, and with a portion of the 11th corps under General Howard, and the 12th under General Geary, passed over the pontoon bridge at Bridgeport.

On the early morning of the following day, the 27th, the co-operating force under Smith descended the river in boats to the point of crossing at Brown's Ferry, near the mouth of Look-out Creek. The preparations had been made with secrecy and skill; a considerable body of infantry and engineers manned the boats, whilst a still larger force, comprising artillery, was concealed in the woods overhanging the right bank. Fires to mark the places for the landing from each boat had been lit along the right or opposite bank, and axes with which to construct a lodgment distributed among the men. A fog concealed the boats from the view of the Confederate pickets, and by daybreak on the 28th October the landing had been effected, after but slight opposition, and consequently with little loss to either side. A pontoon bridge was immediately commenced, and by 4 P.M. was ready for the passage of the artillery.*

In the meantime, Hooker had entered the upper portion of Look-out Valley, and on the evening of the 28th, after driving back the Confederate pickets, had effected a junction with the force at Brown's Ferry,

* Vide General Thomas's and General W. F. Smith's reports. *Rebellion Record*, vol. vii.

and opened communications with Chattanooga. The march had been made under the eyes of Generals Bragg and Longstreet, who, from the heights of Look-out Mountain, had watched the long lines of the Federal columns advancing through the valley below. It had been thought inadvisable to attack, from the fear of bringing on a general action, and Longstreet, commanding the left wing of the Confederate army, was contented to await some false movements on the part of the enemy on which he could seize with advantage. Such an opportunity seemed to offer itself on the night of the 28th; Hooker, with the 11th corps (Howard's), had advanced within a mile and a half of Brown's Ferry, leaving Geary encamped about three miles in rear, to guard the communications with Bridgeport, and to protect the baggage and supply waggons of the army. Seeing this division of forces, and ignorant of the strength of Geary's corps, Longstreet decided on attacking what appeared to be a strong detachment defending the waggons, and for this purpose ordered Jenkins, in command of Hood's division, to effect the necessary dispositions for assailing the detachment, and for preventing any assistance from the advanced corps.*

It was not until after midnight that the assault was made; but Geary's men, being prepared, met the enemy with firmness; and Hooker, hearing the firing, ordered a division of Howard's corps to hasten to Geary's assistance, whilst he directed an assault against the hills commanding the valley. His men scaled the wooded heights with great gallantry, driving back the Confederates; and Jenkins, finding that the enemy in his front was stronger than he had anticipated, and that there seemed to be a

* See Southern Generals, who they are, and what they have done.

risk lest the attacking force should be cut off from the main army, ordered a retreat across Look-out Creek, leaving the Federals in possession of the hills they had gained.

Thus a direct line of communication was opened between Bridgeport and Brown's Ferry; the road was repaired, supplies were readily brought up, and the danger which menaced the Army of the Cumberland ceased.

The position of affairs had been greatly changed since the battle of Chicamauga. From all sides reinforcements were reaching General Thomas's army; Sherman was advancing with rapid strides from the West; Hooker had already brought the veteran troops of the Army of Virginia from the North; whilst Burnside, occupying Knoxville and Kingston, sought to protect the left flank of the main army at the same time that he wrested Eastern Tennessee from the grasp of the Confederates.

It was against this last army that General Bragg sought to operate by detaching Longstreet in command of a comparatively small force from the lines round Chattanooga. Soon after the battle of Chicamauga, he had been urged to adopt a somewhat similar course by General Longstreet, who advocated the plan of leaving a small force to watch, on the banks of the Coosa River, the frontiers of Georgia, whilst the bulk of the army should be transferred to Eastern Tennessee to crush Burnside and operate against Nashville. Now, however, events had changed, and Longstreet saw and pointed out the danger of continuing to hold the extended position in front of Chattanooga, and at the same time of weakening the army by the departure of two if not more divisions. Notwithstanding the repre-

sentations of his subordinate, General Bragg persisted in his plan, and Longstreet with his command marched for Knoxville.

But Grant was not to be diverted from his object by the danger which seemed to menace Burnside : he had formed his plans, and was rapidly putting them into execution. He telegraphed to Burnside to hold Knoxville at all hazards, whilst he took measures to force Bragg to recall Longstreet, or failing this, to sever the communications between his head-quarters and those of the detached force in front of Knoxville.

Bragg's position seemed to invite attack. Although considerably weaker in numbers than when opposed only to Rosecrans, he continued to hold the same extended lines ; whilst each day brought Sherman's forces nearer to the scene of operations.

Crossing the Tennessee at Bridgeport, Sherman, on the 15th of November, rode into Chattanooga in advance of his army, and, together with Generals Grant and Thomas, inspected the position he was required to occupy in the forthcoming attack. He was directed to advance down Look-out Valley, whilst occupying the enemy's attention by a demonstration against Trenton, and crossing the Tennessee by the pontoon bridge at Brown's Ferry, to place his forces on the left of Grant's army, nearly opposite the mouth of Chicamauga Creek.

Inspired with renewed energy by what he had seen and heard at Chattanooga, Sherman hastened forward his wearied troops. The rain was falling in torrents ; the roads were almost impassable ; the pontoon bridge, endangered by the rising waters and by rafts floated down from above with the object of destroying it, seemed ready to break as the long lines of men, horses, and artillery crossed ; but the march was continued.

With the exception of one division, all passed the river in safety, and on the evening of the 23rd November occupied the position assigned. Then the bridge broke, and Osterhaus's division, detained on the south side, was ordered to co-operate with Hooker.*

In the meanwhile, from the report of a deserter and other indications,† General Grant was led to suppose that his opponent was preparing to retreat; he therefore ordered Thomas, on the 23rd November, to push forward a strong *reconnaissance* from the lines of Chattanooga. In full view of the Confederate pickets were the preparations made, and Granger's corps, supported by Palmer's and Howard's (which last had been brought from Hooker's command), was ordered to attack the first line of the Confederate works. It is said that the sentries occupying the advanced rifle pits were contented to watch this display in the plain below, believing that the rapidly mustering forces, clad in their best uniforms, and accompanied by the bands of their several regiments, were parading for a review rather than for serious work.‡ If such was the case, quickly were they undeceived. Sheridan's and Wood's skirmishers advanced at the double, drove in the pickets, and, reinforced by their supports, captured the rifle pits and occupied a small hill between Missionary Ridge and Chattanooga. The *reconnaissance* was accomplished with little loss to either side; but the Federals had obtained possession of an important position, and during the night entrenched themselves, awaiting the great

* See General Grant's and Sherman's reports.

† About this time, two brigades, under General Bushrod Johnson, were sent to reinforce Longstreet, and the attack on the 23rd instant only prevented the remainder of the division from following.

‡ See *Cincinnati Gazette* account, page 228; *Rebellion Record*, vol. viii.

movement in readiness to commence on the following day.

It is now time to inquire what preparations had been made by the Confederate general to meet the overwhelming force that was gathering in his front and on his flanks. It has been already shown how Longstreet, with about eleven thousand men, had been detached to Eastern Tennessee, and how Bragg still continued to hold, with weakened force, the same extended position which he had occupied previous to the departure of his second in command. Pursuing the plan of seeking to crush Burnside, whilst disregarding the danger that threatened himself, Bragg ordered reinforcements, consisting of Cleburne's and Buckner's commands, to proceed by rail to Tennessee. The advance was already on the train, when the position of the Federals presented so menacing an aspect that the order was countermanded, and measures taken to defend from attack the heights of Look-out Mountain and the valley of the Chattanooga, together with Missionary Ridge, which covered the important depôt at Chichamauga station. It was soon apparent that the whole line could not be held, as Hooker in great force menaced Look-out Mountain from Look-out Valley, and the passage by Sherman of the Tennessee, and the concentration of his army at the mouth of the Chichamauga, portended an aggressive movement against the Confederate right flank, and an attempt to sever communication with Longstreet. Thomas's movement on the 23rd November had likewise foreshadowed the imminence of the danger, and had induced General Bragg to order Walker's division from Look-out Mountain to strengthen the right of his line.

Although thus weakening his left to reinforce his

right, General Bragg still maintained his hold on Look-out Mountain, which was occupied by the two divisions of Stevenson and Cheatham. Therefore, on the morning of the 24th November, his lines extended from the western slopes of Look-out Mountain, through Chattanooga Valley, where earthworks had been thrown up, and along the western slopes of Missionary Ridge, almost as far as the mouth of Chicamauga Creek, a distance of at least twelve miles.

The Federal position on both banks of the Tennessee was of less extent. The right wing, occupying Look-out Valley, and protecting the communication with Bridgeport, was under Hooker's command; the centre, in front of Chattanooga, under Thomas; the left, near the mouth of the Chicamauga, under Sherman.

It was the intention of General Grant, to transfer the whole of his forces to the south side of the Tennessee, and whilst assailing Look-out Mountain, to push forward his left wing and to sever the railway which communicated between Bragg's and Longstreet's armies. As the brunt of the action of the 23rd had fallen on Thomas's army, so was that of the 24th borne by Hooker, Sherman, in the meanwhile, being engaged in effecting the passage of the Tennessee. There were thus two distinct movements in progress on the 24th. The right was engaged in the attack on Look-out Mountain, the left in the passage of the river; the centre, already pushed sufficiently forward, remained tranquil.

Rising like a citadel from the valleys of Look-out Creek, the Tennessee, and the Chattanooga, the lofty rocks of Look-out Mountain commanded the town and surrounding country, furnishing a signal-station of considerable importance to the Confederate general, and interposing a barrier between the Federal force

guarding Bridgeport, and the main army occupying Chattanooga, and threatening Chicamauga. For the fulfilment of Grant's plan, and for the connection of his right wing with his centre by a direct line, the occupation of these heights had become necessary, and to General Hooker was the task of assailing them assigned. The force under his command consisted of Geary's division of the 12th corps, a brigade of the 4th corps (both of Thomas's army), and Osterhaus's division of the 15th corps (Sherman's army), together with a small detachment of cavalry.* He was further assisted by the batteries placed on the right bank of the Tennessee, which could reach with their fire the northern slopes of Look-out Mountain. The Confederate pickets occupied the right banks of Look-out Creek and the rail and road running round the northern end towards Chattanooga. The supports were in the valleys on the slope of the mountain, and the reserve, under Stevenson, occupied the higher ridges. The garrison, as it may be termed, of Look-out Mountain consisted of Cheatham's and Stevenson's divisions, General Jones commanding the former until the arrival of Cheatham in the afternoon.

At 8 A.M. on the 24th November, Hooker commenced operations. Geary, who had ascended Look-out Creek, crossed near Wauhatchie at about 8 A.M. and surprised and captured the Confederate picket on the right bank; then marching down the valley, and sweeping the western slope of the mountain, he turned the enemy's breastworks, and drove back the lines of skirmishers towards the northern end and the higher ridges. At the same time a brigade of the 4th corps attempted to

* General Hooker states in his report, that the aggregate force under his command was nine thousand eight hundred and sixty-one.

force the bridge near the crossing of the railway, but meeting with considerable resistance from the enemy, sheltered behind the breastworks, was assisted by Osterhaus's division, which had been sent higher up the creek to act as a diversion. A bridge was thrown across the stream, Osterhaus's men, covered by their batteries, forced a passage; Geary's skirmishers connected themselves with those of Osterhaus, Gross's brigade simultaneously effected a crossing at the railway bridge, and the whole force swept up the mountain, climbing the rocks, and at length disappearing amidst the thick mists which clothed its summit, and which had so far favoured the assailants, inasmuch as it had rendered useless the Confederate batteries on the higher ridges. Look-out Mountain had been captured, its crest occupied, and its defenders, after considerable loss, especially in prisoners, retired down the eastern slopes, and crossing the Chattanooga, effected a junction with the main army on Missionary Ridge. Hooker, contented with his success, and unwilling, in the obscurity of the mist and of the approaching night, to plunge into the unknown valley of the Chattanooga, retained his position on the mountain, from whence the flash of guns and the sound of the musketry had proclaimed his success to the Commander-in-Chief.

On the same day, Sherman, with little or no opposition, effected the passage of the Tennessee. A large number of boats which had been secretly collected in North Chicamauga Creek, were, on the night of the 23rd and 24th, filled with soldiers, and floated noiselessly to the mouth of the South Chicamauga. The men landed, surprising and capturing the picket. The boats were then sent back, and rapidly ferried over the remainder of General Morgan Smith's division, together

with that of General John Smith. A *tête de pont* was immediately commenced, and by daylight presented a respectable appearance; whilst pontoon bridges were constructed, and completed with great rapidity and engineering skill.* The remainder of Sherman's army crossed the river; a junction was formed with Thomas, and the troops rapidly advancing, seized and occupied, with little opposition, the northern end of Missionary Ridge. A detachment of cavalry was sent to cut the rail to Knoxville, and Sherman with all speed fortified his new position.

In the afternoon an attempt was made by the Confederates to regain the hill, but without success; and on the evening of the 24th the whole of Grant's army, numbering upwards of eighty thousand men, was in position on the right bank of the Tennessee. The line embraced Look-out Mountain on the right, the small hill, gained by Thomas on the 23rd, in the centre, and the northern end of Missionary Ridge on the left, whilst communications were maintained with the opposite banks of the Tennessee by the bridges at Bridgeport and Brown's Ferry, by those at Chattanooga, and by Sherman's pontoon bridges at the mouth of the Chickamauga, and between the right centre and left, by

* The following quotation is from Sherman's Report, and bears high and deserved commendation to the skill and energy of the Federal engineers. Speaking of the passage of the Tennessee, General Sherman writes:—

'I will here bear very willing testimony to the completeness of this whole business. All the officers charged with the work were present, and manifested a skill which I cannot praise too highly. I have never beheld any work done so quietly, so well; and I doubt if the history of the war can show a bridge of that extent (viz. 1350 ft.) laid down so noiselessly and well in a short time. I attribute it to the genius and intelligence of General W. F. Smith.'

pontoon bridges thrown across the streams of the Chattanooga and Citico, which crossed the line.* The army was now in position for a further advance on the following morning, and orders to that effect were sent from Grant's head-quarters to the several generals commanding the centre and the two wings.

During the same evening and night Bragg had withdrawn his army from the eastern slope of Look-out Mountain, and evacuating the Valley of Chattanooga, had formed line of battle on Missionary Ridge, his right so disposed as to cover Chicamauga station (an important depôt), and separated from Sherman's position by an indentation in the line of hill, his left overlooking the small town of Rossville. The right wing was under General Hardee's command, and comprised the divisions of Cleburne, Walker (commanded by Gist), Cheatham, and Stevenson. The left, under Breckenridge,† consisted of the divisions of Lewis (forming Breckenridge's), Stewart's, part of Buckner's and Hindman's. The whole force numbered under forty thousand men, the bulk of which was massed on the right flank to protect Chicamauga station, and to oppose Sherman's further advance. Although of too great extent for the number of its defenders, the position would have been one of considerable strength, if properly occupied. The line of battle stretched along the western slopes of Missionary Ridge, which, rising to a height of about

* General Grant in his Report says, with reference to the position of his army on the night of the 24th:—'Thus on the night of the 24th our forces maintained an unbroken line, with open communications, from the north end of Look-out Mountain, through Chattanooga Valley, to the North end of Missionary Ridge.'

† General Breckenridge had superseded General D. Hill, between whom and General Bragg there had been a misunderstanding, consequent on events connected with the battle of Chicamauga.

400 feet, is steep and rocky, and had been rendered defensible by earthworks and batteries. But the latter had been badly placed; they were nearly at the foot of the ridge, and there was no shelter for the horses belonging to the guns, consequently, these, with the ammunition waggons, were stationed behind the crest of the ridge; and not only were the men employed in bringing up reserve ammunition much exposed, but in the event of a reverse, the guns could not readily be withdrawn up the steep slope.*

On the morning of the 25th the day dawned bright and cold, the stars and stripes were flying from the heights of Look-out Mountain, from the battlements of Chattanooga, and from the northern end of Missionary Ridge. The watch fires, gradually paling beneath the light of day, marked the line of the great Federal host. Ambulances, ammunition, and commissariat waggons were hurrying across the pontoon bridges; and General Grant and his staff, standing on Orchard Knob, a small hill in the centre of the line, watched the preparations for the ensuing battle.

It commenced about 10 A.M. by an attack of the Federal left wing, where Sherman, who had been on horseback before daybreak, had well reconnoitred the ground. In his front was a hollow, separating his position from a hill held by the enemy, and entrenched at the summit, the western slopes bare of trees, the eastern clothed with the forest. Beyond, rose a second and higher hill, whilst between them was a narrow valley, under which ran the railway tunnel. Sherman decided on attacking from the centre, along

* It is said that General Longstreet, before his departure to Eastern Tennessee, had called General Bragg's attention to the faultiness in the position of these works.

the crest of the ridge, whilst the wings of his army attempted a diversion on either flank. The attacking column was led by General Corse, the flanking column, on the western slope, by General John E. Smith, that on the eastern slope by Colonel Loomis and General Morgan L. Smith. Advancing gallantly, General Corse ascended the hill and reached a position about eighty yards from the entrenchment, but no farther could he attain. The reserves were called up, and John E. Smith endeavoured to turn the position from the west. Notwithstanding the numbers brought against them, Hardee and Cleburne held their ground, and suddenly assuming the offensive, drove back, with considerable loss, John E. Smith's brigades, capturing many prisoners and colours.* But only for the moment did the Federals give way; re-forming out of musketry fire they returned to the assault, and the attack in front and on both flanks was renewed.

Conceiving his right to be the important point, Bragg reinforced it at the cost of weakening his centre. Sherman was hard pressed; but, although awaiting anxiously the co-operation of Thomas and Hooker, he declined Baird's division (of Thomas's army), offered him by General Grant, who had seen his opponent's flank movement, and had watched the progress of the several regiments as they moved along the crest of Missionary Ridge. The fighting in front of Sherman was very desperate; both sides held their ground, neither could the Federals drive their opponents from the ridge, nor could they regain the position lost in the morning. But, although failing in his purpose of turning the Confederate right, Sherman's attack had (as

* The Confederates claim from 300 to 400 prisoners, and seven stand of colours.

has been before mentioned) drawn away troops from the centre of the Confederate line. Grant seized the opportunity; he knew that Hooker could not be far distant, and at 2 P.M. ordered a general advance.

Four divisions of Thomas's army, under Wood, Sheridan, Baird, and Johnson, with the remainder of the force in support, were ordered to drive the Confederates from the woods and entrenchments on the lower slopes of Missionary Ridge. Men and officers had long awaited this order; they had watched the engagement on their left; they had recognised the danger which menaced Sherman; and now, when the time had come to play their part in the battle, they heartily responded to the call. Rapidly, yet steadily, they moved forward. Nothing could resist the impetuosity of their attack. They swept through the woods, drove the defenders from their rifle-pits, and, animated by success, pursued them up the ridge. The guns from the forts round Chattanooga, and the field artillery rapidly brought to the front, covered the advance: the line of infantry pressed onwards, and, notwithstanding the heavy fire directed against them from the higher ground, crowned the crest of the ridge and broke through the centre of the Confederate line. The rapidity of the movement preserved the assailants from the slaughter which seemed to threaten them; many of the shots passed over their heads, and with comparatively little loss they drove their opponents from the strong position which they had so long maintained. The success was complete, the Confederate centre had been broken, the left was already feeling Hooker's advance, confusion and rout ensued, and Bragg in vain endeavoured to restore order among the now disorganised crowd flying towards Chicamauga. Night, however, and Hardee, who maintained his ground,

prevented further disaster, and Grant, contented with his success, did not push forward the pursuit beyond Mission Mills. Before midnight Hardee retired to Chicamauga, where the stores were set on fire, and from whence the retreat was continued to Ringold and Dalton, Cleburne's division forming the rear-guard.

On the 26th, Sherman, with Howard's corps, crossed the Chicamauga by the pontoon bridge already constructed at its mouth, whilst Hooker marched on Greysville. But the destruction by the Confederate rear-guard, of the bridges over the Chicamauga, delayed the pursuit, which could not be resumed until Hooker had brought up his pontoons, and until Sherman, after crossing at the mouth, had advanced up the right bank of the stream. Thus, Cleburne had time to retire steadily towards the ridge of hills which divides the waters flowing into the Tennessee from the tributaries of the Coosa, and there, on Taylor's Ridge, took up a position to resist the further advance of the victorious army.

Hooker, with a portion of his own and Thomas's command, entered Ringold on the 27th and felt the position occupied by Cleburne. An engagement ensued, in which the Federal infantry was roughly handled, the Confederates maintaining their ground. The advance was thus checked, and General Grant, anxious to afford relief to Burnside, besieged in Knoxville, gave orders that the attempt against Taylor's Ridge should not be renewed, but that Hooker should maintain his position at Ringold, whilst Sherman, with a strong force, marched against Longstreet. Cleveland had been already occupied by a portion of Sherman's command, and the rail between that place and Dalton effectually

destroyed, thereby preventing the possibility of a flank movement against the column advancing on Knoxville.

Thus on the 27th November terminated the succession of battles fought around Chattanooga, by the combined armies of the Mississippi, of Tennessee, and of the Cumberland. General Grant estimated his losses in the several engagements at seven hundred and fifty-seven killed, four thousand five hundred and twenty-nine wounded, and three hundred and thirty missing, making a total of five thousand six hundred and sixteen, a loss small in comparison with the importance of the advantages obtained. The loss on the Confederate side had been less in killed and wounded, but General Grant claimed six thousand one hundred and forty-two prisoners, forty pieces of captured artillery, and seven thousand stand of small arms.*

The victory of Chattanooga, or Missionary Ridge, was the result of an able strategy conceived and directed by Generals Grant and Halleck, and carried out with energy by the subordinate generals commanding armies, and pre-eminently by Sherman, whose

* The covering letter from General Grant to General Halleck, enclosing General Hooker's official Report of the battles, gives a quaint rebuke to the exaggerations of some Generals.

Head-quarters Armies of the U. S. in the field, Culpepper C. H. Va.

March 25, 1864.

Respectfully forwarded to Major-General H. W. Halleck, Washington, D. C.

'I know of no objection to the substituting of this for Major General Hooker's original report of his operations in the battle of Chattanooga. Attention is called to that part of the report giving, from the reports of the subordinate commanders, the number of prisoners and small arms captured, which is greater than the number really captured by the whole army.'

U. S. Grant, Lieut.-Gen. U. S. Army.

rapid movements, untiring activity, and contempt of difficulties had brought the veteran army of the Mississippi to the decisive point at the moment when it was most needed. The tactics exhibited during the three days' battle were equally able with the strategy that had led to them. The perfect combination in the movements of the three armies, proves their good discipline and the excellency of their staff organisations, whilst the construction of the numerous bridges and the passage of the Tennessee reflects the greatest credit on the engineers. The ill effects of the defeat at Chicamauga were wiped away and forgotten in the brilliant victory of Chattanooga or Missionary Ridge, a victory which would have been even more decisive if Hardee (like Thomas in the former action) had not courageously maintained his ground.

With this battle closed for a time the operations of the great army of the West; but before turning to Eastern Tennessee, where contemporary events separated from, but dependent on, the campaign of Chattanooga claim attention, it will be profitable to take a retrospective glance over the operations commenced on the Federal side by Rosecrans, continued by Thomas, and terminated by Grant.

The former victory of Chicamauga, which General Bragg had failed to follow up, was one of those opportunities which offer but seldom, but which if neglected rarely recur. Then the armies of the West had fought on nearly equal terms, the Confederates had been successful, and an opportunity had seemed to offer of converting defeat into annihilation, and of compensating for the loss of the garrison of Vicksburg by the destruction of the Army of the Cumberland. The advantage had not been seized; Rosecrans and afterwards Thomas had tenaciously kept their hold on Chattanooga. The

forethought of the former in creating depôts at Chattanooga and at the stations intermediate between it and Nashville had saved the Federal army from famine, whilst the arrival of Hooker had enabled his successor to resume the offensive by opening a road to Bridgeport and the Nashville rail. Notwithstanding Bragg continued to occupy Look-out Mountain, the importance of which had been greatly diminished ; and, it is said, contrary to Longstreet's opinion, detached that general to Knoxville,* whilst he, with weakened forces, still maintained his extended lines. Then Sherman, having brushed aside the small force which attempted to hinder his march, arrived on the scene, and the disparity of numbers between the two armies became still greater ; but not even then would Bragg relax his hold on Look-out Mountain, and only after defeat and severe loss did he retreat to Missionary Ridge.

The battle ensued, and certain Confederate accounts complain that the heights were not held with the gallantry usual to Southern soldiers.† But when the

* Mr. Davis is reported to have concurred with General Bragg in advocating this scheme.

† President Davis, in his message to Congress on December 7, 1863, thus alludes to the battle of Missionary Ridge :—‘ After a long and severe battle, in which great carnage was inflicted on him (the enemy), some of our troops inexplicably abandoned positions of great strength, and by a disorderly retreat, compelled the commander to withdraw the forces elsewhere successful, and finally to retire with his whole army to a position some twenty or thirty miles to the rear. It is believed that if the troops who yielded to the assault had fought with the valour which they had displayed on previous occasions, and which was manifested in this battle on other parts of the lines, the enemy would have been repulsed with very great slaughter, and our country would have escaped the misfortune, and the army the mortification, of the first defeat that has resulted from the misconduct of the troops.’

inequality of numbers is remembered, and when the composition of the Federal army of the West and the ability of its generals, proved by the many severe contests in which it and they had been engaged, is considered, there can be little matter of wonder that the defence of Missionary Ridge did not equal the stand made on the heights of Fredericksburg or among the woods round Chancellorsville.

Irrespective, however, of the criticisms which may be passed on the Southern Commander-in-Chief or on the conduct of his soldiery, few can deny but that the preponderating power and resources of the North had been evinced to a high degree by the events immediately preceding the last campaign. The facility with which the Federal generals had repaired their losses, and the manner in which Grant, whilst protecting his conquests in Mississippi, had concentrated his overwhelming forces at Chattanooga, and at the same time had held, by means of Burnside's army, the country gained in Tennessee, point significantly to this fact; whilst the numerical inferiority in every locality of the Southern forces shows that the Confederacy, curtailed in its limits and in the number of States under the control of its government, was gradually wasting away, and could with difficulty endure so severe a loss as had been entailed by the surrender of the garrison of Vicksburg, and the consequent deprivation of the services of so many of its soldiers.

Notwithstanding these indirect causes, it was on General Bragg that the blame of the defeat, perhaps justly, fell, and the loss of the battle of Missionary Ridge was the loss to him of the command of the army of the West. A good officer, an inflexible disciplinarian, an able and upright man, disdaining popularity, and

actuated solely by a sense of duty, he had yet failed in either attaching to himself, or in inspiring with confidence, the army under his command. The spirit of the troops on the Tennessee was very different to that of those on the Rappahannock; and the mutual relations between General Bragg and his officers and men were deficient in that cordiality and reciprocal affection which distinguished those of General Lee and his Army of Virginia. To General Hardee was temporarily given the vacant command, and to him was the duty assigned of defending the great State of Georgia and the important city of Atlanta. Before, however, passing to the consideration of the campaign of 1864, the fortunes of Longstreet's detached column must be traced out, together with the effect which the defeat at Missionary Ridge produced on the fortunes of the Confederacy in Eastern Tennessee.

CHAPTER VI.

SIEGE OF KNOXVILLE.

ABOUT the first week of November, General Longstreet, with his troops from Virginia, had been detached from the main army to undertake independent operations against Burnside at Knoxville. Intelligence of this movement had been early received by both Grant and Burnside, and it will be remembered how the former, intent on his great plan, but at the same time seeing the importance of the retention of Eastern Tennessee, knowing also that the true method of affording relief to Burnside was by victory over the main army at Chattanooga, had ordered that general to hold the strategical point of Knoxville at all hazards, and thus protect the fertile valley of the Upper Tennessee.†

Longstreet likewise recognised the danger in which Bragg's army would be placed after the withdrawal of his corps. Doubtless, as has been already stated, he had at an earlier period recommended a plan somewhat similar to that now adopted, but the time for its execution had passed, and the means at his disposal were not sufficient to permit of any certainty of success. He therefore urged on General Bragg the objections to the scheme, but at the same time stated his willingness to undertake its execution if reinforced by the two divisions

* Vide Map, p. 46.

† See Grant's Official Report.

stationed at Sweetwater (near Loudon), and if furnished with the necessary supplies. Both these conditions were accepted by the Commander-in-Chief, and Longstreet, placing his men in the railway train, arrived at Sweetwater with the divisions of McLaws and Hood, about 12,000 men. He fully expected to find there Stevenson and Cheatham, with an additional 10,000; but to his surprise discovered that Cheatham was already on the road to join Bragg, that Stevenson had received orders to follow in the same route, and that no supplies were to be obtained for his troops.

Although feeling himself unfairly dealt with by the Commander-in-Chief, Longstreet resolved, with the small force under his command, to which was attached General Wheeler, with about 5,000 cavalry, to attempt the reduction of Knoxville. He calculated that if Burnside could be driven from the place or obliged to surrender before Grant should assemble force sufficient to attack Bragg, all would probably go well, the detached troops of the Confederacy could be collected, help might come from Western Virginia, and East Tennessee, free from Northern pressure, might, from a portion of its population, furnish recruits to the Southern armies. Time was precious, and Longstreet was not a man by dilatory movements to forego any advantage.

What a career of active warfare had his been! Not for a day off duty since the battle of Bull Run, he had played a conspicuous part in most of the great engagements of the war. Where the need had been the sorest, where the pressure had been the greatest, there was sent Longstreet; and whether among his companions in arms of Virginia, or with the rival army of the West, he had ever been present to lead his troops where the fighting was the hottest, and where the attack was the most

vigorous. Possibly now might the opportunity offer of crushing Burnside, whose divisions, scattered along the banks of the Upper Tennessee, were engaged rather in holding and preserving the peace of the country than in preparing for an active campaign.

But Longstreet was dependent on his own resources, and was forced to halt some days at Sweetwater whilst he sent foraging parties to collect, thrash, and bake the stacked corn. His men were poorly clad, and scantily provided with blankets, without tents, and with shoes almost worn out; but they were veteran soldiers of many campaigns; there was no murmuring among their ranks; they marched and fought under difficulties which would have daunted almost any other troops; and, confident in their general and in their cause, cheerfully undertook any task which might be required of them.

Having sent a strong detachment of cavalry to threaten Knoxville from the left bank of the Holston River, and to distract Burnside's attention, he commenced his march, and falling unexpectedly on convoys of provisions at Lenoir station, fed his army at the expense of his antagonist. He had crossed the Little Tennessee without opposition, and not until the 16th November did he come into collision with any considerable portion of Burnside's force. On that day, at Campbell's station, he was met by Ferrero's and Hartruff's divisions, occupying a narrow valley, through which ran the road to Knoxville. An engagement ensued, in which the Federals were so far successful that they were able during the night to complete their retreat to within the circle of the fortifications. There General Burnside determined to stand at bay, so that he might await the issue of events at Chattanooga, and the consequent effect they would exercise on his own position.

This position was one of great strength. The force under his command numbered from 12,000 to 15,000 infantry and artillery, besides cavalry, whilst the hills round Knoxville, previously fortified by the Confederate general, Buckner, had been joined together by curtains or rifle-pits, thus forming a vast fortified camp. But, notwithstanding the formidable character of the works, Longstreet, knowing well that time would not allow of the operations of a regular siege, ordered an assault on the morning following his arrival before the town (the 17th November) against one of the principal outworks which protected the approaches by the Clinch Valley. After a vigorous resistance, in which the Federal general Sanders fell, and where Longstreet's men more than ordinarily distinguished themselves, the fort was taken and occupied. Both sides had proved themselves good soldiers, and the cautious operations of the earlier periods of the war may be contrasted with the dash shown by the assailants in carrying by open force an entrenched work protected by powerful batteries.*

* The following anecdote is related in Pollard's *Third Year of the War*, which, testifying as it does to the gallant conduct of an Englishman, we must be pardoned for quoting. It is as follows:—'A breastwork was charged by our (Confederate) infantry. They winced under the galling fire of the enemy, and wavered, when Captain Stephen Northrop, an Englishman, formerly captain of Her Britannic Majesty's 22nd foot, who had joined our ranks, and was on duty in Alexander's artillery battalion, stationed several hundred yards from the scene of conflict, mounted his horse, and dashing across the plain—the only horseman in the *mêlée*—rode in advance of the wavering line, up to the very works of the enemy; a hundred rifles were lowered upon him, but he moved on and rallied the wavering line. The work was carried, and Northrop borne away, with a minie ball through his shoulder, his sword scabbard broken by another, and the point of his sword cut off by yet another. His escape was miraculous.'

If, however, partial success had crowned the efforts of the besiegers, the loss sustained, the gallantry of the defenders, and the strength of the inner line of works, proved that an assault, whatever might be the result, would cost the attacking force dear; and Longstreet determined to try the less hazardous plan of reducing the garrison to surrender by famine. As far as was practicable the roads leading to Knoxville were watched by Wheeler's cavalry, supplies cut off, and the transmission of messages stopped; whilst the out-pickets were harassed by frequent attacks made against any portions of the line which appeared weak. The Federals, anxiously awaiting the promised succour from Grant, and catching eagerly at any scraps of news which rumour, either derived from Confederate prisoners, conversation at the outposts, or an occasional courier might bring, strengthened their works, and held themselves in readiness for an assault which they daily expected.

In the Northern States, the situation of affairs at Knoxville was the occasion of much anxiety. Burnside was known to be besieged, and the scanty information, rendered even more meagre by filtering through the war department, augmented rather than satisfied the longing for intelligence. By both sides the event was felt to hinge on the success or failure of Grant's plans; and when the news of Bragg's defeat reached the Confederate camp, Longstreet saw that success, if not safety, could only be won by a bold attack on Burnside's lines, thus crushing one antagonist before he should be engaged with another too surely on the march against him. Shortly before the battle of Missionary Ridge he had received a reinforcement of two brigades under General Bushrod Johnson, and having personally reconnoitred

the enemy's lines, resolved to attack on the morning of the 29th November.

The important position of Fort Sanders or College Hill was the point selected, and against its salient angle General McLaws was ordered to direct the storming party. This fort, commanding the rail and road from Kingston, occupied a position overlooking the town, and therefore if captured would probably necessitate its surrender or abandonment.

During the night of the 28th November the preparations for assault were completed; and on the early morning of the 29th the line of skirmishers in front of Fort Sanders were driven in. Then, under cover of a belt of wood, the storming party, composed of the three brigades of McLaws's division, was formed up, whilst a Georgia regiment, acting as sharpshooters, kept down the fire of the guns which had already begun to open. When the batteries had been silenced, and all was ready, the column, leaving the friendly shelter of the woods, with colours flying, commenced its deadly march. The troops chosen were known to be among the best in the Confederate army; they had followed their general through the several campaigns of Virginia and Maryland, and had shown to the soldiers of the West on the field of Chicamauga that to them renown had not been unduly awarded. They were now called on by a supreme effort to retrieve the fortunes of the Confederacy in the West, and to rescue themselves and their general from the perilous situation in which the mistake of the Commander-in-Chief had placed them.

Up the slope the column advanced, and moving rapidly across the open, reached the edge of the ditch with comparatively little loss. The batteries in the

work had been silenced, and the defenders, confused by the regular advance of the storming party, aimed badly, and produced little effect; but on the edge of the ditch, the leading files came to a halt, for, notwithstanding the directions issued by General Longstreet, no preparations had been made to effect a crossing: there were no scaling-ladders, and the ditch was broad and deep. The hesitation, the halt, were fatal; the defenders recovered their *morale*, and poured in a deadly fire; the compactness of the column was broken, and the first impetus of assault checked. Notwithstanding, some of the boldest leapt into the ditch, others followed; they tried to scale the opposite escarpe, pushing each other up to reach the parapet. Some few, including the adjutant of one of the regiments, climbed to the top or forced their way through the embrasures; one officer demanded the surrender of the work, but was drawn in and captured; the brave men who had reached the parapet were shot, bayoneted, and hurled back into the ditch. The rear of the column, suffering from the terrible fire, began to give way; the ditch was crowded with dead and wounded, and the hand grenades thrown from the parapet increased the confusion. Many had perished, including several of the senior officers; 67 dead lay in and near the fatal ditch, and nearly 400 wounded attested the severity of the fire. Those who were still unhurt retreated, and the attack which had promised so well, failed from the want of proper arrangements in procuring ladders for the passage of the ditch.

Of the defenders but few perished; including the pickets, which had been cut off, the loss amounted to less than 100. The men had been well sheltered by the parapet, and as soon as the fire from the Confede-

rate riflemen had become harassing, the artillerymen had been withdrawn from the guns. A flag of truce and suspension of hostilities followed the assault; the wounded were collected and exchanged,* and the garrison gathered from the prisoners the intelligence which rumour had already announced of the battle of Missionary Ridge.

Cheered by the repulse of the attack on Fort Sanders, and by the anticipation of relief, the Federals expected either the retreat or capture of Longstreet. But day by day his pickets were seen in front of the lines, and straightened provisions gave warning that his cavalry were guarding the roads. Anxiously they awaited the fulfilment of Grant's promise; but it was not until the 5th December that a courier entering the town brought certain news of Sherman's approach.

That general, in command of a strong detachment, consisting of the 15th corps under General Blair, the 11th under General Howard, and a division commanded by Gen. Jeff. Davis, had marched from the scene of the last day's engagement of Missionary Ridge to Charleston, where he had received orders to take command of General Granger's corps, and to hasten as rapidly as possible to the relief of Knoxville. Men and officers were without baggage or provision train, and were badly provided for a long march; nevertheless they knew how much depended on celerity, and overcoming all obstacles, repairing broken bridges and constructing new ones across the rivers which intercepted their line of march, they reached the vicinity of Knoxville on the 5th December. The cavalry entered the town, and Burnside, in person, met Sherman outside the lines of

* Federal accounts claimed 234 prisoners.

fortification. Longstreet had already retreated; he had long known the result of the great battles, and expected that relief for the garrison would soon arrive. He had failed in his last and desperate effort to command success; and then, leaving his pickets to deceive the garrison, he had marched up the right bank of the Holston River towards Rogersville, near the frontier of Western Virginia.

Little energy was shown by Burnside in harassing Longstreet's retreat. After an interview with Sherman, in which he declined the assistance of any part of his force, excepting Granger's corps, he detached his cavalry, under Shackleford, to follow in pursuit. Skirmishing with the rear-guard, that officer advanced as far as Bean Station, a small village on the cross-roads leading to Rogersville and Cumberland Gap. There Longstreet turned on him, and drove him back on his infantry supports, at the same time detaching some squadrons of cavalry to intercept a waggon train on the Cumberland Gap road. After this affair, the attempt at pursuit was abandoned. Longstreet took up his winter quarters at Rogersville, on the frontiers of East Tennessee and Western Virginia, where he maintained himself with difficulty, owing to the inhospitable nature of the country. Burnside, in the meantime, had resigned the command of the army of Eastern Tennessee, and had been relieved by General Forster, from the department of North Carolina; whilst Sherman, having, according to directions received from Grant, stationed his cavalry along the Hiwassee River, a tributary of the Tennessee, to protect the left flank of the main army, repaired with the infantry to Chattanooga, to await fresh orders and new enterprises.*

* See General Sherman's Report.

Throughout the operations which preceded, accompanied, and followed the battles around Chattanooga, Sherman, among all the subordinate generals on the Federal side, played the most distinguished part. His unwearied energy, his celerity of movement, and his rapidity in executing orders, proclaimed him to be a general of no ordinary capacity; and his deeds at Chattanooga foreshadowed the greatness he was hereafter to attain. Older than many of the Federal generals, he was yet possessed of more than youthful activity and enterprise; whilst his character seems to have been tinged with some of the enthusiasm and almost eccentricity which had distinguished General (Stonewall) Jackson.* His despatches show a reflex of the spirit of his deeds, and contrast favourably with many of the voluminous writings of other generals.†

* The author had the pleasure of meeting General Sherman when he commanded at Memphis, in the winter of 1862, and to his kindness was indebted for the permission, seldom granted, of passing through the lines of his army to those of the Confederacy. General Sherman, aware of his intention, most courteously insisted on showing him, previous to his departure, as much as time would permit of his own forces at Memphis; and on the author's offering to give a promise of strict neutrality, he answered that he could not think of exacting one from an English officer.

† In the following extract from his despatches, General Sherman bears well-merited testimony to the deeds of his troops:—'In reviewing the facts, I must do justice to the command for the patience, cheerfulness, and courage which officers and men have displayed throughout—in battle, on the march, and in camp. For long periods without regular rations or supplies of any kind, they have marched through mud and over rocks, sometimes barefooted, without a murmur, without a moment's rest. After a march of over 400 miles, without stopping for three successive nights, we crossed the Tennessee, and then turned more than 100 miles north, and compelled Longstreet to raise the siege of Knoxville, which gave so much anxiety to the whole country.'

With the relief of Knoxville, closed the campaign of 1863 in Tennessee. After many checks, the Federal authority had been extended from the banks of the Ohio to the banks of the Cumberland; from the Cumberland to the Tennessee; and from the Tennessee to the southernmost ridges of the great chain of mountains which intersects the Southern States. Taylor's Ridge and the Great Smoky Mountains now formed the line of defence which interposed between Tennessee and the frontiers of the two Carolinas. That barrier passed, the fertile plains of the maritime States lay open before the invader, and a fruitful country and noble cities presented themselves as a reward for the soldier who could force the passage of the mountains. But the Confederate army of the West, although repulsed and defeated, held the defiles; and, roused by the alternate praise and censure of their fellow-countrymen, and attributing their misfortunes in a great measure to the mistakes of their general, officers and soldiers determined with renewed vigour to protect the approaches to Atlanta, and, if possible, again to carry war far from their borders into the States which had already been the theatres of so many combats.

About this time, the arrival in the Confederacy of the renowned cavalry general of the West excited great enthusiasm, not only in the Western army but also at Richmond. John Morgan had escaped from the prison in which he had been confined, and after many extraordinary adventures, had passed through the States of Kentucky and Tennessee and had rejoined his comrades in the South. His escape was managed with so much perseverance, courage, and dexterity, that even among the great events of the war it claims some notice as an instance of remarkable enterprise.

General Morgan and his staff had not been treated as prisoners of war; but to satisfy the vengeance of those whom he had despoiled, had been confined as felons in the penitentiary of Ohio, with all the indignities attached to offenders against law. They determined to escape; and after weeks of perseverance, although constantly visited at uncertain hours by sentries and jailors, they succeeded in tunnelling through the floor of their cell, and from thence under the foundations of the prison. On the night of the 27th November, the preparations having been completed, and the twelve o'clock rounds having passed, General Morgan and his six officers, armed with bowie knives made out of case knives, crept into the tunnel. As they neared the end, they saw, to their joy, that the night was dark and rainy, and that the sentries had retired under shelter—the dogs to their kennels. Creeping out, they crossed first the inner then the outer wall of their prison by means of a rope ladder, made of strips of bedding, and found themselves outside the penitentiary. There they separated; General Morgan and Captain Hines went to the railway station, and entered the train just starting for Cincinnati. As they neared the town, Morgan noticed that it was past six o'clock, that their flight must have been discovered, and that they would be rearrested immediately on reaching the terminus. Nothing remained but to escape from the train. Making their way, therefore, to the last carriage, they put on the break and jumped off; they then hastened to the Ohio, found a boat, and crossed to the Kentucky shore. There, Morgan was among his friends. He was furnished with food, money, and a horse, and after many adventures succeeded in evading his pursuers and in reaching the lines of the Confederate army.

He was much assisted in his escape by a rumour, copied into the newspapers, which announced his safe arrival at Toronto in Canada, thereby putting his enemies on a wrong scent. On his arrival in Richmond he was received with the greatest enthusiasm, and, taking advantage of it, proceeded to raise a fresh corps of cavalry for service in the West.*

But the narrative of the Western campaign of 1863 is concluded, and to 1864 remains the details of the short career which awaited him. The armies of Virginia claim attention, and their operations, although not to be compared in interest to the campaign of Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, yet demand some notice as the precursors of more important events.

* The author has been indebted for this account of General Morgan's escape to the *Richmond Examiner*. The narrative has been republished in the eighth volume of the *Rebellion Record*.

CHAPTER VII.

AUTUMN CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA.

THE great campaign at Gettysburg, in which both nations had put forth their utmost strength, had been followed by a period of reaction and of comparative quiet, only broken by the operations of the never resting cavalry leaders. Stuart, Fitz Lee, and Imboden, on the side of the South, had found worthy antagonists in Pleasanton, Buford, Kilpatrick, and the young General Custer; and whilst the main armies, under Lee and Meade, occupied the lines of the Rapidan and Rappahannock, and rested after their exertions of the summer, the cavalry outposts frequently broke the routine of camp life by gallant enterprises, which, belonging more properly to a history of the Virginian campaign, must be passed over in a narrative of the whole war.

During this period, attention was mainly directed to the banks of the Tennessee, whither Longstreet on the one side, and Hooker on the other, had transported portions of the Virginian armies; and whilst Meade weakened his forces by detachments sent to repress the tumults at New York, and to enforce the Conscription Act, Lee, willing to reward his men for the hardships they had undergone, pitying also the prolonged separation of many from their families, and anxious, whilst repressing and punishing desertion, as far as might

* *Vide* Map II., commencement of volume; also Map, p. 128, vol. ii.

be possible to remove its cause, granted short furloughs to officers and soldiers to enable them to return to their long abandoned homes.

To protect detachments and convoys from guerillas the Federal general had prescribed the oath of allegiance to all residents between the Potomac and the Rappahannock, under pain of arrest; and having, by other and more effectual means, provided for the safety of the depôts of the army on the Orange and Alexandria rail, had pushed forward the cavalry to the banks of the Rapidan, and established the main bulk of his forces in and around Culpepper.

Such was the position of affairs at the commencement of October 1863, when the Confederate Army of Virginia was again put in motion, prepared to advance over ground which had already been the scene of so many fierce struggles. Leaving Fitz Lee with a division of cavalry to protect the line of the Rapidan and to conceal the movements of the main army, General Lee, on the 9th of October, directed his march on Madison Court-house, his right flank covered by Hampton's division of cavalry, under the personal command of General Stuart. The object in view was to bring on an engagement with Meade's army, encamped around Culpepper, and attacking it on the right flank to sever the communication with the base of operations at Alexandria. The tactics thus conceived were somewhat similar to those which had been put into practice with so great success against General Pope, in the campaign of the preceding year; but the circumstances under which they were now attempted were in many respects different, and less favourable to their probable success.

The Federal army had greatly improved since the

autumn campaign of 1862; it was commanded by a general of farhigher ability than General Pope; its cavalry had been rendered efficient, and, consequently, the system of picket duty and *reconnaissances* were more thoroughly organised and better performed.

General Lee's movement was not long undiscovered; a strong *reconnaissance* under Buford, pushed forward to the Rapidan, reported the disappearance of the main army, whilst Kilpatrick's cavalry came into collision with Stuart near James City, a short distance to the west of Culpepper. Finding that the Confederate army had crossed the Rapidan, and was threatening his right flank, Meade decided on declining a general action, and commenced a retreat towards his base of operations. He destroyed or removed his depôts at Culpepper, and withdrew his infantry towards the Rappahannock, covered by Buford on the left, Kilpatrick in the centre, and Gregg on the right. The Confederate cavalry were not slow in following. Fitz Lee drove back Buford from the Rapidan, whilst Stuart in person pressed hard on Kilpatrick from James City, almost surrounding General Custer's brigade, which only extricated itself by a gallant charge.

Through Culpepper the Federal cavalry retreated, and at Brandy station the two commands of Fitz Lee and Hampton united, and found themselves opposed by Buford and Kilpatrick, who covered the march of the Federal infantry and baggage across the Rappahannock. But the main army of the Confederates was forced to halt during the 11th to await the provision train, necessitated by the barren nature of the country, which forbade any hope of supporting the troops otherwise than by supplies drawn from the rear. Thus was time lost; and Meade every day approaching nearer to his

base of supplies, and to lines which had been carefully entrenched, was in a position to fight or decline a battle as he might consider best, satisfied that his opponent would be obliged ere long to withdraw from a country which, completely devastated by successive armies, offered no means of subsistence.

On the 12th October General Lee marched from Culpepper, in two columns, commanded respectively by Generals A. P. Hill and Ewell, covered by Stuart's cavalry, and, taking the road to Jefferson, bivouacked, after a skirmish with the Federal cavalry, under Gregg, in the vicinity of the village. On the 13th he forced the passage of the Rappahannock, at Warrenton Springs, where the cavalry, amid the cheers of the supporting infantry, charged through the narrow stream, disdaining to be stopped in their advance by the destruction of the bridge. At Warrenton the whole army united on the afternoon of the 13th, and Stuart in person, with two thousand troopers, pushed forward to reconnoitre the enemy's line of retreat. He advanced to the railway in the vicinity of Catlett's station, but discovering a heavy column of infantry retiring steadily, withdrew to rejoin the main army.

Then occurred one of those incidents which savour more of the romance of ancient wars than of the regular operations of modern armies. Marching towards Warrenton, Stuart's advanced guard suddenly reported a strong body of troops moving in good order along a road parallel with the rail, and directly between the cavalry and the main Confederate army. To retreat was impossible, owing to the large force he had already encountered on the rail; to endeavour to cut his way through the column was an enterprise too hazardous even for General Stuart; and the only

remaining alternative was to conceal his cavalry and artillery in a pine wood on a knoll overlooking the road, trusting that the column would pass on without discovering his position. Anxiously did the Confederate troopers watch through the stems of the trees the enemy marching unsuspectingly below them; but still more anxiously did they behold the preparations for bivouacking almost within a stone's throw of their hiding-place. The Federals bivouacked, and not only could the words of command be heard, but even the conversation of the soldiers as they tended their horses. It now became a question what course to pursue; whether, abandoning the artillery, to cut a way through the surrounding enemy, or to endeavour to send word to head-quarters of the perilous situation in which so large a portion of the Confederate cavalry was placed. Stuart, unwilling to lose his guns, resolved on the latter course, and calling for volunteers for a dangerous enterprise, selected three men, whom he directed to put on infantry knapsacks, and, joining the Federal troops, to pass through them and in all haste reach Warrenton.* In the meantime, two Federal officers strayed into the Confederate lines, and were captured, but bore their misfortune lightly, as they anticipated that the morrow would see their positions reversed, and their captors prisoners.

The night passed by, but no sound gave notice to the Federals of the close vicinity of their foe. At day-break, on the following morning, the crack of rifles was heard, proclaiming that the messengers had reached

* See *Richmond Examiner* account, which was corroborated by verbal information given to the author, from an officer who, although not actually present on this occasion, occupied a high position on General Stuart's staff.

General Lee, and that relief was at hand. Then the Federals were seen preparing for action, still ignorant of the enemy on their flank. As soon as the engagement had commenced, Stuart opened on them with grape, and availing himself of the disorder caused by an attack from so unexpected a quarter, limbered up his guns, and galloping through the ranks of the infantry, sabred several, and rejoined, with little loss, the Commander-in-Chief. Men who were present during that eventful night, say that seldom have they passed through a period of such intense excitement.

The advance of the main army was continued on the 14th October, the columns moving parallel with, but at some little distance from, the line of railway. Lee's object was to intercept the Federal army from its base of operations, and to force Meade to accept battle in the open country, away from the fortified lines of Alexandria. In this he failed, as the Federal general had been well advised by the cavalry of his adversary's movements, and had retired rapidly, yet in good order, by the Alexandria railway and the adjoining roads.

About noon on the 14th the two leading brigades of Hill's corps came in contact with the second corps of the Federal army near Bristoe station. The rear of the 5th corps (Federal) was in the act of crossing Broad Run when the Confederate skirmishers debouched from the woods on their proper right, and a few shots were fired from batteries hurriedly brought to the front. Following the 5th corps was the 2nd, under General Warren, an officer who had served with the Army of the Potomac, and had especially distinguished himself during its many campaigns. Unshaken by the unexpected appearance of the enemy on his flank, he

drew up his divisions on the south side of the railway, availing himself of the embankment, which offered cover from the fire. The leading regiments of A. P. Hill's command, mostly conscripts, advanced from the woods supported by the artillery, but were met by so destructive a fire from Webb's and Hayes's divisions, that they hesitated, gave way, and at length fled to the shelter of the trees, abandoning five guns, which fell into the hands of the Federals, and losing many prisoners. Thus was a severe check administered to Hill's advanced brigades: the remainder of the corps was not within supporting distance, and he did not renew the attack.

Contented with the success gained, and having performed well the duties of a rear guard, Warren withdrew, during the night, across Broad Run, and rejoined the main army, now occupying a position which could not be turned, and which might either be held against an attack in front, or abandoned for the security of the fortified lines of Alexandria.

Nothing remained for General Lee but to retire; the country between Warrenton and Bull Run had, by successive invasions, been completely devastated, and could scarcely support the few inhabitants who still clung to their ruined homes, much less afford provisions, even for a day, to a large army. The distance from his depôts rendered the transport of supplies difficult, if not impossible, and as the events of the summer and of the preceding year did not encourage an invasion of the enemy's country, no other course presented itself but to withdraw to his former lines on the Rappahannock. To impede the advance of the Federals, orders were given to destroy the railway between Cub Run and the Rappahannock; and this work having been efficiently

performed, the infantry, on the 18th October, commenced its retreat.

The cavalry covered the movement ; General Stuart, with Hampton's division, retiring slowly by the Warrenton road, for the purpose of drawing on Kilpatrick's cavalry, which had already crossed Broad Run, and, ignorant of the near vicinity of Fitz Lee's division on their left flank, were pressing Stuart's rear. When within a few miles of Warrenton, the sound of Fitz Lee's guns gave notice that he was ready to attack. Stuart, therefore, resumed the offensive, and, marching vigorously against the cavalry in his front, whilst Fitz Lee bore down on the flank, drove back Custer's brigade, inflicting considerable loss, and capturing provision waggons and ambulances. As far as Gainesville and Haymarket the victorious cavalry pursued, and were only stopped by the infantry pickets of the 6th corps.

After this check inflicted on the enemy, General Lee continued the retreat as far as the Rappahannock, where he took up a position on either side of the Orange and Alexandria rail, General Ewell's corps forming the right, and General A. P. Hill's the left wing of the army. Thus, with little advantage to the Confederates, terminated General Lee's advance to Bull Run. He had shown that even after Longstreet's departure, he was more than capable of making head against Meade's army, and by the destruction of the railway had secured himself for some weeks from molestation in the new line he had selected. His cavalry had distinguished themselves, and Imboden, west of the Blue Ridge Mountains, who had been sent to secure the important passes into the Shenandoah, had surprised and captured a Federal regiment at Charleston, within less than two hours'

march of Harper's Ferry. But the total results of the campaign were unimportant ; and the repulse by Warren of A. P. Hill at Bristoe station counterbalanced, in great measure, any loss the Federals might have sustained.

Until the first week in November nothing of note occurred ; General Meade was engaged in repairing the railway destroyed by Lee in his retreat, and the Confederate army held the right bank of the Rappahannock, with detachments occupying rifle-pits at Kelly's Ford, and a *tête de pont* near Rappahannock station. It had been considered advisable to retain possession of these points, in order to keep open communication between the opposite banks ; and thus, should occasion offer, to operate on the flank of any column moving forward with the intention of forcing the passage of the river.* The possibility of attack on these detachments does not appear to have been sufficiently taken into consideration, and although old works had been occupied, and new erected, yet the positions were not strengthened to resist a powerful assault.

Such an attack was, however, in course of organisation ; the line of the Rappahannock was in too close proximity to Washington to allow of its unmolested occupation by the enemy ; and the *tête de pont* at the railway crossing appeared to be a menace of a fresh advance when the Confederate general should feel himself sufficiently strong to make the attempt. Orders were therefore sent to General Meade to drive back the enemy from the line of the Rappahannock.† With this intent he put his army in motion, and moving in two columns, that of the right, comprising the 5th and 6th corps, under General Sedgwick, and of the left,

* See Southern History, Pollard's *Third Year of the War*.

† See Chesney's *Campaigns in Virginia and Maryland*.

the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd corps, under General French, approached on the 7th November the Rappahannock station and Kelly's Ford.

The left column was the first engaged, of which the 3rd corps was in advance. Throwing out a strong line of skirmishers, General Birney (commanding the corps) soon drove back the small force holding the line of rifle-pits, and, under cover of the fire, erected powerful batteries, which swept the southern bank of the river. A pontoon bridge was then constructed, and the 3rd brigade of the 1st division, under Colonel de Trobriand, a French officer, rushed across, stormed the line of entrenchments, and compelled the surrender of the defenders, whilst the remainder of the Confederate force, under the command of General Rhodes, finding itself too weak to offer any effectual resistance, retreated.

On the same day, but at a later hour, the head of the right column approached the work at Rappahannock station, held by Hayes's brigade of Early's division, supported on the right bank by Hoke's brigade, under the temporary command of Colonel Godwin. A cavalry *reconnaissance*, sent forward by the Federal general, had previously brought a report of the position; and, as the leading brigades approached, skirmishers were extended to cover the advance of two heavy batteries destined to occupy hills which overlooked the forts. Before dark the guns were in position, and the two brigades of Russell and Upton, under the command of the former, were formed up ready for the assault. The guns opened, giving warning to the Confederate general, until then apparently unconscious of the imminence of the danger, who ordered Hoke's brigade across the pontoon bridge to reinforce Hayes on the left bank. Almost before it had reached its destination, the storm

broke. Russell's brigade of New England and Pennsylvania troops were seen advancing rapidly across the open plain. They were met by a heavy fire; but, hardly replying to it, and, trusting to the rapidity of their attack, they rushed onward, led by the general, and climbing down the ditch and over the parapet, entered and captured the work at the point of the bayonet.

Upton's brigade now came up in support on the left, and was equally successful in the assault of the remaining redoubt. The pontoon bridge was seized, the greater portion of Hayes's brigade surrendered, many of Hoke's were forced back to the bank of the river and captured, and the trophies of the victory, amounting to about 1,700 prisoners, four cannon, and several colours, attested the completeness of the success. Lee, who had witnessed the disaster from the right bank, now gave up any project of attacking the force which had crossed at Kelly's Ford, and retreated behind the Rapidan.

The actions at Kelly's Ford and Rappahannock stations bear an unanswerable testimony to the marked improvement in the Federal army. The military precision with which the details of the attacks were carried out; the rapidity in the erection of batteries, and construction of pontoon bridges; the method observed in the advance of the storming parties at the end of a day's march, when darkness was closing in, attest the presence of capable generals, an efficient staff, and good regimental officers. The success, purchased at comparatively little loss, proves that bold attacks are often the least bloody; but, at the same time, the infrequency of such successes during the earlier periods of the war is an evidence that they are not, under

ordinary circumstances, to be attained by raw troops and unskilled officers. There can be little doubt that the Confederates were surprised; they seem to have been totally unprepared for an attack; nor was the artillery on the right bank brought into play; indeed, it is said that news of the advance of the Federal storming parties did not reach the right bank in time to allow of the guns opening before it was too late to do so, without danger of killing their own men.*

Lee's retreat was not followed up, but his opponent, urged on by orders from Washington, took measures towards the end of the month for crossing the Rapidan, and for making a bold attempt to separate the two wings of General Lee's army by a rapid advance on Orange Court-house. The successes on the Rappahannock had elated the Northern people, and the press, giving utterance to their feelings, insisted that the moment had arrived for crushing the rebellion by the capture of Richmond; whilst the government, anticipating the results of Grant's combinations before Chattanooga, was anxious to prevent reinforcements from reaching his antagonist from the Army of Virginia.

On the 26th November, the Federal army was put in motion, and to Warren, who, by his recent success at Bristoe station, had become distinguished among the generals of the Army of the Potomac, was the honour of leading the advance awarded. His corps, the 2nd, having overcome the difficulties of bringing artillery through the thick woods bordering the river, crossed the Rapidan on the 26th, and encamped for the night on the Plank road, awaiting the passage of the river by the remainder of the army. This was accomplished on

* See Pollard's *Third Year of the War*.

the 27th. Demonstrations having been made against the upper fords, the 3rd and 8th corps crossed at Jacob's Mill, the 1st and 5th at Culpepper Mine Ford,* and the whole army, turning westwards, marched by the Plank road and Old Turnpike road towards Orange Court-house. The men were provided with fifteen days' rations, and communications with Washington were severed.

Thus a second time did the Army of the Potomac plunge into the woods, swamps, and unknown country of the Wilderness. But the progress was slow : the rain commenced to fall ; it was found necessary to cut roads of communication between the several corps, and to build bridges over the streams and morasses ; thus, between the 26th and the 30th of November, little had been effected beyond gaining a position on the right bank of the Rapidan.

In the meantime, Lee had been well informed of his opponent's movements, and directly he was assured of the reality of the advance, commenced the concentration of his army by bringing up Hill's somewhat scattered corps from the vicinity of Culpepper Court-house to the stream of Mine Run, which, flowing into the Rapidan at right-angles to the Federal line of march, offered a strong defensive position. On the 27th Rhodes's and Johnson's divisions of Ewell's corps encountered Warren on the left, and French in the centre, but little beyond skirmishing was attempted, and infantry were almost exclusively employed, neither side being able to bring up any large number of guns. On the same day, the Federal cavalry on the flanks, the right under Custer at Morton's Ford, the left under

* Culpepper Mine Ford is situated between Ely's Ford, and Germena Ford.

Gregg on the Plank road, were actively engaged; but nothing of importance was effected on either side. General Meade, ignorant of the local features of the country, embarrassed by the vast forests and want of roads, encumbered by a large train of supplies, and fearful, lest by want of proper communication, a detached corps should be compromised and overwhelmed, moved slowly; whilst General Lee, divining the serious nature of the battle which seemed imminent, called for reinforcements, and received from North Carolina Pickett's division, so distinguished in the battle of Gettysburg.

After frequent *reconnaissances* and reports from his corps commanders, Meade determined to endeavour to turn the right of the Confederate position on the morning of the 30th of November, and with this intent strengthened Warren's corps (the 2nd) by the addition of two divisions of the 3rd corps (French). During the night of the 29th and 30th, Warren made his dispositions for attack; but when daybreak allowed him to see the enemy's position, he found that fresh batteries had been erected, and that there were evidences of reinforcements having arrived. Deeming the risk of attacking too dangerous, he communicated in person with General Meade,* and that

* Referring to the opinion entertained among the soldiery with respect to the suspension of the attack by Warren, Swinton, in the *Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac*, relates the following anecdote:—

‘The time has not been seen when the Army of the Potomac shrank from any call to duty; but an unparalleled experience in war, joined to a great intelligence among the rank and file, had taught these men what, by heroic courage, might be done, and what was beyond the bounds of human possibility. Recognising that the task now before them was of the character of a forlorn hope, knowing well that no man could here count on escaping death, the soldiers, without sign of shrinking from the sacrifice, were seen quietly pinning on the breasts

officer, recognising also the difficulties of the situation, where victory, even if secured, would be at so great a cost as to cripple future operations, and where repulse or defeat would probably result in serious disaster,—separated as the army was from the base of supplies, and limited in its ammunition and rations, dared rather to incur personal opprobrium and disgrace by declining battle than by a rash movement to forfeit the advantages which had been secured to his country by the success at Gettysburg and the subsequent operations of the Army of the Potomac. His decision was in all probability right, and it received confirmation from the disappointment felt by his opponent.

On the morning of the 30th, General Lee had called a council of war, to advise whether, with the reinforcements he had received, he should immediately attack. His own opinion inclined to this course; but the other generals, aware of the pressure which the Northern government had put and were putting on General Meade, feeling sure that this pressure would force him to risk a rash attack, and knowing that in the wooded and difficult country the advantage lay with the army acting on the defensive, urged the Commander-in-Chief to await an assault in the lines he had so carefully prepared on the banks of Mine Run. The result proved that General Lee's opinion was the most sound. Had he attacked on the 30th November or morning of the 1st December, he would have found the Federal army almost without artillery. The heavy of their blouses of blue, slips of paper on which each had written his name.'

Swinton's history of the Army of the Potomac derives especial value from the fact that he was an eye-witness of many of the scenes he describes, whilst he is evidently actuated by the most honest desire of telling the truth without bias or partiality.

guns had been sent to the rear by the roads leading to the fords, and these roads were so encumbered with every description of waggon, that to bring them again to the front would have been almost impossible. But the preparations for retreat had been carefully concealed; and on the night of the 1st and morning of the 2nd December, the Army of the Potomac retired across the Rapidan to its former lines.

A storm of indignation awaited the Federal general. The victories in the West and the advantages gained on the Rappahannock had excited hopes which ardent imaginations had exalted into assurances of complete success, and a failure such as had resulted from the onward movement of the Army of the Potomac was, at a time of so great triumph, especially hard to bear. The loss in the campaign had not been inconsiderable, numbering, according to Northern accounts, between 1,000 and 1,500, whilst in the total absence of results, although not in the terrible defeat, the second advance into the Wilderness under Meade offered a parallel to the first under Hooker.

Of course various reasons were alleged for the failure and consequent retreat. By the newspapers and those ignorant of the difficult country in which he was called on to operate, General Meade was blamed for his slowness and for the delay in attacking his opponent before he could concentrate his army and collect reinforcements; whilst others hinted at incompetence on the part of the generals commanding corps, and at the jealousy said to exist against Warren, to whom, in preference to those senior in rank, opportunity for distinction had been given, and to whose corps additions had been made to the prejudice of other officers; advantages which had not been justified by the event. As,

however, the campaign came to be more calmly considered, and probably when the voice of the army had made itself heard, the prudence and self-sacrifice of General Meade in directing a timely withdrawal from a dangerous position was appreciated, and it was felt that if he did not possess the brilliant qualities long looked for among the Federal generals, he was yet an able officer, and one to whose discretion the conduct of the Army of the Potomac might well be entrusted.

With Mine Run terminated for the year 1863 the campaigns of the Army of the Potomac. In Western Virginia, in the space intervening between the Confederate armies of the East and of the West (between Lee and Longstreet), an expedition under General Averill, signalised the close of the year, and offered a parallel to many of the bold raids of the Confederate cavalry. In November, Averill, in command of a mixed force of infantry and cavalry, had penetrated to the mountains which, traversing Western Virginia, connect with the Great Cumberland Range, and, having defeated General Echolls on Droop Mountain, twenty-eight miles from Lewisburgh, had driven him across the Greenbrier River. Contented with this success, and with the injury inflicted on the enemy by the burning of his winter quarters and destruction of stores, and having obtained a local knowledge of the mountainous country which had not felt the presence of an enemy since the earlier campaigns of the Kanawha Valley, Averill retraced his steps to his quarters at New Creek, near Cumberland, on the Baltimore and Ohio rail.*

This raid was only a prelude to an expedition of greater importance. The value to the Confederates of

* *Vide* Map II., commencement of vol.

the occupation of the mountains and passes of Western Virginia lay in the cover they afforded to one of the main arteries of communication between the East and the West. On the eastern side of the chain of mountains ran the rail from Richmond to Lynchburg, and from thence to Knoxville and Chattanooga. The Chattanooga end of this great line of communication had, as has been already shown, fallen into the possession of the Federals; but the remainder still served to supply Longstreet, who, with much difficulty, was maintaining his position, after his retreat from Knoxville, in the mountainous country on the frontiers of Tennessee and Western Virginia. To destroy and render valueless this important railway, was the object which Averill desired to accomplish, and with this intent he marched up the valley of the south branch of the Potomac; and having eluded several detachments of Confederate troops, crossed with some difficulty, and much suffering from cold, the high ridge of mountains, and descended unexpectedly by the Craig Creek Valley on Salem. There he burnt the stores, tore up the rail, cut the telegraph wire, and destroyed such of the rolling stock as fell into his hands; and, having collected as much plunder as he could convey away, commenced his march homewards. The cold had increased, storms raged among the mountains, the rivers were swollen,*

* The following extract from General Averill's report, with another from a Confederate narrative, published in the *Richmond Examiner*, will give some notion of the difficulties of campaigning during winter among the mountains of Western Virginia. General Averill writes:—'My march was retarded occasionally by the tempest in the mountain, and the icy roads. I was obliged to swim my command, and drag my artillery with ropes across Craig's Creek seven times in twenty-four hours.'

The other account speaks of the sufferings of the Confederates

and he heard that the Confederate forces were concentrating to bar his progress. Happily for him he captured a courier bearing despatches, and thus, having learnt the exact position of the enemy, took measures to defeat his plans. Before they could be burnt, he seized the bridges over the Jackson River, and, with but comparatively slight loss, effected its passage, climbed the mountains by a path hitherto considered impracticable, and regained his quarters in a friendly country. The injury done to the rail at Salem was repaired, but the Confederates could ill spare the stores which had been burnt, and which Longstreet's men greatly needed; nor did a parallel raid, executed with equal courage and enterprise by Fitz Lee, compensate for the damage inflicted by Averill. The North, rich in resources, could afford the wear and tear of horseflesh consequent on these raids, but the South, where every man and horse were of the utmost value, was obliged to put restraint on her officers, lest, when the time arrived for decisive action, her cavalry, worn out by frequent expeditions, should be inefficient and useless.

concentrating in Averill's rear :—' No language can tell the sufferings of our men. They were in the saddle day and night, save a few hours between midnight and day. They were beat up by their swords—the only means of arousing them—numb and sleepy. Some froze to death; others were taken from their horses senseless. They forded swollen streams, and their clothes, frozen stiff, rattled as they rode. It rained in torrents, and froze as it fell. In the mountain paths the ice was cut from the roads before they ventured to ride over.'

CHAPTER VIII.

CLOSE OF THE YEAR 1863.

IT WOULD almost seem that the arbitrary limit given to certain periods of time had effected the several military operations spread over the various States and climates of the Southern Confederacy. As the year approached its termination, the campaigns appear to culminate towards certain points, from whence, soon after the commencement of the new year, they branch out again in diverging directions and with different designs.

The great attack on the defences of Charleston had virtually terminated with the capture of Fort Wagner, and the fruitless attempt on Fort Sumter. The retreat from Mine Run across the Rapidan had closed for the year 1863 the operations of the Army of the Potomac and of Virginia. The relief of Knoxville, and subsequent withdrawal of Longstreet to the confines of Western Virginia, had secured to the Federals the possession of Eastern Tennessee; whilst the defeat of the Confederates at Chicamauga, followed by the pursuit to Tunnel Hill, had changed the aspect of affairs in Georgia, and promised to be the forerunner of even more remarkable events. Of the trans-Mississippi department little notice has been taken for a considerable time. Cut off from all except secret communication with the remainder of the Confederacy, and yet

possessing in themselves the sinews of war, the States of Texas and portions of those of Louisiana and Arkansas continued a resistance generally successful to the encroaching power of the Federals, directed from New Orleans in the South and Little Rock in the North.

The situation of New Orleans prevented her from becoming other than a primary base of operations for a campaign directed against the interior of Louisiana or Texas. For purposes of invasion, positions on the coast were necessary, such as the mouths of the Sabine River and of the Rio Grande, which offered the advantages of safe harbours from whence military operations might be directed, whilst they afforded refuges to the Federal gunboats employed in preventing the brisk trade carried on between those ports and Europe. Against a fort which guarded the mouth of the Sabine River, an expedition, partly naval, partly military, was directed in the month of September. The troops were under the command of General Franklin, and it was intended to seize the small town of Sabine City, near which a vast accumulation of cotton was known to be stored,* and there establish a base of supply for further operations. Success was confidently expected; but the garrison of the fort at the entrance of Sabine Pass, consisting of but forty-seven men, made so good use of their guns that they disabled and captured two of the gunboats, and thus frustrated all attempts at

* The position of this store of cotton, 40,000 bales, had been revealed to the Federals by a traitorous agent of the Confederate government. The treachery was discovered, and the agent was tried, convicted, and condemned to death by court martial; but was released by the intervention of the civil power, under a writ of *habeas corpus*. The respect for civil power in the Confederate States during the continuance of the war was sometimes carried to the extreme.

disembarkation on the part of the troops. The fleet and transports returned to New Orleans, and a second expedition was fitted out against Brownsville, a town on the left bank of the Rio Grande, opposite the Mexican town of Matamoras, apparently with the purpose of preventing the trade carried on between the State of Texas and Mexico, and of closing a port of entry through which large supplies of war materials reached • the Confederacy.

General Banks in person accompanied the expedition, of which the military force was under the command of General Dana, who, more fortunate than Franklin at Sabine Pass, accomplished the disembarkation of his troops at Brazos Island, nine miles from the mouth of the Rio Grande, and marching on Brownsville discovered that the enemy had blown up the fort and abandoned the place. A garrison was placed in the fort and town, but no attempt was made to invade from this quarter the extensive but thinly-inhabited State of Texas.

Still later in the year an endeavour on a grander scale to penetrate through the Bayou Teche country into North-Western Louisiana terminated disastrously to the Federal cause. A strong column of two corps, comprised of the troops in and near New Orleans, and of Franklin's division, brought back from Sabine River, had marched as far as Opelousas, compelling the small Confederate force of 8,800 infantry* and 2,000 irregular cavalry to fall back towards Alexandria. But, although retreating, General Green, superior in cavalry, was able to watch closely the enemy's camp, and thus to prevent the devastation of

* Viz., Walker's division, 6,400; Morton's, 2,400; and Green's 2,000 cavalry.

the country by foraging parties. Whether owing to a misconception of the strength of the Confederate army, or to unwillingness to hazard more than a strong *reconnaissance* through the country, General Franklin did not advance beyond Opelousas, but ordered a retreat to New Orleans. It was then that Green, watching his opportunity, swooped down on the two brigades forming the rear-guard of the army under General Burbridge, completely surprised them, captured one whole regiment (the 69th Indiana), burned the camp, and utterly routed the whole force, the arrival of the supporting division alone preventing a more serious catastrophe. This, and General Walker's short but successful attempt to blockade the Mississippi with batteries erected near the mouth of the Red River, closed the operations of the winter of 1863* in the trans-Mississippi States.

Since the capture of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, and the consequent extended operations of the Federal gunboats, little influence had been exercised by the States west of the Mississippi on the great campaigns of the war. Their sons, who had marched north during its earlier periods, still continued to preserve their character for gallantry and more than ordinary

* General Walker had formerly served in the regular forces. During the first two years of the great war of secession, he played a distinguished part under Longstreet's command. He was then transferred to the States with which by birth and relationship he was more especially connected, and commanded a division in the army of the trans-Mississippi. In the operations detailed above, a curious use was made of the resources of the country for military engineering. To reach the bank of the Mississippi it was necessary to cross the broad stream of the Atchafalaya, over which General Walker threw a bridge, constructed of sugar coolers, from the neighbouring plantations, and of dried logs, which answered its purpose extremely well,

dash. But, as States, those of Texas, Louisiana, and Arkansas, helped but little in repelling the great invasion which, as will be seen, burst in 1864 over the central regions of the Confederacy.

The hardships brought on her population by the war were increasing as the limits of the Confederacy became more narrow, and the difficulty of finding food and forage was even greater than that of procuring men. Tennessee was no longer open to the Confederate commissariat officers, and whilst South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, and Florida† were ransacked to furnish the requirements of the Western army and of the garrison of Charleston, North Carolina and Virginia hardly sufficed to provide the necessary supplies for General Lee's force. Thus, as the North was growing stronger, not so much from the augmentation of her resources as from her increased power of utilising them, the South, no longer possessing in as great a degree the advantages over her antagonist which the higher talent of her leading men and the more warlike character of her population had given her at the outset of the contest, was gradually succumbing under the pressure which, although yielding occasionally to well directed blows, was still forcing itself onwards, and by its weight and impetus defying opposition.

On reference to the messages of the two Presidents, delivered during the first week in December to the respective houses of Congress, the contrast between the still confident, but somewhat sorrowful tone of the and lasted until the rapid rise of the Atchafalaya compelled the retreat of the division.

* The Texan regiment, under Longstreet, was especially noted for its gallant bearing in the field.

† See Official Circular, office of chief commissary, Quincy, Florida, Nov. 2nd, 1863.—*Rebellion Record*.

head of the Southern Confederacy, and the jubilant announcements of President Lincoln, cannot fail to be remarked. In his summary of the events of the war, Mr. Davis was forced to acknowledge the great reverses which had befallen the Southern arms during the past year. Against the loss of Vicksburg and Port Hudson he could only set the successful defence of Charleston, and the short, but, for permanent advantage, ineffectual invasion of Pennsylvania by General Lee; whilst the victory of Chicamauga, barren of results, could not be claimed as a counterpoise to the defeat at Chattanooga, the repulse from Knoxville, and the occupation by Federal armies of the whole State of Tennessee. As feats of arms, the deeds of Southern men were worthy of all praise; but the benefits arising from permanent conquest remained with the North.

Partially, if not entirely resulting from these evidences of the preponderance of power on the side of her antagonist, were the unsatisfactory state of the relations of the Confederacy with foreign powers, and the depreciated condition of her currency, animadverted on by Mr. Davis in the same message. With respect to the former, Mr. Davis regretted to inform Congress that there had been no improvement in the state of the relations with foreign countries since his message on January 1st; on the contrary, there had been a still greater divergence in the conduct of European nations from the practical impartiality which alone deserved the name of neutrality, and their action in some cases had assumed a character positively unfriendly. Mr. Davis complained bitterly of the conduct of England and France in recognising what he termed a paper blockade, and thereby cutting off the South from the advantages derived from foreign commerce, thus weak-

ening the wealth and resources of her government, dependent in a great degree on the taxes levied on exports and imports for the payment of the interest, in specie, of bonds issued at the commencement of the war. As a consequence, these bonds depreciated in value, and the issue of treasury notes was increased until the currency in circulation amounted to more than threefold the amount required for the business of the country.

This state of affairs was productive of evil results, not only, as Mr. Davis showed, in the increased difficulty presented to the necessary operations of the government, and the efficient conduct of the war, but in the corrupting influence it exercised on the morals of the people, by the stimulus given to the spirit of speculation, a spirit which had become noticeable in many of the larger towns, and had conduced to loud complaints. It was alleged, and with some truth, that whilst the soldiers were scarcely able to subsist on their scanty rations and depreciated pay, civilians, and those of the worst character, were growing rich by infamous speculations.

A fresh conscription was proposed, from which exemptions were to be greatly restricted ; whilst measures were recommended for the employment of persons above the conscript age, or those physically unfit for service, in many of the duties which had hitherto been performed by detachments from the army.

No doubt at the end of the year 1863 the strain of the war fell heavily on the population of the South, and possibly at this period there were many who looked back with regret on the time when they had enjoyed quiet and prosperity under the constitution of the United States, and who might, by

conciliatory measures on the part of the North, have been led to seek peace in reconstruction. No such measures emanated from the President of the Federal States : an amnesty proclamation was indeed put forth, but its purport, in place of conciliating, tended to rouse afresh the spirit of hatred and animosity, and to convert wavering adherents of Mr. Davis's policy into strong supporters. Mr. Lincoln seems to have been led to the issue of this proclamation more from a desire to please the Republican party in the North, with the view to its earnest support in the approaching Presidential contest, than from an expectation that terms such as were there set forth would be submitted to by a nation still in the possession of large and victorious armies, of an extensive territory, and a strong government.

Having specially excepted from pardon all the officers and agents of the Confederate government ; all who had left judicial stations under the United States to aid the *rebellion* ; all military officers above the rank of colonel, or lieutenant in the navy ; all who had left seats in the United States Congress to join the rebellion ; all who had resigned commissions in the army or navy of the United States, and afterwards aided the rebellion ; and all who had been engaged in any way in treating coloured persons, or white persons in charge of such, being soldiers or sailors of the United States service, otherwise than as prisoners of war. Mr. Lincoln tendered forgiveness to the remainder on condition of taking an oath to support all measures passed during the war relating to the emancipation of the slaves, whilst he at the same time graciously promised to re-admit into the Union any State in which not less than one-tenth of its voting population, having taken the prescribed oath, should re-establish a State government in conformity with its provisions.

Could such an amnesty proclamation be intended to promote peace? was it not rather an incentive to war? Could the proud population of the South be expected to yield up their chosen leaders, their gallant officers, to the tender mercies of their enemies? and could it be supposed that these men, who enjoyed the confidence of their country in the capacity of civil governors, or who, as leaders in the field, had won victories which, from the disparity of numbers engaged, must ever excite wonder and admiration, should willingly counsel their fellow countrymen to lay down their arms, and to submit to conditions which, even if tendered to the vanquished, would still be sufficiently severe?

As a declaration of Mr. Lincoln's resolution to carry the war to the utmost extremity, the proclamation may have been intended; but it certainly could not have been put forth with any idea of paving the way to peace. The successes in the West might have justified his congratulations to Congress on the favourable aspect of affairs, but they could never have led him to suppose that the South was sufficiently humiliated to accept conditions such as he offered in his amnesty proclamation.*

If Mr. Lincoln's proclamation may be considered an evidence of a leaning on his part towards the more

* To those who suppose that Mr. Lincoln had constituted himself a champion for the abolition of slavery, the following passage, quoted from his message, is recommended for study:—'According to our political system, as a matter of civil administration, the government had no lawful power to effect emancipation in any State; and for a long time it had been hoped that the rebellion could be suppressed without resorting to it as a military measure. It was all the while deemed possible that the necessity for it might come, and that if it should, the crisis of the contest would then be presented. It came, and, as was anticipated, was followed by dark and doubtful days.'

violent section of the Republican party, the declaration of the instructions issued by the Commander-in-Chief (General Halleck) for the future conduct of the war may be taken as corroborative of the same intent. General Halleck stated in his report, that 'instructions had been given to the generals operating in hostile territory to subsist their armies, as far as possible, upon the country, receipting and accounting for everything taken, so that all persons of approved loyalty may hereafter be remunerated for their losses. By this means our (to quote General Halleck's report) troops can move more rapidly and easily, and the enemy is deprived of supplies if he should re-occupy the country passed over by us.'

In the subsequent campaigns it will be seen how thoroughly these instructions were acted up to ; and how great was the contrast between the conduct of General Lee's troops in Pennsylvania, and that of the invading armies of the North when they entered the central States of the Confederacy. The animosity of the war was augmenting ; each side accused the other of cruelty to the prisoners ; and, whilst Mr. Davis incurred the censure of many individuals in the Southern States for refusing to put in execution retaliatory measures to avenge the deaths of men executed by the enemy contrary to the usages of war, and to punish by like severity the terrible harshness with which General Morgan's officers had been treated in the civil prison of Ohio,* General Halleck asserted that the conduct

* The account published in the *Third Year of the War*, by Pollard, of the treatment of Captain Calvin C. Morgan, the brother of the general, and his brother officers, in the penitentiary of Ohio, and purporting to be taken from his own lips, is almost too horrible for belief.—It would appear that on neither side did the go-

pursued by the Confederate authorities towards their prisoners of war was more barbarous than that which Christian captives formerly suffered from the pirates of Tripoli, Tunis, and Algiers.

Additional sufferings were entailed on these unhappy men, both Federals and Confederates, by the cessation of the system of exchanges, commenced in July 1862, for which each government threw the blame on the other. Mr. Davis distinctly alleged in his message that the fault lay with the Federal authorities, whilst General Halleck, although accusing the Confederate government of infringements of the rules of war, yet acknowledged that the declaring null and void of certain paroles given by Federal soldiers (one of the first of the irregularities which led to the refusal to exchange), was a sort of retaliatory measure for the reported bad feeding of Federal prisoners in the hands of the South; and whilst he cast in the teeth of the Confederate authorities their threat of refusing to treat negro soldiers and their officers as prisoners of war, he weakened his own case, by alleging, on no given authority, that they sold the negro soldiers into slavery

vernment intend to treat the prisoners of war with undue severity; but it sometimes happened that timid or violent men, who mistook severity for firmness, and perpetrated cruelty under the idea that they were exercising proper authority, were placed in charge of the prisons. In the South the scarcity of provisions, and the feeble guards which could be furnished from her diminished armies to prevent the escape of prisoners, necessitated scanty supplies, and perhaps a rigour, which even those circumstances could not justify; but the stories told in the South of Northern prisons would lead to the belief that the rigour was not all on her side. In the subsequent investigation of the facts relating to the prison at Andersonville, it should be remembered that the South was then conquered, and that the inquiry was conducted by partial persons and under the influence of strong popular pressure.

and sentenced the officers to imprisonment and death for alleged violation of the local State laws.

Amid conflicting statements, it is difficult, if not impossible, to fix, or portion out, the amount of blame due to either side ; but on whomsoever the responsibility may lie, its burden should be very heavy, for there are few measures that tend more to lessen the horrors of war than the system of exchange of prisoners ; and it ought to be the endeavour of every civilised government, not only to prevent an infringement of the obligations of this system, but also to check and restrain the popular clamour which, usually founded on insufficient evidence, will often seek to hurry a government into retaliatory measures, thus increasing the already bitter feelings of hostility, and so diminishing the probability of a return to peace.*

At the close of the year 1863 there was no prospect of any abatement of hostilities ; no light broke through the dark clouds of desolation which hung over the land. The Confederacy, like a beleaguered fortress whose defenders driven from the outworks hold the inner lines with greater tenacity, and with the strength derived from concentration, offered on all sides a dauntless front : not an inch of ground had been yielded in Virginia, but the long chain of mountains

* By Southern officers of very high rank, the blame of refusing to permit a regular system of exchange is distinctly thrown on the Northern government. One whose veracity was never questioned, even by his enemies, stated that the Confederate government offered to release on parole all the Federal prisoners in its hands, as the South could not furnish proper means for keeping and guarding them ; but that the Northern government distinctly refused to recognise the parole, thus obliging the South to retain her prisoners, and so causing the infliction on these unhappy men of rigours which were frequently excessive.

separating Eastern from Western Virginia, and forming the Southern boundary of Eastern Tennessee, had replaced as a frontier line the river and mountains of the Cumberland. In the south-western portion of the Confederacy, the enemy had forced his way between the outer works and the main fortress. Texas, Louisiana, and Arkansas were separated from Mississippi and the central States, and the line of the Pearl River had replaced that of the Mississippi as a defence for the hitherto unscathed State of Alabama. On the seaboard, Mobile, Savannah, Charleston, and Wilmington, bade defiance to all the efforts of the boasted ironclads; and although an augmented naval force* afforded means of rendering the blockade of the Southern ports far more effectual than during the previous years of the war, yet the necessities of the time had developed the talent and resources of the Confederacy,† enabling her people to

* Mr. Lincoln, in his message delivered to Congress on 9th December, stated that the naval force of the United States consisted at that time of 588 vessels, complete and in the course of completion, and that of these 75 were ironclad or armoured steamers. Also that the number of seamen in the public service had increased from 7,500 in the spring of 1861 to about 34,000 at the present time.

† The following extract is taken from Captain Ross's interesting narrative of a visit to the Southern States during the second and third years of the war :—

‘The largest powder mills in the South are at Augusta. They, as well as the arsenal, are under the superintendence of Col. Buines. The mills turn out 8,400lbs. of powder in thirteen hours. In fifteen hours over 10,000lbs. have been made. They began to work on 27th April 1862, and since then one and a half million pounds of powder have been sent to Richmond alone.’

The special correspondent of the *Times* in the Confederate States, in a letter dated Richmond, 16th January 1864, thus notices the progress of invention in the South :—

‘A singular commentary on the old text (that necessity is the mother of invention) may be observed in the artificial leg which

meet the inconvenience which might otherwise have been felt from the exclusion of foreign products. War-like stores of all descriptions were manufactured in quantities sufficient to supply the armies, and Atlanta, Augusta,* and Richmond formed the bases of supply for the forces on the Eastern and Western frontiers.

To capture these cities, to occupy certain strategical points, to sever the lines of rail, and to carry war in its utmost rigour into the heart of the enemy's country were the fundamental principles of the plans for the campaign of 1864. There was no question now of the encouragement of union feeling in the South; the Radical and Abolition faction was in the ascendant; emancipation had been proclaimed; the Democratic or Constitutional party, feeling itself in a minority, concealed or changed its opinions; and Mr. Lincoln's amnesty proclamation afforded evidence to the Southern people of the tender mercies which awaited them should they sheath the sword and bow the neck to the conqueror. But to this extremity the South was not yet reduced. In Congress,* by the press, and among the ranks of the army, was the amnesty proclamation received with scorn and defiance. There was no attempt made to conceal

supplies the place of General Hood's lost limb. When this war commenced, there was throughout the length and breadth of the South no artificer cunning in the construction of artificial limbs; but such was the demand occasioned by the fierce battles of the bloodiest war of the century, that Richmond is now teeming with every variety of wooden leg and crutch; and there has arisen in Charlottesville (a little town in the interior of Virginia) an artist who had attained no inconsiderable skill in patching up and supplementing lost arms and legs, and enabling the maimed again to take the field.'

* See Mr. Foote's resolution, presented to Congress 15th December 1863.

the disasters of the past year either by the President or the generals ; but these reverses were used rather as a plea for renewed energy than as a cause for despondency. The armies were reinforced, and the President so far conceded to the public wish, as to remove General Bragg from the command of the forces in the West, replacing him temporarily by General Hardee, until General Johnston, having given up the charge of the Army of the Mississippi to General Polk, could in person take the direction of affairs.

The partial respite occasioned by the cold and wet was welcome to the armies on either side, more especially to those of the Confederacy, far less well supplied with the means of resisting their effects. But this time of comparative quiet in respect of movements in the field, was a period of active preparation for the campaign, which it was felt would open on the part of the North with increased power and renewed resources, as soon as the spring should admit of the commencement of military operations.

CHAPTER IX.

THE MISSISSIPPI AND RED RIVER CAMPAIGNS.

TRULY may the Federal Secretary of War, in a report subsequently presented to Congress, say that the arrangements for the spring campaigns of 1864 were made on the part of the government on a scale of the greatest magnitude. His own words best describe these preparations, giving as they do, at the same time, an idea of the immense resources of the Northern States. Thus, he writes, 'In all bureaus of the war department supplies were provided on a scale of great magnitude, to meet any exigency that could be foreseen. The estimates were based on an army organisation of a million of men. The States were called upon to strengthen the army by volunteers; new drafts were ordered and put in execution throughout all the loyal States; vast supplies of arms, ammunition, clothing, subsistence, medical stores, and forage were provided and distributed in depôts, to meet the wants of the troops, wherever they might operate; horses, mules, waggons, railroad iron, locomotives and cars, bridge timber, telegraph cable and wire, and every material for transportation and communication of great armies, under all conditions, were supplied; whilst Congress, with unstinting hand, voted large appropriations for recruiting, paying, and supplying the troops.' The

North had resolved to put forth her utmost strength, and her resources seemed to have increased rather than to have diminished during the continuance of the three long years of war.

The great effort was to be made in the spring, when, over the larger portion of the regions occupied by her armies, the improving weather would admit of military operations. But unwilling, even during the winter months, wholly to relax the pressure by which it was hoped ultimately to crush her antagonist, a campaign was inaugurated in those States where the cold reigned with less severity than among the mountains of Tennessee or on the plains of Eastern Virginia; and to General Sherman, temporarily transferred from Tennessee, was entrusted the command of a formidable army with which to penetrate into the heart of Mississippi.

To understand the object of this movement, some idea of the natural and artificial features of the country must be arrived at. In Mississippi and Alabama were no large towns or cities, if we may except the seaport of Mobile; but the country, thinly populated, was purely agricultural, its soil fruitful, and, since the growth of corn had succeeded to that of cotton, capable of furnishing supplies to a large army. On the productions of these States were the Confederate troops of the West mainly dependent; but the great distances from which supplies had to be collected and transported rendered railway appliances necessary. These were not wanting: through the States of Mississippi and Alabama three trunk lines ran, one, already partially destroyed and rendered useless from Memphis to the neighbourhood of New Orleans, through Jackson; the second, from Corinth through Meridien to Mobile; and the third, from Atlanta through Selma to the same

town. Joining these three railways was a direct line running from Jackson to Meridian, and from thence, by a branch newly constructed, to Selma. Thus with regard to the railways, the important points (i.e. the junctions) the possession of which would render the lines nearly useless to an enemy were Meridien and Selma.

But, in addition to the railways, two navigable rivers, the Tombigbee and the Alabama,* intersect the heart of a fertile country, and connect the inland towns of Alabama with the seaport of Mobile. To command the course of these rivers would be of great importance to a general whose object was the attack of Mobile; whilst any interference with the water traffic would inflict much injury on the Confederate Western army, dependent for supplies on the country in its rear. Therefore, for an army marching eastwards from the Mississippi, the line of operations would be by Jackson to Meridien, and from thence to Selma, from which place a junction might possibly be effected with the army from Chattanooga, or an attack directed against the city of Mobile. But the distances to be traversed, through a scantily populated and hostile country, were long, the retention of communication with the base on the Mississippi difficult, if not impossible; and the capability of subsisting on the country dependent in great measure on the activity and numbers of the cavalry.

With this force the Federal Army of the Mississippi was ill supplied. During the siege of Vicksburg there had been little need of its services, and the cavalry in the West had had sufficient occupation in protecting Western Tennessee from the incursions of Forrest, Lee, and other Confederate leaders. As, however, for any operation

* These, uniting together, form the Mobile River.

of real importance, the services of strong bodies of horse were clearly requisite, it was arranged that whilst Sherman, with two *corps d'armée* and seven batteries of artillery, should march from Vicksburg on Jackson, and from thence to Meridian, a large cavalry force under Generals W. Smith and Grierson, moving down the Mobile and Ohio Railway, should effect a junction with him at that point. All was in readiness by the first week of February. An army of about 25,000 men, consisting of the greater portion of the 16th and 17th corps under Generals Hurlbut and M'Pherson, the whole commanded by General Sherman, marched from Vicksburg on the 3rd February; whilst a few days later, a force of three brigades of cavalry, accompanied by artillery, was concentrated at New Albany* in readiness to move on Meridien by the Mobile and Ohio rail.

To oppose this formidable army, General Polk, who had succeeded General J. Johnston in command of the department, had but a small force, which, reinforced by a portion of the garrison of Mobile, amounted to less than one half of that of his opponent. Therefore nothing was left for him but to retreat; and, using all diligence, to transport the stores collected at the several railway stations into Alabama, behind the shelter of the Tombigbee River. General Sherman's advance was, consequently, almost unopposed; and the military promenade to Meridien, and from thence back to Vicksburg, for it was little more, was productive of misery incalculable to the unfortunate inhabitants, but was not of commensurate importance to the conduct of the war.

With twenty days' provisions, a supply of ammunition, and little other baggage, General Sherman com-

* A small town on the Tallahatchie River, about 80 miles south-east of Memphis.

menced his march ; and, traversing the country between Vicksburg and Jackson, where blackened chimneys alone marked the presence of former civilisation ; he advanced to the latter town after encountering but little resistance. Seizing the boats which the Confederate rear-guard had failed from want of time to destroy, he crossed the Pearl River ; not, however, before he had put the finishing stroke to the destruction of the State capital. The few remaining houses which had escaped two occupations by Federal troops were burned, and the remnant of the miserable population driven into the streets. Along the belt of country through which his columns marched similar devastation and ruin marked their progress. Villages and houses were fired, farms plundered, cattle and horses seized, and the negroes, expecting in their ignorance they knew not what from their professing liberators, and leaving their homes and masters, swelled the vast column of march—a rabble of men, women, and children, without protectors, without any idea of helping themselves, and destined, the men to enter the army, the women and children to be transported to the Government plantations, where labour awaited them harder than they had formerly been accustomed to, without the alleviations which, under their old masters, had lessened its evils.

The system of living on the country in which operations were conducted, was practised to its fullest extent ; every description of provision was seized, and the white inhabitants, almost entirely women and children, whose fathers, husbands, and brothers were serving in the Confederate armies, stripped of all their possessions, without food, and their own servants numbering among the plunderers, were left, as the army marched onwards, to grieve over the ruins of their once happy homes,

and to curse with additional bitterness the hated Yankee.*

In eleven days Sherman reached Meridien, at the distance of one hundred and fifty miles from Vicksburg, and there he awaited the arrival of the cavalry column, occupying his time in tearing up and destroying the railway; whilst he sent detachments to collect news of

* The author has taken the account of the devastation caused by Sherman's forces from Northern sources, of which he appends a few extracts. They are published in vol. viii. of the *Rebellion Record*.

A national account:—

'It was the expectation when the expedition started out, that they would draw most of their supplies, and all their forage for horses and mules, from the country. There was very little difficulty in finding enough for our purpose, even in the most barren parts of the country we passed through. There was nothing left however after our passage, and in many instances the people must suffer for want of food.'

Again:—

'One thing the darkies showed themselves fully susceptible of, the art of foraging. Nothing so nettled the secessionists as to have the things taken from them by the negroes.'

Again:—

'There was considerable destruction of private property, which may hardly be considered justifiable, yet the houses destroyed were almost invariably deserted, and their owners in all probability serving in the Confederate army.'

The following account is given of the burning of Jackson by an eye-witness, a soldier in the Federal army:—

'It was truly a vivid picture of war to see the streets filled with armed men, squares of large brick building on fire, furniture of every description, from rocking cradles to pianos, clothing, books—in fact, almost every article of domestic utility and ornament piled upon the side walks. Women and children running hither and thither, pictures of the most abject despair. There was no protection given to the town, and but little mercy shown, as this was the third time our army had been compelled to come here, and we judge General Sherman rightly concluded that he would obviate all necessity of having to come here again.'

the expected reinforcements. Polk, in the meanwhile, had placed the Tombigbee River between himself and the invading army, having previously ordered the cavalry under Lee to join Forrest, and returned to General Maury at Mobile the troops he had borrowed from the garrison. He knew that Sherman, cut off from his base of operations by irregular bands and a hostile population, would be unable to subsist his army, either if he remained stationary at Meridien, or if he attempted a forward movement, unless accompanied by a force of cavalry sufficient to protect his flanks and scour the surrounding country for provisions. He was aware that such a force was marching to his assistance, and recognised the importance of defeating and crushing it, before, combined with the infantry and artillery, it presented a too formidable front. Therefore, to Forrest he delegated the duty of preventing the junction of the two columns, directing him, at all hazards, to interpose a barrier to the advance of the cavalry.

The task was one of difficulty. Smith and Grierson were able officers, the latter had acquired a knowledge of the country in his former raid, and the men under their command were well trained in Western cavalry warfare. Forrest's troops on the other hand were mostly raw levies, composed of the inhabitants of the country, little practised in war, but fighting each and all for their homes and firesides, and they were commanded by a man who possessed to a high degree the genius of a soldier. Near Okolona, where the road from New Albany crosses the Mobile and Ohio rail, Forrest collected his forces, and, without awaiting the arrival of Lee, determined to oppose the farther advance of the Federal cavalry.

Seven thousand troops formed into three brigades

constituted the enemy's force; it had marched from Memphis to Colliersville, encountering no opposition excepting such as was offered by a country ruined and rendered barren by war; from Colliersville turning southwards, it had entered a rich and fruitful land, where, as yet undisturbed by the foe, the inhabitants were engaged in their usual pursuits of industry. Through fertile plantations and pleasant farms the cavalry marched, but more resembling marauders than regular soldiers, plundered, burnt, and straggled from their ranks, encumbering the line of route with spoil and booty, and dragging along with the fighting men a horde of runaway negroes.* Passing through New Albany and Pontotac, the column reached Okolona on the third week of February, where, on the border of the prairie country, Forrest, with considerably less than half the force opposed to him, barred its progress.

Dismounting his cavalry, and forming them into skirmishers,† Forrest advanced through a wooded

* This description is taken from a Northern account, published in the *Rebellion Record*, p. 489, vol. viii.

† The following account of General Forrest's career will be of some interest, especially as it is derived from a perfectly authentic source:—'Before the war, he was unknown in the South, being a man of no property or education. But troublous times soon brought him to the front, and his behaviour at the first battle of Shiloh attracted General Beauregard's attention, who, at a loss for officers, appointed him to the command of a detached brigade of cavalry. Forrest doubted his own powers of command, especially as the cavalry were undisciplined and were quarrelling among themselves; but being assured that he would be supported even if he should be obliged to shoot some of them to restore discipline, he accepted the appointment, and quickly rendered the force efficient and performed good service. He usually fought his men dismounted, himself and his staff leading them on horseback, into the thickest of the fire. His talent for war was very remarkable, although owing to his almost total want of education, no despatches are extant to give the details

country, against the leading regiments, and drove them back in some confusion upon the supporting brigade, which, being attacked in flank by a force sent round for that purpose, became demoralised and retreated in great disorder on the main column, losing six guns. The remainder of the enemy's force was then brought into action and for a time held the Confederates in check; but the manœuvres of the fighting men were impeded by the tumultuous crowd of camp-followers who, giving way to panic, fled to the rear, sweeping with them a portion of the troops moving into position. Then Forrest pushed onwards in skirmishing order, the riflemen of the Mississippi pouring in a deadly fire, and it became a question with Smith how best to cover an inevitable retreat. The fourth Missouri cavalry was detached to form the rear-guard, and in some measure retrieving the credit lost by their comrades, held the enemy in partial check until night closed in. Then the Federals, demoralised, suffering from want and cold, and many of them dismounted, hurried in disorderly retreat to Pontotac, where some degree of discipline was restored. From thence retracing their steps through the country they had wasted and pillaged, they reached Colliersville, after losing three hundred and fifty men, three thousand horses, and, worse than all, that prestige and confidence which leads to success.

of his campaigns. At the battle of Okolona the subjoined order sent to the officer commanding the detached force, who in place of waiting for Forrest's attack commenced the engagement prematurely, is characteristic of the man. Forrest hearing the guns, called his aide-de-camp, and told him to write as follows. "Why the h—l do you force on the battle, withdraw your men and be d—d." Notwithstanding his rough exterior, he was a man of great genius, and is classed by General Beauregard as one of the most remarkable soldiers that the war produced.'

General Polk may well say that at Okolona was the turning-point of the campaign. Sherman, after anxiously and in vain awaiting the cavalry, seeing that a farther advance was impossible, retreated to Vicksburg, and the interior of the State of Mississippi was again free from the presence of the enemy.

The Federal generals and the Northern press in vain tried to disguise the failure of the campaign, by enumerating the amount of damage inflicted on the enemy by the destruction of railways and the ruin of the country. But in truth marauding had produced its usual effects, and the failure of the cavalry may be in great measure attributed to the evil influence which habits of plunder exercised on the soldiery.* On the other hand, the ease with which a powerful and well-handled column penetrated the heart of the Confederacy, the feeble resistance it encountered, and the general idea conveyed by the scantiness of the male population that the strength of the South was well-nigh exhausted, paved the way to plans of which the execution at a later period produced the most important results.

* The following extract is taken from a Northern account of the Red River expedition, in which a portion of General Sherman's troops were employed :—

‘I should not be a faithful historian, if I omitted to mention that the conduct of the troops during the late raid of General Sherman is becoming very prejudicial to our good name, and to their efficiency. A spirit of destruction and wanton ferocity seems to have seized upon many of them, which is quite incredible. At Red River, landing, they robbed a house of several thousand dollars in specie, and then fired the house to conceal their crime. At Simmsport a party of them stole out, and robbed and insulted a family about two miles distant. In fact, unless checked by summary example, there is danger of our whole noble army degenerating into a band of cut-throats and robbers. I am glad to say that General Smith is disposed to punish all offenders severely.’

Had Sherman's campaign proved successful, possibly the events which occurred nine months later would have been in some measure forestalled. It had been arranged that an attack on Mobile by Farragut should have been made simultaneously with the advance of the military force, whilst a threatened movement against J. Johnston by Thomas was intended to prevent the transmission of any assistance from the army of the West to either Polk in Mississippi, or Maury, commanding at Mobile. But the defeat of the cavalry, by occasioning Sherman's retreat, frustrated these plans. The army, in place of marching on Mobile, retired to Vicksburg; the fleet, under Farragut, bombarded Fort Powel at the entrance of Mobile Harbour, but was beaten off with the loss of a gunboat, and the *reconnaissance* from Thomas's army towards Dalton merely developed the strength of the enemy's position; whilst the increased premium on gold afforded evidence that in the opinion of the Northern public, the winter's campaign in the West had been unsuccessful.

But the repulse of the cavalry was to be productive of still greater evil, and a counterpart of the raid into Mississippi was to be furnished by an expedition, under Forrest, through Western Tennessee and Kentucky. Taking advantage of the severe lesson given to the Federal cavalry, and availing himself of the opportunity which the weakening of the garrisons of Tennessee, necessitated by the concentration of the Western armies for the spring campaign, seemed to offer, Forrest crossed the frontiers of Tennessee, captured the town of Jackson on the 23rd of March, compelled the surrender of the garrison of Union City, and sacked the town of Paducah, on the Ohio River, on the 26th. The rapidity and daring of his march, the secrecy of

his movements, and possibly the doubtful loyalty of many professing Unionists, in the States of Kentucky and Tennessee, partially paralysed the Federal officers. Colonel Hicks, commanding the fort at Paducah, held out gallantly, and Columbus refused to surrender ; but no efforts were made to pursue or drive Forrest from a country which had long been considered as within the Union lines ; and during the remaining days of March and the commencement of April, he maintained a position in the heart of Tennessee, subsisting his troops on stores either captured from the enemy, or furnished by professing Unionists from the north of the Ohio.*

On the 12th April he appeared before Fort Pillow, on the Mississippi, with a force of two brigades ; and, after sending a summons to surrender, which was refused, prepared to storm the works. Fort Pillow was principally garrisoned with negro troops, to which had been added a Tennessee cavalry regiment, the whole force numbering about 550 effective men.† After the first summons, the Confederate skirmishers advanced to a ravine, where were some temporary barracks and Government stores, and in which they effected a lodgment notwithstanding the fire of the garrison, assisted by that of a gunboat on the river. Having thus invested the fort on the land side, Forrest again sent a flag of truce, to demand that it should be given up, at the same time complimenting the Federal commandant on the courage he had shown. The summons was a second time refused ; Major Bradford, who had succeeded Major Booth (killed), declaring his intention of holding

* See General Brayman's evidence before the committee of enquiry on the conduct of the war.

† General Hurlbut's evidence before the committee of enquiry on the conduct of the war.

out. Immediately on the answer being received, the Confederates moved forward to the assault; they were close to the main work, and rushing onwards with terrible impetuosity, without pause or halt, poured over the fortifications.* The negro garrison, paralysed by fear, threw away their arms and fled down the steep bluff towards the river. The whites, seeing the hopelessness of further resistance, endeavoured to surrender, but the men from Missouri, Mississippi, and Tennessee, heated by the fight, and rendered savage by the sight of the negro troops, gave little or no quarter. From the hill they had gained they poured a destructive fire on the terrified fugitives, shooting them down without pity, and killing them in the water, as they sought a momentary safety by swimming; whilst others, descending the hill, continued the slaughter on the river bank. Few prisoners, either white or black, were captured; the greater number of the negroes were slain, and the whites, stigmatised as traitors to the State of Tennessee, in many instances met with a similar fate. Some of the Confederate officers endeavoured to stop this awful butchery, but others seem to have given way to the lust for blood which characterised their men, and which disgraced troops who, by the gallant assault of the work, had earned a reputation due to their conduct as soldiers.

* Federal accounts accuse the Confederate troops of having approached the fortifications whilst the flag of truce was flying. There seems to be some truth in their allegation, but the seeming infraction of the laws of war is excused by the fact, that during the time given by General Forrest to the Federal commanding officer to come to a decision, steamers were seen ascending the river, crowded with what appeared to General Forrest to be reinforcements for the garrison. See evidence given before the committee of enquiry on the conduct of the war, and General Forrest's report. *Rebellion Record*, vol. viii.

It was the result of no ordinary genius for war, that enabled General Forrest, with but a small body of men, about 5,000, to keep possession of the greater portion of Western Tennessee for upwards of a month ; but it may be doubted whether the services there rendered to the Confederate cause were productive of good commensurate with the wear and tear of horses and men during the active operations of a winter campaign. Forrest had captured the garrison of Union City, and destroyed that of Fort Pillow ; he had fed his men and horses at the expense of the enemy, but he had been unable seriously to interfere with the communications of the Army of the Cumberland. The line of the Tennessee River and the rail from Nashville remained intact ; and General Sherman, now in command of the West, intent upon the grand plan of the spring campaign, could afford to permit Forrest to hold temporary possession of Western Tennessee, knowing that he would be unable to establish forts to command the Mississippi ; and, trusting that the sympathy of the inhabitants of the State being divided, he would fail in any endeavour to augment his forces by a *levée en masse* of the population.*

The expedition of Forrest would naturally lead to the consideration of the spring campaign of the West ; but in this great war, so many were the battles, so vast the theatre of operations, that it continually becomes necessary to turn from the connected narrative of one campaign to that of others, of which the success or failure more or less influenced the great strategical plans, and tended to hasten, on or to delay the final catastrophe. Leaving, therefore, General Forrest at

* General Brayman's evidence before the committee of enquiry on the conduct of the war.

Jackson, Tennessee, at which place he had established his head-quarters after evacuating Fort Pillow, we must follow the fortunes of General Banks, engaged in an endeavour to penetrate the fertile States of Louisiana and Arkansas.*

* The following narratives relating to Forrest's raid, published in vol. viii. of the *Rebellion Record*, give some insight into the incidents of civil warfare :—

‘Lieutenant McIntire, of the 9th Illinois cavalry, relates that just as the fight near Summerville commenced he arrived on the ground with a dispatch from General Grierson to Colonel Prince. Finding himself surrounded and unable to escape, he sprang from his horse and crawled under a house ; but fearing that this would not be a safe place, he crept into a cotton-gin, a short distance off. In this gin he found a large heap of cotton seed. Jumping into the heap he covered himself with the seed, so as to have only his head out, over which he pulled a basket. Here the lieutenant was feeling comparatively safe, when an officer of the 7th bulged in the door, with a dozen rebels at his heels. The officer ran upstairs and hid under some loose boards in the floor. The rebels put a guard round the house and began a vigorous search. Upstairs and down they went several times, and every hiding-place but the right one was examined. They knew that the officer was there in some place, and they were determined to have him. Presently the mass of cotton seed caught their attention, and forthwith they began plunging their sabres into it. The heap was pitched in all directions, but providentially, without touching the lieutenant's body. At last one of them, exasperated beyond endurance at this ill-success, vented his anger on the basket over the lieutenant's head, by striking it a furious blow with his sword. Had the latter not kept a vigorous hold of the handle it would have been knocked over. Just then some occurrence outside caused them to hurry away, and both officers escaped.’

‘In the great hurry in which the rebels made their crossing at Lafayette, there was necessarily much confusion and straggling. By some means an officer of Forrest's staff became separated from the main column, and after our occupation of the place he came riding up in the dark and enquired for head-quarters. The sentinel pointed out the house just occupied by General Grierson. Starting in the direction indicated he was encountered by Major Starr of the 7th Illinois,

Since the expedition to Opelousas and the operations immediately preceding the siege of Port Hudson, little of importance had taken place in the southern department of the trans-Mississippi. General Banks, more suited by previous education for civil than military life, had maintained a firm hold on New Orleans, and had busied himself in endeavouring to reorganise a system of serf labour to replace that of slavery. He had been mentioned as a candidate for the approaching election for the Presidency, and his devotion to the Union, together with his excellent public and private character, and his successful administration of the department of the Gulf, seemed to point him out as a formidable rival to Mr. Lincoln. He had, moreover, been partially successful in his military operations; he had secured possession of an important post on the Rio Grande, and had interrupted the communication between the newly organised Empire of Mexico and the Confederate States.

In an evil hour he undertook to extend his conquests into the heart of Louisiana, a project which seems to have found especial favour at Washington, as the whole naval force of the Mississippi, together with the army of Arkansas, were put in motion, to co-operate with the advance of the troops from New Orleans. Possibly

to whom he repeated the enquiry. "What head-quarters?" asked the major. "Why, d—n it, General Forrest's, of course," replied the rebel. "This way, then," said the major, and to his unspeakable surprise, he was escorted to the presence of General Grierson.'

'During the campaign of Eastern Tennessee General Longstreet and his staff occupied the house which belonged to Mr. Johnson, subsequently President of the United States. The board on which Johnson, tailor, was written remained on the house, but the business was at that time principally carried on by his brother, he, the future President, having forsaken tailoring for the study and practice of law, although he occasionally worked at his old trade.'

political, as well as, or more than, military reasons, may have led to this expedition. To sever the Confederacy from Mexico by the occupation of Louisiana and Arkansas, and to interpose a barrier to any understanding or alliance between these two countries, may have presented itself as an object worthy of attainment, whilst the possibility of reorganising the civil governments of those States, and thus securing their votes for the Republican candidate at the shortly forthcoming election for the Presidency, may also have added its weight in favour of the project.

Regarded merely in a military light, the diversion of so large a force from the true theatre of war was an error. The trans-Mississippi department had been almost entirely cut off from the main portion of the Confederacy, by the results of the campaigns of the preceding summer. The heart of secession was in Virginia, the Carolinas, Georgia and Alabama, and in those States were to be found (strategically speaking) the true objective points. This fact was subsequently understood and acted upon; but as during the earlier years of the war the strength of large armies had been frittered away in the desultory warfare of partisans, so at this later period was the power of the North diverted from its proper channel to the furtherance of schemes based on political rather than military reasons.

Nevertheless, regarded merely in relation to the objects in view, the expedition of March 1864 was planned on sound principles. The aim and objects of the army and the fleet were to obtain command of the Red River, which intersects the heart of Louisiana, and to capture and hold Shreveport, the seat of the Louisiana legislature, and the head-quarters of the military department

of the trans-Mississippi. The season chosen for the enterprise was the early spring months, when the waters of the upper Red River would be sufficiently deep to float the gunboats and transports, and when a co-operating force from Tennessee could best be spared. The expeditionary force under General Banks and Admiral Porter was to be composed of about 12,000 men of the army of Louisiana, commanded by General Franklin,* together with about 5,000 cavalry, 10,000 of Sherman's force under General A. J. Smith, and a fleet of 19 gunboats and 30 transports;† whilst General Steele, from Little Rock, Arkansas, with about 10,000 infantry and 2,500 cavalry, was to co-operate by an advance on the upper Red River. This considerable army in three columns was set in motion about the middle of March; General Franklin marched from the neighbourhood of New Orleans by Brashear City up the Bayou Teche country towards Alexandria; Admiral Porter with his flotilla, containing Smith's division, rendezvoused at the mouth of Red River, prepared to force a passage up its waters; and General Steele commenced his wearisome and difficult march through the swamps and forests of Southern Arkansas.

To meet the threatened invasion, Kirby Smith, recently appointed to the command of the trans-Mississippi department, was able to organise and bring into the field a force of little more than 13,000 infantry and 3,500 cavalry.‡ He had placed his head-quarters at

* Formerly belonging to the Army of the Potomac.

† General Walker (the Confederate general) estimated the force at 25,000 infantry, and 7,000 cavalry or mounted infantry.

‡ General Taylor's corps of two divisions; Walker's and Mouton's, and General Price's force of 6,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry. General Green's cavalry had been sent to reinforce Magruder in Texas.

Shreveport, and having directed General Taylor * to watch and obstruct the course of the Red River, he sent Price and Marmaduke to harass the march of General Steele. It was his object to draw the enemy into the heart of the country, and when far from his resources and entangled amid the swamps and pine forests, to fall upon and overwhelm him. To defend the outlying towns and villages at the mouth of the Red River was impossible, but to check the advance, to separate the land forces from the gunboats, to impede the movements of the transports and thus to give time for the concentration of the army of the trans-Mississippi, were the duties delegated to General Taylor.

Since the abandonment of the Mississippi the Atchafalaya River had formed the line of defence for the State of Louisiana, but the movement of General Franklin by the Bayou Teche, and of the gunboats up the Red River, necessitated the withdrawal of General Taylor's force from the Atchafalaya and the abandonment of the works that defended it. One fort only, named Fort de Russy, situated near the junction of the Atchafalaya with the Red River,† about fifty miles from the confluence of the latter with the Mississippi, threatened to bar the progress of the gunboats. It was a small work, capable of containing a garrison of about 450 men, and had been erected on an island, unfortunately commanded by neighbouring hills. Therefore its permanent defence depended on the occupation of these hills which could only be main-

* General Taylor was a son of President Taylor. He had large property in Louisiana, and although not a soldier by profession, had studied war, and was considered to be one of the most highly instructed among the Confederate generals.

† There is communication between these two rivers, although they flow in different directions.

tained by a considerable force, and such a force it was not advisable to risk for so small an object. Nevertheless, in order to secure General Taylor from being cut off by the division moving in gunboats up the Red River, the temporary defence of the fort became necessary, and to Colonel Byrd was the duty assigned of holding it to the last extremity. The assault was made on the afternoon of the 13th March, by a portion of General Smith's division, which, having landed and forced its way through the swamps and forests, invested and stormed the work. The garrison resisted bravely with musketry, but the guns, owing to their position (*en barbette*), which exposed the men who worked them to the enemy's riflemen, could not be used, and thus the fort was carried, its garrison made prisoners, and the gunboats, proceeding with their attendant transports up the river, joined Franklin's force at Alexandria on the 15th March. There General Banks assumed the command, and formed his intermediate base of operations. He was now at a distance of 140 miles from the mouth of Red River, and about 300 remained to be traversed before reaching Shreveport. The next intermediate point was the old French settlement of Natchitoches, four miles from the landing place of Grand Ecore, on the Red River, and thither General Lee, with the cavalry force of Banks's army, was ordered on the 28th to direct his march.

After delays occasioned by bridging the Cane River, and after a slight skirmish with the retreating Confederates, General Lee occupied the town of Natchitoches on the 31st March, where he awaited the infantry and artillery, which arrived shortly afterwards.* In the

* A portion of General Smith's force, viz. 3,000 men, was sent back to Vicksburg to garrison the forts on the Mississippi, and about

meantime, Admiral Porter, with a portion of the fleet, having overcome the difficulties of the rocks and shoals /on the Red River, and having left patrols of gunboats to guard the lower waters, arrived at Grand Ecore, where General Banks, who, with his staff, had ascended the river on board a gunboat, rejoined the army. There were signs that a considerable force of the enemy was prepared to dispute a further advance ; light troops had made their appearance on the banks, and had fired on the vessels, and Lee had come in contact with a more formidable body near Pleasant Hill, a few miles beyond Natchitoches.

The army was immediately put in motion, and Admiral Porter, with the gunboats of lighter draught, prepared to continue his course up the river, the lowness of the water precluding the employment of the heavier vessels. But at Grand Ecore, the waggon road to Mansfield, and thence to Shreveport, leaves the river from fifteen to twenty miles on its right hand, and it was there decided that, whilst a small force of infantry should remain on the transports with the gunboats, the bulk of the army, including the whole of the cavalry and artillery, together with a baggage train of undue proportions, should move through the forest towards Mansfield. On the 6th of April the march commenced, General Lee, with 5,000 cavalry, heading the advance, followed by the 3rd and 4th divisions of the 13th corps, under Franklin, and the 19th corps, trailing with them along the narrow road through the pine woods *impedimenta* of every description ; whilst behind this unwarlike procession, and consequently hin-

3,000 men, under General Grove, were left to guard the dépôts at Alexandria. Thus, Banks's total force which marched on Natchitoches was 20,000 men.—*Report of the Conduct of the War.*

dered and delayed in his march, General A. J. Smith brought up, at a distance of several miles, the Western troops.* On the 7th April the leading column encamped at Pleasant Hill, thirty miles distant from Natchitoches, and on the 8th marched on Mansfield, seventeen miles distant.

In the meantime, General Taylor, still retreating, had been joined by detachments of Green's cavalry from Texas, men trained from boyhood in the use of arms and the practice of horsemanship. These soon proved their superiority in the art of skirmishing, and between Natchitoches and Mansfield kept up an almost continuous engagement with the Federal advanced cavalry. In addition to this reinforcement, Price's infantry had been brought to Shreveport, leaving that officer to obstruct with his cavalry, assisted by a regiment of half-civilised Indians, the advance of Steele. General Taylor's orders were to continue the retreat until a junction had been effected between his two divisions and Price's infantry, now at Shreveport. These he obeyed, until issuing from the pine woods near Mansfield, he found himself entering an open country, where the single road through the forest diverged in several directions, and where easy communication could be maintained between the troops on land and the gunboats. All these were direct advantages to the invading army, and the question arose whether the orders of the commanding

* The following extract from a national account gives a description of the baggage train of Banks's army :—

'It was only through the greatest personal exertions of General Smith that his troops were hurried through the thick pine country, while the narrow road was completely blocked up with this long train, half of the waggons filled with trunks, chairs, valises, and other cumbersome baggage, such as greatly embarrass, and, oftentimes, as in the disaster of yesterday, imperil the lives of numbers of men.'

general should be obeyed to the letter, or whether, acting on his own responsibility, General Taylor should fall on the advancing column with his two divisions before they could issue from the forest and obtain the assistance of the fleet. The intelligence of the approach of the gunboats, received on the night of the 7th April, decided him on taking the responsibility of infringing his orders. Therefore, directing Walker's and Mouton's divisions to retrace their steps through Mansfield, he selected and occupied a position, on the morning of the 8th of April, three miles in front of the town.*

During the early part of that day there was constant skirmishing between Green's cavalry, falling back, and the Federal advanced guard, consisting of Lee's cavalry, supported by the 4th division of the 13th corps, and separated by a considerable interval and a long baggage train from the 3rd division. General Banks, although warned of the close proximity of a formidable body of the enemy, had neglected the most ordinary precautions; he had hastened on his cavalry and artillery with one division in support, allowing a train of 260 waggons to encumber the line of march in their rear, and to separate them from the reserve; whilst the Western division, under Smith, was still farther on the road to Natchitoches, struggling to make its way through the almost interminable baggage of the 13th and 19th corps.† Whilst marching in this unwarlike array, the catastrophe which his want of foresight and

* For many of the details connected with the trans-Mississippi campaign, the author is indebted to General Walker, late of the Confederate army.

† General Franklin states that this train was composed of 700 waggons.

organisation seemed to suggest, fell on him. Green, who had been fighting bravely, but still fighting in retreat, finding himself supported by two divisions of infantry, suddenly turned on his pursuers and attacked boldly with his dismounted cavalry, whilst Mouton's division on the left, advancing without orders, captured a battery of artillery. Then Taylor, who, even until this moment, had doubted whether he ought to bring on a general engagement, seeing what he deemed to be a favourable opportunity, ordered forward Walker, with his three brigades. These noble soldiers, advancing over an open field, exposed to a heavy fire, with arms at the slope, and without replying to a shot, charged with a rush the enemy occupying the pine woods. Nothing could resist the impetuosity of their attack; the Federals turned and fled, abandoning their artillery. Lee's cavalry galloped to the rear, rushing through and involving in the panic the 4th division. The whole of the artillery (eighteen guns) was lost, General Ranson was wounded, Banks and Franklin, who had hastened to the front, were forced to retire in rear of the baggage train, where the 3rd division attempted to make a stand. But forward pressed the pursuers, Texans and Louisianians vying with each other, eager to avenge the wrongs of their States, but maintaining even in the disorder of the advance their unbroken ranks. Vain were the efforts of the 3rd division to stem the torrent. The terrified fugitives, abandoning their arms, swept onward, dragging with them the troops who still maintained their formation.*

* Extract from a Northern account—*Philadelphia Press* narrative:—

'It was my fortune to see the first battle of Bull Run, and to be among those who made the celebrated midnight retreat towards

Lee's baggage train fell into the enemy's hands, and the pursuit was only checked by the troops of the 19th corps, which, under General Emory, had hastened towards the scene of action, and offered a barrier to the enemy's further progress. It was now night, and General Banks, covering his retreat with the 19th corps, retired towards his former camping ground of Pleasant Hill.

Seldom has a victory been more complete than that gained by General Taylor at the battle of Mansfield :— 22 pieces of artillery, 220 army waggons, laden with subsistence, ammunition and baggage, 30 ambulances, and 3,500 prisoners, were claimed as its substantial result, whilst the main army of General Banks was driven to seek refuge in flight, at a loss to the victors of less than 1,000 in killed and wounded. Amongst the former was one whom his country could ill afford to spare—General Mouton was numbered among the slain, treacherously killed, it is said, by five Federal soldiers, who had surrendered as prisoners.*

Washington. The retreat of the 4th division was as much a rout as that of the first Federal army, with the exception that fewer men were engaged, and our men here fought with a valour which was not shown on that serious, sad, mock heroic day in July.'

Other Northern accounts confirm the statement of the utter rout of the 3rd division.

* In the midst of grand campaigns and decisive victories, one is often tempted to forget the calamities of war and the misery inflicted on individuals. It is only when conversing with those who have acted in such scenes that their painful and affecting incidents are to be realised. As one among many others the following is given :—

'Shortly before the battle of Mansfield, a colour, worked by the ladies of New Orleans, had been forwarded to General Walker for presentation to such regiment as he might select. He chose one commanded by a young colonel remarkable for his zeal, who, on receiving it, as his regiment was marching to the battle field, promised

On the evening of the same day, General A. J. Smith, with the Western troops of the 16th and 17th corps, was encamped at Pleasant Hill, when the fugitives from the advance announced the terrible defeat that had befallen the army. At first the news was received with incredulity, but on the arrival of an officer of General Banks's staff confirming the rumours, no doubt remained of the extent of the disaster, and measures were immediately taken to afford what assistance might be possible. The troops were ordered to be in readiness to march at daylight; but the orders were changed when, during the night, Generals Banks, Franklin, and Emory arrived with the remnants of the army, and it was decided to take up a position and await the enemy at Pleasant Hill. During the morning of the 9th April, the almost unarmed and disorganised troops belonging to the cavalry and the 13th corps were sent to the rear as escort to the remnants of the baggage train; whilst the Western men, with the 19th corps, remained at Pleasant Hill to cover the retreat which seemed inevitable, and which during the day was fully decided upon. Through the forenoon of Saturday all was quiet; such of the houses of the little village of Pleasant Hill as had not been pulled down for firewood, were cleared away to afford sweep for the guns, and, watching the wide circle of woods which enclosed the open ground around the low ridge of hill, the men from Sherman's army, confident in themselves, and ascribing the defeat of the

the General's wife, who had accompanied the army, that he would defend it to the last gasp; but asking if she would intercede with her husband for a fortnight's furlough for himself when the battle was won, as he had a young wife whom he had not seen for eighteen months. The request was granted, but he never returned to claim its fulfilment. He was shot at the battle of Mansfield, and died far from his wife and home.'

preceding day to the inferiority of the generals and troops of the Army of Louisiana, awaited in sullen silence the advance of the foe.

In the meantime, Churchill's infantry from Arkansas had joined Taylor's force, and Kirby Smith, the general commanding-in-chief, ordered the enemy to be followed up. But the Confederates, wearied by their efforts of the previous day, and by the long march made by Churchill's men, advanced but slowly, and it was not till about 4 P.M. that Green's cavalry came in contact with the 19th corps, under Emory, guarding the approaches to the open and cultivated ground which surrounded the village of Pleasant Hill. These troops were quickly driven in, with the loss of a battery of artillery; so quickly as to lead General Taylor to the belief that he had before him merely the rear guard of a retreating army. He therefore ordered Churchill to move by a bye road, and take the enemy in flank, whilst Walker attacked him in front, Polignac,* now in command of Mouton's division (that general having fallen on the previous day), remaining in reserve. Churchill advanced fearlessly, but he soon found that he had to deal with troops differing widely from the demoralised fugitives of the preceding day, and sent anxiously for support from Walker's division. A brigade was immediately despatched to his assistance, and Walker moved forward with the remainder of his force, supported by Polignac, from the shelter of the woods, to where the Western men, posted on a ridge of rising ground near the village of Pleasant Hill, awaited his assault. The action had now become general: Churchill on the right

* Prince Polignac, a French gentleman of high family, who had embraced the Confederate cause, and who acquired much distinction during the war.

was severely handled and driven back to the woods ; Walker, on the left, suffered greatly whilst crossing the valley, Smith's Western men, sheltered by the inequalities of the ground, pouring in deadly volleys ; but reinforced by Polignac, he continued to advance, and at nightfall had partially driven back the enemy's right wing, compensating for the repulse of Churchill on the right. Neither side could claim a decisive success ; guns captured by the Confederates in the earlier engagement with the 19th corps had been retaken, and the Federals had maintained their ground ; whilst the retreat of the Confederate infantry after nightfall, to seek for water, eight miles in rear, gave some colour to the assertion that they had suffered repulse.

Nevertheless, the battle of Pleasant Hill was fought by the Federals for existence, not for victory. The invasion had terminated with the action in the pine woods near Mansfield, and the retreat to Grand Ecore and the gunboats was continued. There, for a short time, the army encamped, awaiting intelligence of Steele's column from Arkansas ; whilst Admiral Porter with difficulty withdrew from a somewhat perilous position higher up the river. His advance had been stopped by the news of Banks's disaster, his fleet was threatened by the infantry on the banks, and it was only by running the gauntlet of the fire, and sweeping the woods with grape, that the vessels of war were enabled to return, bringing with them the transports to Grand Ecore.* But the waters of the Red River were falling ; one of the gunboats had been blown up by a torpedo, and, whilst the army halted at Grand Ecore, two transports were captured, and fears were

* The Confederate General Green was killed in one of the affairs with the gunboats.

entertained by Admiral Porter that it might become necessary to abandon the fleet of the Mississippi, and that the vessels which had done so good service during the many battles on the Western waters would perish above the Grand Falls, whose rocks and shoals prevented their downward progress.

Then was conceived and carried out a project of which the army and navy of the West may justly be proud, and which reflects especial credit on Lieut.-Col. Bailey of the engineers. He planned and executed the magnificent scheme of constructing a dam across the rocks of the falls, and thus raising the water sufficiently to float the gunboats. Few supposed the project possible, nevertheless army and navy worked vigorously. The lumberers from Maine felled the trees, quarries were opened for stone, flat boats conveyed the blocks down to the falls, and a tree dam was commenced on either bank of the river. In eight days the work was almost finished, one day more and all would have been in order, when the river, sweeping through the opening with resistless force, carried away two of the barges which, filled with stones and sunk in its current, formed a part of the dam. Then the Admiral, supposing that the dam was ruined, and that no persuasion would induce the disheartened troops to resume the work, galloped up the river's bank to where his gunboats were lying, and ordered four of them to attempt the passage. One after another, with full heads of steam on, they approached the gap in the dam, where the stream was running like a mill race; each, amidst the breathless silence of the thousands of spectators, plunged in, and, greeted by shouts and cheers, emerged in the calm waters below the falls. The passage had been successfully effected, the troops recommenced their labours, the dam was com-

pleted, and the whole fleet safely passed the falls, and, accompanied by the army, returned to Alexandria.

The misfortune at Mansfield and Pleasant Hill had led to the abandonment of all designs for the invasion or occupation of the valley of the Red River; and General Banks, with a numerically formidable army, and a powerful fleet, fled before one weak infantry division and four brigades of cavalry.* Meanwhile, the great body of the troops, under Kirby Smith, having abandoned the pursuit of Banks, had turned on Steele; and, whilst the Federal army of Louisiana was congratulating itself on its safe escape to Alexandria, and was avenging its defeat by the wanton destruction of towns, villages, and farm-houses,† the war was fiercely raging among the swamps of Southern Arkansas, where General Steele was enduring the consequences of the rout and flight of the main army of invasion.

With great difficulty, owing to the poverty of the country, the badness of the roads, and the frequency of swamps and streams over which the bridges had been destroyed by the enemy, General Steele had penetrated by Archidelpia to Camden. There he had been brought to a halt by the failure of his transport

* The infantry under Polignac; the cavalry under Wharton.

† The following extract is taken from a Confederate account, on which great reliance may be placed:—

‘The conduct of the Federal army in this retreat will be a standing disgrace to the Federal arms for all time, and generations must pass away before the devastation and wanton destruction of towns, villages, and farm houses will be forgotten or forgiven. The perpetrators of these acts of barbarism were worse enemies of the cause of the Union than the *rebels* in arms, and to the minds of the sufferers and their descendants this cause will for ever be represented by the ashes and blackened ruins of their once peaceful and happy homes; and the names of Banks and A. J. Smith will be uttered with execrations by a ruined people for generations to come.’

animals, and by the almost impossibility of protecting his supply trains from Little Rock, threatened and frequently attacked by the enemy's cavalry, which, more numerous than his own, prevented his foragers from collecting supplies from the surrounding country. It was at Camden that intelligence reached him of the defeat and retreat of Banks; and, justly fearing that the weight of the trans-Mississippi army would now be directed against his force, scarcely able to retain its position against Price's cavalry, he ordered and commenced a retrograde movement to Little Rock.

Not a day too soon was this determination taken, for Kirby Smith, in opposition to the opinion of some of his subordinate generals, who considered that the annihilation of Banks would be more beneficial to the cause than the defeat of Steele, had crossed the Red River with the divisions of Walker,* Parsons, and Churchill, and, on the 26th April, reached the neighbourhood of Camden. But Steele, now on the road to Little Rock, had placed the Ouachita River between himself and his pursuers, destroying the bridge and sinking the boats; and Kirby Smith, whose pontoon train had not arrived, found himself delayed until his engineers could construct a temporary foot bridge, and bale out a ferry-boat not completely destroyed. Then, hastening on his infantry, with four light field batteries, without baggage, he continued the pursuit. He hoped that the retreat of the Federal general would be delayed by a strong body of cavalry, who, under Fagan, had made a wide circuit, and had taken position on his line of communication; but, although successful in capturing

* General Walker had been badly wounded at Pleasant Hill, but continued in command of his division during the trying and severe campaign against Steele.

a large number of prisoners, supplies, and guns, on the road from Little Rock to the front, General Fagan failed to intercept or hinder the retreating column; and thus, whilst Marmaduke, with the Missouri cavalry, engaged the rear guard, the infantry, struggling along the roads almost impassable on account of the mud, was unable to approach nearer than a day's march to the retreating column. But the eagerness of pursuit, and the confidence engendered by the victory of Mansfield, aroused the spirit of the men, and rendered them insensible to fatigue. On the afternoon of the 29th April they heard the guns of Steele's rear guard; and, in the midst of a storm of rain, pressed onwards during the night of the 29th and 30th. The Saline River was in their front, and possibly Steele might be brought to bay before he could place it between himself and those who thirsted for his destruction. Across this river, much swollen by rain, was a pontoon bridge; but between it and the comparatively dry pine forest, lay a marsh through which the weary animals could not drag the baggage waggons of the Federal army. Steele, unwilling to sacrifice his trains, resolved to accept battle, to cover the passage of the river; and, throwing up a slight breastwork of fence rails, awaited the pursuing infantry.

He had selected a strong position; his right rested on a small stream rendered deep by the still falling rain, and his left on a marsh covered with shallow water. There Kirby Smith resolved to attack him; but, fearing that he might escape if any delay should occur, hurried forward his brigades successively as they arrived at the edge of the forest overlooking the marsh. There was no time to reconnoitre the ground; each brigade of Price's infantry as it arrived was pushed forward to the

attack, which, owing to the weariness of the troops, was not conducted vigorously. Seeing this, and perceiving also the strength of the position occupied by his adversary, Kirby Smith ordered Walker, who had now reached the scene of action, to attempt to turn the enemy's left flank by advancing through the marsh. This, General Walker essayed to do, although the water was nearly breast high, and his men fell thickly. The three brigade commanders were wounded (two mortally), the supply of ammunition was failing, but the division held its ground, until a brigade of Price's troops coming up in support enabled it to resume the offensive. Night was now approaching ; and the Federals, abandoning some of their waggons too deeply embedded in the mud to be dragged forward, crossed the Saline River, and, without further molestation, reached Little Rock. The Confederates, who had been marching almost continuously for three days and nights, with no other subsistence than that contained in their havresacks, were hopelessly weary ; the men threw themselves down in the mud and water, and, with the battle of Saline River, the pursuit of Steele's column terminated.*

The loss on the Confederate side had been heavy, amounting to nearly 1,000 ; the country in the rear was barren, and supplies for a further prosecution of the

* General Walker thus bears testimony to the soldierly qualities of his Texan troops :—

‘It may be mentioned, as evidence opposed to the received opinion that Southern troops are wanting in physical stamina and powers of endurance, that the infantry division of General Walker, composed entirely of Texans, from the 13th of March to the 30th of April, or forty-eight days, had marched 620 miles, and fought three pitched battles, and after a repose of five days only, set out for the lower Red River valley, a distance of 190 miles, which it accomplished in eight days.’

campaign would necessarily have to be brought from the far-distant Red River. Therefore, after three days' halt, the troops were put in motion towards the lower Red River valley, to reinforce Taylor, still watching Banks. But that general, unwilling to risk a fresh attack from the trans-Mississippi army with a force now diminished by the departure of Smith's Western division, after burning Alexandria, retreated, about the middle of May, across the Atchefalaya to the neighbourhood of New Orleans, the fleet at the same time withdrawing from the Red River and re-entering the Mississippi.

Thus terminated the invasion of Louisiana, an operation fraught with misfortune to the North, and with ruin to General Banks's reputation as a general. A searching inquiry was instituted into the causes of the disaster, when the majority of the members composing the court concurred in blaming the plan equally with the conduct of the expedition. Political and commercial motives were said to have influenced the former, as they interfered with the proper execution of the latter, although it is fair to state that a strong minority exculpated General Banks from much of the blame that was thrown upon him. Among the Confederates of the trans-Mississippi there was joy and triumph at the successful termination of the campaign. With far inferior forces they had defeated and driven back in disgrace a formidable army, backed by the naval power of the Mississippi, advancing against them from the South ; and then, utilising the advantage of interior lines, had turned on the column from Arkansas entering their territory from the West, and had forced it to seek safety by a rapid retreat.

The trans-Mississippi department, from the Arkansas

to the Bayou Teche, was now free from the presence of the invader, and, removed from the scene of the active operations of the ensuing campaigns, watched, but only slightly participated in, the final struggle which was to determine the fate of the Confederacy, and to influence the destiny of Texas and Louisiana equally with that of their sister States.

CHAPTER X.

MINOR OPERATIONS OF THE WAR.

It was during the trans-Mississippi campaign that an expedition on a minor scale, but somewhat resembling it in its objects and results, was equipped and put in motion against Florida; and, although these and other operations of the winter of 1863–1864 break the connected narrative of the more important campaigns, yet some allusion to them is requisite in order to present a picture of the several scenes of conflict, and to afford means of estimating the magnitude of the Federal resources, often frittered away in desultory operations, rather than husbanded for the prosecution of great schemes.

It will be remembered how, after the failure to capture Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbour, the siege of the city had degenerated into a blockade and fruitless bombardment; and it will be understood that, consequent on this state of affairs, a considerable force, both naval and military, had become idle, and free for other purposes. This force it was decided to employ against Florida, and in February an expedition of some importance was organised for the invasion of that State. To quote General Gillmore's own words, four objects were to be attained by the proposed operations:—

1. To procure an outlet for cotton, lumber, timber, &c.
2. To cut off one of the enemy's sources of commissary supplies.
3. To obtain recruits for any coloured regiments.
4. To inaugurate measures for the speedy restoration of Florida to her allegiance, in accordance with the instructions received from the President.

The last motive was probably the strongest, as the reconstruction of Florida would throw into the hands of the party preparing to bring forward Mr. Lincoln as a candidate for re-election votes which might be of consequence. However, whatever may have been the true objects, the expedition left Charleston Harbour in the first week of February 1864, for Jacksonville, Florida. The plan of the campaign was to seize the towns of Fernandina, Jacksonville, and St. Augustine, on or near the sea-board, to hold the line of the south fork of the St. Mary's and St. John's Rivers, and to occupy Baldwin, the point of intersection of the Florida Central, and Fernandina and Cedar Keys railways.*

The troops landed, and, with little opposition, fulfilled their task. The Confederate General Finnegan was not possessed of sufficient force to offer any formidable resistance, and, retreating before the invaders, established his head-quarters at Lake City, on the Florida Central railroad, about sixty miles from Jacksonville. There he expected and received reinforcements from Charleston and Savannah, until his army had reached the number of 5,000.† General Gillmore had, in the mean-

* *Vide* Map I., commencement of volume.

† Colquhitt's brigade was sent to Florida from Charleston, and Harrison's from Savannah.

time, returned to Hilton Head, having left General Seymour in command, with directions to maintain a defensive attitude, holding the line of the south fork of the St. Mary's and the St. John's Rivers. It was, therefore, with much surprise and displeasure that he received a letter, dated February 17th, to the effect that his lieutenant had undertaken an expedition against Lake City, with the intention of destroying the railway ; that he was actually in the field without awaiting the approval of his superior officer ; that he had not even secured sufficient supplies for his own army during the advance ; and that he was dependent in a great measure for success on the co-operation of the fleet, which he requested might make a demonstration against Savannah, a co-operation which had never been intended or even thought of by either General Gillmore or Admiral Dahlgreen. This inopportune movement commenced about the middle, and ended on the 20th of February. Its execution was equal to its conception, and its disastrous termination was the natural consequence of its rash commencement.

After leaving Baldwin, the troops had advanced along the road which runs parallel with the Florida Central railway, and on the night of the 19th February had halted at a small station about thirty miles from Jacksonville. From thence, on the morning of the 20th, they marched, with the expectation of encountering the enemy in the vicinity of Lake City. But Finnegan, who anticipated an attack, had taken up a strong position fifteen miles from the town, on a swamp which extends for some distance in a southerly direction from Ocean Pond, a small lake north of the railway. There he had concentrated his forces, including a battery of artillery belonging to Savannah, which had done good

service at the defence of Fort Wagner.* His dispositions were, however, not completed when the advanced cavalry of the Federal column made its appearance in front of his pickets, and it became apparent to both armies that an engagement would take place on that afternoon.

The numerical strength of the forces was more evenly balanced than in many of the battles of the war. The Confederate general had about 5,000 men in the field, and expected the assistance of a body of Georgian cavalry. The Federal general, after leaving detachments to hold the posts on the coast and St. John's River, had collected together a force of nearly 6,000, of which about one-half were New England troops, the other half being negroes.† The Confederates had the advantage of position, and of the knowledge of ground, the swamp and forest forming a natural defence, and the railway embankment furnishing a ready-made entrenchment.

The action commenced about two o'clock P.M. The Federal troops, tired by a march of sixteen miles over heavy ground, commenced the battle under disadvantage, but, covered by their artillery, which, more powerful than that of their opponents, was pushed well up to the front, proceeded to deploy on either side of the road. There was however, as little system in the tactics of this battle as there had been in the strategy of the campaign. Regiment after regiment was brought into action as it arrived on the ground; fired away its

* *Southern History of the War*.—Pollard.

† The Federal force in Florida comprised twelve infantry regiments, of which seven were at the battle of Ocean Pond or Olustee. See General Gillmore's and Seymour's letters, also a national and other accounts, published in the *Rebellion Records*, vol. viii.

ammunition in the woods and cypress swamps, suffered considerable loss, and retired. The artillery, more unfortunate and more exposed, lost in men, horses, and, consequently, in guns, of which five fell into the hands of the enemy. For four hours the battle continued, both sides maintaining their ground ; when, as the sun was setting, the Georgians, assuming the offensive, pressed heavily on the disheartened troops. Then the Federals gave way, and retired almost unmolested behind the St. Mary's River, having lost in killed, wounded, and missing, upwards of 1,200,* against about 700 *hors de combat* on the side of the Confederates.

The capture by the enemy of the five guns subsequently became a subject of inquiry. It was probably occasioned by the necessity of sustaining the raw and inexperienced regiments† by the presence of artillery, consequently the guns were advanced too far, and the infantry giving way exposed the artillery to the full brunt of the enemy's fire ; the horses then fell, and the guns could not be dragged out of action. This, together with the badness of the roads and the thickness of the forest, the former impeding the movement of the guns, the latter affording shelter to the enemy's skirmishers, would seem to account for the loss of artillery in this action, as it affords an explanation of similar disasters so frequent in American battles. With the defeat at Ocean Pond terminated the unsuccessful campaign of Florida. The troops continued

* A national account estimates the Federal loss at 1,700, and that of the Confederates at 800. Another account put the Federal loss at 1,200.

† Many of the regiments were blacks, who had recently been slaves.

to hold the stations on the coast, but the interior of the State remained free from the presence of the foe until the terrible events of the succeeding year established the Federal power over Florida, as well as over the other States of the Confederacy.

Further north on the coast of North Carolina, operations resembling in many of their features and results those of the preceding year, filled up the intervals which the inclemency of the weather necessitated in the campaigns of the grand armies. The same causes in the year 1864 produced consequences nearly identical with those of the year 1863, and as, during the winter of the former year the operations on the Mississippi, in Florida, and in North Carolina, preceded the opening campaign of the spring, and the battles of Chancellorsville, so did the above-mentioned Red River and Florida expeditions, and the events in North Carolina, soon to be narrated, employ the soldiers and keep alive the interests of the people of the belligerent nations during the winter of 1864, until the tide of war in Virginia again rolled over the forests of the Wilderness, embracing with its increasing wave the whole extent of the battle fields of the earlier years.

How different was the practice in the old European wars ! Then winter quarters awaited the troops weary with the summer's campaigns ; now, the increased facilities of communication and transport, rendering distance of little account, enable generals to choose their theatre of operations in accordance with the climate and the features of the country. Thus, when the rain and mud of Tennessee rendered an advance from Chattanooga difficult, the more southern States of Mississippi and Louisiana offered a field of employment for troops otherwise idle ; whilst, on the other hand, the quiescence of Meade's

army in Virginia enabled the Confederate government to strengthen the hands of its generals in North Carolina, and to attempt the recapture of towns lost during the first years of the war.

On the 1st February, General Pickett, with two brigades,* drove in the Federal out-pickets in front of Newbern, forcing them to seek shelter under the guns of the fortifications: at the same time he attempted to cut the communication between Newbern and Beaufort, capturing in so doing a considerable number of a Vermont regiment stationed to guard the railway. This was the extent of his success, as, finding the town of Newbern too strong for assault, and being unprovided with the requisites for a siege, he retired to Kingston, contented with the capture of several prisoners and government stores, thus avenging a raid recently made into the State of North Carolina by the garrison of the town. Two months later, a somewhat similar expedition, directed against the town of Plymouth, met with a more successful termination. General Hoke, a North Carolinian by birth, and commanding two brigades from that State and one from Virginia, together with a cavalry regiment and seven batteries of artillery, made a sudden and unexpected descent on the fortifications which defended the approaches to Plymouth,† whilst a ram constructed on the upper waters of the Roanoke co-operated with the movements of the army.

The town of Plymouth, on the right bank of the Roanoke River, had been held by the Federals since Burnside had forced his way into the inner waters of

* Hoke's and part of Corse's and Clingman's brigades. *Vide* General Pickett's despatch.

† *Vide* Pollard's *Southern History*, vol. iii., for a detailed account of this expedition.

Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds. It had been strongly fortified, and, in addition to a line of entrenchment (consisting of a parapet and ditch, enfiladed by Fort Williams), two detached works guarded the river and the approaches from the interior. These two forts were first assailed, the Confederates suddenly appearing before them on the evening of the 17th April, and opening a heavy fire on Fort Warren, commanding the river. On the following morning the other detached work (Fort Wessel) was assailed by Hoke in person, with his own brigade, under Colonel Mercer, whilst Ranson's brigade made a demonstration against the entrenched lines. The garrison fought well, slaying many of the assailants, and, amongst others, Colonel Mercer; but, being surrounded and cut off from support, surrendered in the afternoon, fifty-two men giving themselves up as prisoners. On that same afternoon the steam-ram lent her aid to the army; unperceived she had passed the fort commanding the river, and suddenly attacking the two gunboats which were engaged in firing on the troops, sunk one, and compelled the other to fly. Then taking up a position below the town, she guarded the mouth of the Roanoke River, preventing the reinforcements despatched by General Peck from reaching the garrison.

But, notwithstanding his ill success, the Federal general, Wessel, continued to hold out. He had thrown himself into Fort Williams, and although the entrenchments on either flank had been forced, and the town entered, made a brave resistance. Then Hoke brought all his artillery to play against the work, and his sharpshooters, creeping under cover close up to the parapet, poured in so destructive a fire that the gunners were prevented from serving the guns; at the same time the magazine

was exploded by a shell, and many of the garrison, in terror, fled unarmed from the fort, giving themselves up as prisoners to the Confederate skirmishers. The remainder, together with their commander, General Wessel, surrendered. About 30 pieces of artillery, upwards of 2,000 prisoners, together with a considerable quantity of stores, rewarded the conquerors, and sanguine hopes were entertained throughout the South that the capture of Plymouth would lead to a renewed attack on Newbern, and the expulsion of the enemy from the mainland of North Carolina, hopes which were destined to disappointment, as every man that the Confederacy could muster was required to protect the seat of government from the gathering armies which on all sides menaced its existence.

Vigorous were the efforts made by the Federal government to recruit its armies in the spring of 1864. Bounties amounting to four hundred dollars were paid to every re-enlisting volunteer, and three hundred to every new man; and when even these means were found insufficient to produce the required numbers, a threatened draft for 500,000, followed by another for 200,000, to be enforced in April, put a pressure on those States and cities which had not filled up their quotas, and induced many of them, by adding to the already large bounties, to evade the inconvenience and discredit of a conscription.

Pending the concentration of the great armies, an attempt was made by a *coup de main* to obtain possession, if only temporary, of the city, for whose capture so many thousand lives had already been sacrificed.† A

* See *Southern History, Third Year of the War.*—Pollard.*

† Major-General Meade, in a speech at Philadelphia, in February 1864, stated that it might not be uninteresting to know that since

scheme was devised by which, whilst the attention of General Lee was engaged in watching a feint of the army on the Rapidan, General Butler, in command of the forces at Yorktown, strengthened by reinforcements from Charleston, should surprise Richmond, release the prisoners confined in the Libby prison, and thus, whilst settling the difficulties of the exchange, should accomplish a deed attempted in vain by so many able commanders.* The expedition, as might have been expected, failed; on the 5th of February, General Sedgwick, in temporary command of the Army of the Potomac, made a *reconnaissance* across the Rapidan; but finding the enemy well prepared to receive him, retired, after inflicting and sustaining some slight loss. In the meantime, General Wister, from Butler's command, with a force of cavalry, supported at some distance in rear by infantry, appeared on the banks of the Chickahominy. Rumour had already given notice of his approach, as it had exaggerated his strength; and whilst the alarm bells were ringing at Richmond, and the Home guards mustering to man the works, Wade Hampton's cavalry had already taken precautions to prevent the further advance of an enemy rendered even more than usually hateful by association with the detested Butler. The fords of the Chickahominy were well watched and guarded, the roads blocked with felled trees, and the evident preparations so clearly warned General Wister that the surprise had failed, that he thought it advisable to retreat with all despatch to

March 1861, when the Army of the Potomac left its lines in front of Washington, not less than 100,000 men had been killed and wounded.
—*Rebellion Record*, p. 44, vol. viii.

* *Vide* Map II., commencement of volume.

fortress Monroe. The failure of Butler was received with derision in the North, where men began to understand that success in war is dependent on well-considered schemes, based on sound principles, rather than on the extravagant plans of unpractised generals.* For although doubtless the forces at the disposal of the Confederate government were miserably inferior to those of the North, it would have been extremely unlikely that a door of entry already attempted should have been left open for the approach of the enemy to the capital of the Confederacy, for whose defence so much labour and so many lives had been expended.

Notwithstanding this failure, a second attempt was made a month later, with greater probability of success. It was undertaken by those bold cavalry leaders who had done so much to raise the fame of that arm of the service, and had caused it at length to vie with, if not to surpass in efficiency, the horsemen of Virginia. No blame to the latter, if unlimited supplies of men and horses, and greater attention to discipline had, after long training in war, given the supremacy in the field to the more rich and powerful nation, able to replace the wear and tear of battle from its almost inexhaustible

* The *New York World* thus alludes to General Butler's expedition :—

‘The Richmond part of the programme failed because it was absurd to suppose that a city which had been menaced for three years is not at all times proof against the attack of anything less than a great army. All such schemes to capture Richmond are based upon the theory that the rebel administration is composed of a set of improvident fools. So ends this last “On to Richmond,” the most unmilitary and sorry exploit of the war. We do not believe that this scheme received the endorsement of any competent military commander, or that it ever had the remotest chance of success.’

resources. In the South horses were scarce, and forage difficult to procure, and still more difficult to transport, consequently the cavalry, unable during the winter months to maintain its full strength, whilst present with the main army, was detached in small bodies and sometimes singly among the farms and homesteads of Central Virginia. These facts must account for the comparative impunity with which the daring schemes of General Pleasanton and his subordinate cavalry officers were partially carried out.

To liberate the prisoners confined at Bellisle and the Libby prison ; with their aid to destroy the government stores, if not to sack the city of Richmond ; to capture or kill the President and members of the Confederate government ; and to burn the bridges and tear up the railways, were the objects placed before the officers and men selected for the dangerous enterprise. To General Kilpatrick was the task of leading the principal column allotted. He was to cross the Lower Rapidan, and, marching by Spotsylvania Court-house direct on Richmond, was to send a detachment under Colonel Dahlgreen to threaten the city from the south bank of the James River, whilst Custer was to engage the attention of Stuart and his cavalry by a menace directed against Charlottesville and the rail connecting Gordonsville with Lynchburg.

The feint made by Custer was partially successful ; he drew away Stuart from the real point of attack to the defence of Charlottesville, and, finding himself opposed by a strong force, skilfully effected his retreat across the Rapidan to the main army. In the meantime, Kilpatrick crossed the same river at Ely's Ford, not far above its junction with the Rappahannock, and advanced directly on Spotsylvania Court-house, where,

dividing his command, he sent Dahlgreen to Fredericks-hall, he himself marching on Beaver Dam, both stations on the Virginian Central railroad.

No warning of the coming danger had reached the city of Richmond. The secret of the expedition had been well preserved, and the troopers as they rode past the farms and mansions of the formerly wealthy families of Virginia were looked upon with astonishment and fear by the women and children, who, with the negroes, formed almost the only inhabitants of the State. Scarcely an able-bodied man was to be seen; the country was still; few sounds of labour were heard; the land remained unploughed; and the spectacle presented by Virginia proved to friend and foe that she at least had not spared her sons, but had given her all to the service of her country.

Kilpatrick's cavalry carried no stores; they subsisted on the inhabitants, but refrained from wanton spoliation or insult. The negroes, men and women, as usual, followed the line of march, going they knew not whither, and frequently, weary and footsore, falling on the road. On Sunday night, the 28th February, the crossing of the Rapidan was effected; on Monday, the station at Beaver Dam was burned, and the rail on either side torn up; on Tuesday, there were signs that the Confederate infantry were enclosing and following the rear of the column, but crossing the south branch of the Pamunkey, and burning the bridge, Kilpatrick hindered their advance, and hastening onwards about midday reached the vicinity of Richmond, when the sight of the spires and steeples of the city greeted the eyes of the troopers, astonished and excited at their own success. Now was the co-operation of Dahlgreen hoped for, but hoped for in vain; no rockets signalled his arrival on the south side

of the James River ; whilst the guns from the batteries protecting the city gave warning that its defenders were prepared to resist an attack. Colonel Stevens, with a small detachment, engaged the Federal advanced guard ; artillery was used on both sides, but Kilpatrick, fearing the concentration of troops in his rear, and supposing from the enemy's bold attitude that the garrison was more numerous than was really the case, retreated towards the Chickahominy, and encamped, or rather bivouacked, near the Mechanicsville road. Now, however, was the Confederate cavalry on the alert, and during the night Wade Hampton beat up Kilpatrick's quarters and forced him, with the loss of some few prisoners, to retire across the Chickahominy towards the White House. Near this place a portion of Dahlgreen's men joined their comrades, bringing news of the failure of the enterprise and of the capture or death, they knew not which, of their commander.

It appeared that from Fredericksall, Colonel Dahlgreen, with about 1,000 men, had marched on Goochland, under the guidance of a negro, who had promised to point out a ford by which he might cross the James River. But, either through accident or design, the man misled those he had undertaken to guide, and Dahlgreen, incensed at the mistake, which he attributed to treachery, ordered him to be hanged. Not finding any means of crossing the James River, Colonel Dahlgreen advanced directly towards Richmond, burning barns, mills and stacks, and wantonly destroying the property of Mr. J. Seddons, the Confederate Secretary of War. He passed Dover, did what injury he could to the locks on the James River canal, and reached the environs of Richmond on the evening of the 2nd March, the day following the attack made by Kilpatrick. But on the north and west

side the city was well protected; its population, called to arms, were in readiness to meet the invader, whilst the local forces gathering from all quarters began to hang on his flanks. To attack the city would have been the height of rashness. To retreat and to join Kilpatrick seemed the only hope of safety. But the night was dark, the men were dispirited, and, harassed by frequent skirmishing, straggled and became separated from their commander, who, with about 200, endeavoured to make his way across the Pamunkey to Gloucester Point. His retreat was not unmolested. Capt. Magruder and Lieut. Pollard, with a squadron of Virginian cavalry, raised in the country they were now called on to protect, were on his track, and they were determined to intercept him. With the knowledge of the country possessed by these men, it was not difficult to do so, and near Walkertown, on the left bank of the Mattaponey River, Pollard's detachment met the cavalry in a narrow road. Dahlgreen fell at the first fire, and, after attempting some resistance, and endeavouring to escape through the woods, the greater number of his men surrendered, and were led back to Richmond as captives.

Thus terminated, with the death of a most gallant officer, one of the boldest raids of the war. Still suffering from a dangerous and painful wound, which had necessitated the amputation of his foot, Dahlgreen had led his men on an enterprise which was desperate even to rashness, but which proved the courage and daring of the cavalry officers and soldiers of the Army of the Potomac. To liberate the prisoners, of whose sufferings (perhaps exaggerated) the whole of the North was ringing, was a purpose calculated to inspire with the utmost ardour the young colonel and the men under his command. To capture the President and members of the Confe-

derate government, was also an object for which much might be staked; and whilst the proposed burning of the city, and the consequent sufferings of many non-combatants must be deprecated, it should be remembered that the evils of war will often fall on the innocent, and that although wanton devastation should never be permitted, and the general who countenances or allows it should be held up to reprobation, yet, when great objects are to be attained, the instincts of pity must be crushed, and the necessities of war pleaded to excuse deeds otherwise revolting to every man endued with the ordinary feelings of humanity. Colonel Dahlgreen perished in an attempt which, naturally enough, much exasperated the Confederate nation; but had Stuart, in one of his bold raids around Washington, captured the White House, would he have allowed President Lincoln to have escaped? Surely not. War among civilised nations is waged as far as may be possible against governments, not against individuals; but the civil governor, equally with the general, must be accounted among the public enemies, whose capture or even death in open war may be sought for as an object of attainment. These doctrines may be open to much abuse, and, when carried to extremes, may be used to justify acts which every civilised community condemns; but under a condition of affairs where, as in war, evil must predominate, to draw the line between the lawful and the unlawful is extremely difficult, and often results in the necessity of judging each separate act on its own merits rather than on a basis of general rules.

With the failure of Kilpatrick, and the death of Dahlgreen, terminated what may be termed the desultory operations of the campaign. The skirmishers on both sides were cleared from the front, leaving the

ground open for the movements of those giant armies which had in the meanwhile congregated among the mountains of Georgia and on the plains of Virginia. During the winter the balance of success had inclined towards the Confederacy. The failure of Sherman in Mississippi, the advance of Forest into Tennessee, the defeat of Banks in Louisiana, the retreat of Steel in Arkansas, the repulse of Seymour in Florida, the success of Hoke at Plymouth, and the termination of the raids in Virginia, all tended to raise the spirits of the Southern people, depressed by the events of the preceding autumn, and lead them to anticipate in anxiety, but still with hope, the approaching campaign.

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CHAPTER XI.

ACROSS THE RAPIDAN.

THERE is little doubt that from information received from spies, from reports of the several generals commanding the widely-scattered armies, and from other and indirect sources, the Federal government was possessed with the idea that, notwithstanding the bold attitude still assumed by the Confederate forces, and the partial advantages gained over the Northern troops in the detached operations of the winter, the resources of the South in men and means were well nigh exhausted, and that a supreme effort, to be made in the approaching summer, would probably be crowned with the success so long and as yet so vainly looked for. This belief seems to have been shared by the great mass of the Northern nation, if the alacrity with which troops were furnished by the several States, and the silence of the peace party, which at one time threatened to attain to some importance, may be taken as evidences of the hopes of the majority of the people in the successful termination of the war.

To those who urged on individual Americans of the Northern States the frequent victories gained by their opponents, the unanimity of the Confederate nation in its firm adherence to the principles of continued resistance, and the waste and consequent approaching ex-

haustion of the aggressive power, the answer almost invariably given was that in the end numbers must win, and that as Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, Western Virginia, and portions of Arkansas and Louisiana had been successively wrested from the Confederacy, so must the central States, by continued pressure and by the slow but sure advance of the armies, succumb before the overwhelming power of the North and West. The lesson had moreover at length been learnt, that combined action, and, consequently, centralisation, were necessary if the preponderance of power known and acknowledged was to be utilised with effect, otherwise that the facilities of concentration possessed by the Confederacy would still enable her, whilst far weaker than her assailant in actual numbers, to oppose to each invading army forces sufficient to repel assault, and defer through long years, if not altogether evade, the final blow.

To attain this concentration and unanimity, the appointment of a Commander-in-Chief was decided on, and since the great success at Vicksburg, and the victory at Chattanooga or Missionary Ridge, had pointed to General Grant as the most successful if not the most talented general, it was resolved by President Lincoln to raise him to the rank of lieutenant-general, the then highest grade in the American service;* and whilst placing him more particularly in connection with the Army of the Potomac, to entrust to his supervision the entire control of the campaign. His antecedents evinced his soldierly qualities, his persistency of purpose, his perseverance in action, and his power of utilising the immense machinery over which he had held the control. He had shown comparatively little of the

* General Grant's appointment as Commander-in-Chief was dated March 9, 1864.

remarkable strategical genius of Lee, or of the equally wonderful tactical energy of Jackson, but his firmness, and the manner in which his plans had been comprehended and carried out by his subordinates, proved him to be possessed of many of the qualities for high command. Little regarded when an officer in the old regular army, he had gradually profited by the lessons of war, and, taught by the results of his own campaigns, was fully imbued with the idea that the continued pressure of overwhelming numbers must in the end terminate the contest by the exhaustion and consequent destruction of the inferior army.

The array of force under his command has seldom been equalled: 662,345 men was the available military strength of the Federal States on the 1st May, 1864,*

* The aggregate available force present for duty, May 1st 1864, was distributed in the different commands as follows:—

Department of Washington	42,124
Army of the Potomac	120,380
Department of Virginia and North Carolina	59,139
Department of the South	18,165
Department of the Gulf	61,866
Department of Arkansas	23,666
Department of the Tennessee	74,174
Department of the Missouri	15,770
Department of the North West	5,295
Department of Kansas	4,798
Head-quarters of the Military }	476
Division of the Mississippi }	
Department of the Cumberland	119,848
Department of the Ohio	35,416
Northern Department	9,546
Department of Western Va.	30,782
Department of the East	2,828
Department of the Susquehanna	2,970
Middle department	5,627
9th Army corps	20,780
Department of New Mexico	3,454
Department of the Pacific	5,141
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	662,345

Report of the Secretary of War, Washington, Nov. 22nd, 1865.

and in all that contributes to the efficiency of modern armies, this immense body was furnished on a scale unknown in previous wars, and which resulted from a combination of the recently developed powers of science with the marvellous energy of the American character. To utilise this power was the task of the newly appointed Commander-in-Chief, and it may be well from his own words to gather the ideas of the man to whose guidance the subsequent campaigns of the war were to be entrusted, and to whose keeping the fortune of the American Republic was to be confided. He thus, in his report dated July 22nd, 1865, set forth the motives which induced the plans for the campaign of 1864.

‘From an early period in the rebellion, I had been impressed with the idea that active and continuous operations of all the troops that could be brought into the field, regardless of season and weather, were necessary to a speedy termination of the war. The resources of the enemy, and his numerical strength, were far inferior to ours : but as an offset to this, we had a vast territory, with a population hostile to the government, to garrison, and long lines of river and railroad communications to protect, to enable us to supply the operating armies.

‘The armies in the East and West acted independently and without concert, like a balky team, no two ever pulling together, enabling the enemy to use to great advantage his interior lines of communication for transporting troops from East to West, reinforcing the army most vigorously pressed, and to furlough large numbers, during seasons of inactivity on our part, to go to their homes and do the work of producing for the support of their armies. It was a question whether our numerical strength and resources were not more than balanced

by these disadvantages, and by the enemy's superior position.

‘From the first, I was firm in the conviction that no peace could be had which would be stable and conducive to the happiness of the people, both North and South, until the military power of the rebellion was completely broken.

‘I therefore determined, first, to use the greatest number of troops practicable against the armed force of the enemy, preventing him from using the same force at different seasons against first one and then another of our armies, and the possibility of repose for refitting and producing necessary supplies for carrying on resistance. Second, to hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his resources, until by mere attrition, if in no other way, there should be nothing left to him but an equal submission with the loyal section of our common country to the constitution and laws of our land.

‘These views have been kept constantly in mind, and orders given and campaigns made to carry them out. Whether they might have been better in conception and execution is for the people, who mourn the loss of friends fallen, and who have to pay the pecuniary cost, to say.’

These were the ideas of the Commander-in-Chief. There was little of brilliancy in their conception ; but, at the same time, they pointed to a decisive, although bloody road, towards the termination of the war, if only the Northern nation were prepared, after so long a period of strife, to further sacrifices of men and money on a scale hitherto unprecedented.

During the summer and autumn of the year 1864, two great campaigns were to be carried on simultaneously, the one in Virginia, the other in Georgia ;

and, although each was to include within its wide extent the movements of several armies, yet the concentrated purpose and well-arranged combinations of the whole scheme permit of an easy classification of the several events, with the relative importance of each to the other. To break the military power of the Confederacy, i.e., to overwhelm and defeat the forces of Lee and Johnston, was the first object, to which the capture of Richmond and Atlanta was secondary, but relatively of the greatest consequence, as destroying the base of supplies for each of these armies. For it must be understood that in modern warfare, dependent in so great a measure for success and even for continuance on the productions of machinery, large cities concentrating the labour and the resources of surrounding districts, and utilising the raw material by means of manufacture, form the natural dépôts of armies, and consequently become the objective points of the enemy. Unless under most exceptional circumstances, guerilla warfare waged in mountains and among thinly-populated districts cannot long resist the efforts of armies holding the fertile plains and the important cities. Consequently the possession of the great cities of the Confederacy was requisite to crush the military power of the government; and with this intent Sherman, who had succeeded Grant as Commander-in-Chief of the three armies of the Cumberland, Tennessee, and Ohio, was to move against Atlanta; whilst Grant, with the Army of the Potomac and the James, was to march against Richmond, the other minor armies co-operating, from their several departments, in the great campaign.

But, before passing to the events in Virginia, it will be well clearly to understand the position of each of the several armies. Commencing with the forces in

Virginia : General Meade commanded the Army of the Potomac, of 120,380 men, supported by the 9th corps, of 20,780, under Burnside,* and with a reserve of 47,751, stationed in and around Washington, to which may be added, as a further resource in case of need, a force of 5,798, occupying the department of Eastern Virginia and the Susquehanna. Co-operating directly with this army was that of the James, under General Butler, comprising a force of 59,139, formed of his own original command, with the addition of 10,000 men under Gillmore, from South Carolina, and General W. F. Smith's division from Tennessee ; whilst acting in immediate conjunction with it, i.e., Army of the Potomac, were the troops under General Sigel, watching the Shenandoah Valley and the approaches to Maryland and Pennsylvania, and numbering 30,782 men. Thus the total force brought to bear against Richmond and the armies that defended it was 284,630 men, or, excluding the troops in the Susquehanna, 278,832.† Of this number, the Army of the Potomac, and the 9th corps, under Burnside (upwards of 140,000), were actually disposable for an immediate advance against General Lee, who, with the astoundingly small number of 52,626 men of all arms, alone interposed a barrier between Grant and Richmond. The disparity of num-

* Removed from Eastern Tennessee.

† This force comprises only the men available for duty, as to arrive at the number 662,345, of which the details have been already given, the secretary of war deducts the following items :—

On detached service in the several military departments	109,348
In field hospitals, or unfit for duty	41,266
In general hospitals, or on sick leave at home	75,978
Absent on furlough, or as prisoners of war	66,299
Absent without leave	15,483
These items, added to the 662,345, make the grand aggregate	
of all the forces of the Northern States, in May 1864	
	970,719

bers can scarcely be credited, unless the almost similar disparity in the previous campaigns of Antietam and Chancellorsville be remembered, and the fact taken into consideration that to the original disproportion between the population of the Northern and Southern States, must be added the vast immigration of able-bodied men from Europe, which had allowed the North to supply her forces from exterior sources, at a time when the advance of the armies in the West had deprived her antagonist of much of her recruiting ground, and had extracted from her armies many men who, willing to fight for the defence of their States, were averse to leaving their families to the mercy of the enemy, whilst they waged war far from their own borders for the welfare of the Confederacy.*

To this force of less than 53,000, forming the army proper of Virginia, must be added the garrison of Richmond, under General Ransom, numbering about 5,000; the troops under Pickett and Hoke in North Carolina, about 10,000; the garrison of Wilmington, and the force guarding the Richmond rail, under General Whiting, of about 7,000; detachments from the garrison of Charleston of 3,000, and the forces scattered along the frontiers of Western Virginia and the head of the Shenandoah Valley, numbering also about 3,000, making a total of 81,000 to resist the march of upwards of

* The numerical strength of General Lee's army has been taken partly from a letter of General Early, partly from conversation with officers employed on the staff of that army, and partly from General Lee's own statement, made in the presence of an English officer, which is to be found in Major Smyth's (R.A.) interesting account of the final attack on Richmond, published in the *Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Association*, September 1865.—Swinton, in his valuable *History of the Army of the Potomac*, states that he has derived the above mentioned number from the muster rolls of General Lee's army.

284,000, under Meade, Burnside, Butler, and Sigel, directed by the Commander-in-Chief in person.*

✓ In the West the numerical strength was more equally balanced. The actual numbers in the field fit for service were on the side of the Federals 229,438,† but more than half of this immense force was requisite to protect the long lines of communication stretching from Chattanooga and Knoxville to Nashville, and thence to the Ohio River, to hold forcible possession of the country conquered but not tranquillised, and to garrison the several stations on the Mississippi, Tennessee, and Cumberland Rivers. Thus General Sherman could only bring into the field for offensive operations 98,797 men, to which General Johnston was able to oppose about 50,000, or, including the cavalry under Forrest, about 58,000.

In the month of May, if possible on the 1st, the campaign was to commence; the Federal armies of Virginia were to move on Richmond,‡ the Army of the

* These numbers have been estimated from various published documents, and from conversations held with several Southern generals and other officers.

† *Vide* extract from Secretary of War's Report.

‡ The author has compiled from various sources the following estimate of the Confederate forces in the month of May 1864 :—

Army of Virginia	53,000
Garrison of Richmond	5,000
Do. of Petersburg, Wilmington, and in North Carolina	20,000
Guarding the Shenandoah Valley under Breckenridge	3,000
Garrison of Charleston and Savannah	9,000
Mobile	6,000
Under Polk	2,000
Johnston	50,000
Forrest	8,000
On frontiers of Eastern Tennessee and Western Virginia	4,000
Guarding prisoners and employed in other duties in interior	12,000
Trans-Mississippi forces under Kirby Smith	50,000
Total	222,000

West on Atlanta. To the former, the dense thickets of the Wilderness, the swamps of the Chickahominy, and the well-known approaches to the Confederate capital, were to offer fresh battle fields, and furnish graves for troops, which, although retaining the name of the Army of the Potomac, embraced within their ranks but few of those who had followed McClellan to Fair Oaks, Burnside to Fredericksburg, and Hooker to Chancellorsville. To the Army of the West there awaited a constant succession of engagements before the last ridge of hills should be crossed, and the fertile plains of Georgia should afford a more easy, but still hardly to be contested, road to the city of Atlanta.

With the first of these armies we have now to deal, and extending through the month of May, to narrate a series of battles and a continuance of slaughter seldom equalled in modern times, and which developed a strategy which few generals have dared to practise, fewer still to acknowledge. General Grant was determined to wear out and crush by weight of numbers the enemy, whose qualities, both in regard to the talents of the general, and the courage of the men, he not only appreciated but had the magnanimity to acknowledge. He recognised the cost which must be paid for such a work, but, disregarding the slaughter awaiting his own troops, was satisfied if, by repeated blows and almost inexhaustible resources, he might finally destroy, if he could not conquer, the indomitable defenders of Richmond.

The Federal Army of the Potomac had been reorganised, and in place of five was formed into three corps, commanded by Hancock, Sedgwick, and Warren; the whole under General Meade. By the middle of April the sutlers, civilians, extra baggage, and all things

tending to encumber the line of march had been sent to the rear, and on the 4th May the movement commenced. General Lee, with 42,000 infantry, and about 10,000 cavalry, was in the meanwhile encamped on the south side of the Rappahannock; * the two corps of Ewell and A. P. Hill guarded the river for a distance of nearly twenty miles, whilst Longstreet's corps, recently brought from Eastern Tennessee, and still suffering from the terrible hardships of that winter campaign, was stationed thirteen miles to the rear, in and around Gordonsville.

It will be needless to repeat the description of a country whose features, after the many campaigns of the two previous years, must be sufficiently well understood, and it will be enough to say that General Lee's army was performing the double duty of protecting the approaches to Richmond, and of guarding the important railway from that city through Gordonsville to Lynchburg.† Thus, although not on the direct road from Washington to Richmond, which, passing to the right of the army, traversed the barren country and tangled forests of the Wilderness, the scene of the former defeat of General Hooker, Lee was able, by a line of march shorter than could be adopted by Grant, to concentrate his forces to intercept the invader, should he endeavour to sever the communication with Richmond, and whilst still retaining his hold of the main line of railway, to send help to the Shenandoah, or detachments to

* General Lee's army was composed of three corps, viz. Longstreet's, Ewell's, and A. P. Hill's:—Longstreet's corps, of two divisions, McLaws and Field; Ewell's of three, Johnson, Rodes and Early; A. P. Hill's of three, Heth, Wilcox, and Anderson. The cavalry, under J. E. B. Stuart, was in three weak divisions.

† *Vide* Map II., commencement of volume, also Map, p. 246, vol. ii., for the summer and autumn campaign in Va.

assist the garrison of Richmond against the threatening Army of the James.

Never were the advantages of interior lines or of genius to see and apply them more needed. Simultaneously with the march of the grand army, Butler was to operate on the James, Sigel in the Shenandoah Valley; and it may well be asked where were the forces to be found to meet these three converging columns? That they were met, that for nearly a year their advance was checked and the plans of their leaders defeated, will ever be a proof of the supreme talent of Lee, the executive skill of his generals, and the courage of his troops.

On the 4th May, the grand Army of the Potomac, in three corps, crossed the Rapidan, Warren with the 5th, and Sedgwick with the 6th, at Germania Ford, and Hancock with the 2nd at Ely's Ford, a short distance above the junction of the Rapidan and Rappahannock rivers, whilst Burnside, with the 9th corps at Warrenton, protected the line of communication with Washington until a second base of operations at Acquia Creek could be established. Covered by cavalry who explored the roads towards Chancellorsville, the passage of the Rapidan was effected with little resistance from the Confederate pickets, and the troops became involved among the tangled forests of the Wilderness. On the night of the 4th May, the 2nd and 5th corps bivouacked on the Fredericksburg turnpike, the former at Chancellorsville, the latter at Wilderness Tavern, whilst the 6th corps remained near Germania Ford on the road leading to Chancellorsville.

On the same day, General Lee, perceiving the object of his opponent's strategy, and unwilling to run the risk of losing his communication with Richmond, put

his army in motion, directing Ewell and Hill to march towards the wilderness by the two roads named the Plank road and the turnpike, which, running almost parallel with each other, connect Orange Court-house with Fredericksburg, at the same time that he ordered Longstreet to march in the same direction from his quarters round Gordonsville. Lest, however, his opponent's movements should be merely a feint to draw him away from the Upper Rapidan, General Lee jealously watched, with the rear divisions of Ewell's and Hill's corps, the fords of the river, which, as the army marched, protected its left flank. Thus, on the night of the 4th, Ewell's corps bivouacked between Wilderness Run and Locust Grove, Hill with two divisions on the Plank road, about three miles to the east, his 3rd division watching the fords, and Longstreet in reserve between Gordonsville and White Plains. On the following day, the first of the great battles of the Wilderness commenced.

Soon after dawn Hill and Ewell began their march, separated from each other by about three miles; and at 6 A.M. Johnson's skirmishers (his being the leading division of Ewell's corps) encountered and drove in the advance of Griffin's division of the 5th (General Warren's) corps. This was near the small stream of Wilderness Run, where a hill rising above the thick woods offered a strong position. Johnson, having gained this hill, drew up his division in order of battle; he placed Jones's brigade on the turnpike, Stuart's and Stafford's on his left, and Walker, commanding the old Stonewall brigade, with his left thrown back to guard the flank.* Scarcely were these dispositions made, when Griffin

* See the Battle of the Wilderness, from the *London Herald*, republished in Pollard's *Third Year of the War*. Also the *American Encyclopædia*, for 1864.

boldly advanced down the road, bringing with him two pieces of artillery by the only track open for that arm. Jones's men received him with a heavy fire, but, evincing high courage, the Federals pressed on, overwhelmed and drove back their opponents, and, as General Jones endeavoured to stem the torrent of fugitives, shot him down by the roadside. Then, however, Stuart closing to the right took the victorious troops in flank, and routed them with the loss of their two guns; whilst Rodes's division, having heard the firing, formed up rapidly on the right of Johnson, Gordon's Georgians especially distinguishing themselves as they swept back in disorder the defeated Federals. But only one of Warren's divisions had been engaged, and he now hastened up Wadsworth and Robinson,* whilst Sedgwick, with the 6th corps, commenced to press heavily against the left of the Confederate line, now reinforced by Early's division. Then Stafford's and Hay's Louisianians, fighting side by side with Pegram's Virginians, the two extremes of the Confederacy vying with each other in desperate courage, achieved worthy renown, although with the loss of Stafford, who fell far from his home on the banks of the Mississippi. But not alone on Ewell's corps was the honour of fighting in the first battle of the Wilderness to fall; Hill had come up on his right by the Plank road, and had formed line of battle across it near the intersection with the road from

* In alluding to the battle of the 5th, Swinton (*History of the Army of the Potomac*) thus accounts for a portion only of the Federal army being brought into action:—

‘Neither of these commanders (Generals Grant and Meade), however, believed that aught but a small force was in front of Warren to mask the Confederate retreat, as it was not deemed possible that Lee, after his defensive line had been turned, could have acted with such boldness as to launch forward his army in an offensive sally.’

Germania Ford, Wilcox being on the left, and Heth on the right, Anderson still remaining in rear to guard the fords. He thus threatened to separate Warren's corps from Hancock's, or the centre from the right of the Federal army. This brought against his right the whole force of Hancock's corps, and at 3 P.M. the musketry fire was incessant, especially where Heth held his ground with difficulty against the infantry of the 5th corps, under Birney, Barlow, Gibbons, and Mott. Of the artillery little use could be made, owing to the density of the wood and undergrowth; but the deadly rifle inflicted terrible destruction on the more numerous Federals, whilst the comparatively small numbers of their opponents, concealed among the forest, suffered far less loss. Along a front of six miles, during the whole day, the strife continued, the Confederates firmly holding their ground, and under the eye of their Commander-in-Chief doing deeds worthy of the Army of Antietam, of Chancellorsville, and of Gettysburg.

Shortly before Hill had become seriously engaged, General Lee was exposed to great risk. A few of the enemy's riflemen had pressed forward between his right and left wing, between Hill and Ewell, and as Lee, seated on the ground, was giving orders to General Hill with reference to the action, they advanced within easy range of where he was; but, not knowing the prize so nearly in their grasp, and seeing only their own danger, they withdrew without firing.

Towards evening, Heth's division showed signs of exhaustion, and Wilcox came to his assistance, sustaining the battle until darkness had closed in. But on the Confederates' left, night brought little relief to either side: Sedgwick had been reinforced by portions of Burnside's corps, and after nightfall made an attack

against that portion of the line which Pegram guarded with the Virginians. The Confederate skirmishers were driven in, but the reserves stood firm, and behind hastily constructed breastworks, inflicted severe injury on the assailing column, repulsing it, although themselves suffering in the loss of their gallant commander, who fell severely wounded.

Thus the two corps of Lee's army had fallen valiantly on the right flank of the Army of the Potomac, forcing it to fight for very life, and preventing its further advance in the direction of Richmond. The loss on both sides had been considerable. Of the Confederates, Heth's division had suffered very severely, and during the night was withdrawn from the front, its place being taken by Wilcox's. Orders were also sent to Longstreet to hasten rapidly onwards to the succour of Hill's corps; and that officer, responding to the call, put his troops in motion at 2 A.M., and whilst Wilcox, seeing and hearing—for the armies were very near to each other—the preparations for the assault, was forming an *abattis* in front of his thin line, McLaws and Field were marching forward through the night, and Anderson, now relieved from the duty of guarding the fords, by the certainty that the whole of the Federal army was across the Rapidan, was bringing up his division to take part in the morrow's battle.

The first gleams of light ushered in the combat. On the Federal side Sedgwick fought on the right, endeavouring to keep open communication with Germania Ford, Warren in the centre, and Hancock on the left, Burnside's corps having been posted as a reserve ready to reinforce any portion of the line that might require assistance. With varying success, through the morning of the 6th May, the battle continued on the centre and right

of the Federal line. Each side had thrown up earth-works and formed *abattis*, and the defence and attack of the entrenchments evinced equal stubbornness in assailants and assailed. The Confederates had gained a slight advantage, when detachments from Burnside's corps increased the already preponderating numbers of their opponents, and re-established the Federal line forced back for a short distance. But it was on the left flank of the Federals, on the right of the Confederates, that the crisis of the battle was twice to occur. There Hancock had attacked with terrible vigour; there in confusion had Wilcox's and Heth's divisions been driven back; * there was Lee for once almost roused from his noble serenity, watching the confused mob hurrying in rout along the Plank road, and listening to the reports of the almost despairing generals. But at this awful crisis, Longstreet appeared, at the head of McLaws's division, those veteran soldiers who had followed him through the campaigns of the East and the West, and on whom no scene, however terrible, could produce evil effect. Kershaw, in immediate command, drew up in line on either side the road; the crowd passed on, and the pursuing Federals, headed by General Wadsworth, approached the noble old division. Firmly it withstood the shock, and, unused to passive resistance, advanced on the enemy until the assailed became the assailants. The Federals were driven back, the brave Wadsworth fell, and only the presence of the reserves prevented further disaster.

Thus the left centre of the Federal line was almost

* According to Swinton, Hancock's attack would have been even more formidable if he had not kept a portion of the troops under his command in reserve, to resist the expected advance of Longstreet against his left flank.

broken, when Grant ordered the larger portion of Burnside's corps into the gap between Hancock and Warren, and had hardly completed the movement before Lee's great attack burst on him. That attack was intended to have been final, but as at Chancellorsville the death of Jackson had paralysed the efforts of his corps, so did a similar disaster check in their career of victory the troops commanded by Lee's other great lieutenant.

The movement against the Federal right had been a feint to enable Longstreet to concentrate his own two divisions, and that of Anderson, with which to make the important attack of the day. All had gone well; Kershaw had played his part grandly, and had restored the fortunes of the Confederates, imperilled by the repulse of Hill's corps. The troops, inspired by success, and headed by Longstreet in person, felt the opportunity, and burned to seize it. Not long had they to wait. With his staff, accompanied by General Jenkins, Longstreet rode rapidly forward to reconnoitre the Plank road previous to leading on his men. He was in front of the line, when from the woods on the flank a volley was heard, and Longstreet and Jenkins were seen to fall from their horses. The latter was killed, the former dangerously, it was feared mortally, wounded, and alas! the wounds were inflicted, not by the bullets of the enemy, but by those of the very men whom he was about to lead to victory. In the confusion of battle, and among the thick trees, he and his staff had been mistaken for Federal fugitives; the fatal volley had been fired, and the man on whom the impetus of the attack depended, fell desperately wounded, and was carried to the rear through the sorrowing ranks of those who had followed him in so many campaigns, and who were to

all appearances about to signalise their return to Virginia by a brilliant success. For an hour the wounded general lay unconscious, when awakening from his swoon, he exclaimed: 'In another half-hour, but for my wound, there would not have been a Yankee regiment standing and unbroken on the south of the Rapidan.'*

Then Lee thinking that the crisis of the day had arrived, and knowing that his last reserves were in action, prepared to place himself in person, at the head of Gregg's Texans to lead forward the final attack. But, horrified at the danger to which their beloved general was about to expose himself, officers and men expostulated, the latter even refusing to move until he had consented to forego his purpose. Yielding to their remonstrances, General Lee retired, and the line advanced through the forest on either side of the Plank road.† McLaw's, Field's, and Anderson's divisions, with the shattered remains of Heth's and Wilcox's, were now engaged on the right; between them and Ewell's corps was a gap caused by the removal of Wilcox on the previous day; and then Rodes, Johnson, and Early continued the line. On the Federal side, the whole Army of the Potomac, reinforced by Burnside, had been brought into action, and backwards and forwards,

* See an interesting letter from the special correspondent at Richmond, in the *Times* of June 14, 1864.

† During the remainder of the day Longstreet's corps was commanded by Field, afterwards by Anderson.

General Field had formerly served in the U. S. regular army. When the war broke out, he commanded the 48th Virginia cavalry. He was badly wounded at the second battle of Manassas, and consequently was forced to withdraw from active service for some time. He joined Longstreet as brigadier-general, in Eastern Tennessee, and remained with his corps during the remainder of the war.

surging among the woods and thickets, the conflict raged with varying success.

The attack which Longstreet was to have headed was only partially successful. Pressing between the right of Hancock and the left of Warren, his men encountered the flank divisions of both these corps and Stevenson's division of the 9th corps, which was driven back with great loss;* but Hancock in turn brought forward his left, and taking the Confederates in flank, regained his former line, which he held until night terminated the contest on the Confederate right and the Federal left.

On the other flank, after the varying events of the day, as the sun was setting, Ewell permitted Gordon, with his Georgian brigade, supported by Johnson's North Carolinians and Pegram's Virginians, to endeavour by a rapid movement to overlap and crush the Federal right wing. Rapidly, for but an hour of daylight remained, they marched through the thick undergrowth, and falling furiously on Seymour's and Shaler's brigades of Sedgwick's corps, who were occupied in entrenching, drove them back in headlong rout, capturing the two generals and many prisoners. But Sedgwick and Wright succeeded in forming line with the remainder of the corps, about a mile and a half in rear, and the now intense darkness put an end to the contest, and prevented a misfortune which seemed to threaten serious consequences to the right wing of the Federal army.

During the whole day, Grant and Meade had been

* Swinton (*History of the Army of the Potomac*) attributes the success of the Confederates in this portion of the line to an accidental fire which burst out in the wood, and which drove the Federals from the line of breastworks they had erected.

in rear of the centre, not actually present in the battle, but calmly occupied in directing the movements of their large army and in sending reinforcements to such portions as were badly pressed. Twice had affairs appeared critical ; once when Longstreet's men forced their way between Hancock and Warren, and again when Gordon fell on Sedgwick's corps. As on the preceding day, and for similar reasons, artillery had been little used ; the work was done at close range, with the rifle, and the inferior force held its own with a loss much less than that which it inflicted on the more densely packed masses of the enemy.* The first reserves of both armies had been engaged ; Longstreet, on the Confederate right, had borne the brunt of the fighting during the afternoon, whilst Burnside, having left the greater number of the black regiments to guard the communication with Washington, had, by a march which elicited the commendation of General Grant, brought the remainder of his corps into action on the morning of the day. Generals on both sides had fallen : the Confederacy had to mourn the loss of Jones, Stafford and Jenkins killed, and of Longstreet and Pegram severely wounded ; whilst on the side of the North, Hayes and Wadsworth had fallen (the latter a man of note in the political world), Generals Getty, and Webb (distinguished for his gallantry during the many campaigns of the Army of the Potomac) lay dangerously wounded, and Seymour and Shaler were prisoners.

The second day's battle of the Wilderness was now

* In the annual *Encyclopædia* for 1866, the Federal loss is estimated at 15,000. In the Confederate account of the *London Herald*, the loss of Lee's army is put at 6,000 during the two days. Swinton, however, who seems to have had access to good information, places it at 8,000.

finished, and the third day commenced. General Grant had failed in his effort to turn Lee's right, and from his base on the Rappahannock to accomplish the proposed movement on Richmond. His own right had been turned, and his communications with Washington by means of Germania Ford, and Rappahannock station, seriously endangered. Therefore he decided on changing his base of supplies, and so having established hospitals and depôts at Fredericksburg, he gave up Germania Ford, contenting himself with holding Ely's Ford, United States Ford, and Bank's Ford; and still persisting in his former strategy, pushed forward his army towards Spottsylvania Court-house, and the Richmond and Fredericksburg rail. His magnificently organised transport service did not fail him; Colonel Ingalls, the distinguished quartermaster-general of the Army of the Potomac, gave the requisite orders, and Acquia Creek and Fredericksburg became the new base.

General Lee, on the morning of the 8th, withdrew from the slightly advanced position he had gained on the previous day, occupying lines somewhat in rear, which he had entrenched with the materials that were at hand. He knew the advantage which a defensive attitude gave to an army occupying a country similar to that presented by the Wilderness, especially when that army was far less numerous than the attacking force, and when no reinforcements, such as might be brought into the field by his opponent, could be furnished from the already overtaxed country in his rear. Once during that morning did the Commander-in-Chief find time to visit his trusted lieutenant, lying severely, or, as it was then feared, mortally wounded, only a few miles distant from where General Jackson had breathed his last, one year previously. What he felt as he left

that house, no one may venture to say ; but the tears which fell from his eyes bore witness to the grief with which he saw one after another of his noble companions in arms pass from his side, leaving him still to bear the brunt of the battle, and with diminished forces and younger generals to withstand the constantly recurring and still augmenting waves of invasion which threatened the State for which he bore so deep an affection, and the cause he had adopted as his own. There was, however, little time to lament the fallen ; the battle was to be renewed, and the devoted energy of every man in that small army, which alone barred the road to Richmond, was required to resist the checked but not defeated enemy in his onward course.

The 8th of May opened with heavy skirmishing, and later in the day, Stuart, who had been watching the right flank of the Confederate army, and holding in check Gregg performing a similar duty on Grant's left, sent word that a flank movement of the whole of the enemy's force was in progress, and that Spottsylvania Court-house, important as being on the intersection of several roads, appeared to be the point aimed at. Thither Lee, late on Saturday evening, after night had closed, directed Anderson, now commanding Longstreet's corps, to march, whilst, at the distance of a few miles, Warren, with the 5th corps of Grant's army, was hurrying forward through the darkness with the same object in view. But the road pursued by Anderson was shorter than that taken by Warren, and the former hastening on his divisions, led by Kershaw's men, who had already done such good service, arrived first at the Court-house, and quickly driving out some cavalry that attempted to hold it, prepared to resist the onset of the infantry, whose attack was shortly to be expected.

Bartlett's brigade was the first to come up, and being pushed forward under the supposition that cavalry alone occupied the position, suffered terribly, one of his regiments losing in fifteen minutes three-fourths of its number. Other troops from the 5th and 6th corps then arrived, and the action continued during the day, each side bringing up its supports. At nightfall the whole of Lee's army was in position in front of the Court-house, and the scene of battle had shifted from the Wilderness to Spottsylvania. Grant had been again foiled in his attempt to interpose between Richmond and its covering army, and there remained the only alternative of endeavouring to obtain by force what he had failed to secure by strategy.

On Monday, the 9th, there was comparative quiet, but the 6th corps of the Army of the Potomac lost, by the bullet of a rifleman, the general who had commanded it through many campaigns. General Sedgwick, an officer of the old regular army, one who had distinguished himself in Mexico, who, through the campaigns of McClellan, Pope, Hooker, and Meade had successively, as general of brigade, division, and corps, won renown on many battle fields, who, older than the generality of the commanders of the Federal armies, had yet shared in all its hardships, and had shown greater vigour than many younger men, who had been wounded at Antietam, fell as he was superintending the placing of his artillery, shot through the head by a bullet from a concealed enemy. His place was taken by Wright, and towards dusk the battle recommenced.

But, notwithstanding the efforts of the Federal generals, Lee held his ground, increasing the strength of his position by entrenching, and occupying the country north of the Po River, his left on Glady Run, his centre

embracing Spottsylvania Court-house, and his right resting on Ny River, an insignificant stream. During the 9th the Federal cavalry, under Sheridan, were despatched on an expedition against Lee's communications, and on the night of the 9th and 10th the 2nd corps crossed the Upper Po, preparatory to the grand attack on the following day. The country, more open than that of the Wilderness, admitted of the use of artillery, and a furious fire from the Federal batteries heralded in the engagement. Then followed a repetition of the incidents of the previous battles. The 2nd corps on the right, the 5th in the centre, and the 6th on the left, successively marched forward to the attack. There was the usual fighting in the woods, the usual terrible loss, falling more heavily on the assailants than on the assailed, and the usual termination, both armies holding their relative positions.*

The next day, the 11th, was consumed chiefly in skirmishing, and among the Federals in preparations for another assault. The first rain since the campaign commenced fell on this day, and after nightfall, under cover of the storm and darkness, Hancock, with the 2nd corps, moved from the right of the Federal line to the left, placing himself between Wright and Burnside, as it was intended to direct the principal attack against the right and right centre of the Confederate position, in place of against the left and left centre attempted on the previous day. Thus the Federal line, on the right bank of the Po, was formed by Warren's corps (the 5th) on the right, Wright's (the 6th) in the centre, with Hancock's (the 2nd) and Burnside's (the 9th) on the left, whilst the Confederates, occupying a convex position,

* In this battle, Heth's division of A. P. Hill's corps won the especial commendation of General Lee.

their centre advanced, held the ground with A. P. Hill on the right, Ewell in the centre, and Anderson on the left.

Quietly, before dawn on the 12th, the 2nd corps, destined for the first assault, took up its position. No artillery gave notice of the approach of the conflict; but with the intention of concealing the movement of the previous night, and the consequent accession of force on the Federal right, the march was executed secretly,* and the 1st and 3rd divisions forming in line, supported by the 2nd and 4th in column, approached the Confederate entrenchments. Advancing silently but rapidly through the woods, they ascended the slope held by Johnson's division of Ewell's corps, which formed a salient angle in the Confederate line, and with a rush as they neared the field works, charged the enemy, unprepared for the assault, and taking him suddenly in front and flanks compelled the surrender of Johnson's division, capturing himself and Brigadier-General Stewart. Then Hancock's men, elated by their success, and eager to pursue the flying enemy, pressed forward rapidly to storm the second line of rifle-pits, at the same time that Burnside on the left, and Warren and Wright on the right, covered by a fierce artillery fire, advanced their several corps. But the old soldiers of the Army of Virginia recovered from the first surprise, and, too well accustomed to the incidents of war to be injured in *morale*. by a repulse, rallied on their reserves, and turning on the assailants pressed forward to regain the lost position. Hill brought up his corps

* Swinton states that the direction of Hancock's march was determined only by a line, determined by compass, drawn from Brown's house to a large white house known to be inside the enemy's lines. Such, he adds, was warfare in Virginia.

on the right, whilst Ewell held his ground with his remaining two divisions, and Anderson successfully resisted the onward progress of Wright. Thus passed the morning. About noon there was a temporary lull in the battle, and Meade, thinking that the flanks of the Confederate position appeared less strong than the centre, ordered Warren and Burnside to attack whilst he sent Wright to the assistance of Hancock. Both these attacks failed in producing any impression on the Confederate lines, and later in the day two divisions of Warren's corps were sent to reinforce the centre, whilst on the other hand Lee, perceiving that the great body of the enemy had disappeared from his left, directed Anderson to the support of Hill. Then, through the afternoon and evening, the battle raged with redoubled fury, but not a step of ground could the Federals gain; Hancock held the rifle-pits he had taken in the morning, and drew away some of the guns captured, but the greater number, covered by the heavy fire of the Confederates, could not be removed, whilst every effort to advance on the part of Burnside met with repulse. The slaughter had been very great, and, concentrated within a small area, presented spectacles of more than ordinary horror. Night, as usual, terminated the struggle, leaving Lee in possession of his lines, with the exception of a mile of ground taken by Hancock.

On the following day, General Lee withdrew for a short distance, still, however, retaining his hold of the Court-house, and presenting a bold front in all parts of his line. Facing each other, and constantly, although partially, engaged, the two armies remained without movement during the six following days, weary with incessant fighting, and impeded from manœuvring

by the rain and consequent deep mud. The terrible fatigue of constantly marching and countermarching through the swamps and forests by night, and of fighting during the day, had told heavily on both, although the actual loss was far greater among the Federals than the Confederates. Since the 5th May, the former had lost in killed, wounded, and missing, nearly 50,000 men, whilst the latter were diminished by about 12,000.

And now whilst the pause which very lassitude necessitated gives leisure to direct attention from the operations of the main armies, it will be well to direct a glance on the cotemporary movements of the co-operating forces; to follow the fortunes of Sheridan, who, whilst Meade, under the direct supervision of the Commander-in-Chief, had been battling against Lee at the Wilderness and Spottsylvania, was on detached service with his cavalry; of Butler, who was operating against Petersburg; and of Sigel, who was marching up the Shenandoah Valley. The first of these officers, after watching the left flank of Meade's army during the battles of the Wilderness, and being engaged in frequent skirmishes with Stuart, marched with three cavalry divisions against General Lee's lines of communication, crossing the North and South Anna Rivers, destroying an important depôt of supplies at Hanover Junction, and penetrating within the outer entrenchments around Richmond. There his leading brigade was met by Stuart, at the head of two Virginia regiments. An engagement ensued in a narrow road, and one of the regiments being thrown into some disorder, Stuart rallied it and led forward in person the supports, which, charging with vigour, in turn drove back the Federal cavalry; then Stuart, riding to the front to secure some dismounted prisoners, calling on them to

surrender, and on their resisting discharging at them his revolver, received a shot which brought him to the ground, happily on the further side of the fence that bounded the road. The Federals, recovered from their repulse, again advanced, and in turn defeated the Virginians, pursuing them and passing the spot where Stuart was lying. But among these Virginian regiments was the very troop that he had once commanded; the men knew and loved him, and now, seeing their general and former captain actually in the power of the enemy, resolved on making one supreme effort to rescue him. They charged down the road; they drove back the Federals; they lifted the general from the ground, and, placing him on a horse, carried him to Richmond, where many sorrowing friends, and, amongst them, the President of the Confederacy, anxiously awaited the issue of the wound. It was soon apparent that no hope could be entertained. The dying general lingered through the day, his mind often clear and vigorous, but occasionally wandering to the scenes of his former exploits. Towards evening, mortification ensued; his wife, whom he wished once more to see, was unfortunately absent from Richmond, and so, after making a disposition of a few bequests to his old friends and brother officers, he died as he had lived, the type of a good patriot, a noble soldier, and a Christian gentleman.

General Stuart possessed all the genius and instincts of a cavalry officer, his eye for ground was wonderfully accurate, and he had the talent for command equally with the fearless dash of the hussar. He admired the *arme blanche* as the true weapon for a horseman, but unfortunately, neither time nor means were at hand to organise and discipline a force on the model of European cavalry; and, during the later conflicts, the

improved discipline of the Federals, together with their superiority in horses and arms, gave them the advantage which belonged, during the earlier periods, to Stuart's horsemen. Their officers had also carried to great perfection the system of skirmishing on foot, the horses being used mainly for the transport of the men, who in the forests of Virginia performed most efficiently the duties of infantry riflemen, whilst Stuart had always preferred the more dashing warfare of the cavalry soldier.

Few men have been more beloved than General Stuart; his youth, for he was little more than thirty when he died, his good looks, his fearless gallantry, his daring exploits, and his cheerful, social disposition, gained the admiration and affection of all with whom he was brought in contact. He was the model of a chivalrous cavalry officer, uniting in his character high principles with reckless courage. Like most of the distinguished leaders in the war, he had formerly served in the United States army, and had been employed against the Indians. When Virginia seceded, he embraced her cause, and the history of the campaigns of Virginia and Maryland, from Bull Run to Spottsylvania, is a record of his achievements and a testimony to his fame.* General Stuart was succeeded in command of the cavalry by Wade Hampton, already greatly distinguished, and who to the renown of a soldier added the influence due to wealth, high position, and a noble character.

Having accomplished the purposes of the raid, i.e., having inflicted considerable damage by tearing up the railways and burning the depôts of supplies; having

* A most interesting narrative of General Stuart's campaigns, written by Colonel von Borcke, of his personal staff, has been published in *Blackwood's Magazine*.

also drawn away most of the Confederate cavalry which threatened Grant's communications, Sheridan retired across the Chickahominy at Meadow bridge, and recrossing at Bottom bridge, opened communication with Butler from Turkey Island bend.

It is now time to inquire how that general had played his part in the great programme of the advance on Richmond. He had under his orders a considerable army, consisting of two corps of infantry, commanded by Generals Gillmore and F. Smith, 1,800 cavalry, and a co-operating force of 3,000 of the same arm at Suffolk, besides a fleet of gunboats and transports, together with five iron-clads. He was thus in a position to operate by land or water, and, with head-quarters at Yorktown and Gloucester Point, threatened Richmond either by the route formerly pursued by McClellan, or by the James River. Thus, whilst the main body of the Confederate forces under Lee was holding its ground with great difficulty against the Army of the Potomac, General Butler menaced, by what was termed in homely language the back door, the capital of the Confederacy.

On the same day that Grant, or, more properly, Meade, crossed the Rapidan, Butler having sent his cavalry towards the White House and Cumberland to divert the enemy's attention, shipped his men on board the transports, and under convoy of the gunboats and ironclads steamed up the James River. He landed a strong detachment, chiefly of negro troops, at Charles City Point and City Point to protect the water communication, and reaching Bermuda Hundred on the James,* four miles above the mouth of the Appomattox, disembarked and immediately commenced to entrench.

* Called properly Bermuda Hundred Neck.

Leaving Butler to fortify himself under the protection of his gunboats, it will be well to enter Richmond and see what preparations had been made to protect the city from that direction. The concentration of the Federal forces in the Yorktown peninsula had allowed of troops being drawn from Charleston and North Carolina. Thus Hoke's division from North Carolina had been conveyed by train to Richmond; Beauregard in person, with about 3,000 infantry, had come up from Charleston; Whiting had brought his division from Wilmington; and, under Ransom* and Colquhitt, the garrison of Richmond and the troops in the vicinity had been collected and formed into two divisions. The whole of this force, amounting to about 19,000 men, was now under the command of General Beauregard.

This officer, who, since the campaign in the West of 1862, had not commanded an army in the field, but had been engaged in the difficult and trying duties of watching the coast, and especially in protecting Charleston—who had organised in a masterly manner the men and material for the defence of that city, was now, at this trying hour for the Confederacy, brought to the capital and entrusted with one of the defending armies, whilst his successor in command of the Western forces (General Bragg) was also at Richmond, acting as military adviser and as chief of staff to President Davis. Thus three out of four of the generals of the Confederacy who had exercised supreme commands were at and near Richmond. But notwithstanding the presence of these leading men, President Davis retained in his own hands the chief direction of affairs

* Ransom's force, of about 5,000, forming the garrison of Richmond, was partially formed of Pickett's division, that officer being absent by reason of sickness.

(Lee merely commanding the Army of Virginia), and the combination of civil and military authority with which he was invested was a type of the double motives which actuated the Confederate government in insisting on and maintaining to the utmost limit of time the defence of Richmond. The plans of the several generals were submitted to the President for his approval, and he did not shrink from the responsibility of refusing his sanction or of altering them when he saw fit to do so. Possibly President Davis may, from early experience, have been more fitted than many civil governors for the exercise of such a power, but he had never had an opportunity of acquiring a knowledge of military operations on a large scale; and at a time when, with forces far inferior to those of the enemy, a great campaign was in progress, where the separate and distinct armies were yet so near to each other as to be within the compass of the command of one man; and where such a man, standing pre-eminently forward, was present at hand, it must appear to bystanders strange that the strategical movements were controlled by a civilian.

Thus, when Beauregard seeing that the crisis of the war was approaching, knowing well the preponderating power of the enemy, and yet discerning the great advantage of the possession of interior lines, advocated a plan of rapid concentration and brilliant movements, President Davis withheld his consent, and what was hoped would have proved a decisive victory terminated in only partial success.

To comprehend this plan, Butler's operations since his arrival at Bermuda Hundred on the 6th of May must be followed out and understood. He had landed with his infantry, and entrenched himself, whilst his cavalry, under Kautz, was marching from Suffolk with

the intent, by cutting the Weldon rail, of preventing the concentration by the enemy of troops from the south. On the 7th he pushed forward a strong *reconnaissance* to destroy portions of the Richmond and Petersburg railway, which, unsuccessful in the attempt, fell back, and not until the 9th did he advance in any force towards Richmond. Even then his operations were slow and feeble. Three divisions of the 10th corps, and two of the 18th, marched from Bermuda Hundred, but after skirmishing with the enemy in the neighbourhood of Petersburg, retired and occupied themselves during the 11th in strengthening the defences of the camp. On the 12th, however, a real advance was made, and a sufficient force having been left to watch the garrison of Petersburg, the greater portion of the infantry and artillery marched by two roads on Richmond, the cavalry under Kautz, which had joined the main army, being detached to the left to sever railway communication between Richmond and Weldon.

There was skirmishing during the 12th, and on the 13th Gillmore obtained possession of the outer line of fieldworks, which, extending from Fort Darling, or Drury's Bluff, in a south-westerly direction, covered the approaches to Richmond from the south. This slight success was not followed up energetically, and during the two following days little was effected. Valuable time was thus lost, and his opponent, perceiving the slow and uncertain movements of the Federal general, and the opportunity that presented itself of a brilliant success, conceived a plan of campaign for which, as it involved the co-operation of the Army of Virginia, the approval of the President became necessary.

But there was no time to be lost. Beauregard purposed to attack Butler before he could perfect his

entrenchments, and, cutting him off from the river and his base at Bermuda Hundred, to overwhelm and crush him. The crisis was imminent. Admiral Lee (Federal), with a fleet of ironclads and gunboats, was on the James, busily engaged in removing obstructions and torpedoes preparatory to an attack on the river defences. General Lee's army had but three days' provisions, and at Richmond there were supplies for only ten days more. Thus the fall of Richmond would be fatal to the safety of the Army of Virginia ; and yet Butler was but a few miles distant, and the force that interposed between him and the prize at which he aimed was small in number and heterogeneous in composition. The troops composing it had been hastily assembled, and were imperfectly organised ; many of the regiments and brigades were unacquainted with their commanding officers, and the staff were unknown to each other ; but Beauregard, looking beyond the difficulties that surrounded him, showed how they might be surmounted, and already with keen eye discovered a means of converting the apparent danger into decisive victory.

With some difficulty, owing to the advance of Butler, he had reached Drury's Bluff, and from thence, on the night of the 15th May, he despatched an aide-de-camp to Richmond with the following plan. He proposed that, making use of the railway, 15,000 men should be withdrawn from the Army of Virginia, and attached temporarily to his command: that with this reinforcement he should fall on and overwhelm Butler, and then, with his victorious army, should cross the James River, and coming unexpectedly on Grant's left flank, whilst Lee engaged him in front, should involve that army also in an overthrow so complete as to render the continuance of the campaign impossible. Possibly, even probably,

the withdrawal of the 15,000 men would entail General Lee's retreat to the defences of Richmond; but this would only draw Grant nearer to the James River, and shorten Beauregard's march.

The aide-de-camp hastened to Richmond, and sought an interview with the President; but Mr. Davis, overworked and unwell, had retired to rest, and his attendants refused to awake him. He then went to General Bragg's quarters, and that officer, recognising the émergency of the case, repaired at once to Drury's Bluff, where General Beauregard was anxiously expecting an answer to his despatch. To General Bragg, Beauregard expounded his plan, praying him to take the responsibility of issuing the requisite orders for the march of the troops from the Army of Virginia; but Bragg hesitated, and again was a message sent to the President. This was delivered, and Mr. Davis at once galloped to Beauregard's quarters, and listened to the scheme. He saw its advantages, and seemed to be about to give his assent, but hearing that it might entail General Lee's retreat, if only temporarily, refused to allow of the withdrawal of any portion of his army, and ordered Beauregard to attack with the force at present at his disposal.

Although disappointed at the refusal of the President to sanction his plan of action, and recognising the risk attendant on attacking a superior force within the breastworks of which time had admitted the erection, General Beauregard at once set himself to work to perfect the somewhat complicated combinations for the ensuing battle. These combinations arose from the position of the Confederate forces; the main army of three divisions (Hoke's, Ransom's, and Colquhitt's),* under Beauregard in person, held the lines from near

* Colquhitt's division was in reality little more than a strong brigade.

the James River to the Richmond and Petersburg rail, whilst Whiting's division (of about 4,000 bayonets), having advanced three miles from Petersburg and Swift Creek, was distant about nine miles from General Beauregard, and was destined to act on Butler's rear, when the sound of heavy firing should have warned him that he (Butler) was fully occupied in front.

On the morning of the 16th May, about 4.45 A.M., Beauregard commenced the battle * by the advance of Ransom's divisions, his intention being to turn the right of the Federal position held by Smith's corps, and to interpose between Butler and Bermuda Hundred, whilst Hoke should engage Gillmore on the opposite flank, Colquhitt being held in reserve to act when required. But, partly owing to unforeseen causes, partly to the reasons already mentioned, which marred the efficiency of the Confederate army, the plan miscarried, and the success was only partial. A thick fog covering the woods at daybreak delayed Ransom in making his attack. Notwithstanding, he succeeded in driving back the enemy from his rifle-pits, and in turning his flank; but owing to the fog, and to the heavy loss sustained, his division became somewhat scattered and disordered, necessitating the presence of the reserve. Colquhitt came up, and enabled Ransom to maintain his position; but the enemy, released from present danger on his right flank, strengthened his left, and pressed hard on Hoke, who with difficulty maintained his ground. Then should Ransom have renewed his attack with fresh vigour, and Whiting should have created a diversion from Petersburg; but the former did not fulfil the expectations of General Beauregard, and the latter, moving with hesitation and doubt where rapid and earnest

* *Vide* Map, p. 258.

action was required, failed to carry out his orders, and remained inert, fearful of engaging a superior force in a position with which he was unacquainted.

Noon had already passed, but not until 4 P.M. did General Beauregard give up all hope of carrying out his original plan. Then, hearing and learning nothing of Whiting, he determined to press the enemy in his retreat to his entrenched camp at Bermuda Hundred. Hoke was ordered forward, and opened fire on the retiring columns from the rising ground west of the railway, but heavy rain which commenced to fall delayed the re-formation of the Confederate lines disordered by the engagement of the morning, and darkness closing in, caused General Beauregard to countermand the order for advance, fearing to fall on Butler's strong entrenchments with troops unsuited to act in the difficult operations of a night attack. Butler, relieved from the pressure of the foe, with the loss of many prisoners, and some guns,* retired behind his entrenchments which he completed across the neck of land, and which Beauregard, satisfied with having neutralised the effect of his army, contented himself with watching from an opposing line of works thrown up on the days succeeding the battle.

Thus, whilst Grant was held in check by Lee at Spottsylvania Court-house, Butler, whose slowness of movement had deprived his operations of the intended character of a surprise, was (to quote General Grant's own words) 'as completely shut off from further operations directly against Richmond as if in a bottle strongly corked.'†

* General Beauregard claims to have captured 1,400 prisoners. Federal accounts state Butler's total loss to have been 2,500.

† *Vide* Lieutenant-General Grant's report. For the account of the battle of Drury's Bluff, the author is much indebted to certain

Nevertheless, the Federal Army of the James, although repulsed, had not been defeated, as had been designed by General Beauregard in the plan submitted to the President. It still remained with *morale* little injured, and if it could not effect the important diversion which was its proper task, it was yet able, as will be seen in the future record of the campaign, to afford material assistance to the Army of the Potomac when such assistance was most required.

The repulse of Butler enabled Beauregard to dispense with a large portion of his force, which was despatched to strengthen the Army of Virginia, 10,000 men being considered sufficient to hold the lines of Bermuda Hundred.

It has now been seen how the second column of invasion directed against Richmond received a check. Still another remains to be accounted for; and before returning to the main armies, the fate of Sigel, advancing up the Shenandoah Valley, must be narrated, involving as it did future important events. To capture Staunton, possibly also Lynchburg, and to destroy the depôts of stores there collected, at the same time to sever the communication between Virginia and Tennessee by seizing on stations on the great line of railway running from Richmond through Lynchburg to Knoxville, were the objects for which the converging columns from the Shenandoah and Kanawha valleys were put in motion. The former, under Sigel, advanced from Winchester; the latter, concentrated at Charleston on the Kanawha River (under the command of General Crook), was divided into two detachments, under Crook

memoranda made from General Beauregard's despatches by Captain Hichens, R.E., and also to details given him by General Beauregard in conversation with himself.

and Averill,* and was directed by mountain roads across the great intersecting chain to the valley through which ran the Virginia and Tennessee rail.

To meet these formidable columns, General Breckenridge, who was guarding the passes from Western Virginia, rapidly collected such troops as he could lay hands on, and marched to Staunton; whilst Gen. Jenkins, with his cavalry and the local forces of the neighbourhood, prepared to encounter Crook and Averill. The disparity of numbers was very great. Breckenridge had with him Imboden's cavalry and one infantry division (Wharton's), whilst in the Shenandoah Valley and among the adjoining mountains were small bands of cavalry, who, under Colonel Gilmor, † were incessantly employed in watching the approaches from the Potomac, in harassing the Federal forces in the valley, and in obstructing the Baltimore and Ohio rail. The total number of men under Breckenridge was not more than 3,500, and with this comparatively insignificant force he was called on to defend the important Western communications of Richmond from Sigel, who, according to Federal accounts, had under his command 15,000 men of all arms.

In the first weeks of May, whilst the great armies were engaged in the terrible battles of the Wilderness and Spottsylvania, Sigel commenced his march from

* Consisting of three brigades, chiefly cavalry. Army operations. *American Annual Encyclopædia*.

† Colonel Gilmor was trained under Ashby, and by his gallantry and soldierly qualities rose from the rank of private to that of colonel. He was employed in watching the Shenandoah Valley, and for three years was almost incessantly engaged with the enemy. He was wounded five times, and had thirteen horses killed or disabled under him. He trained his men to fight principally with the sabre, only permitting a small number to carry pistols or carbines.

Winchester and Strasburg, moving up the north fork of the Shenandoah, whilst Breckenridge, having entered Staunton, and deputed to Col. Gilmor the task of observing and reporting on the enemy's movements, organised his small army preparatory to an advance. He was joined at Staunton by the pupils from the military college of Lexington (Virginia), boys whose ages averaged between 14 and 17, and who, in course of training for service in the Confederate army, were, at the crisis of their country's fate, brought to the front to the number of 250; mere boys they were in age and in appearance, but possessed of the courage of veterans, and buoyed up by an enthusiasm which enabled them to bear fatigues which might have broken strong men down. Reinforced by this small detachment, and accurately informed of his adversary's movements by Gilmor's scouts, who, hanging on the flanks of the Federal columns, looked down on their camps from Massanutten Mountain, Breckenridge marched from Staunton, taking the road to Newmarket.

On the 13th of May the opposing armies met at Newmarket. Sigel, having advanced up the left bank of the north fork of the Shenandoah, crossed below the small town, leaving a strong detachment to guard the bridge in his rear, and his advanced guard reached the outskirts of Newmarket on one side as that of Breckenridge entered it from the other. Breckenridge was ignorant of the country, but among the friendly inhabitants found many sources of information; and ascending a house in the town, soon comprehended the features of the ground and the position of the enemy. He saw Sigel in column of march with his right on the river, now unfordable, moving through the rich corn land which bordered the road, whilst he learnt the

existence of the bridge by which he had crossed the river. His determination was quickly taken. Directing Gilmor with his cavalry to threaten, and, if possible, to burn the bridge, he marched with the remainder of his force out of Newmarket; but instead of attacking Sigel in front, or waiting to be attacked, he proceeded to turn his left flank, as if with the purpose of cutting him off from the bridge. This unexpected and bold movement seems to have alarmed the Federal general, who, in place of falling on the inferior force which in full view was marching round his flank, attempted a counter movement to cover the bridge and his trains. Breckenridge saw his opportunity, and rushing furiously against the Federal troops, who were in some confusion, drove them back with great loss to seek shelter under cover of their artillery, posted in a cedar wood.

Then the boys from Lexington distinguished themselves. They had endured the long march from Staunton, had bivouacked the night previous to the battle in the rain and mud, and were now called upon to attack a battery well supported by a formidable force of infantry. Major Ship, their instructor and commander, formed them in line and advanced. The colour bearer fell, but was replaced by another brave boy. Then, under the heavy fire of grape, Ship halted the line, ordering bayonets to be fixed, and prepared for the final assault. At this time he was struck; but still able to stand, called on his boys to make a rush at the battery. Gallantly did they respond, and advancing at a run through the deep ground, losing their shoes in the mud, they leapt into the battery, killed the artillerymen, drove back the infantry supports, bayoneted the colonel, who refused to surrender to such apparently insignificant foes, and captured the

guns, losing in the charge eighty of their number. In view of the whole army this gallant action was performed; and when many a more important battle is forgotten, and when many a general is remembered only as a name, the noble conduct of the boys of Lexington will still be called to mind, and their exploit narrated among the most striking traditions of the war.

The Federals, after the battle, retired towards the bridge, which had been protected by a force too large to permit of Gilmer's attacking it with any prospect of success, and although followed in the retreat by his indefatigable troopers, who swam the river and the other streams which intersected the line of march, fell back without further mishap to Strasburg. Six guns, together with several stands of arms, were captured, and a large amount of property was destroyed to prevent it from falling into the hands of the victorious enemy.

Thus did the third column of invasion advancing up the Shenandoah Valley receive a decisive check, and General Lee was enabled to avail himself of the greater portion of Breckenridge's force to replace the losses of the Wilderness, and to meet Grant on the new battle-fields around Richmond. Crook and Averill had, in the meantime, attacked the Virginia and Tennessee railway, but meeting with a stubborn resistance from General Jenkins, and anticipating an attack in rear from a detachment of Morgan's men, advancing from the Tennessee frontier, retired across the mountains, not, however, without inflicting some injury to the rail, and causing the death of General Jenkins, who was mortally wounded in an engagement at Dublin depôt. In his death the Confederacy lost one of its most efficient cavalry leaders, and one who had long and successfully guarded its frontiers on the borders of Western Virginia.

CHAPTER. XII.

THE SUMMER CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA.

It is often necessary to pause, whilst following the operations of a great campaign, to discover the connecting links which bind the movements of the several armies. Days of slaughter, of which the chief incidents differ but slightly, follow each other with such rapidity that the mind of the reader grows weary, and, involved in a consideration of details, is apt to forget the great scheme of the campaign. It is well, therefore, to select some date, and to recall the positions of the various armies at that particular time, so that these several bearings of each on the other may be distinctly comprehended, and the object of their movements clearly ascertained.

Such a date seems to be best furnished by the third week of May. At that time the armies, under Grant and Lee, were still in the vicinity of Spottsylvania Court-house; the former, notwithstanding his vastly preponderating strength, was awaiting reinforcements from Washington, which were to amount, it was said, to 25,000 men; the latter, with only his small and over-worked army to rely on, was expecting the arrival of troops from the Shenandoah, set free by the defeat of Sigel, and of help from the army of Beauregard, libe-

* *Vide* Map II., commencement of volume. Also Map, p. 258.

rated by the repulse of Butler. It must ever remain a marvel how this small force, ill supplied, overworked, harassed by continual fighting, and marching by night and by day, could hold its ground against the almost innumerable host under Grant's command. That it did so, inflicting loss far heavier than it sustained, and creating a belief in the mind of the enemy of numbers far larger than it contained, has been already shown ; and that it continued in its successful resistance will be apparent when the change in the Federal general's plan of attack comes to be fully understood.

By the use of interior lines, but yet without the facilities of movement which water communications furnished to the enemy, the three converging armies of Sigel, Meade, and Butler, with their attendant, but often detached, cavalry expeditions, had been met and repulsed. Two out of these three armies had been forced to seek shelter behind fortified lines ; the third had been brought to a halt to await reinforcements, and the arteries which supplied life to the capital of the Confederacy had been preserved. But whilst, after the hardships of campaigning, the Federal forces could seek and obtain rest and reorganisation, and, secure within entrenched lines, could await reinforcements and supplies, their opponents, whose presence was required in other battle-fields, were forced to employ this period of respite in carrying help to portions of the line where the pressure was more heavily felt.

Thus, after Sigel's defeat, whilst his troops were halting at Strasburg, Breckenridge, with the majority of his force, comprising about 2,500 infantry and artillery,*

* General Early, in a letter dated Havannah, December 18, 1865, and published in the *New York Times*, thus alludes to the reinforcements which, shortly after this time, joined General Lee :—

was hastening up the valley to join Lee; and whilst Butler, under shelter of the guns of the fleet, and behind formidable entrenchments, was repairing the damage inflicted by Beauregard, that officer was sending to the assistance of the army north of the James such troops as could be spared from the task of watching the enemy's lines at Bermuda Hundred. But before these reinforcements could reach General Lee, active operations had recommenced, and Grant, giving up the plan of forcing a way to Richmond through the Confederate army, endeavoured to outflank it, and cutting it off from its base, to throw it back towards Lynchburg.

Separating himself from his own base at Fredericksburg, and directing his long baggage-train to march in a south-easterly direction, towards Port Royal on the Rappahannock, he put his army in motion down the left bank of the Ny River towards Guinea's station, twelve miles south of Fredericksburg, on the Fredericksburg and Richmond railway, with such of the cavalry as had not accompanied Sheridan in advance of the column. By this means the bridge at Guinea's station was secured, and the army having crossed the Ny River, occupied on the 22nd May a position in an open and well-cultivated country along the line of the Richmond and Fredericksburg railway, between the Ny River and the North Anna. But General Lee had divined the plan; he had harassed and delayed the march by con-

'At Hanover Junction, General Lee was joined by Pickett's division of Longstreet's corps, one small brigade of my division of Ewell's corps, which had been in North Carolina with Hoke, and two small brigades, with a battalion of artillery, under Breckenridge. This force, under Breckenridge, which General Grant estimates at 15,000, and which was subsequently united to mine at Lynchburg, did not exceed 2,000 muskets.'

stant skirmishes, approaching in magnitude to engagements ; * and when his opponent reached the north bank of the North Anna River, occupied a position covering the Virginia Central railway, prepared to contest its passage and to defend the important strategic position of Hanover Junction. Here he was joined by Pickett's division, by a brigade of Early's division, and by the small division under Breckenridge, making in all a reinforcement of about 9,000 men. But previous to the arrival of these troops on the ground, the enemy had attempted, and had partially succeeded, in effecting the passage of the river.

The two wings of the Federal army, the right formed of Warren's corps, the left of Hancock's, arrived at the north bank almost simultaneously, the former at Jericho Ford, the latter four miles lower down, at the County bridge, near the railway crossing. Warren's men immediately plunged into the stream, fording it, although breast high, and having formed line of battle on the south bank, withstood the attack of Hill's corps, † temporarily under Early's command. Hancock, having

* In one of these engagements, General Tyler, commanding a division of foot artillerists recently brought from Washington, distinguished himself. His men, unused to fighting among woods and behind breastworks, exposed themselves gallantly to the enemy's fire, and repulsed an assault made on the flank of the army by Ewell's corps.

† Swinton relates the following anecdote in connection with this exploit of Warren's corps :—

‘ One of Bartlett's regiments (the 83rd Pennsylvania, under Lieutenant-Colonel McCoy), in marching by the flank, ran plump against Brown's column (Confederate), which was moving to follow up its first advantage against the right. It was one of the critical situations which a moment will decide—the decision, in fact, depending on gaining the advantage of the first volley. With quick self-possession, McCoy wheeled his forward companies into line, and secured the

captured a redoubt which defended the bridge, prevented the enemy from burning it, and on the 24th May established himself on the south side of the river. Wright's corps (the 6th) followed Warren, and Burnside (the 9th) hastened to connect the two wings, and to throw a bridge over the stream between Warren and Hancock. But here Lee, by an exercise of consummate generalship, foiled his opponent. He had continued to maintain his hold on the salient angle with its apex on the river in front of Burnside, between the two wings of the Federal army, and, when the leading division of Burnside's corps essayed to cross the river, made it pay dearly for its attempt, and, cutting the communication between Warren and Hancock, threatened to turn successively on both wings of the army, overwhelming and crushing each in succession. General Grant, not liking the situation in which he found himself placed, and fearful of attacking Lee in a position so disadvantageous to himself, secretly recrossed the river, and withdrew down the peninsula between the Mataponi and Pamunkey rivers, to Hanover town, covering and protecting his line of march with Sheridan's cavalry, which had rejoined the army from the vicinity of the White House.*

At Hanover town he crossed the Pamunkey river,† and, having formed a new base of supplies at the White

first fire. One of McCoy's men seized the Confederate commander by the collar, and dragged him in, and the 83rd poured into the flank and rear of the hostile brigade a volley which sent it back in disorder through the woods.'

* For a detailed account of this and other affairs connected with the Army of the Potomac, the reader is recommended to consult Swinton's *Army of the Potomac*, apparently a most fair and graphic account of the campaigns in which that army was engaged.

† Formed by the junction of the North and South Anna rivers.

House, marched on the Chickahominy and the old battle-fields of 1862. General Lee's army had made a corresponding flank movement, and now held a line stretching from Atlees station on the left to Coal Harbour, covering the Hanover Court-house and White House and Mechanicsville roads. Between the cavalry of the two armies, there had been several actions resulting from *reconnaissances* pushed forward by the Federal commander, and usually terminating in favour of the Federals, but not until the 3rd of June did any engagement, which in a war of such vast dimensions could be accounted a battle, test the power of General Grant to accomplish on the same ground, but with even larger numbers, the task which McClellan two years previously had failed to fulfil.

During the march from the Pamunkey to the Chickahominy, separate corps had been engaged, the Confederate generals, with their perfect knowledge of the country, falling on any detachment which pushed forward beyond support; but Lee, careful of the only army which stood between Grant and Richmond, acted on the defensive, partially compensating for the inferiority of his force by the strength of the successive positions which he occupied and entrenched. Nevertheless the near approach of the invading army to its objective point rendered a decisive battle imminent, and Grant's operations all tended to lead to the belief that he purposed endeavouring to gain possession of the bridges by which M'Clellan had crossed the Chickahominy in order to push forward against the city of Richmond by lines similar to those selected by that general. He had brought 16,000 men of the 10th and 18th corps under Smith by water down the James and up the Pamunkey River from Bermuda Hundred, and now, with his base

of supplies at the White House, extended from the Coal Harbour and Despatch Station road on the left, to Tolopotomy Creek on the right; Burnside, with the 9th corps, and Wilson's cavalry being on the extreme right, Warren, Smith, and Wright, forming the centre, with Hancock on the left of the line near the hill against which Jackson had made his famous attack at the battle of Gaines Mill.

And yet, short as had been the time, measured by ordinary rules, since that battle had been fought, but few of the great army brought into line on the night of the 2nd and 3rd of June, 1864, recognised the features of the country so familiar to those who exactly two years previously had encamped and contended on the very same ground. The bloody campaigns of those two years had swallowed up the old Army of the Potomac, and their successors were destined to learn the power of resistance which the defenders of Richmond still possessed, as they attempted to force the fatal passage of the Chickahominy, and obtain firm footing on its right bank.

Before daylight of the 3rd of June, the troops occupying the positions above stated were lying behind the breastworks which they had laboured hard to throw up during the preceding night, and were snatching a short slumber, regardless of the drizzling rain which had commenced to fall. All was quiet at 4 A.M.; but at 4.30 orders were given to advance; the pickets were soon engaged, and Hancock's men, with Wright and Warren on their right, were quickly in motion among the woods and swampy ground which separated them from the slight entrenchments held by the Confederates. At first, Hancock, by a sudden rush, obtained some success, a portion of Breckenridge's line was driven back, and

some guns temporarily captured, but the remainder of Hill's corps, and especially General Finnegan, with the men who had won renown in Florida, came to the rescue, and, sweeping onward with irresistible force, retook the guns, turned them on the enemy, and drove back Hancock with great slaughter to his former lines. Anderson's corps had likewise held its ground against Wright and Smith, and Early, now in command of Ewell's corps (that officer being absent on account of sickness), although less seriously engaged, yet prevented any advance on the part of Warren and Burnside.*

It is said that, with the exception of Hancock's first attack, the battle on the side of the Federals was sustained with less vigour than those fought at the Wilderness and Spottsylvania, and that the soldiers, horrified at the continual slaughter and the unintermittent and yet indecisive engagements, had advanced slowly and unwillingly, consequently sustaining loss far heavier than they inflicted. Thirteen thousand men and many officers of note were among the killed, wounded, and missing, in the battle of the 3rd of June, and the troops, thoroughly dispirited, refused to answer to the call which General Meade made on them to renew the attack at a later period of the afternoon. They commenced to entrench, and made preparations similar to those which followed the battle of Fair Oaks, to push forward siege operations against the breastworks with which Lee defended the passage of the Chickahominy and the approaches to Richmond.

* In this battle General Tyler was severely wounded. He was a West Point officer, and had served with much distinction during the whole of the campaigns of the Army of the Potomac. His kindness to English officers who visited the army during these operations will ever be remembered gratefully by those who have experienced it.

The result of the battle, and the temper of the soldiery, proved to General Grant that the attempt to force a way to Richmond by the destruction of Lee's army was completely unavailing. He could no longer, whilst operating on the north of the James River, execute a flank movement to turn his adversary's position; the assault by open force had failed; the plan of converging movements from the outer circumference of the circle had been thwarted; each successive column of invasion had been met by General Lee or his lieutenants, and not only had the cities of Richmond and Petersburg been preserved, but the main lines of railway which fed both them and the army had been retained almost intact. After many battles, and losses, of which few wars can afford a parallel, and which surpassed in number the whole strength of the enemy's force, General Grant had brought his army to a position which McClellan had reached with far greater ease and far less expenditure of life two years previously.

Yet it would be wrong to suppose that the battles of the preceding month, even in their unprecedented and disproportionate slaughter among the Northern troops did not exercise an influence important and in respect to the future of the war not altogether adverse to the Federal cause. Although General Lee's army had suffered in a far less degree than its antagonist, it had lost heavily. At least 18,000 men had been put *hors-de-combat* since he had left his lines near Gordonsville, and behind this army was no rich and populous country, and no Europe from which fighting men could readily be obtained. Officers and men saw their ranks diminishing; they knew that, with the exception of the black population, few but women and children occupied the farms and plantations of Virginia and the Carolinas, and they regarded with

a sort of despair the fresh legions which filled the gaps caused by those they had slain in the many battle-fields between Richmond and Washington.

But notwithstanding this feeling, which seems to have existed, and to have been combined with the triumph of present success, in the ranks of the Confederate army, it must be a matter of doubt, even among the warmest admirers of General Grant, whether the results obtained since the crossing of the Rapidan were at all commensurate with the losses incurred: whilst the unbiassed and impartial can have little hesitation in pronouncing the opinion that, had Lee been in possession of any force at all approaching in number that commanded by Grant, Washington, and not Richmond, would have been in danger. Excepting in persistency of purpose, Grant had shown few of the qualities of a great general. In a campaign fought without strategy, and in battles without tactics, he had sacrificed, since he marched into the Wilderness, at least 60,000 men. Had McClellan been equally prodigal of life, doubtless a cry would have been raised throughout the country which would have compelled his removal; but since 1862 the people of the Federal States had become so accustomed to the cost of war, and were so ready to support the generals in the field, whatever sacrifice that support might entail, that they were prepared to yield to General Grant what they would have failed to concede to General McClellan. Compared with the losses sustained under General Grant's command, those of the old Army of the Potomac had been small, and yet Grant occupied, previous to the battle of June the 3rd, no better position as regarded Richmond than had McClellan in 1862, and at that battle, although commanding a larger army than the latter general had ever brought into the field,

and opposed to a smaller force than that which had barred the progress of the Army of the Potomac in June 1862, Grant had accomplished results of no greater value than had followed the battle of Fair Oaks, or the other engagements on the Chickahominy.

In almost every respect the position occupied by General Grant was far more independent, and allowed of a far higher exercise of authority than that previously held by McClellan. His movements were almost uncontrolled, and his plans unfettered by the central government; he was supreme in command, and could therefore utilise the armies which were operating in other departments for the furtherance of the main scheme, and, in the event of any general failing to show either the ability or energy required, had the power to remove him and appoint a successor. In the temperament of the people he also found support; sobered by adversity, and taught to appreciate both the talents of the officers and the courage of the soldiery of the Confederacy, they yet maintained a stubborn confidence in their own vast power and resources. They had ceased to anticipate brilliant successes, but had learned by bitter experience that the changes in the generals had not produced corresponding advances towards victory. McDowell, McClellan, Pope, Burnside, Hooker, and Meade, had each and all attempted and failed in the task now undertaken by Grant. He likewise had endeavoured to advance by the same line as all, excepting McClellan, had adopted, but had at length been forced to follow a plan of attack similar to that pursued by the sole general who had as yet reached the outer defences of the enemy's capital with any considerable force.

It may have been owing to political considerations that the line of the Pamunkey and James Rivers had not

been sooner adopted ; as to have done so would have been to acknowledge the justice of McClellan's views : but the ultimate although tardy and costly movement of the army to the eastern approaches of Richmond will ever prove a justification of the soundness of that general's views, as it offered to his friends, of which among the remnants of the old Army of the Potomac many were still to be found, a triumph over those who, having in times of prosperity bespattered him with fulsome praise, deserted him at the first breath of adversity, calumniating not only his operations in the field but his wisdom in the council.

The action of the 3rd June may be considered as closing another era in the Virginian campaign, an era which even by the acknowledgment of General Grant terminated disadvantageously to the Federal arms, and which, as regarded the position of his army and his future plans, will be best described in his own words, although exception may be taken to the assertion of his ability to invest the city of Richmond from the northern side.

He thus writes, after describing the action of the 3rd June :—

‘From the proximity of the enemy to his defences around Richmond, it was impossible by any flank movement to interpose between him and the city. I was still in a position to either move by his left flank, and invest Richmond from the north side, or continue my move by his right flank to the south side of the James. While the former might have been better as a covering for Washington yet a full survey of all the ground satisfied me that it would be impracticable to hold a line north and east of Richmond, that would protect the Fredericksburg railroad—a long vulnerable

line, which would exhaust much of our strength to guard, and that would have to be protected to supply the army, and would leave open to the enemy all his lines of communication on the south side of the James. My idea had been from the start to beat Lee's army north of Richmond if possible. Then, after destroying his lines of communication north of the James River, to transfer the army to the south side, and besiege Lee in Richmond, or to follow him south if he should retreat. After the battle of the Wilderness, it was evident that the enemy deemed it of the first importance to run no risks with the army he then had. He acted purely on the defensive behind breastworks, or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where, in case of repulse, he could easily retire behind them. Without a greater sacrifice than I was willing to make, all could not be accomplished that I had designed north of Richmond. I therefore determined to continue to hold substantially the ground we then occupied, taking advantage of any favourable circumstances that might present themselves, until the cavalry could be sent to Charlottesville and Gordonsville, to effectually break up the connection between Richmond and the Shenandoah Valley and Lynchburg; and when the cavalry got well off, to move the army to the south side of the James River by the enemy's right flank, where I felt I could cut off all his sources of supply except by the canal.*

What may be considered the wings of the main army were, in compliance with this plan, again put in motion. Siegel, removed from the command of the Shenandoah in consequence of his defeat by Breckenridge, was

* I.e. the James River Canal, connecting Richmond with Lynchburg.

succeeded by Hunter, who was ordered to advance without delay up the valley to Lynchburg. Two divisions of cavalry under Sheridan were sent from the Army of the Potomac to break up the Virginian central rail, and effect a junction, if possible, with Hunter, and Butler received an imperative command to obtain possession of Petersburg.

Leaving for the present Butler and the main army under Meade, the operations in the Shenandoah, embracing collaterally the whole line of mountains as far as Eastern Tennessee, claim attention, and deserve careful study, as evincing the vast power of the Federals to put masses of men in motion contemporaneously and with corresponding objects; whilst on the other hand, they show the genius, which, with means contemptible in appearance, defeated during the whole summer every effort to obtain permanent possession of, or to destroy effectually, the important railway which, connecting Richmond with Lynchburg and Eastern Tennessee, supplied its defenders from the fertile districts south of the Blue Ridge Mountains.

A plan of campaign similar to that which Siegel had failed to accomplish was to be adopted, and carried through by Hunter, assisted by Crook and Averill operating from the Kanawha, by Burbidge moving down from the mountains of Eastern Tennessee, and by Sheridan, who, detached from the main army, was marching towards the Richmond and Gordonsville rail. The country was open to attack; Breckenridge had carried to the assistance of Lee almost the whole of the infantry formerly employed for the defence of the valley; and, to replace him, Imboden's and McCausland's cavalry under General W. E. Jones had been withdrawn from watching the passes into the low country bordering

the Tennessee and Virginia railway, and were engaged in guarding the roads leading to Staunton and Lynchburg by the two forks of the Shenandoah ; whilst, far to the west, Morgan, having collected together many of his former command, was contemplating a raid into Tennessee, for the purpose of drawing away Burbridge from his designed participation in the plan of invasion. Thus, unless help could be sent from Lee's army, nothing, except a few regiments of cavalry, mounted and dismounted, were present in the valley to defend the approaches from the north and west to Staunton and Lynchburg ; whilst the very communications connecting those important places with Lee's army were endangered by Sheridan's cavalry.

In the last week of May, Hunter received his orders to advance ; he was to march on Staunton and Charlottesville, living on the country, and destroying beyond possibility of repairs the railways and James River Canal ; and then, having taken Lynchburg with the help of the force from the Kanawha, was either to fall back down the Shenandoah or join the main army around Richmond. As his rear and line of communication with the Potomac would be open to incursions from the irregular cavalry of Gilmor and Mosby, he diminished his baggage as far as was possible, giving strict orders, not only that his men should live on the country, but that they should destroy utterly what they were unable to consume. Then, marching up the north fork of the Shenandoah, and defeating General W. E. Jones, who attempted to cover Staunton, and fell fighting gallantly but unsuccessfully at Piedmont, he joined Crook and Averill, occupied Staunton, and burned much railway property ; whilst the small Confederate force fell back towards Wraynesborough.

But Gilmor and Mosby were not idle ; the former, especially, having watched the passage up the valley of the Federal column, and being well informed of the expected arrival of a large train of hospital and other stores, collected a small body of horsemen, and prepared to capture or destroy it ; and this enterprise affords so characteristic a picture of the guerilla warfare of the valley, and of the romantic adventures of the men who aspired to lead those bold horsemen, that it may take a place among other and more important operations.

Knowing the road by which the strongly escorted train was to march, and being thoroughly acquainted with every by-path, Colonel Gilmor concealed his cavalry in a thick wood, keeping them out of view of the flanking party which preceded the train. He saw the cavalry escort, outnumbering his own men, in front and rear of the baggage waggons, whilst he could perceive that, under the large awnings that covered these waggons, a strong force of infantry was concealed. As they passed his ambush and entered the long street of a small village, he charged, but his own horse becoming unmanageable dashed through the ranks of the enemy, who attempted to shoot or cut him down. He was now quite alone, surrounded by the enemy's cavalry, some of whom, seeing that his horse was running away and hoping to capture him, refrained from firing ; but he, spurring on, left the cavalry in rear engaged with his own men, and singly reached the long train, galloping in terror along the road, the infantry soldiers being thrown out by the heavily swaying waggons. Having at length got his horse in hand, he rode past the teams, knocking the teamsters from their horses, and cutting down one who ventured to fire at him. Thus, reaching

the head of the train, he shot the leading horse, upsetting the waggon, and so impeding the road and completing the confusion that already reigned. Having stopped the train, he crossed some fields, and, attaining an eminence, saw his own men, dispirited by the supposed capture or death of their leader, yielding ground.

He made signs and shouted to them, and they, perceiving their colonel, and being inspired with fresh courage, charged home, broke through and routed the cavalry, and captured and burnt the whole of the train, thereby depriving General Hunter, at the outset of the campaign, of most necessary supplies.*

That general had, in the meanwhile, reached Staunton; but, in place of marching on Charlottesville, advanced by way of Lexington on Lynchburg, where Breckenridge had already arrived with his own troops, soon to be reinforced by Early with Ewell's corps. There he paused before the fortifications of the place, and having expended most of his ammunition, and being unable to keep open communications by way of the Shenandoah Valley, fearing also a concentration of troops in his front, decided on retreating; and on the 18th June, after a feeble attack directed against the entrenchments of the town, commenced a retrograde movement. Influenced by the fear of an attack on his flank by detachments from the Army of Virginia, brought by the Richmond and Gordonsville rail, and, knowing that the devastated country through which he had already marched could not afford food for his men,

* Some of these details were communicated personally to the author by Colonel Gilmor. They have since been published in a book, entitled *Four Years in the Saddle*, by Colonel Gilmor, which contains an interesting and striking account of the war in the Shenandoah Valley.

in place of retreating down the Shenandoah and thus covering the approaches to the Potomac, he retired by Liberty on Salem; and so, harassed in his rear by the Confederate cavalry, and losing baggage and artillery,* he escaped across the mountains into Western Virginia. His men suffered greatly from hunger in the thinly populated country, thus feeling in their own persons the misery they had inflicted on the hapless inhabitants of the Shenandoah and James River valleys.†

General Hunter's raid, for it was little else, was productive of slight benefit to his cause; he had injured, but only temporarily, the rail to Staunton and the James River Canal, whilst, on the other hand, he had been forced to withdraw from the theatre proper of the war, thus depriving General Grant of the services of a large force at an important crisis of the campaign, and uncovering to the Confederate army, now concentrated at the head of the Shenandoah Valley, the approaches to Pennsylvania and Maryland.

Sheridan had not been more successful. Wade Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee, with the Confederate cavalry, met him at Trevilian depôt, not far from Gordonsville, and repulsed him with considerable loss, following up their advantage by marching on the depôts of stores collected at the White House, which they nearly succeeded in capturing.

* Colonel Gilmor thus alludes to Hunter's retreat:—

‘At Buford's Gap (between Liberty and Salem) General Ransom had gone round Hunter, and ambuscaded him in a mountain pass about four or five miles from Salem, had captured and destroyed many waggons, thirteen pieces of artillery and caissons, which he had blown up, killing about thirty men.’

† In this raid the Military Institute at Lexington and the house of Governor Letcher of Virginia were wantonly burned.

In the attempt to sever Lee's communications with the West, General Grant had been foiled. The long distances, and the difficulties of transporting supplies, had baffled the Federal general in the Shenandoah, rendering his movements slow and indecisive; whilst the far-seeing genius of Lee, divining his adversary's plans, had by rapid movements and by concentrating at the decisive point troops, which his successful defence of the line of the Chickahominy enabled him to dispense with, compensated for the inferiority of his force. The Federal army of the centre had failed in the battle of Coal Harbour on the 3rd June, the right wing under Hunter had been forced to seek shelter among the mountains of Western Virginia, Sheridan had found in Wade Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee worthy successors to his former opponent, General Stuart, and there remained the left wing which Butler commanded, and which, reinforced from the army of the centre, was ordered at all hazards to force Beauregard from his lines in front of Petersburg, and to secure the important approaches to Richmond covered by the city which commands the mouth of the Appomattox.

Finding the lines of the Chickahominy too strong to be forced, Meade had thrown up entrenchments covering the White House, and extending south of the old battle-field of Gaines Mill to the banks of the Chickahominy; there, content with holding his works, and with driving back the *reconnaissances* of the enemy pushed forward with the object of discovering his movements, he had prepared for the flank march already arranged and now in readiness for execution. Grant had resolved to attack Richmond from the south side of the James, transporting his army rapidly by successive corps, effecting a junction with Butler, and so overwhelming

Beauregard engaged in watching Bermuda Hundred Neck, and in guarding Petersburg with a force of little more than 6,000 men.

From his lines south of the Chickahominy, the distance was shorter by a direct march to the banks of the James, and so to Petersburg, than from General Lee's entrenchments to the same point,* whilst the possession of water communication permitted of an easy means of transport of such portions of the army as could be spared from the front. Whilst therefore the depôts from White House were in course of removal, and the rail from thence to the front was being taken up and conveyed away for other uses, Smith's corps, embarking on transports, was brought up the river James, and, having landed at Bermuda Hundred, joined Butler's force, crossed the Appomattox by a pontoon-bridge, and advanced on Petersburg. At the same time, Meade put his army in motion towards its left flank, masking the operation by a feint on Richmond, and, having skilfully effected the passage of the Chickahominy near White Oak Swamp, marched by Newmarket to Deep Bottom; then crossing the James on a pontoon bridge, he hastened by successive corps (the 2nd Hancock's leading) to reinforce Smith already engaged with the defenders of Petersburg.†

These events occurred in the second week of June

* Against this statement it may be objected that the Confederates held possession of the rail from Drury's Bluff to Petersburg. But this rail, in respect to the speed of its trains, was no better than a road. The railway and its rolling stock were in such bad condition that the troops usually marched in rear of and by the side of the trains, which could not attain greater speed than the infantry.—Information derived from General Beauregard.

† See Map, p. 258.

and as the attack commencing on the 15th of June was only the prelude to a series of engagements which lasted, with little intermission, until the close of the war, it will be well to take this opportunity of describing the situation of Petersburg and its importance in regard to the defence of Richmond.

The city of Petersburg, containing about 18,000 inhabitants, is built on the south side of the Appomattox, a navigable river which enters the James ten miles below and eastwards of the city. The distance from Richmond is twenty-two miles, with which city it is connected by a rail and road running parallel with the James River. South of Petersburg three railways branch off, the most western to Lynchburg, the centre to Weldon and Wilmington, the remaining one to Suffolk, and several good roads converge on the city from various directions.


At the time when General Peck had threatened an advance from Suffolk, whilst Lee was engaged with Hooker at Chancellorsville, some slight works had been thrown up to cover its southern side. These, although embracing a somewhat too wide semicircle, afforded a feeble but useful line of defence to its present garrison. These defences were subsequently altered, and being extended to the right to cover the Lynchburg rail, rested on the Appomattox above the city, thus enclosing Petersburg on the south and forming the advanced fortifications of Richmond. The lines of defence for Richmond may be said to have extended due north of Petersburg, through the peninsula formed by the James and Appomattox, to the obstructions in the James River in front of Drury's Bluff; then across the river to Chaffin's Bluff, and through the woods and over the undulating ground which commands the approaches to

Richmond from the Chickahominy. From thence, turning westwards, and encircling its north side, they rested on the James River above the city, the right bank being protected by detached forts.

These fortifications bore little resemblance to the great works which encircle the important fortresses of Europe. On the north side of the James they consisted of redoubts of low profile, but well constructed, with ditches and palisades, and connected together by a parapet. On the south side and around Petersburg they were merely a trench resembling the first parallel of a siege, with batteries at the salients, and with rifle-pits in front of the main line. These became somewhat improved as the siege progressed, but at the time of Smith's attack were of the slightest possible tracing, and subsequently never reached the dimensions of the counter-works thrown up by the besiegers.*

To return to the operations of the right wing of the Army of the Potomac. On the 15th of June, Smith, with his own command and a division of negroes, assisted by the cavalry of Butler's army, crossed the Appomattox with the design of accomplishing what some few days previous Gillmore had failed to perform. To assault and capture Petersburg before reinforcements from Lee's army could arrive, was an enterprise which, considering the vast preponderance of force on the side of the Federals, might justly be calculated upon as promising almost certain success. In and around Petersburg were only two infantry and two cavalry regiments, under General Wise, assisted by a few militia, whilst Bushrod Johnson's brigade, with a

* An interesting paper on the defence of Petersburg, written by Lieutenant Fetherstenhaugh, R.E., appeared in vol. xiv. of the *Professional Papers of the Royal Engineers*.



small force of cavalry, fronted Butler at Bermuda Hundred. This was Beauregard's army; and with it he prepared to withstand the enemy, which he knew, by intelligence received from scouts posted along the James River, was receiving large reinforcements from the army in front of Lee.

He duly appreciated the great importance of retaining possession of both Petersburg and of the lines of Bermuda Hundred. The fall of the former would be disastrous, not only as depriving the Confederacy of an important town on which two serviceable lines of railway converged, but as uncovering the flank of the defences of Bermuda Hundred; whilst the capture of the latter would separate the troops under his (Beauregard's) command from those under Lee, would cut off Richmond from direct communication with the south-east, and would allow of a land and naval force approaching the works at Drury's Bluff, and so closely besieging the city of Richmond on its most vulnerable side.

Whilst General Beauregard discerned the importance of the charge entrusted to him, he saw also the danger and difficulty attending its fulfilment. All depended on being able to maintain a successful defence until Lee could come to his assistance; and with the very small force at his disposal, could such a hope be entertained? Butler, with an army far outnumbering his own, was at Bermuda Hundred, whilst the several corps from the Army of the Potomac were on the march to reinforce Smith, already approaching his lines.

The latter officer crossed the Appomattox, and although delayed by a skirmish with a small detachment covering the road to Petersburg, appeared before its defences at 7 P.M. on the 15th June. Beauregard

telegraphed to Richmond, begging for reinforcements, and during the night Gracie's brigade came up and took the place of Bushrod Johnson, who, with a portion of Hoke's division, entered Petersburg. But before these reinforcements had arrived Smith had assaulted the entrenchments, held by Wise's men, and had succeeded in driving the defenders from a portion of the more advanced line ; happily for them his success was not followed up, as Hancock, with the 2nd corps, who, according to the intention of General Grant, should have co-operated in the attack, had, owing to faulty maps and inaccurate instructions, failed to effect a junction until after nightfall, and therefore did not bring his troops into action until the following day.

Then, on the 16th June, the fighting was renewed. Beauregard in person superintended the defence, and watched his Virginians contending against the terrible odds brought against them. About 8,000 men were under his command, and he knew that each succeeding hour might double or quadruple his opponents. He telegraphed to Richmond, begging for help, and asking whether he should give up Bermuda Hundred or Petersburg ; both he could not hope to hold. No answer was received, and he determined to act on his own responsibility. Sending an aide-de-camp to Gracie, he desired him to withdraw his brigade secretly from the entrenchments, and, leaving a few sentries to deceive Butler, to march with all speed to Petersburg. Gracie carried out his orders, and making his men creep quietly to the shelter of the woods, under cover of the parapet, evacuated his lines without the knowledge of the enemy.

In the meantime, the battle in front of Petersburg raged with varying success ; the defenders, although

hard pressed, held their ground, and in the afternoon, Beauregard, wearied with incessant work, left the front to snatch a hasty meal in Petersburg. Whilst doing so he heard the galloping of a horse through the streets, and the cry that all was lost. Sending one of his staff to arrest the runaway (a sergeant of artillery), he learnt that the enemy had broken through the defences, and was even then entering the city. Leaving orders that the man should be put under arrest, and shot if the news should prove false, the general mounted and hastened at full gallop to the front. Not a moment too soon. He met crowds of fugitives, unarmed, hatless, and panic-stricken, swarming along the roads leading to the city. He called on them to halt, exhorting them by every motive that could influence brave men to check their disgraceful flight, and turn to face the enemy. He told them that the fate of Virginia depended on their efforts, and that their mothers, wives, and sweethearts would hold them in scorn for their cowardice in thus abandoning their posts. All in vain : deaf to the expostulations of their general, the fugitives poured onwards, and the day seemed to be lost. Then Beauregard, extending his escort across the roads, commanded them to shoot down any who refused to obey the orders to re-form, and at length by repeated efforts, and by the assistance of Gracie's brigade, which came up most opportunely at this crisis, he restored order, and leading back the troops to the abandoned defences, regained the line and continued the battle.*

The situation was still most critical : Burnside with the 9th corps had arrived about noon, and thus upwards of three corps were engaged before Petersburg ;

* For some of the incidents above described the author is indebted to General Beauregard.

whilst Butler, discovering that the lines in his front had been weakened of defenders, was advancing against the Petersburg and Richmond line, and threatened to bar the way to Anderson's corps,* leading the van of the Army of Virginia.

Night brought no intermission in the struggle. Beauregard and Hoke, perceiving the exhaustion of their troops, longed anxiously for the battle to cease; but again and again were the assaults renewed, and during the first hours of darkness the musketry and artillery firing was unceasing. However, towards eleven o'clock, there were signs that the efforts of the attacking force were slackening; there were intervals between the volleys of musketry, and pauses in the roar of the artillery; the sounds of battle were dying away; and a captured despatch from Burnside gave information that the enemy was dispirited. Seizing the opportunity, Beauregard about midnight retired his troops to a shorter, and therefore more easily to be defended, line already traced out in the rear, and which he had caused to be carefully pointed out to the several staff officers before darkness had set in. This line was to be entrenched in the short pause between the battle that had just ceased and the assault which was to be expected on the morrow.

The summer's night had almost passed when the troops took up the new position, and weary and exhausted as they were, and without proper tools, with their bayonets and split canteens, they laboured hard through the early morning hours of the 17th. Happily, the enemy was equally worn out, and morning passed and noon came before his preparations for a renewed

* In Longstreet's absence Anderson was in command of the corps.

attack were completed. Then help for the almost exhausted defenders was at hand. Anderson's corps had forced its way through the feeble obstructions offered by Butler's troops, and whilst Field and Pickett occupied temporarily the abandoned lines of Bermuda Hundred, Kershaw, crossing the Appomattox, and marching swiftly through Petersburg, brought up his fresh division to the succour of the men who had been fighting and working almost continuously for two days and nights.

Soon after noon the battle recommenced, and was continued with varying fortune. Hancock gained some important ground to his front, but Burnside, who attacked where Kershaw's men held the breastworks, was received with heavy volleys poured in at close range, and falling back, after suffering great loss, sought refuge in the wooded ravines until night enabled him to withdraw his troops. Along the whole extent of the line the Confederates retained the ground which Beauregard had traced out for the new defences, and during the hours of darkness which followed the battle of the 17th completed the enciente commenced on the preceding night.

The 6th corps (Federal) had in the meantime joined the 5th and 9th, and consequently Smith was ordered to retire from before Petersburg and to reinforce Butler at Bermuda Hundred. With these fresh troops, in conjunction with the other two corps, the assault was again renewed on the 18th June, but the defenders, firmly posted behind more formidable entrenchments, repulsed the enemy, driving him back on all sides with terrible loss.

Thus ended the attempt to gain Petersburg, before Lee's army, moving on the circumference of the circle from the lines of the Chickahominy, could arrive to its

assistance. Arguing from calculations based on numbers and distances, the plan ought to have been successful. Had Smith pressed forward vigorously on the 15th, the effort was not beyond his strength ; and reinforced as he should have been by Hancock about noon on that day, the assault would probably have terminated in the capture of the town. But there seems to have been a want of combined action between the several corps and between the two armies of the Potomac and the James. The directions given to Hancock were obscure and confused, and Butler at Bermuda Hundred did but little to assist the operations against Petersburg by detaining in his front the defenders of the lines stretching across the peninsula where he was encamped.* Gracie's brigade, withdrawn from before Butler, reached Beauregard at a most critical juncture, whilst Anderson with little difficulty brushed aside the division which, on Gracie's departure, Butler had ventured to push forward to obstruct the railway by which Lee's army was expected to arrive.

The fruits of the well-executed flank march from the Chickahominy were in a great measure lost by the failure to capture Petersburg. Lee was again between the Federal general and Richmond, and the task of defeating the Army of Virginia appeared as little near accomplishment as when Grant first commenced his flank movement after the second battle of the Wilderness.

* Anticipating that he might be obliged to draw off Gracie's brigade, General Beauregard had given orders some days previously that the men should be kept out of sight behind the parapet. When the major part of the force had abandoned the works, the small detachments still remaining were marched backwards and forwards to different places in the line, the men occasionally showing themselves, in order to give the appearance of greater numbers. Picket firing was kept up night and day, to prevent desertions and ensure watchfulness.

Moreover, the *morale* of the Federal army had been much injured by the repeated repulses it had sustained, and by the terrible and disproportionate losses it had incurred, whilst the new recruits sent to replace the men who had acquired the spirit and training of soldiers in many previous campaigns, were far inferior to the volunteers who at an earlier period had hastened when their country was in danger to swell the ranks.

To send forward such men against the fortifications of Petersburg, manned by Lee's veteran troops, was to court defeat, as the superior numbers of the assailants would but entail greater slaughter; therefore Grant, abandoning all attempts to capture the town by assault, gave orders to erect counter-works to those of the enemy, and with his more numerous working parties, and better materials, soon raised entrenchments far superior in strength to those of the besieged. Thus providing for the security of the portion of his army immediately in front of Petersburg, and between it and the Lower Appomattox, he extended his left flank, seeking to gain possession of the Weldon railway, and with his cavalry to cut the communication between Petersburg and Lynchburg by the Southside railway. Both these expeditions failed. In attempting to turn the right flank of the Confederate lines by wheeling the 2nd corps to the right, a gap was left between its left and the right of the 6th corps to its left rear. This weakness in the line was quickly perceived by Hill, who moved forward Mahone's brigade, which, falling on the left of the 2nd and right of the 6th corps, routed the troops opposed to it with great ease, and capturing about 2,500 men, held the entrenchments which the Federals had commenced to erect until the prisoners and guns had been secured, and then retired

without molestation to its former position in the Confederate lines.

The cavalry expedition had not met with better fortune. In two columns, under Wilson and Kautz, it had succeeded in penetrating as far as the junction of Richmond and Danville and Petersburg and Lynchburg rail, repulsing General W. F. Lee's division of cavalry; but after inflicting some temporary injury on the railways, and whilst on the march to rejoin the main army, it encountered the Confederate cavalry on the Weldon railway, together with a strong detachment of infantry, and only with the loss of its train, artillery, and a large number of prisoners, succeeded in effecting its retreat to the lines around Petersburg.

Richmond at this time swarmed with constantly arriving squads of prisoners, and their unsoldierlike appearance, and mixture of colour and races,* excited the derision of the Virginians, and raised the confidence of the citizens in the small but gallant band who, stretching in a thin line from the Appomattox to the Chickahominy, bade defiance to the mingled hordes which surged vainly against the apparently insignificant entrenchments barring the roads to Petersburg and Richmond. Little anxiety was felt in either of these two cities. The roar of artillery and the rattle of musketry were sounds too familiar with the inhabitants to cause alarm. Society at Richmond allowed itself to be but slightly affected by the near presence of the invading armies, and whilst Congress continued its debates without heed to the operations of the troops, the families of those who were battling in the trenches, hardened to the danger of even their nearest relatives,

* See a letter from the Confederate States, dated Richmond, June 27, in the *Times* of August 4, 1864.

pursued their usual course of life unmindful of the constantly recurring battles.

Along the extended line, the engagements were almost incessant; sometimes the Confederate general, at others the Federal, assuming the offensive, as each in turn descried some weak point in the defences of his antagonist. Thus, whilst Wilson was engaged in his disastrous expedition to the Weldon and Southside railway, Sheridan, whose presence was required to replace the missing cavalry, was brought from the White House, and, being attacked on the march to the James, suffered considerable loss; and at the same time Butler's army, now on both sides of the James (Forster's division having been sent across to Deep Bottom), was harassed by frequent sorties from the entrenchments in its front.

So passed the last weeks of June. The hot weather had commenced, and the swamps of the James River threatened to be as fatal to the army of Grant as those of the Chickahominy had proved to McClellan. The men were disheartened; the bravest and best had perished in the frequent battles; many of the old officers who had led them through so many campaigns were either killed, wounded, or prisoners, and the enemy, apparently infused with renewed vigour, kept up a constant and harassing war at the out-pickets.*

* This was done purposely by General Lee to ensure the watchfulness of his sentries, and to avail himself of their better qualities as marksmen. With reference to the statement that the Federal army was injured in *morale*, the following extract from the *United States Army and Navy Journal*, quoted in the *American Encyclopædia* of 1864, will best show the opinion entertained by military critics of the state of the Army of the Potomac during the latter weeks of June 1864:—

'The medical and commissary department had been well con-

Notwithstanding, Grant's position was in many respects not unfavourable. In numbers, his army was at least four times as large as that of Lee; his works of contravallation were stronger than those of circum-

ducted, but it is not too much to say that the troops were thoroughly worn out. While their spirit and enthusiasm were, and always have been, beyond all praise, the fatigues of so extraordinary a campaign had been overpowering. Officers experienced its effects as well as men. Their conspicuous bravery had stretched out, dead or wounded, commissioned officers of all grades, not by hundreds, but by thousands, before the James was crossed. The effect was apparent in some want of skill and experience in succeeding battles. Captains were sometimes commanding regiments, and majors brigades. The men, missing the familiar forms and voices that had led them to the charge, would complain that they had not their old officers to follow. On the other hand, more than one leader of a storming party was forced to say, as he came back from an unsuccessful attempt against the outworks of Petersburg, "My men do not charge as they did thirty days ago." A few commanders, too, showed the fatiguing effects of the campaign by a lack of health, by a lack of unity and harmony, or of alertness and skill. The last attacks on Petersburg showed clearly how the campaign was telling on men and officers, and the two achievements on the Jerusalem road of the 22nd and 23rd of June put the matter beyond all doubt. On the former occasion the gallant 2nd corps, whose reputation is unexcelled, fell back, division after division, from the enemy's onset, and one of the very finest brigades in the whole army was captured with hardly a shot fired. In our account at that time the probable cause of the disaster was intimated. But when, in addition to this, the Vermont brigade of the 6th corps was badly cut up on the following day, it became clear that the rapidity of the fighting must be checked awhile. The pace was now too great. There was need of rest, recruitment, and some reorganisation. It may be added that the influx of raw troops, and of Angur's troops from Washington, with new officers, had temporarily changed the character of brigades, of divisions, and almost of corps. These affairs of the 22nd and 23rd of June were the last offensive movements of infantry in force.'

In the statement made by General Meade before the Committee of Enquiry on the explosion of the mine before Petersburg, the above extract receives corroborative evidence.—*Vide* p. 39 of the Report.

vallation. The connections between Forster at Deep Bottom, only ten miles from Richmond, with Butler at Bermuda Hundred, and with Meade in front of Petersburg, were secure and rapid. Pontoon bridges, protected by formidable gunboats, spanned the James and Appomattox Rivers, and in his capacity of assailant, and in possession of force sufficient to man his lines, and yet to allow large detachments for aggressive operations, General Grant could select place and time for any sudden attack ; whilst Lee, obliged to move on lines at least equally long, could only oppose to the assaulting columns troops drawn from other portions of the defences less dangerously menaced.

In addition to these advantages, the water communication, by means of the James River and of the sea, between the Federal army and the rich cities of the North, gave General Grant secure bases of supply to which, in point of convenience or safety, the long lines of railway and the James River canal, on which General Lee was dependent, could bear no comparison.

If, from the dust, heat, and consequent fatigue of midsummer on the banks of the James, the Federals, able to relieve their guards and working parties, suffered, how much more must the soldiers of the Confederacy, manning without intermission trenches within easy rifle-shot of the enemy, have endured hardships, which only the love felt by each individual man for the cause could have enabled them to sustain ?

Such was the position of affairs at the end of June. The Federal army had been diminished by 15,000 men since Smith had made his first attack on the lines of Petersburg,* and there seemed to be some danger lest,

* See *Army of the Potomac*.—Swinton.

after all the sacrifices that had been made, the enterprise against Richmond should be abandoned. Then was submitted to Gen. Grant a scheme which at first met with but little favour. It originated with a colonel of a Pennsylvania regiment, in Burnside's corps, whose regiment occupied a portion of the lines in front of Petersburg; and being approved of by Burnside, was recommended by him to Generals Meade and Grant. Lieutenant-Colonel Pleasant proposed to run a mine under one of the batteries commanding the approaches to the Confederate defences, and exploding a large quantity of powder, to create a gap through which the assailants, taking advantage of the consequent confusion, might rush, and by a sudden surprise capture the town.

An unwilling consent permitted the prosecution of the plan, and whilst the miners were at work, the second corps (Hancock's), together with Sheridan's cavalry, were detached to the north side of the James to attempt an attack on the lines supposed to be but thinly guarded, owing to the concentration of the Army of Virginia at and near Petersburg. It does not appear that this movement was especially organised as a feint to draw away the troops from the defences at Petersburg, but was rather intended to sweep back any detachments sent by the Confederate general to interfere with the navigation of the James, or to threaten Butler's position from the left bank of the river; whilst, at the same time, the officers in command, viz. Hancock of the infantry, and Sheridan of the cavalry, were, in the event of opportunity offering, to push forward their forces within the defences of Richmond.*

* This is contrary to the usual opinion, viz. that Hancock's movement was intended as a feint; but the version in the text appears to tally with the evidence of General Meade, given at the Court of Enquiry on the explosion of the mine.

On the 27th and 28th July, skirmishing, or more properly, engagements, occupied the attention of the Confederate troops on the left bank of the James, and induced General Lee, who feared an assault on that portion of his weakly guarded lines, to withdraw four out of the seven divisions from the right bank, thereby increasing the force in front of Hancock to five divisions, and leaving but three * to garrison the defences of Petersburg and Bermuda Hundred. Any expectation that Hancock might succeed in his enterprise had now ended; but General Meade, having gathered from deserters and prisoners the intelligence of the flank movement to the north of the James River of the larger portion of the Confederate forces, communicated the same to General Grant, and suggested that the time for exploding the already completed mine had arrived. General Grant gave his assent, and, determining to collect his forces for a decisive blow, ordered Hancock to recross the James River on the night of the 29th July, without alarming the enemy in his front, and taking position in rear of the 18th corps, which in turn supported the 9th corps, to hold himself in readiness to follow up the anticipated success. Warren, in command of the 5th corps, also received directions to concentrate, as far as safety would allow, the men who were manning the entrenchments, and to support, with all the force possible, the main attack, whilst Wilson with the cavalry was sent to make a feint against the right of the Confederate lines.

These movements were executed, and on the night, or rather the early morning, of the 30th July, the preparations for the explosion of the charges and the consequent assault were completed. The position of the mine

* Viz. Mahone's of Hill's corps, and Johnson's and Hoke's of Anderson's (Longstreet's).

was between the Jerusalem Plank road and the Norfolk railway. It had been commenced on the 25th June, and the gallery (522 feet in length) had been completed by the 17th July. From this main gallery lateral galleries had been constructed nearly parallel with the Confederate works, and on the 23rd these were finished and in readiness to receive the charges, which, consisting of 8,000 pounds of powder, were placed in the chambers on the 27th July.* Rumours of the construction of this mine had been rife among the Confederate as well as among the Federal troops, and although its exact situation was not known to General Beauregard, he had yet made preparations to repel assault in the event of any casualty happening, by the erection of batteries in rear of the defences against which he considered mining operations might be conducted.

There were, however, no circumstances to arouse suspicion before the actual explosion occurred. The long lines of parapet were thinly manned by such of the Confederate forces as had not been detached north of the James;† and Generals Beauregard and Lee occupied their respective head-quarters in the town of Petersburg.

The night of the 29th passed quietly. At 3.30 A.M. on the 30th the explosion was to take place, and Ledlie's division of Burnside's corps, supported by Willcox and Potter, with Ferrero's division of black troops, were ordered to be in readiness to rush in at the gap formed by the explosion. The fuse was

* General Burnside's evidence, p. 18 Commission of Enquiry, on the explosion of the mine before Petersburg.

† General Beauregard informed the author, that so great was the scarcity of troops, that only one man for every six yards of parapet could be allotted to the defence.

lighted and anxiously was the event expected, but no explosion took place. Then two brave men * entering the gallery, and discovering that the fuse was extinguished, relighted it, and at 4.42 A.M. the mine exploded, blowing into the air two guns, together with a few of the occupants of the battery, and forming a crater nearly 200 feet in length and 60 feet in width. For a brief space the defenders of the parapet were in consternation and amazement. Then Elliot, of Fort Sumter celebrity, commanding in that portion of the line, leapt on the parapet to rally the men, but fell shot through the body, dangerously wounded, and the troops commenced to retire towards the town. By this time Lee and Beauregard, alarmed by the sound of the explosion, followed by the heavy firing, were galloping to the front, the latter ordering on his way Mahone's † division from the right to hasten to the scene of action. By their efforts the panic was checked, and the guns of the Federal works, which had immediately opened, received a reply from the Confederate batteries.

Ledlie's division had in the meantime reached the crater, and was quickly followed by Willcox and Potter, but the assault was made with little vigour, the obstructions (such as *abattis*, etc.) placed in front of the Federal lines had not been cleared away, and in place of rushing forward in a formidable mass, the

* Lieutenant Jacob Doughty, and Sergeant Henry Rees, 48th Pennsylvania regiment.

† General Mahone became greatly distinguished during the operations around Petersburg. From the commencement of the war, he had been noted for his soldierly abilities, and when placed in high command evinced the qualities of an able general. Previous to the war he had been a civil engineer on the Richmond and Norfolk railway. He and General Gordon were accounted as two of the best of the divisional generals of the Army of Virginia.

assailants filed out of the approaches, and losing the impetus of a rapid attack, occupied, but did not cross, the cavity caused by the explosion. Beyond was rising ground, for the moment almost denuded of defenders, but the Federals, instead of carrying this ridge by assault, followed the instinct of troops accustomed to fight under cover, and sought shelter, contenting themselves with firing over the edge of the crater. Potter in vain tried to disentangle his men from the confused and disordered mass, which, without regard to divisions, brigades, or regiments, was huddled at the bottom of the great trench in unmilitary disorder. But now the Confederate batteries in rear and in flank of the mine sent their shells into the crater and swept its approaches. Lee, unmoved and tranquil, seemed by the very calmness of his presence to restore confidence to the defenders, whilst Mahone's division began to arrive on the scene. Then, about 7 A.M., Ferrero's division of blacks, never as yet under fire, was ordered up, and, with the confidence of raw troops, rushed forward and entered the crater, but meeting with a heavy fire, the brief enthusiasm of the negroes quickly evaporated, and was succeeded by helpless panic. The confusion and disorder was thereby greatly increased; there was no commander to take the direction of affairs, Burnside being at his quarters in rear, and none of the other officers holding rank superior to their fellows. Whilst, therefore, the main body of whites and blacks huddled together sought a temporary refuge behind the heaped up earth, or endeavoured in the face of a deadly cannonade to find their way to the rear, a few of the braver men replied to the fire which Mahone's regiments now commenced to pour into the helpless mass.

The slaughter in this closely packed crowd was fearful, whilst, as long as daylight lasted, the troops could not be withdrawn, and it was felt that to reinforce them would only add to the disorder, and consequently to the number of victims. Along the other portions of the line, the Confederates presented a firm front, and Warren, with the 5th corps, considered that he could not with any prospect of success effect a diversion. Therefore the men in the crater were sacrificed. Mahone's division, assaulting and entering the cavity, killed, wounded, and captured at least 5,000,* and the event which in the morning had threatened to be replete with so great danger to the defence of Petersburg, ended before the close of the day in a triumph to the Confederate arms.

Its terrible incidents may afford lessons which it would be unwise to disregard. The want of a sufficiently wide *place d'armes* from which an attack with an extended front could be directed, was the prelude to disaster; the employment of troops whose *morale* had been injured by continually fighting behind cover and in the trenches, and who were, therefore, unfitted for a rush across the open, was a second cause of failure; whilst the absence of a competent common head at the scene of the assault, and the failure on the part of some of the superior officers to lead forward their men with dash and energy, were attendant causes which the court of enquiry, assembled soon after the event, assigned as reasons for the unfortunate result.

If the power at the disposal of the Federal general, whether with reference to his numerical force or to his mechanical means, be taken into consideration, success

* Federal accounts place the number at 4,000, Confederate at 6,000.

might have been confidently expected. Then Petersburg would have fallen; the three divisions on the southern side of the James would have been overwhelmed; the whole of the defences up to the lines of Drury's Bluff would have followed the fate of Petersburg; the possession of the Richmond and Danville and Petersburg and Weldon railways would have entailed the evacuation of Richmond, cut off from its supplies and exposed to attack from the river as well as from the land, and thus the capture of the seat of the Confederate government would have been effected almost simultaneously with the occupation of Atlanta, and the Army of the Potomac would have signalled the autumn campaign by an advance into the Carolinas as that of the West extended its conquests into Georgia. But, whether owing to the different material of which the two great Federal armies were composed, whether to the higher genius of the general commanding the Western forces, or to the more warlike talents of the opponent of General Grant, the success of the Army of the Potomac, in its campaign of Virginia, can bear no comparison with the continued advance of Sherman's Army of the West. Had the future of the war depended on the events of the summer campaign in Virginia, the fate of the American Republic would have been far different to what it subsequently was. The people of the North were commencing to feel the utter hopelessness of the struggle, and to seek, in the approaching election for the Presidency, a man who would dare to advocate peace. The slaughter of the troops under such a general as Grant was greater than they could endure, and murmurings might be heard against the conqueror of Vicksburg, hitherto exalted for his indomitable firmness and invincible resolution.

Why these murmurings and this horror of profitless slaughter did not find vent otherwise than in the speeches of men belonging to what was termed the Copperhead party, will be seen when the events of the West and the culminating triumph at Atlanta receive their due quota of attention.

But before concluding the account of the campaign before Petersburg, and turning from thence to the field of more brilliant operations (as regarded the Federal arms) in the West, one short campaign which, viewed retrospectively by the light of subsequent events, and in relation to the future disasters to the Confederacy, seems like the last rays of the setting sun, must claim our attention, carrying back as it does the imagination to the earlier triumphs of the Army of Virginia, and the menaces of its general to transport the war into the enemy's country.

CHAPTER XIII.

GENERAL EARLY'S CAMPAIGN.

GENERAL HUNTER'S retreat across the mountains of Western Virginia into the valley of the Kanawha opened the Shenandoah Valley to the Confederate force concentrated at Lynchburg, under Early's command.† That general had, as before related, pursued Hunter to the confines of the mountainous country, and then, keeping his plan a profound secret, made preparations by an advance down the valley for an invasion of the Federal States, and a consequent diversion for the relief of Lee's army confronting Grant in front of Richmond and Petersburg. The force at his disposal, all told, amounted to little more than 12,000 men, and comprised four very small divisions of infantry, viz. Breckenridge's and Rhodes's, united under Breckenridge, and Gordon's and Ramseur's, together with the cavalry, formed of the troops collected from Western Virginia and the valley, under Ransom, formerly an infantry officer.‡

* *Vide* Map II. commencement of volume. Also Map, p. 7, vol. ii.

† General Early was a graduate of West Point, older in years, but a cotemporary at the academy with General Beauregard. He was noted for solid rather than for brilliant qualities.

‡ General Early states, in the letter before quoted, that the force with which he arrived in front of Washington was only 8,000

Masking his movements by an advance of the guerilla cavalry, under Gilmor, which effectually cut off all channels of communication, Early moved swiftly down the valley, and coming unexpectedly on Sigel, whose head-quarters were at Martinsburg, forced him to retreat, with the loss of a considerable amount of stores, across the Potomac to Maryland Heights. Then, having detached his cavalry to break up the Baltimore and Ohio rail, to levy heavy contributions on the towns of Pennsylvania, and to collect horses, cattle, and other plunder, Early crossed the river, demonstrated against Maryland Heights, and marched on the Monocary. Here General Wallace, having collected a force of recruits, hundred days' men, and other detachments from Baltimore and Washington, and being reinforced by a division of the 6th corps, sent from Petersburg on the first rumour of Early's advance, prepared to oppose his progress.

Time was of the utmost importance. Already were the remaining divisions of the 6th corps steaming up the Potomac; the 19th corps, brought from Louisiana after its defeat on the Red River, were hurrying onwards to the same destination; Hunter was hastening from the Kanawha Valley; whilst the President and the governors of the menaced States were levying volunteers and militia to repel this invasion so menacing and so unexpected.

At first, the news of the crossing of the Potomac by any force stronger than a few squadrons of cavalry was discredited and even ridiculed by the citizens of New York and Washington. Then fugitives hastening north-

infantry, 40 field pieces, and 2,000 badly mounted and equipped cavalry. General Ransom was subsequently succeeded by General Lomax in the command of the cavalry.

wards from the invaded districts, and rumours of the appearance of Confederate troops simultaneously at many and distant points, tended to spread reports exaggerating the danger and augmenting the numbers of the invaders. It was said that Lee in person, at the head of an army of 60,000 men, was marching on Washington and Baltimore. The Unionists were in terror; the Southern sympathisers in Maryland, many of whose relatives were among Early's men, rejoiced.* Plate, jewels, and all descriptions of valuables were rapidly conveyed northwards from the various towns and from the residences of wealthy men. Neither was Philadelphia nor Washington considered secure, and New York, Boston, and the northern cities were sought as places of refuge from the danger which, in such unexpected form, had burst over the country, scarcely recovered from the effects of the previous incursions of Lee's army.

In a spirit far different from that shown in the invasions of those two preceding years was this third expedition into the Northern States conducted. The devastation by Hunter of the Shenandoah Valley had aroused a bitter spirit of vengeance. Pennsylvania was not spared, and even the towns of Maryland could with difficulty be protected by the officers and men who, raised from that State and serving in the Confederate armies, could not endure to see the horrors of war inflicted on their own homes by the cavalry of Western Virginia and Eastern Tennessee. Governor Bradford's house was burnt in retaliation for a similar act perpetrated by Hunter against Governor Letcher, of Virginia;

* Colonel Gilmor, when sent on a raid to the neighbourhood of Baltimore, took the opportunity of visiting his home, much to the surprise of his relatives, who believed him to be many miles distant.

the country residence of Mr. Blair, an intimate friend of the President, met with the same fate, and the farmers of Pennsylvania saw their flocks driven into the Confederate camps, whilst the merchants and tradespeople of the towns paid with unwilling hands contributions as ransom for their homes and goods.

On the 8th July, an action was fought on the Monocary, where General Wallace had drawn up his small army to cover the rail and road to Baltimore. But his mixed forces could not stand against Early's veterans; his right flank, where the recruits and detachments were stationed, gave way, Rickett's division, hardly pressed in front, and now threatened in flank, was forced to retire, and in some confusion retreated on Baltimore, pursued to within a few miles of the city by detachments of the enemy's cavalry.

The result of the battle of Monocary increased the excitement at Baltimore and Washington. At the former city the alarm bells were rung, and the citizens mustered and enrolled for the defence of their homes; whilst at Washington General Angur collected together the marines, home guards, and the government *employés* to man the forts. In the meantime, General Early reached Rockville, fourteen miles distant from Washington, whilst detachments of his cavalry burnt houses and seized prisoners, horses, and cattle within five miles of the capital, at the same time that Colonel Gilmor cut the communication between Baltimore and Philadelphia, capturing a railway train containing, among other passengers, General Franklin, who was proceeding north in consequence of a wound received in Louisiana.*

* Resulting from the extreme fatigue of Colonel Gilmor and his men, who, on horseback for days and nights together, were com-

On the 11th July, Early advanced still nearer to Washington, his skirmishers exchanging shots with the garrison of Fort Stevens; but whilst he hesitated before involving his insignificant force within the forts and buildings of a large city, into which reinforcements might at any hour be thrown by means of the river, the two remaining divisions of the 6th corps (Wright's), together with the 19th corps, landed from the steamers, and at once garrisoned the defences. Then all hope, supposing such hope to have been entertained, disappeared of capturing Washington by a *coup de main*. The citizens regained their confidence, and, venturing outside the fortifications, beheld some of the ravages of war which as yet they had only read of in the descriptions given by the newspapers of the devastation inflicted on Southern territory. They saw farms and larger houses in ruins, crops destroyed, and the dead and wounded still strewing the fields, whilst they could scarcely credit that the city was now safe, and that the force which had spread so great alarm was in retreat, laden with booty, towards the Potomac.

Early crossed at Edward's Ferry, and proceeded leisurely through Snicker's Gap and over the Shenandoah River, where he turned on Wright, who had followed him with his two divisions and the 19th corps, inflicting considerable loss, and obliging him to abandon the pursuit. Having thus freed himself from molestation, Early established his head-quarters at Winchester, Wright returning to Washington and leaving the further conduct of the campaign to Crook and Averill.* The

pletely worn out, the prisoners were not carefully guarded, and General Franklin and others effected their escape. See *Four Years in the Saddle*, by Colonel Gilmer.

* General Hunter was in chief command, but these two officers

latter, with his cavalry, made a dash at Winchester, attaining some success; but being attacked by the concentrated forces of the enemy, was driven in rout down the valley, and at length sought and obtained safety at Harper's Ferry.

This defeat of the Federal cavalry of the valley, and the consequent rumours of another intended raid into Pennsylvania, led General Grant to abandon his plan of withdrawing the 6th corps from Washington to strengthen the Army of the Potomac, and compelled him to order it to retrace its steps, and to proceed to the defence of the menaced districts. Reports of Early's advance were again rife; his cavalry was devastating Pennsylvania, whilst Mosby's guerillas, having crossed the Potomac, alarmed the denizens of the villages near Washington. The strength of these raiders was, as usual, greatly exaggerated; and the infantry of Hunter and Wright, and the cavalry of Crook and Averill, were marched hither and thither in search of the squadrons who, by the very smallness of their numbers, eluded pursuit. Railways were torn up, government stores plundered, requisitions on towns made, and failing the compliance of the citizens, the towns were burned.

This fate befel Chambersburg. A small detachment under Gilmor had entered the town, and, acting under superior orders, made requisitions for 200,000\$ in gold, which the inhabitants, anticipating the approach of a strong body of cavalry, refused to comply with, and laughed at the threat to burn the town. But the men who had suffered by Hunter's devastations were not to be trifled with; and although pitying the helpless and

seem to have been principally engaged in the operations in the Shenandoah Valley.

unoffending population, Gilmor, who commanded the detachment, proceeded to carry into effect the orders which Early had issued, roused to wrath at the spectacles which had greeted his eyes on his march down the valley. Chambersburg was fired, 118 houses perished in the conflagration, and Averill arrived only in time to see the town in flames. The Confederate cavalry retired towards the Potomac, and having with some difficulty extricated themselves from the numerous bodies of troops intent on cutting off their retreat, crossed the river.

The division of command had been fatal to a proper combination of the far superior Federal forces around Washington and Harper's Ferry. Wright and Hunter were independent of each other, and Crook, Averill, and Kelly appear to have failed in co-operating together so as to bring the preponderance of their numbers to effect commensurate results. Grant, engaged in directing the operations of the armies of the Potomac and the James, could not give proper attention to the movements of the forces around Washington, even if the telegraph wires had remained intact; but these, since the Confederate cavalry had entered Maryland, were frequently cut, and all communication, except by letter, stopped. To remedy such evils the middle department, and the departments of Western Virginia, Washington, and the Susquehanna, were united into one, and (General Hunter having resigned the command) were allotted to General Sheridan, who received as additions to his force two divisions of the best cavalry of the Army of the Potomac. He had thus under his command Hunter's former army of Western Virginia, the 6th and 19th corps, a powerful artillery, and 10,000 well mounted and well disciplined cavalry, viz. Torbett's and Wilson's divisions,

and the cavalry of Western Virginia and the Shenandoah, making up a total force of not less than from 40,000 to 45,000 men, whilst General Early, from his position around Winchester, menaced Pennsylvania and Maryland, and collected the rich harvests of the Shenandoah with but 13,000, of which 3,000 were cavalry.

Notwithstanding this vast disproportion of strength, General Grant hesitated before permitting Sheridan to assume the offensive ; he feared a defeat, alarmed at the consequences that might ensue, and only after a personal visit to the Federal camp near Charleston, and influenced by the pressing necessity of reopening for traffic the Baltimore and Ohio and Chesapeake and Ohio canal, did he consent to allow the Army of the Shenandoah to advance, accompanying his orders with directions so completely to devastate the valley, that to use his own words, ' Nothing should be left to invite the enemy to return ; ' provisions, forage, and stock were to be consumed or destroyed ; and the buildings alone were to be left to the miserable inhabitants deprived of all means of sustenance.

With such instructions, Sheridan commenced the autumn campaign by an advance on Winchester. During the month of August the operations had been of a desultory character, principally confined to engagements between the cavalry of the two armies, in which the superior numbers, arms, and general efficiency of the Federal horse had given them the advantage, whilst the carelessness with which the lines of communication had been guarded, more particularly where the passes through the Blue Ridge Mountains debouched on the lower country, had presented opportunities to Mosby of which he was not slow to avail himself, and

with his small body of irregular cavalry to inflict damage which marred the success of the campaign.*

When Grant visited the army it was encamped on the left bank of the Shenandoah, in front of Early, who occupied the line of the Opequan, covering Winchester. He received Sheridan's report, and acquiring confidence from the appearance of the troops, and the clear views of the general, directed an immediate advance. The two armies had been watching each other for some weeks, and Early, emboldened by the inaction of the enemy, and anxious to prevent the repair of the Baltimore and Ohio rail, had detached Gordon's division towards Martinsburg, threatening the right of Sheridan's line. By so doing he had exposed his own right wing, and Sheridan, informed by his spies and scouts that Gordon's division was at Bunker's Hill, ten miles distant from the main army, resolved to overwhelm Early's remaining divisions before he could concentrate his forces. Availing himself of his powerful cavalry, he directed Wilson to cross the Opequan at daybreak on the 19th, and having secured a position on the left bank to cover the passage of the infantry. This, Wilson, after a severe skirmish, succeeded in effecting, carrying the fieldworks erected to defend the passage; the 6th corps quickly followed, threw out skirmishers, and opened with its artillery; but the 19th corps, under Emory, seemingly, regardless of the lessons of the Red River campaign, was in rear of the baggage train of the 6th corps, and consequently endured a delay of two hours before it could come into line.

This delay gave time to Early to hasten back Gordon's division, and to concentrate his small force for

* See *United States Army and Navy Journal*, Sept. 10, 1864, a valuable record of the several campaigns.

the battle which was to decide the fate of the Shenandoah Valley. The infantry on both sides was now fiercely engaged, and success was inclining to the Confederates, when Sheridan brought up his reserves under Crook, of the army of Western Virginia. Even with the preponderance of force that these reinforcements gave to the Federals, Early's men held their ground. Then Sheridan, riding to his right wing, found Torbett with two divisions of cavalry, under Merritt and Averill, the latter of whom, having been engaged during the morning with Gordon, had now joined the main army. There were at least 7,000 sabres, headed by Custer, Devin, Lowell, and others well known as dashing cavalry officers, and this force, well equipped, well mounted, and well led, were hurled against the left wing of the small Confederate army. The charge was magnificent; nothing could resist it; the enemy was doubled up; and as the storm of cavalry broke on his flank, the Federal infantry advanced.

The victory was complete. In confusion and rout the Confederates fled through Winchester, losing heavily in prisoners. The inhabitants, startled by the heavy firing, and by the shot and shell, with which, alas! they were only too familiar, hastened to their windows and their doorsteps, to see with sorrow and dismay their fellow-countrymen defeated and in flight. Cavalry, infantry, and artillery, intermingled together, swept through the town, and such of the wounded as could mount a horse or secure conveyance in an ambulance joined the crowd to avoid falling into the enemy's hands. Notwithstanding, either on account of the lateness of the hour, or from the heavy losses they had sustained, probably from both these causes combined, the Federals did not pursue with vigour: order was restored

and Early proceeded to retreat to Fisher's Hill, near Strasburg, where he took up a strong position across the valley of the north fork of the Shenandoah, with Massanutten Mountain on his right and North Mountain on his left.* There he prepared to dispute the further progress of Sheridan's forces. But these, animated by success, and headed by an energetic leader, were eager to resume the offensive, and once for all to clear the valley of the Shenandoah from the presence of the enemy's troops.

Having detached a strong force of cavalry, under Torbett, up the valley of the south fork of the Shenandoah, to threaten the enemy's right flank and rear, Sheridan, with his main army, composed of the 8th corps (Crook's), the 6th (Wright's), and the 19th (Emory's), with Averill's cavalry, prepared to attack Early in his position at Fisher's Hill. The morning of the 21st September was passed in various preparations. Emory, on the Federal left, pushed forward a strong *reconnaissance*, whilst Averill, supported by Crook's infantry, endeavoured to gain a position on the enemy's left flank. After an engagement, in which both sides lost heavily, the Confederate left was turned: the 6th and 19th corps then advanced, and Early, abandoning his position in confusion, retreated hurriedly, with the loss of eleven guns and many prisoners, down the valley. Sheridan followed to Woodstock, sending his cavalry† to continue the pursuit, which succeeded in

* In this battle of Winchester or Opequan, General Rhodes, commanding a division in Early's army, was killed.

† Averill was about this time succeeded in command of the cavalry by Torbett. He (Averill) was much respected by both his own men and by the enemy for his qualities as a soldier, and for his opposition to the system of making war on non-combatants.

reaching Staunton, and in destroying an important railway bridge on the Staunton and Gordonsville rail. Early, reinforced by Kershaw's division of Longstreet's corps, entrenched himself at Brown's Gap, in the Blue Ridge Mountains, where he defied attack, and prepared to resume the offensive when opportunity for so doing should offer. Then Mosby recommenced his operations in rear of the Federal army, issuing as usual from the various mountain passes, and falling on depôts and convoys, whilst Rosser and other cavalry leaders engaged in frequent skirmishes with the Federal horsemen in the upper valley.

During this time Sheridan was laying waste the country, converting the most fruitful district of Virginia into a complete wilderness,—not only devastating the crops and carrying off the cattle, but burning the barns, mills, and agricultural implements, thus equalling, if not surpassing, in deeds of rapine and violence, the commanders whose names have been held up to reprobation for similar acts in the wars of past centuries. What Hunter had spared, Sheridan destroyed; and not content with inflicting temporary ruin on the country and its inhabitants, did what lay in his power to prevent a return to prosperity when peace should again visit the land,* and the population reseek their abandoned homes.

Nothing of note, as regarded military operations,

* The following extract is taken from General Sheridan's despatch :—'I have destroyed over 2,000 barns filled with wheat, hay, and farming implements; over 70 mills filled with flour and wheat; have driven in front of the army over 4,000 head of stock, and have killed and issued to the troops not less than 3,000 sheep.' These acts of General Sheridan, Mr. Swinton, in his *History of the Army of the Potomac*, justly reprobates, comparing them to the deeds of the French in the Palatinate.

occurred until the third week in October, when Early, recovered from the effects of his defeats at Opequan and Fisher's Hill, moved down the valley and resumed the offensive. Sheridan, warned by the ill success of Hunter's previous advance on Lynchburg, and probably restrained by orders from the Commander-in-Chief, had made no attempt at further conquests, but had taken up a position behind Cedar Creek, a tributary of the north fork of the Shenandoah River. There he had thrown up entrenchments, and having, as he considered, provided for the safety of his army, and guarded against surprise by covering his flanks with cavalry, repaired, on the 15th of October, to Washington, leaving Wright in temporary command during his absence. At that very time Early was making final arrangements for a sudden attack. The arrival of Kershaw's famous division had infused fresh spirit into his troops, and with the addition of a small force of cavalry had replenished the losses of the previous disastrous battles. Notwithstanding these reinforcements, his army was very far inferior to that of the enemy, and to attack him in front in a position of his own selection would have been to court disaster. To compensate by strategy for his weakness in number was General Early's design, and to obtain by surprise what would be impossible to gain by an open attack was the course which he proposed to adopt.

The Federal army held a position on the north or left bank of Cedar Creek, with the cavalry on its flanks, and frequent and strong patrols were sent up the valley of the south fork of the Shenandoah to prevent a repetition of the tactics of former Confederate generals. On the 18th October, the day previous to Early's attack, what was reported to be a careful *reconnaissance* had been

pushed forward as far as Fisher's Hill and Strasburg ; but although a despatch had been captured, giving warning that the enemy was about to advance, no information could be obtained of his exact position. On the following day, probably in consequence of the captured despatch, another and stronger *reconnaissance* was ordered to be made by the 19th corps ; but before the night had passed events happened which prevented the necessity or possibility of a *reconnaissance*, and declared only too plainly the close proximity of the enemy.

Soon after midnight on the 17th October, Early advanced from the position he occupied behind Strasburg, at Fisher's Hill, and under cover of a feint made against the cavalry pickets on the Federal right, moved Kershaw's division by a ford across Cedar Creek, and, concealed by a thick mist, which rose from the river about dawn, completely turned the left flank of the Federal army, Kershaw attaining a position in the left rear of Crook's, 8th corps. In the meantime Early, hidden by the fog, advanced close up to the strong earthworks which that general had thrown up to protect his left front, and in whose strength rather than in the watchfulness of his pickets he appears to have trusted. Just as day was breaking, Early in front, and Kershaw on the left rear, rushed simultaneously on the enemy's lines. Nearly the whole of the pickets were captured, and as the main body of the infantry, roused from sleep, hastened to seize their arms, Kershaw's men poured into the camp, completely surprised the half-awakened troops, captured 18 guns, and turning them on the now disorganised and retreating 8th corps, increased the confusion and the slaughter. Still pressing onwards in its victorious course, the Confederate infantry

fell on the 19th corps, driving it back in rout on the road to Middletown, and threatening to cut off the entire Federal army from its depôts at Winchester. But the 6th corps on the right, and Custer's and Merritt's cavalry, preserved their discipline, and under the supervision of General Wright formed a rear-guard which checked the victorious Confederates in the wooded country near Middletown. There General Wright succeeded in restoring some order among the ranks of the 8th and 19th corps; the first vigour of pursuit was checked, and many of the Confederates, demoralised by success, in place of pressing onwards to secure complete victory, spread themselves through the abandoned camps, plundering and carousing when they should have been fighting with their generals in the front.

It was now 9 o'clock A.M., and Sheridan, who had slept at Winchester, and had heard the sound of the firing, was galloping to the front, urged by the sights that met him on the road to the most strenuous exertions to reach his army, which he well knew had met with a terrible repulse. He rode on to the field of battle whilst Wright was reforming his broken lines, and whilst Early was bringing up his troops scattered among the abandoned camps. His presence reassured the beaten troops, and inspired with renewed ardour those who had held their ground and covered the retreat. He approved of Wright's arrangements, and received and repulsed an attack made by the enemy under cover of his now powerful artillery. Then, for the space of one hour, there was a pause in the fighting: Sheridan was preparing to resume the offensive, and at 3 o'clock formed up his infantry, the 6th corps in the centre, supported by the remains of the 8th and 19th

corps, with the cavalry covering the flanks. In this order he moved forward against Middletown, Gitty's division leading. Once the line wavered, and even showed signs of giving way, but being reformed and supported by a heavy fire of artillery, carried the village and drove back the enemy on the road to Strasburg.

Then a panic seems to have seized the Confederate army; the numerous stragglers, plunderers, and teamsters rushed to the rear, carrying among the disciplined troops their cowardly terror. The disorderly retreat of the Federals in the forenoon was repeated by their opponents in the evening, whilst the inferiority of their force, especially in cavalry, prevented the formation of an efficient rear-guard. Before dusk a great portion of the army was in flight, the captured camp of the Federals was abandoned, and an attempt at a stand made at Cedar Run was defeated by the charge of the Federal cavalry, who crossed the stream under a heavy fire.

During the night Early bivouacked at Fisher's Hill, but on the following day retreated up the valley beyond Woodstock, followed by the Federal cavalry, and finally took up a position at Mount Jackson, from whence Kershaw's division was soon afterwards sent back to Richmond.

Grievous was the disappointment among the ranks of the Confederate army: a victory complete beyond the hopes of the most sanguine had been converted, in great measure by the undisciplined conduct of the troops, in part also by the want of cavalry to follow up the success, into a miserable defeat.* Most of the stores and

* General Early states, in the letter before quoted, that he went into the fight at Cedar Run with 8,500 muskets, about 40 pieces of artillery, and about 1,200 cavalry, as the rest of his cavalry in the

camp equipages, all the captured artillery, and 22 of Early's own guns fell into the hands of the victors. The prisoners are said to have numbered on each side about 1,500, and the killed and wounded were more numerous among the Federals than among their opponents; but the substantial fruits of victory were reaped in a rich harvest by General Sheridan.* The designs of the Confederate generals in the Shenandoah were once and for ever defeated, and General Grant was enabled to recall to the army before Petersburg the 6th corps and two divisions of cavalry.

Thus ended for the year 1864 the campaign of the Shenandoah Valley, and thus terminated the last of the many attempts made by the Confederates to carry the war into the enemy's country. In looking back on the campaign, it must be a matter of wonder that so long a stand could have been made, and even repeated aggressive operations attempted, by a force numerically so greatly inferior to that which, after the concentration round Washington of the 6th, 19th, and 8th corps, and the divisions of cavalry, was brought to bear against it. General Early showed remarkable courage and firmness in maintaining his position in the Lower Shenandoah

Luray Valley did not get up in time, though ordered to move at the same time he moved to the attack.

* Among other officers of high rank who fell on the side of the Federals at Cedar Run, a young but distinguished colonel of cavalry, Lowell by name, met his death at the last charge. Of a good New England family, he had improved his education by travel and by the observation of foreign armies. He entered the cavalry at the commencement of the war as a sub-lieutenant, but his superior attainments being recognised by General M'Clellan and other officers, he received rapid promotion, became a colonel of cavalry, and received the local rank of brigadier-general. His death was deeply regretted by all who had the pleasure of his acquaintance.

Valley, and these qualities he seems to have possessed in a greater measure than the rapidity and enterprise which would have led some of the more dashing of the Confederate generals to have attempted, even if it had been only for a few hours, the capture of Washington. That this might have been accomplished is a matter of belief among many officers of the Confederacy, and that it was regarded as more than possible at General Grant's headquarters is likewise to be gathered from collateral evidence : but the firmness of the Commander-in-Chief was not to be shaken by the fear of such an event ; and his refusal to entertain any plan of withdrawing the main army from its strong position on the James deprived General Lee's diversion into Maryland of much of its advantages. The terror of the administration at Washington had been overrated, and the firmness of General Grant under-estimated, by the leaders of the Confederacy ; and excepting as partially relieving General Lee's army from immediate pressure by the withdrawal from his front of the 6th corps, and the gathering up for the uses of the Confederate army of the harvests of the valley, the campaign of the Shenandoah was productive of little real benefit to the cause.

The arrival at so critical a time of the 19th corps from the South was one of those fortunate coincidences which may be observed in every war, although its withdrawal, after serious defeat, from Louisiana, appears to furnish evidence that the Confederate general in that department had not followed up his victory and employed vigorously the large force at his disposal. With regard to the three important actions fought in the valley, namely, those of Opequan, Fisher's Hill, and Cedar Run, it must be remembered that, although the movements that

preceded and accompanied them are open to criticism, and although to General Early some degree of blame must consequently attach, yet that the overwhelming numbers of his opponent would have justified him in refusing action altogether and in retreating to the upper valley.

At Opequan, by detaching large portions of his army beyond the reach of immediate recall, he afforded an opportunity to his opponent for an overwhelming attack on his right wing. This the firm attitude of the infantry on the flank prevented, and to the terrible charge of cavalry must the adverse issue of the battle be attributed, thereby affording the first, and indeed the only instance, during the four years' war in America, of cavalry deciding the fate of an important battle. Why, with his preponderating superiority of that arm, Sheridan permitted Early to rally at Fisher's Hill, has not been clearly explained. The reasons will probably be found in the lateness of the hour, the fatigue of men and horses, and the difficult nature of the country. At Fisher's Hill Early was attacked whilst preparing for a retreat, consequent on his anxiety—which, owing to the good behaviour of a small detachment of cavalry, proved groundless—lest his right should be turned from the direction of the Luray Valley. This fact may account for, although it cannot excuse, the precipitate flight of the army, which affords an indication of the want of proper discipline, afterwards in great measure the occasion of the defeat at Cedar Run. There, the success of the first attack reflects credit on the Confederates as it points to laxity in the watchfulness of the Federal army. For the complete surprise and consequent capture of the pickets, which resulted in the rout of two out of the three corps of infantry, there seems to have

been little or no excuse; whilst the subsequent good behaviour of these troops is another out of the many proofs furnished during the progress of the war of the rapidity with which American soldiers recover the effects of even complete defeat. The want of sufficient cavalry to follow up the pursuit, as well as the demoralisation of his troops by the capture of the enemy's camp, are the reasons which General Early himself assigns for the subsequent conversion of an almost unprecedented success into a calamitous defeat.

Having thus followed the course of events in the Shenandoah, and traced the fortunes of a campaign which, although detached from, must yet be considered as forming part of, the operations of the armies of the Potomac and of Virginia, we must again return to those armies, and conclude the narrative of events which, commencing in May with the crossing of the Rapidan, continued until the rain and cold of winter necessitated a short but welcome intermission of labour to the much enduring soldiers.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG.

THE summer and autumn campaign of the Army of the Potomac presents a marked contrast to the far more brilliant operations of the Western forces. Still confronting Lee, Grant remained within his long but strongly fortified lines, extending between twenty and thirty miles from near the Weldon railway on his left, across the James, towards Newmarket on the right. After the failure of the mine, he did not attempt to force a passage through his opponent's entrenchments by a recourse to siege operations; and after the many lessons he had already received, he refused to risk the loss and disaster consequent on the repulse of an assault. His operations were, therefore, reduced to attempts to turn the flanks of the Confederate army, and by moving strong bodies of troops now against the right, now against the left, of the feebly-manned defences, to find some weak point by which an entrance might be forced, and his own lines advanced nearer to the beleaguered cities.

Could he secure possession of Chaffin's Bluff, opposite Drury's Bluff, on the James, he might, with the assistance of the fleet, force a way up the river, and render impossible the further retention of Petersburg. This failing, he might, by extending his left, envelop within

* *Vide* Map, p. 258; also Map II., commencement of volume.

his entrenchments the Weldon and the Southside (Lynchburg) rails, and thus cut off city and army from two of their arteries of supply. Each project was in turn tried; each for many months, until winter brought a short cessation to active operations, was met by corresponding movements of Lee's indefatigable troops; and after engagements in which now one side, now another, obtained a transient success, the two great armies of the Potomac and Virginia remained facing each other in nearly the same parallel lines until the close of the year 1864.

But although Lee, by personal influence and by the admirable spirit infused through all ranks of his noble army, drew from the sorely harassed troops an amount of endurance and of indomitable resolution of which the history of war can produce but few parallels, he was still unable to concentrate the efforts of the civil government on the task of providing recruits, either white or black, of establishing needful depôts of supplies, or of organising a proper method of extracting from the States in rear of his army the resources necessary for the vigorous prosecution of the war. General Grant well estimated the excessive difficulty of recruiting the Confederate armies, and the far higher value attached to the life of each individual soldier by General Lee than by himself. He knew how small was the force in his front; he saw of what materials the new levies were composed; and knowing and seeing this, although baffled in nearly every attempt at aggressive operations, he hoped that exhaustion would effect what force had failed to accomplish.*

* This opinion is shown in the following letter from General Grant, dated Aug. 16, 1864, and addressed to the Hon. E. B. Washburne:—

‘Dear Sir,—I state to all citizens who visit me that all we want

From the time of the explosion of the mine in July, to the late autumn, when the heavy rains prevented active campaigning, General Grant, with the two armies of Meade and Butler acting in conjunction and combination, endeavoured, by a succession of attacks, first against one end of Lee's long line, then against the other flank, weakened to reinforce the menaced point, either to capture the defences of Chaffin's Bluff on the north bank of the James, or to extend his lines primarily to the Weldon, subsequently to the Southside railway. The several features of these movements, unless the details belonging more properly to the narrative of the campaigns of the Army of the Potomac than to an account of the whole war are carefully studied, present so great a similitude both in their conception and execution that it will be requisite to do little more than to glance at their respective incidents.

On the 12th of August, General Grant, believing that Lee had either detached, or was about to detach, strong reinforcements to the force under Early's command, and learning from General Butler that only 8,000 men were employed in guarding the approaches to Richmond from the north bank of the James, sent the 2nd corps,

now to insure an early restoration of the Union is a determined unity of sentiment in the North. The rebels have now in their ranks their last man. The little boys and old men are guarding prisoners, guarding railroad bridges, and forming a good part of their garrisons for entrenched positions. A man lost by them cannot be replaced. They have robbed the cradle and the grave equally to get their present force. Besides what they lose in frequent skirmishes and battles, they are now losing, from desertion and other causes, at least one regiment per day, &c. &c.'

This letter may possibly have been written partly with the object of strengthening Mr. Lincoln's cause in his contest for re-election, but in all probability it contains a great amount of truth.

with Gregg's cavalry, and Birney, now in command of the 10th corps, * the whole being under Hancock's orders, in transports up the James River. This mode of moving the troops was adopted in order to produce an impression at Confederate head-quarters that the expedition was about to proceed to Washington to guard the city against Early. But whether owing to General Lee's better information, or to the slowness with which the troops, after steaming up the river to Deep Bottom, proceeded to disembark, the expedition failed as a surprise. The small force north of the James held it in check until the Confederate general had massed the main body of his army on the menaced flank, when, after a succession of engagements, unimportant in their results, the troops were withdrawn, Birney returning to Butler's army, Hancock and Gregg to the lines in front of Petersburg.

During their absence advantage had been taken of the weakening of General Lee's right flank, and Warren, with the 5th corps, had obtained a position across the Weldon rail, hitherto employed for the transport of supplies to Petersburg; and there, notwithstanding the departure of many of his troops to the north bank of the James, General Lee resolved to attack Warren before he could entrench himself and mount his guns in battery. Selecting a weak point in the line, where, owing to a misconception in orders, the troops holding the left of the defences in front of Petersburg had failed to connect themselves with Warren's right, Lee moved forward two brigades, which, falling heavily on the flank of the 5th corps, drove it back in great

* General Birney had relieved General Gillmore, in command of the 10th corps, and General Ord had relieved General Baldy Smith, in command of the 18th corps.

disorder, capturing 2,500 prisoners ; but the left of the corps still clung persistently to the railway, and being reinforced by two small divisions of the 9th corps, repulsed the assailants and recovered the lost ground, although without releasing the prisoners.

Warren then proceeded to erect batteries, and to throw up breastworks, preparatory to an attack which he expected would be made on his position when General Lee had collected a force sufficient for the purpose. His anticipation proved correct. On Sunday, the 21st August, the Confederates advanced, attacking in front and on his left flank ; but being met by a heavy artillery fire, and not fighting with their accustomed *élan*, were repulsed with heavy loss to themselves and at a slight cost to the enemy.*

In the meanwhile, Grant, operating by lines shorter than those possessed by his adversary, had brought Hancock's corps from the right to the left of the army, and this general, on the day on which Warren was engaged in repulsing the attack directed against his front, attained the Weldon railway near Reams station, about four miles south of Warren's entrenchments. From thence, moving southwards, he occupied himself in tearing up and destroying the railway until the 25th August, when Hill, advancing against him, drew on the action known by the name of Reams station.

Hampton, with his cavalry, commenced the battle by driving back a brigade of Kautz's cavalry, posted as videttes to warn the infantry engaged in destroying the track of the enemy's approach ; then crossing the rail, and acting, dismounted, as infantry, he gallantly essayed

* In this action General Haygood's brigade (Confederate) suffered severely.

to storm the entrenchments on the Federal left, whilst Heth, with portions of Wilcox's division, assailed them on the right. These entrenchments had been erected some time previously by the 6th corps, and the construction is said to have been faulty; consequently the defenders were seen in reverse, and suffered considerable loss from the well-directed fire of Pegram's artillery. Moreover, the 2nd corps, much enfeebled by continuous marching and fighting, were few in numbers, comprising not more than 6,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry.* Two assaults made on Miles's division were nevertheless repulsed, although the assailants, acting with great courage, advanced to within a few yards of the entrenchments. Then Hampton pressing onward against the left, and a brigade of North Carolinians being formed up under Heth, and pushed forward with vehemence against the breastworks on the right, drove back the defenders, killing, wounding, and capturing 2,400, and obtaining possession of Reams station, at the same time forcing the 2nd corps to retreat towards the reinforcements which began tardily to arrive from the position held by Warren. The victory remained with the Confederates, but it was barren in its fruits excepting in respect of the losses inflicted on the enemy, for which a heavy price had been exacted.

The results of these engagements on the Weldon railway may be taken as samples of many of the battles of the war. The balance of success had certainly inclined to the Confederates. They had captured many guns and prisoners, had killed and wounded a far larger number of the enemy than had fallen in

* *Army of the Potomac*, Swinton. General Miles commanded Barlow's division in this action, Gibbon commanding the other division of the 2nd corps.

their own ranks, had routed and driven back portions of the forces opposed to them, and yet in the end had retired leaving the Federals in possession of the point of contest. Either darkness, or some strong line in rear of the position assailed, wrested from them the fruits of victory, and whilst fighting victoriously they yet fought almost always in retreat. The tactics of these battles resembled those of most others fought among the woods of Virginia; they consisted of efforts to take or retake breastworks, the dismounted cavalry on both sides acting as infantry, and vieing with them in their own branch of warfare. The absence on the battle field of a superior general appears to have been the cause of the tardiness shown in sending reinforcements from the 5th to the 2nd corps, the distance between which was little more than four miles, and traversed by both road and rail.

Notwithstanding the repulse of Hancock, and the previous severe handling of Warren's corps, the Federals retained possession of the Weldon rail, strongly fortifying their position, and connecting it with the centre of the army in front of Petersburg. Then, as if exhausted by their efforts in so long a series of engagements, both armies lapsed into comparative quietude for the space of a month. Not that warlike operations ceased during that period: the shelling of Petersburg was an event of daily and nightly occurrence; whilst the Confederate batteries commanding the James River between Drury's Bluff and Bermuda Hundred kept up a frequent engagement with the Federal gunboats, and endeavoured to hinder the work conceived and undertaken by Butler of cutting a canal through Dutch Gap, with the object of facilitating the passage of the fleet, and of turning the Confederate batteries commanding the long bend of the river.

But neither political nor military motives could long allow of the inaction of the principal army of the Federal States. The time was approaching when the heavy rains and cold of winter would prove a bar to active operations, but before that time the fine autumn weather, succeeding to the heat of summer offered favourable opportunities for campaigning. Moreover, the success at Atlanta had roused the martial spirit of the North ; new regiments had reinforced the armies of the Potomac and the James, taking the place of some of the older veterans and of the hundred days' men, and General Grant believed himself to be in a position to recommence active operations. He had constructed a branch railway from the City Point and Petersburg rail to the Weldon rail, thus uniting his extended position, and as he considered that the lengthening of his own line had probably necessitated a similar extension of that of his opponent, and as he knew from prisoners and deserters that no reinforcements had reached Lee's enfeebled army, he concluded that but few troops remained on the northern bank of the James to guard the approaches to Richmond from the east. Consequently he determined to renew his former strategy of feinting with Meade's army against the right of Lee's line, directing that officer to make a real attack should opportunity offer ; whilst with the two corps of the Army of the James under Butler he made an attempt to obtain possession of the works in front and to the north of Chaffin's Bluff, with the object of turning and capturing that important position.

The necessary preparations for these attacks became known at Richmond, where anxiety even amounting to panic showed itself among the usually courageous

population.* The small number of men under Lee's command was only too well estimated ; the losses of the previous engagements had been replaced by few or no recruits, and Kershaw's division was away with Early in the Shenandoah. Until the attacks had sufficiently developed themselves, Lee could not weaken any portion of his lines ; and consequently a natural alarm was felt lest by a sudden assault the defences which guarded Petersburg or Richmond should be broken through, and the latter city fall a prey to the man who, above all others, had incurred the hatred of the Southern people.

As the strong force, composed of the 18th and 10th corps, crossed the James River, the former above Deep Bottom, the latter near Bermuda Hundred, and, assaulting the defences in their front, obtained possession of the Newmarket road, there appeared some reason for the anxiety of the inhabitants of Richmond. Grant in person was present, and saw and approved of the conduct of the troops. The outer line of defences on the Newmarket road, and those in the immediate front of Chaffin's Farm, were already captured, when relief reached the garrison, and the negro troops who had been ordered forward to assault the inner works around Chaffin's Farm were repulsed with serious loss ; whilst, a few days later, Kautz's cavalry on the extreme flank was driven back in confusion, with the loss of all its artillery. Nevertheless, the position gained by Butler was believed to be of so great importance that General Grant determined to retain it, and so extending his lines from opposite Dutch Gap to the Newmarket road, he threw up fortifications parallel with those of the enemy.

* See letter from the Southern correspondent of the *Times*, dated Richmond, Oct. 8.

Simultaneous with these operations on the north bank of the James, Meade had moved forward with Warren's two divisions and a division of the 9th corps, Gregg's cavalry being on the flank performing duties similar to those of Kautz with Butler's force, and after three days' engagement, and the loss of 2,500 men, occupied a position across the Squirrel road parallel with the Weldon railway, the Confederates retiring within their main line of works, which in all points remained intact. The advantages gained by these two movements were not in any way commensurate with the loss incurred, and had the final result of the war depended on the operations of the armies of the Potomac and the James, its issue would have been very different to that which ultimately occurred. Nevertheless, before the troops retired into winter quarters, General Grant resolved on one more attempt to capture Petersburg, but still eschewing either siege operations or an open attack against its front, determined on turning the right of the Confederate defences; and if he could not succeed in obtaining possession of the town, to cut it off from communication with the South by occupying the Boydton road and the South-side rail.

At the time that Meade's army was engaged in this expedition, Butler, with that of the James, was to make a somewhat similar attempt on the north side of the river, although, in opposition to the previous operations of October 7th, his manœuvres were to take the character of a feint rather than of a real attack. The extension of the left wing was the ultimate end in view, with the object of drawing closer round the southern side of Petersburg the lines of contravallation, by first occupying and then advancing along the Boydton

Plank road and the Southside rail. Here ran General Lee's line of works, extending southwards from the defences of Petersburg, covering both road and rail, and garrisoned by Hill's corps, in which Mahone's division occupied a conspicuous place.

By making a long sweep through the wooded, and, to the Federal staff, almost unknown country to the south of the stream of Hatcher's Run, thus turning the extreme right of Lee's line, General Meade hoped to gain possession of the Southside rail in rear of its defences; and this enterprise appeared of so great consequence that, leaving the works in front of Petersburg but thinly guarded, he marched towards his left flank with the 2nd, 5th, and most of the 9th corps. To the 2nd, under that able officer General Hancock, was the duty allotted of marching round the enemy's flank, whilst Warren and Parke (in command of the 9th corps) were to engage his attention in front.

On the 27th October, Hancock commenced his march with all secrecy: no fires were to be lit, no drums nor bugles were to play, and but little artillery, and scarcely any baggage, were to accompany the troops, whilst the cavalry under Gregg were to explore the roads towards the left flank, and capture any detached pickets of the enemy who might be engaged in watching or guarding them. Crossing Hatcher's Run, Hancock, with slight opposition, attained the Boydton road; then wheeling to his right, he recrossed the stream by a bridge, which he carried with little difficulty, and was proceeding with the further execution of the plan when he received orders to halt. Parke had been unsuccessful in carrying the works in his front, and Warren was therefore sent to form a connection between Hancock's right and Parke's left. But the woods were dense, the roads

numerous, and their directions unknown; the maps were defective, and brigades and regiments went astray and were lost in the forest, the staff-officers sent to seek for them becoming likewise entangled in the maze.* Then General Hill, advertised of the enemy's movements, assumed the offensive. He ordered forward Heth and Mahone, supported by Hampton,† who, falling on the right of Hancock and left of Warren, captured many prisoners and some artillery; but missing their direction in the closely wooded country, and being unexpectedly attacked in flank by Egan's division of the 2nd corps, they in turn suffered severely, losing heavily in prisoners, and abandoning their captured guns. Night then closed in; rain fell; the troops of the two armies wandering among the woods became entangled with each other, and strayed into their respective bivouacks. On the following day the Federals, satisfied that their attempted movement had failed, withdrew across Hatcher's Run, the cavalry which formed the rear-guard being hard pressed by Hampton.

Butler, on the north of the James, whilst attempting a manœuvre somewhat similar to that of Meade, met

* General Beauregard informed the author that in these battles around Petersburg it would frequently happen that small detachments wandering in the thick forest would capture parties of the enemy, but both sides being ignorant in which direction their respective lines lay, the officers commanding would agree that they should march through the forest, and that if they found themselves within the Federal lines the Confederates should surrender as prisoners, if within the Confederate lines the Federals should yield themselves up. At this time there were many desertions from the Federal forces of Germans and Canadians, who considered that they had been cheated out of their proper bounties, probably by the swindlers who made a trade of procuring recruits and substitutes for the Federal armies.

† *Vide* General Lee's despatches. Also Swinton's *Army of the Potomac*, and *United States Army and Navy Journal*.

with no better success. Terry, with the 10th corps, engaged the enemy's attention in front, whilst Weitzel (who had succeeded Birney in command of the 18th corps) passed along his rear, and endeavoured by a surprise to capture the works in the neighbourhood of the old battle-field of the Seven Pines. Both operations failed. Field, in command of a division of Longstreet's corps, fell on Weitzel, capturing 400 prisoners and many colours; and the Federals, with a total loss of nearly 1,500 men, regained their former lines.

Thus closed for the year 1864 the campaign which, commencing with the battle of the Wilderness, had gradually assumed the characteristics of a siege, carried on, as was the case at Sebastopol, against an army in full possession of communications with the rear. It was a trial of strength, where one side, numerically weaker, had the advantage of higher genius in its general, and better qualities in its troops, who—in contradistinction to the mixed masses of native born Americans, of Irish, Germans, and negroes, pushed forward, regardless of loss, against them—were composed of men doing battle for their homes and country, and although almost wearied out by days of incessant toil, watching, and fighting, were still enabled, from their rude casemates and still more roughly constructed rifle-pits, to keep back their assailants, and, when opportunity presented itself, to convert a stubborn defence into an energetic attack.

But human strength could scarcely endure the continuous strain; desertions were not infrequent, and the jaded aspect of Lee's indomitable troops showed that the most trying task that a soldier can be called on to fulfil was telling on their *physique* as well as on their *morale*. Supplies of food and clothing were scanty, the

formation of proper depôts had been neglected, and the news from the West and from the Shenandoah tended to gloom and discouragement. Yet the Army of Virginia fought on: Longstreet, partially recovered from his severe wound, had rejoined his old corps, and seemed, by the effect of his presence, to renew the enthusiasm of former years. The men laboured, strengthening their defences, and citizens and soldiers felt that, if in other quarters the States of the Confederacy could hold their own, to them might safely be entrusted the task of guarding the defences of Richmond and Petersburg.

Except for unconquerable firmness, little praise can be awarded to General Grant for the operations during the siege. He had failed, and his failures had been most costly, in all his attempts, although possessed of the advantages of numbers, of interior lines, and of open communication by rail, river, and sea with the opulent cities of the North. His system of concentrating and attacking first on one flank, then on the other, of his opponent's lines, had resulted in repeated repulses; many of his bravest officers, and a large proportion of his best troops, had perished; and, although Meade, Hancock, Warren, and others still kept up the fame of the old Army of the Potomac, the men who followed them were inferior to those who had perished in the rude battles of Spottsylvania and the Wilderness. Lee's soldiers, extended in a thin line along the works, ceased to look with anxiety on their attacks, and the officers commanding the pickets posted in the rifle-pits were held responsible for repulsing the first line of assault, the converging fire of well aimed and long range rifles telling with deadly effect against the front and flanks of the advancing foe.

During November, December, and January, the

monotony of the so-called siege was broken by little except unimportant skirmishes and occasional bombardments. The works at the Dutch Gap canal were continued, but with feeble prospect of success, and the two armies remained facing each other in their fortified lines, those of the Federals surpassing in strength the works they had been erected to control. Had not the campaign in the West been more productive of results, and more cheering to the Northern people in its promise of future and complete victory, than the operations which, commencing with the indecisive battles of the Wilderness and Spottsylvania, had dragged wearily through the summer and autumn of the year 1864, entailing slaughter and distress, to which the success alleged to have been obtained was far from affording an even balance, the termination of the war would have been looked for in mutual concession rather than as the result of subjugation ; and the North, weary of the contest, would have accepted peace on terms widely different from those which subsequent victories enabled her to exact. From May to December a succession of great events had occurred in the West, whose progress must now be followed, and whose results will partially explain the equanimity with which the Northern people regarded, and the firmness with which they persisted in, a war whose course, judged by the incidents of the Virginian campaigns, appeared as interminable as it was bloody and indecisive.

CHAPTER XV.

BETWEEN CHATTANOOGA AND ATLANTA.

WHILST the armies were thus fiercely contending in Virginia, and whilst Lee was barring the road to Richmond, and compelling his opponent to purchase each mile of progress at a cost which horrified even the callous politicians of the North, a more brilliant campaign, and one fraught with greater consequences, had opened in the West, and was being pushed forward with all the energy that had characterised the previous operations of the general to whose direction it had been assigned. Sherman, placed by General Grant in command of the division of the Mississippi, including the vast tract of country between Knoxville and Vicksburg, was manœuvring the three armies under his control in the masterly manner of a proficient in the art of war. He had met Grant at Nashville in the middle of March, had received general directions for the conduct of the campaign, and had immediately placed himself in personal communication with the three generals commanding respectively the armies of the Cumberland, Tennessee, and Ohio. At Huntsville he found General McPherson, under whose orders was the Army of the Tennessee; at Chattanooga, Thomas, with the Army of the Cumberland; and at Knoxville,

* *Vide* Map, p. 46. Also Map I., commencement of volume.

Schofield, who had succeeded Forster in command of the Army of the Ohio.

All were officers of the old regular army, and well trained in Western warfare. McPherson, born in 1828, had graduated at West Point, in the same class as Schofield, and also with his present opponent General Hood. He had served during the whole of the Western campaign, from the capture of Fort Donelson to that of Vicksburg, and had won each successive step of promotion by distinguished services. Thomas, older than his brother generals, was born in 1816, had seen service in the regular army, had quickly arrived at high command in the Army of the West, and at the disastrous battle of Chickamauga had achieved renown when others had suffered defeat and disgrace. Schofield, the youngest of the three, was not yet thirty-three years of age; but notwithstanding his comparative youth, he had evinced, by his civil and military government of Missouri during the troublous times which followed the declaration of secession, that he possessed moderation, sound judgment, and high ability. Such were the three generals placed under Sherman's immediate command. Between him and them, as equally between himself and the Commander-in-Chief, there was complete unanimity, induced partly by the training at the military college and by the later discipline of the regular army, partly by the confidence engendered by the knowledge of each other's abilities in the higher commands of the great war.

The Confederate forces were also led by men educated at West Point and in the regular army. General Johnston was in chief command, whilst Hardee, Hood, and Polk* commanded the three corps. In numbers, the

* General Polk did not join the army from Mississippi until the

Federal general possessed the advantage, but in a less proportion than that which existed in Virginia, whilst he was engaged in operations at a distance remote from his base of supplies, in place of being, as was the case with Generals Grant and Meade, in its near vicinity.

Having inspected the several armies, and clearly informed himself of their condition, as well as of the local features of the country, General Sherman took measures of preparation for the ensuing campaign. He ordered supplies to be sent to Chattanooga from the great depôts at Nashville, and, discerning the impossibility of feeding his army and at the same time of providing for the people of Tennessee ruined by the war, directed that all issues of food to the inhabitants should cease, and that the whole locomotive power of the railways should be employed in the conveyance of stores to the magazines at Chattanooga. To that point also, he directed the larger portions of the three armies, and by the 6th May had collected south of the Tennessee 98,800 men and 254 guns.*

5th of May, and the whole of his command did not arrive before the 18th May.—*Vide* General Johnston's report of the Atlanta campaign.

* *Viz.*, Army of the Cumberland :—Infantry, 54,568 ; artillery, 2,377 ; cavalry, 3,828 ;—total, 60,773 ; guns, 130.

Army of the Tennessee :—Infantry, 22,437 ; artillery, 1,404 ; cavalry, 624 ;—total, 24,465 ; guns, 96.

Army of the Ohio :—Infantry, 11,183 ; artillery, 679 ; cavalry, 1,697 ;—total, 13,559 ; guns, 28.

The army of the Cumberland, Major-General Thomas commanding, comprised the 4th corps, General Howard ; 14th corps, General Palmer ; 20th corps, General Hooker.

The army of the Tennessee, Major-General McPherson commanding, comprised the 15th corps, General Logan ; 16th corps, General Dodge ; 17th corps, General Blair. The last corps joined later in the campaign.

Army of the Ohio, 23rd corps, Major-General Schofield.

To this army, well equipped, well supplied, and well commanded, General Johnston was at first able only to oppose 40,900 infantry and artillery, and 4,000 cavalry, viz., Hardee's corps of 22,000, Hood's 19,000, and Wheeler's cavalry, to which were shortly afterwards added General Polk's corps of two divisions, and other reinforcements, amounting to 15,000 infantry and artillery and 4,000 cavalry ; * whilst Memphis was watched, and Mississippi and South-Western Tennessee guarded, by about 8,000 cavalry, inclusive of Forrest's command, under General Stephen Lee.

Notwithstanding this inferiority of force, it had been intended by President Davis that General Johnston should assume the offensive, and, carrying the war into Tennessee and Kentucky, should revive the successes of the earlier campaigns. He seems to have argued from an analogy of the Virginian armies, and to have miscalculated the true comparative strength of the belligerent forces of the West. From whatever causes it may have arisen, whether from the superior talent of the Federal generals, or from the more soldierly qualities of the Western troops, or whether from an absence in the Confederate commanders of the high abilities shown by Lee, Jackson, Longstreet, and others, the Federal armies of the West were almost invariably more successful than their brethren of the Eastern States, although

* *Vide* General Johnston's report :—

'On the 5th May, General Canty's brigade joined the army at Resaca.

'On the 11th, General Polk arrived at Resaca, with Loring's division.

'On the 18th, he was joined by French's division.

'On the 4th June, Governor Brown, of Georgia, reinforced the army by a division of State troops, placed under the command of General G. W. Smith.'

the numbers of the belligerents were more evenly balanced in the former than in the latter. Thus, whilst Grant, with the Army of the Potomac, had approached no nearer to Richmond than had McClellan two years previously, Sherman, with the Western forces, was firmly established south of the Tennessee, with Chattanooga as a base of supplies, in place of defending the Cumberland and occupying Nashville.

On the 6th May, the Army of the Tennessee (McPherson) was on the Chickamauga at Gordon's Mill, the Army of the Cumberland (Thomas) at Ringgold, and that of the Ohio (Schofield) near Tunnel Hill, in front of the pass known as the Buzzard Roost, which leads directly to Dalton, and from thence to Resaca. The range of high hills traversed by this pass, which had been occupied and entrenched after the disastrous battle of Missionary Ridge, was held by the Confederate army, and behind its shelter Johnston was earnestly engaged in disciplining the raw levies which, partially recruited from the Georgia militia, had joined his force during the winter. The plan which he proposed and carried out was to contest each range of hills, each river, and every strong natural barrier which lay between his present position and Atlanta, refusing a general engagement, but fighting and retreating slowly, drawing his adversary farther and farther from his supplies, and then turning on him when defeat would entail annihilation.*. This plan he steadfastly pursued, notwithstanding the outcry raised against him by the Confederate press, and the opposition encountered from the high authorities at Richmond. It was a plan somewhat similar to that which he had adopted when operating against McClellan on the

* *Vide* General Johnston's report.

Yorktown peninsula, and the partial success which there attended it seems to have induced him to pursue it on a larger scale when conducting the defence of the approaches to Atlanta. It had this disadvantage, that gradually as the army fell back the strong mountain positions were abandoned, passes which appeared impossible for an enemy to force were turned, and the mountains south of Chattanooga were abandoned for the undulating hills beyond Kinnesaw Mountain and Marietta. Moreover, a system of fighting and retreating was fraught with great danger to the *morale* of the army, especially as that army was not composed entirely of seasoned troops, whilst it comprised within its ranks men who, as it retired, left behind them their homes, their wives, and their families, deprived of support, and abandoned to the mercy of a relentless foe. These objections to his strategy, General Johnston, a man of no ordinary experience in war, must have seen and appreciated; but nevertheless he thought good to pursue the Fabian policy which, in his opinion, was best adapted to the situation of affairs in the West.

In the first week of May, the Confederate army occupied a strong defensive position, holding the range of hills known as Rocky Hill Ridge, covering the approaches to Dalton and Resaca, and this barrier it became General Sherman's first object to break through. But the direct road along the Buzzard Roost Pass was so strongly fortified and protected by the damming up of a stream, that to force a passage seemed impossible. General Sherman, therefore, decided on turning the position, and, being informed of another pass, known as Snake Creek Gap, eighteen miles to the south-west, directed McPherson to march with all speed from Gordon's Mills, and, seizing on it, to threaten Resaca and

the left rear of the Confederate army, whilst Thomas, supported by Schofield on his left, was ordered to advance against the front of the position at Tunnel Hill. The troops were prepared for rapid movements; the quantity of transport had been strictly limited, and Sherman himself, in the simplicity and modesty of his own equipment, set an example which his officers were fain to follow.

On the 7th May, Tunnel Hill was occupied, after but little opposition; and the railway from Chattanooga immediately put in working order up to the very camps of the army. But as the troops looked down from the crest already seized, they could estimate the frightful strength of the position held by the enemy on Rocky Hill Ridge; nevertheless, on the 9th Sherman ordered an assault to be made by Thomas, whilst Schofield engaged the enemy's attention on the left, and McPherson, who had surprised a brigade of cavalry in Snake Creek Gap, advanced on Resaca. Newton's division of the 4th corps (Howard's), and Geary's of the 20th corps (Hooker's), were selected to attack the ridge, and commenced without hesitation to scale the rocks and to force their way through the forest and thickets which interposed between them and the lines occupied by the enemy on the crest. There was no lack of gallantry shown by these men; they climbed the rocks, replying to the fire of the riflemen posted on the higher summits, who occasionally hurled down on them masses of stone. Once the crest was nearly reached by Geary's men, but from the upper plateau so terrible a fire of grape tore through their ranks that the general was forced to draw off his troops, and thus the evening of the 9th saw the Confederates still holding the summit of the ridge.

It was under cover of this engagement that McPherson approached Resaca, and although failing to attack the place, and even falling back on the pass, for fear lest his own flank should be assailed, he yet demonstrated the possibility of turning Johnston's position. Sherman saw the opportunity; and leaving Howard's corps to threaten Dalton, he moved the remainder of Thomas's army, together with that of Schofield, by forced marches towards and through Snake Creek Gap. On the 12th May the passage of the gap was effected, and McPherson, preceded by Kilpatrick's cavalry, marched on Resaca. The enemy's cavalry was forced back, but Kilpatrick, leading a charge against the supporting infantry, fell severely wounded. The Federal cavalry then drew off the road, and McPherson, pressing on with the infantry, supported by Thomas on his left rear, and Schofield, who was vigorously forcing his way through the thick forests still farther to the flank, drove back the opposing forces within the fortifications, already prepared by Johnston around the town of Resaca, and to which he withdrew by roads constructed, with forethought and skill, from his lines at Buzzard Roost.

Dalton was occupied by Howard, and, on the 14th of May, the whole Federal army was concentrated in front of the entrenchments which guarded Resaca and the approaches to the Oostanaula River. The first step on the road to Atlanta ~~had~~ been attained; the first line of hills had been crossed; ~~but~~ eagerly pressing his advantage, Sherman at once took measures to force the passage of the Oostanaula, and ~~by~~ following up his success to utilise the enthusiasm engendered by confidence. To turn Johnston's strong position at Resaca tactics similar to those used at Buzzard Roost were employed.

The main army was closed in around the fortified lines, whilst Sweeney's infantry division, and the cavalry division under Garrard, were ordered to cross the Oostanaula below Resaca, and to cut the railway between that town and Kingston.

But General Johnston was not prepared to yield his position without a severe contest. He held a semi-circle of low wooded hills round the small town of Resaca, both flanks resting on the Oostanaula River. Previous to his retreat from Buzzard Roost entrenchments had been thrown up, which were occupied by Hardee on the right, Hood in the centre, and Polk on the left, and during the night of the 13th May these entrenchments received additional strength, and the guns were placed in battery. Following the custom of American armies, the Northern troops threw up lines of works in front of, and similar to, those of the enemy, and acting from the secure places of retreat thereby afforded, attempted to storm the hills held by the Confederates, and so gain heights which would command the bridges over the river. McPherson held the right of the Federal line, Thomas the centre, and Schofield the left, and it was Sherman's design to attract the enemy's attention by heavy attacks directed against his centre, whilst McPherson gained ground on his left, and Sweeney and the cavalry division operated against his line of communication.

About midday on the 14th May the attack commenced. Palmer's corps of Thomas's army, and Judah's division of Schofield's, playing a conspicuous part, and suffering severely, but producing no serious impression against Johnston's lines.* Then in the afternoon, that

* This portion of the line was held by Hindman.

general, under cover of the chestnut woods, massed a heavy column, composed of Stevenson's and Stuart's divisions, under Hood, which he hurled against the Federal left, breaking through Stanley's division, and driving it back in some confusion. But Hooker, by bringing up his corps, retrieved the day, and forcing the enemy to retire to his lines, entrenched himself strongly in his front, prepared on the morrow to push forward a formidable column of assault. The attack was made on the afternoon of the 15th, after heavy skirmishing during the morning, and a lunette occupying the summit of a low hill was the scene of the struggle. This, Butterfield's division, supported by Williams, was sent forward to capture, and in spite of a heavy fire climbed the ascent and seized and, for a time, held the prize; but so deadly was the fire, so fierce the resistance of Hardee's troops, that no man could live within that work, the guns could not be removed, and when night ended the conflict, Federals and Confederates in close proximity lay down on either side of the parapet.

However, whilst Johnston had thus been engaged in repelling the effort made against his right front, McPherson had advanced on his left, and threatened to cut him off from his bridges, whilst the railway in his rear was already menaced by the Federal cavalry. Then, satisfied with the price he had made Sherman pay for his advance, on the night of the 15th May, under cover of a heavy fire, General Johnston effected the passage of the Oostanaula, and retired to the Etowah River, forty miles south of Resaca and ninety-six from Chattanooga. He was immediately followed by Sherman, who sent forward in pursuit two cavalry divisions, supported by a division of infantry, the main army crossing the river and advancing in parallel lines in three columns,

with the exception of General Jeff. Davis's division, which, diverging to the south-west, captured and occupied Rome.

There was skirmishing with the Confederate rear-guard, but nothing of importance occurred until Johnston had crossed the Etowah River, and occupied Allatoona Pass in the Etowah Mountains. On both sides the campaign had been ably conducted. Johnston was playing a difficult game : he risked the demoralisation of his army by the system of fighting and retreating, whilst he was forced to bear the animadversions of the multitude, and especially of the inhabitants of Georgia, who watched with terrible anxiety the abandonment of their mountain barrier. But he persisted in the course of action which he considered was most fitted for the welfare of the cause. He trusted to weaken his adversary by repeated losses, heavier than his own, in proportion as the assailants suffered more than the assailed, and by obliging him to make detachments necessary to protect a long line of communication through a hostile country ; whilst he anticipated that the enemy's army would be reduced in numbers by the expiration of the services of many of the men. He hoped then to find an opportunity of assuming the offensive, and, turning to bay, to inflict such disaster on his opponent as would not only deprive him of the fruits of conquest, but would cause his defeat if not total destruction. Sherman's operations were, however, conducted with so great skill, combining consummate prudence of design with rapidity of execution, that he exposed no portion of his army to risk of defeat in detail. Although separated for the convenience of marching, the several columns were in direct communication with each other ; the flanks were

watched by cavalry, and wherever the reports of the advanced guard, the intelligence collected from spies or deserters, or the natural features of the country indicated a probability of a concentration of the Confederate army for the purpose of delivering battle, there were the several columns united, each army and each corps supporting the other.

Once before crossing the Etowah General Johnston thought that he saw an opportunity of turning on and crushing the centre column marching by the railway. Hood, with Polk in support, attacked and threatened to overwhelm Palmer's corps; but Hooker on the right, and Schofield on the left, bringing up the 20th and 23rd corps, after some hard fighting compelled Johnston to continue his retreat, and abandoning the rich country between the Oostanaula and the Etowah, to seek the rugged and mountainous district around Dallas and Allatoona Pass.

For a few days there was a pause in active operations; Johnston, after burning the bridges over the Etowah, commenced the work of entrenching in the strong position which covered the approaches to Marietta and the Chattahoochee River, whilst Sherman was glad to give his army a short rest, so that he might bring forward supplies from Chattanooga preparatory to a renewal of the advance. He encamped in the rich country around Kingston and Cassville, his right occupying the small but prettily-situated town of Rome, with strong posts at Ringold, Tunnel Hill, and Dalton, connected with each other and with the main army by block houses constructed to protect the line of rail. For food and other stores the Federal troops were almost entirely dependent on their depôts. Johnston had well-nigh exhausted the resources of the

land, the greater number of the inhabitants had fled before the invaders, and Sherman's plan of living on the country in which he waged war was productive of habits of plunder among the soldiery rather than conducive to the well-being of his army. Laxity of discipline was engendered, men left their ranks to seek spoil among the rich plantations, and many of these depredators fell victims to the just vengeance of Wheeler's cavalry, who, hanging on the flanks of the army, and frequently swooping down on the supply trains, proved a thorn in the side of the Federal forces, and were implacable in their punishment of the gangs of plunderers who made war an excuse for the gratification of their evil passions.

The protection of the long line of communication dependent chiefly, if not entirely, on the preservation of the railway, was a continual source of anxiety to General Sherman; the displacement of a rail, or the fixing on of a sort of cramp, contrived for the purpose of throwing the engine off the track, would hinder communication for a considerable time; whilst the frequent attacks made on the trains by the guerilla forces among the forests necessitated strong guards, and were often the occasion of considerable loss of life.* Nevertheless, supplies were brought up; and whilst the troops—in the enjoyment of fine weather and a beautiful country, forgetful of the hardships and dangers of war,—were eagerly pursuing such pleasures as could be extracted from the circumstances in which they were placed, preparations were energetically made for a further advance with the purpose of forcing or turning

* General Johnston states in his report that he could not spare a sufficiently powerful force of cavalry to interfere permanently with the enemy's communications.

the line of mountains on the south side of the Etowah.*

On the 23rd May, the Etowah was crossed at two places, one bridge being constructed near Kingston, and another at a point lower down, not far from its junction with the Oostanaula; and the army was directed on Dallas with the object of turning the mountains in the vicinity of Allatoona, and avoiding the necessity of attacking the enemy in the pass through which ran the railway to Marietta and Atlanta. The same order of march was again pursued; McPherson's army formed the right column, with its outer flank protected by Garrard's cavalry, Thomas's army the centre,

* The following description, taken from *Sherman's March through the South*, by Captain Conyngham, gives a picture of camp life contrasted with the sufferings of the inhabitants of the country :—

'The country around was fine, the weather favourable, and the officers and men seemed inclined to employ their days of rest with amusement and recreation. Races were got up, hunting parties formed; also foraging and visiting parties. Generals and officers, in their gayest uniforms, rode from camp to camp, making it a pleasant and exciting scene. Most of the plantation houses were abandoned by their owners, who were either hiding in the woods until we should pass, or had gone on with the rebel army. Old men and women, with decrepit negroes and squalling piccaninies, were the only persons at home. The lying press of the South, and all other sources from which they draw their information, had so poisoned their minds with stories of our savage and cannibal acts, that they trembled at our approach, and looked upon their total destruction as certain. Unfortunately, the wanton acts of some of our troops gave colour to this. In all large armies there is a class of cowardly ruffians who are sure to slink from battle, and whose only object is plunder. General Sherman had issued an order that the army, as far as practicable, should live on the country. The soldiers took this as a licence for each man to rob and pillage as much as he could; and in truth too many of them seemed well inclined to obey this special order. For several days a most disgraceful scene of rifling houses, breaking up furniture, ripping up bedticks, and after making a general mess of things, then firing the houses, ensued, etc.'

and Schofield's the left, Stoneman's cavalry division performing on the left flank duties similar to those of Garrard's on the right, whilst the 3rd cavalry division, under McCook, protected the communications in rear.

Soon after crossing the Etowah, the leading divisions entered a wild and rugged country, frequently encountering the enemy's skirmishers, and as they advanced becoming more seriously engaged with larger bodies of the Confederate army. Johnston was not the man to commit the fatal error of clinging to a strong position, merely on account of its strength, when its value had ceased. He had divined Sherman's flank movement, had checked it by a corresponding manœuvre, and when Hooker's corps, marching on Dallas, reached Pumpkin Vine Creek, it found itself in front of Hood's corps, strongly entrenched across the road. Hooker attacked, but was severely handled, and forced to give way, and to await the concentration of the remainder of the forces.

Then ensued a series of operations among the forests and thickets which clothe the hills. Each army threw up entrenchments, and under cover of these works manœuvred for the purpose of outflanking its opponent or discovering a weak place in his line. The system of warfare differed from that adopted in European campaigns—it was one of earthworks against earthworks; in fact, a siege and a counter siege. Sherman endeavoured to develop his left, and so cut off Johnston from Allatoona Pass; Johnston watched for a false movement as a probable consequence of an extension of his line. On the 28th May, the opportunity seemed to have occurred, and thinking that he would be able to take McPherson in flank, whilst in the act of closing on Thomas, Johnston fell heavily on him. But the Federals were well protected by lines of breast-

works, and awaiting the enemy under their cover, poured so terrible a fire on his successive columns of attack, that after leaving the ground thickly covered with the dead, and earning the praise of even their opponents for their desperate gallantry, the Southern troops were obliged to give way and retire within their lines. Persistent in his plan, Sherman continued his flank movement, extending towards his left round Johnston's right, and gradually occupying all the roads between the Confederate army and Allatoona Pass. Then rapidly throwing forward his cavalry, he entered the pass simultaneously from the east and west ends, gained that important position, and opened a direct communication by means of the railway with his rear. On the 4th June Johnston, finding that his position was no longer tenable, as failing to cover the road to Atlanta, retired to Lost Mountain, whilst Sherman moved to Ackworth, rebuilt the railway bridge across the Etowah, and took measures to establish at Allatoona Pass an intermediate base for a fresh advance.

At Ackworth, General Sherman was joined by two divisions of infantry under General Blair, and a brigade of cavalry, thereby replenishing the losses of his army in the several actions in which it had been engaged since leaving Tunnel Hill.*

* For an account of this campaign of Sherman's army, the author has consulted *Sherman and his Campaigns*, by Colonel S. M. Bowman and Lieutenant-Colonel Irwin, a most valuable work; General Sherman's official account of his Great March; *Sherman's March through the South*, by Captain D. Conyngham; *the Story of the Great March*, by Major G. W. Nichols; *Sherman and his Campaigns*, by Headley, together with other authorities. He has also had access to General Johnston's and Hood's reports, in addition to extracts from Southern newspapers and conversations with several Confederate officers.

Having collected supplies, and fortified a position at Allatoona Pass, Sherman, on the 9th June, again advanced. Marietta, 119 miles from Chattanooga and 20 from Atlanta, was the objective point; but between it and Allatoona lay the mountain ranges which, under the names of Kinnesaw Mountain, Pine Hill, and Lost Mountain, divide the tributaries of the Etowah from those of the Chattahoochee. There Johnston had taken up his position. The conical summits of the chestnut-covered hills were crowned with his signal stations, whilst along their sides and among their ravines busy working parties were engaged in throwing up breastworks and forming *abattis*. The hills formed a sort of triangle, of which Pine Hill was the apex, and Lost Mountain on the left, and Kinnesaw on the right, the base. The first of these was held by Polk commanding the centre, Hardee being on his left and Hood on his right rear.

Sherman in person reconnoitred the position, often exposing himself to much danger as he directed the firing of batteries for the purpose of drawing a return fire and leading the enemy to develop his strength. By the 11th of June he had pushed forward to the base of the hills, and determining to break the enemy's line between Pine Hill and Kinnesaw Mountain, i.e., between Polk and Hood, he brought up batteries, and ordered Thomas's army to prepare for the work. A series of engagements ensued, in one of which General Polk, whilst overlooking the scene of action, was killed by a round shot, and the command of his corps devolved temporarily on General Loring. Thus Louisiana lost its Bishop, and the Confederate army of the West a noble soldier and an able officer, identified with its many campaigns, and familiar with nearly every battle-field

from the Ohio to the Etowah. Pine Hill was evacuated, and Johnston concentrated his army in shorter but more compact lines on Kinnesaw Mountain. From thence he overlooked the Federal position, and his batteries sent shells into their very camps.

About this time General Sherman was expecting to receive reinforcements, an expedition under General Sturgis having marched south from Corinth ; but Forrest, who was engaged in protecting Northern Mississippi, informed of the enemy's advance, fell on him with his cavalry, completely routed him, and having captured many prisoners and stores drove him back to Memphis, threatening even an attack on that town. To a general of fewer resources, the defeat and consequent retreat of this reinforcement might have proved of considerable moment, but Sherman did not allow it to interfere with the prosecution of his grand scheme, and continued steadily to press forward his operations against the strong lines which Johnston seemed prepared to hold with firm tenacity.

For about a week after the occupation by the Federals of Pine Bluff, there was a pause; the rain, falling in torrents, hindered operations, and rendered the movement of the artillery almost impossible. Johnston was watching an opportunity to swoop down on his antagonist, and for this purpose manœuvred Hood's corps, bringing it from the right to the left of his army. On the 22nd June he fell impetuously, with Hindman's and Stevenson's divisions, on Hooker's left and Schofield's right, driving back the advanced brigades, but in turn suffering repulse as the assailants surged vainly against the breastworks held by the supports in rear.

Then Sherman, influenced by motives which he himself declares, determined to abandon his usual strategy, and

adopting a bolder plan, to strike furiously against the centre of the enemy's line, and to force a passage through all opposition to Marietta. His own words best describe his reasons. After speaking of Hood's attack, which he terms the affair of Kulp House, he writes thus : ' Upon studying the ground, I had no alternative in my turn but to assault his (Johnston's) lines or turn his position. Either course had its difficulties and dangers, and I perceived that the enemy and our own officers had settled down into a conviction that I would not assault fortified lines. All looked to me to outflank. An army, to be efficient, must not settle down to one single mode of offence, but must be prepared to execute any plan which promises success. I waited, therefore, for the moral effect, to make a successful assault against the enemy behind his breastworks; and resolved to attempt it at that point where success would give the largest fruits of victory.'

Possibly these may have been in part the reasons which influenced General Sherman's mind ; possibly he hardly liked to allow the feeling of risk which his advance into the heart of a hostile country, with an army in his front still unbroken and retreating on its resources, must have engendered. He was losing heavily in every engagement ; every day increased the distance from his base of operations, and augmented the difficulty of protecting the rail and roads in his rear.' Already had Wheeler's cavalry fallen on a supply train between Kingston and Resaca, inflicting considerable damage, and there were examples sufficient in the history of former wars to warn him that with a formidable army in his front the course he was adopting was one of considerable danger. He may also have watched with some anxiety the effect on his troops of continually

acting behind cover, rendering them unwilling to meet the foe in the open. Possibly these reasons, as well as those given by himself, may have had their effect in leading him to abandon his usual tactics and to risk an attack by open force.

The most favourable locality for the prosecution of the plan appeared to be on the left centre of the Confederate army, as should the column of attack succeed in breaking the line at that point, its head would reach the railway below Marietta, and, cutting off the right from its line of retreat, would cause it to be overwhelmed by the weight of converging numbers.

On the 27th June the assault was to be made. McPherson and Thomas simultaneously at two points were to force the entrenchments, whilst Schofield attracted the attention of the enemy's right wing. The breastworks in the woods on the lower slopes were first to be captured, and certain knolls which flanked, bastion-like, the main ridges, occupied. The preparations were complete; no *contretemps* prevented the attacks from taking place simultaneously: Logan's corps of McPherson's army advanced through the woods at the base of the hills, drove in the pickets, and occupied the lower lines of entrenchment; but the higher ridges were too strongly fortified; they were assaulted, but in vain; heavy loss was sustained, and the Federals fell back. On the left, where Thomas was engaged, and where the post of danger was allotted to Newton's and Davis's divisions, the slaughter was greater and the repulse more serious. There Cleburne's men, answering among the troops of the West to the Stonewall division of the Army of Virginia, held a line of breastworks on a steep ridge overlooking a thick wood, supported by the flanking fire of artillery. Against them were directed

Harker's and Kimball's brigades, forming the head of the assaulting columns, whilst the batteries in rear endeavoured, but in vain, to draw off from the advancing infantry the deadly fire of the enemy's guns. The assailants showed great courage ; Harker led forward his men, rallying them when repulsed, and falling mortally wounded in their front ; but all in vain : 3,000 fell on that hardly-contested slope, the defenders lost little more than 500, and the results of the day are best summed up in General Sherman's own words. Speaking of the action he says : ' Failure as it was, and for which I assume the entire responsibility, I yet claim it produced good fruits, as it demonstrated to General Johnston that I would assault, and that boldly ; and we also held ground so close to the enemy's parapets that he could not show a head above them.*

A flag of truce, for the purpose of burying the dead, enabled victors and vanquished to meet. Officers and even generals took this opportunity of conversing with their present foes, frequently their former friends.

* In speaking of the comparative advantages of breech-loading and muzzle-loading rifles, a Federal general of high rank told the author, that during the engagements between Sherman and Johnston, when the breastworks were in close vicinity to each other, many men were wounded through the hands and arms as they raised them in the act of loading their rifles, and consequently that these men would have been saved to the service if they had been armed with breech-loaders. On the other hand, with reference to the same subject, a distinguished officer of General Longstreet's staff informed him that he was sure that, with regard to the Confederate soldiers, the expenditure of ammunition would have been too great had they been armed with breech-loaders, and that he knew of very many instances, even when armed with muzzle-loaders, where great advantages had been lost and great risks had occurred in consequence of the troops having fired away their ammunition more rapidly than they could be furnished with fresh supplies.

Sometimes brother would recognise brother, father encounter son, as the burying parties met on the field of the deadly strife; scenes which only the terrible incidents of civil war could produce were the result. Fortuitous circumstances rather than political bias had often separated families, and the members, still preserving strong personal attachments, would find themselves to have been engaged in the deadliest hostility, in many instances only recognising their enemy when life had become extinct.* In the Western armies these painful occurrences were even more common than among the combatants in Virginia. Kentucky and Tennessee had been divided in political opinions, whilst the successive success or defeat of either Federals or Confederates had exposed their populations to the requirements of the conscriptions for both of the antagonistic armies.

Satisfied that his former strategy was best adapted to the capabilities of his army, Sherman proceeded to turn the position he had failed to force by assault, and extending his right towards the Chattahoochee River, threatened Johnston's communications with Atlanta, and thus compelled him either to assume the offensive, and run the risk of a battle fought on ground of his enemy's selection, or to fall back. The latter course he adopted, and evacuating Marietta, took up a position five miles in its rear, covering the approaches to the

* In General Magruder's affair at Galveston, a terrible incident of this description occurred. The *Harriet Lane*, a Federal gunboat, was boarded and captured by a detachment of Texan cavalry, under Colonel ——. As he leapt on the deck he saw a young lieutenant of the vessel lying dead, with his face downwards, and turning him over recognised his own son. The father had embraced the cause of his State, the son had continued in the service of the United States, and thus the two had, unknown to each other, met in deadly strife.

Chattahoochee and the construction of a strong *tête du pont* to protect the passage of his army across that river, the sole remaining line of defence between the invading army and Atlanta.

Thomas and Schofield followed his retreat, passing through Marietta on the 3rd July, and advancing rapidly with the hope of falling on the retiring army whilst crossing the river. But the strength of the Confederate defences forbade attack; Johnston, occupying carefully prepared lines, covered the direct approaches to Atlanta, and again Sherman commenced his accustomed tactics of operating against his flanks. With McPherson's army he advanced to the Chattahoochee below the lines held by Johnston, whilst he detached his cavalry to either flank, for the purpose of destroying the flour mills and cloth factories which had long supplied the Confederate armies of the West.* With Thomas's army he confronted Johnston, whilst Schofield remained in reserve. Having thus threatened the left flank of Johnston's position, and attracted his attention in that direction, he resolved, by a bold movement, to secure the passage of the Chattahoochee before his opponent could collect reinforcements and increase by additional works the difficulties which already attended the crossing of the river. Accordingly, Schofield was at once put in motion towards the left, and marching quickly and secretly, surprised the guard which was watching the river, and at once utilising his engineer

* In alluding to the destruction of one of these factories, Captain Conyngham writes:—

‘There were at the time about three hundred female operatives employed in it, and it was feeling to witness how they wept as this, their only means of support, was consigned to destruction.’ Such are some among the many horrors of war.

corps, commenced and finished a trestle and pontoon bridge, whilst his infantry effected a lodgment on the high ground overlooking the course of the river from its left bank. In the meantime, the ford at Rosswell, some miles higher up, having been secured by the cavalry, McPherson's army, under cover of Thomas, was transferred by a rapid march from the right to the left flank, whilst Thomas prepared bridges below those constructed by Schofield. These complicated movements, dependent on exactitude and energy, were successfully executed, the command of the Chattahoochee River was secured, and Johnston, still pursuing the same system of refusing battle, retired to the left bank of the river, and entered the defences which protected the important city of Atlanta.*

He had retreated 100 miles, but in doing so had forced his opponent to consume more than two months, to weaken his army by successive and large detachments, and to pay for his advance in losses far heavier than those which he himself had suffered. He had maintained the efficiency of his own army, and now, in close proximity to his resources, watched narrowly for the long-expected opportunity of falling on his opponent when defeat would be ruin to the army, and, possibly, destruction to the political party which advocated the continuance of the war. In refusing to assume the offensive, and in yielding a tract of country of so large extent as that comprised between the Tennessee and the Chattahoochee, General Johnston had exposed himself

* Atlanta was important from its situation at the junction of several lines of rail. Before the war it was but a small place; since the outbreak of hostilities the mills, factories, and government works and stores had tended to augment its population, and to increase its value to the Confederate government.

to the enmity of a considerable portion of the Confederate nation. President Davis had led the people to expect, nay, had almost promised them, that the Western army should, in the spring campaign, resume the offensive, and now they saw it yielding ground step by step, and, although fighting bravely, fighting only in retreat. Not only had territory been lost, but the valuable mineral resources of the mountains of North-Western Georgia, and the mills and factories long established on the Etowah, Oostanaula, and Chattahoochee rivers were also gone. The people of Georgia murmured at the devastation of their beautiful State, and at the successive destruction of their towns ; many of the militia, as their homes were passed in the retreat, and given up to the enemy, deserted, and loud complaints from various quarters, which found their outlet in the press and in the Confederate Congress, and were reechoed by members of the cabinet, urged President Davis to remove a commander who knew only how to retreat, and to replace him by a man whose fighting qualities had been proved in the greatest battles of the war. On the other hand, it is said that the armies of the East and of the West supported General Johnston's war policy. The qualities of Sherman as a general, and the temper of his troops, were to them well known and highly appreciated ; the difference in the numerical strength of the contending forces was also understood ; and it was felt that whilst the defeat of the only existing Confederate army in the West, an army carefully and even painfully collected from every quarter, would entail utter ruin to the cause, a drawn battle or even barren victory would not compensate for the risk necessarily attending it,

and in results would hardly weigh against the loss with which it must be accompanied.

Supposing, however, that the delivery of a decisive battle was considered objectionable, may it not be urged that the defence of the many strong positions offered by the hilly country of Georgia should have been prolonged? At first sight there appears justice in this criticism; but it must be remembered that a mountainous country has its disadvantages as well as its advantages, when considered as forming a line of defence. The guarding of many passes weakens an army, and exposes it, should even one be turned and occupied, to defeat in detail; whilst the undulations of the land conceal the operations of the enemy attempting and executing a flank movement. Sherman, by following out the remarkable system of warfare practised by him in its fullest extent, was enabled to engage Johnston's attention in front with a portion of his army, sufficient, by means of the quickly-constructed and yet easily-defended breastworks, to repel attack, whilst with the remainder he turned his flank and operated against his communications. The crossing of the chain of mountains between Tunnel Hill and Resaca, the passage of the Oostanaula, the turning of Allatoona Pass, and finally the operations at Kinnesaw Mountain and the Chattahoochee, demonstrate the success of this plan. That Johnston felt its power, and struggled against it, is shown by the many bold attacks he made on portions of the army opposed to him. But the operations of the component parts of Sherman's force were so well timed, his numerical strength so overpowering, and the defensive capabilities of a forest country to troops well-accustomed and well-instructed to use them so great, that, although evincing the highest courage—a courage to which their enemies bear worthy

testimony—the Southern troops could never force the lines of breastworks with sufficient rapidity to overwhelm one corps before others had arrived to its rescue.

The operations of the two armies during the months of May and June have been well described as a succession of sieges. Each army entrenched itself against the other; but the assailants, whilst advancing by approaches, were enabled, through their superior numbers, to turn the flank of the assailed, as well as to meet them directly in front. The Confederate cavalry was needed to watch the flanks of the main army, and could be spared but infrequently, and only in feeble detachments, to operate against the enemy's communications—communications which were secured in a masterly manner by the occupation of strong and well-chosen positions.

In estimating Sherman's advantages, the junction of General Blair with two divisions on the 8th June must not be forgotten, as at a most critical period of the campaign these fresh troops replaced the losses consequent on a succession of engagements and of frequent detachments. Notwithstanding these reinforcements, and the advantages which success and confidence had engendered among the troops, the position of the Federal army on the banks of the Chattahoochee was critical. In the presence of a vigilant enemy, commanded by a general of no ordinary skill, the passage of the river was to be effected, and the siege of Atlanta prosecuted without endangering the long and single line of communications by which alone warlike stores could be brought to the front.

Atlanta had become, since the war, a place of no little importance; it was the Richmond of the West. Thither converged the railways, and thither therefore had been concentrated the requisite supplies and military stores,

Could these railways be destroyed, the army, for want of provisions, must either fight or retreat. Already had great difficulty been encountered in feeding the Southern forces, not so much from a scarcity of provisions as from a want of means of transport. Therefore, whilst Sherman, willing for a while to rest his men on the banks of the Chattahoochee, paused in his advance, and occupied himself in forming depôts for stores at Allatoona, Marietta, and other places, in providing for the defence of the railway, and in improving the roads and bridges leading towards and across the river, he sent a telegram to General Rousseau commanding 2,000 cavalry at Decatur, Alabama, to march south and destroy the railway which connected Georgia with Alabama, and then turning north to join him at the camp on the Chattahoochee. The march was accomplished between the 10th and 22nd of July, when, with the loss of but thirty men, Rousseau entered General Sherman's lines.

Before that time the preparations for the passage of the Chattahoochee had been completed; and the advance on the city of Atlanta had commenced. The three armies of the Ohio, Cumberland, and Tennessee, compact in their organisations, and with flanks covered by the cavalry, were to cross the Chattahoochee above the railway bridge and between it and Roswell; then wheeling on and towards the right, were to swing round so as to invest Atlanta on the northern and eastern sides, holding Decatur, and embracing within its lines the important railway which connects Atlanta with Augusta and the sea-coast. The march was somewhat critical, as, although every precaution had been taken to prevent disaster, it was to be conducted in the presence of 38,750 infantry, and 10,000 cavalry.*

* General Hood, in a series of severe reflections on General

It is said that the Confederate Commander-in-Chief had then determined to abandon his Fabian tactics, and boldly turning on the enemy, to try the issue of the campaign before the fortifications of Atlanta. But on the same day that Sherman's legions poured over the bridges and across the fords of the Chattahoochee, Johnston received orders to resign command of the Western army, and to yield his place to General Hood, an officer supposed to possess more of the dash which had led to the brilliant results of the Virginia campaigns.

Johnston was a man who had carefully studied the art of war as taught in the history of European strife; he was possessed of confidence in himself, and determination which led him to disregard popular pressure or animadversions against his own talents. He believed in the strategy which careful study and deep

Johnston's strategy, published in his report, estimates the losses of the army, between the commencement of the campaign and the date at which he took the command, at 22,750. General Johnston, on the other hand, states that the loss of the infantry and artillery, from the 5th of May until the time of his resigning the command, was about 10,000 killed and wounded, and 4,700 from all other causes. These, and the slightly wounded, were beginning to rejoin their regiments. Of the cavalry the losses are not given. The exact numbers of the army, as given by General Hood at the time of his assuming the command, were 33,750 infantry, 3,500 artillery, 10,000 cavalry, 1,500 militia. General Johnston states that he transferred to General Hood an effective force of about 41,000 infantry and artillery, and 10,000 cavalry.

* A correspondent of the *Times* newspaper, writing from Columbia, South Carolina, on September 23rd, 1864, thus alludes to the change of commanders:—

‘General Bragg, at this crisis, in his capacity of Commander-in-Chief of the Confederate forces, repaired to Atlanta, consulted with General Johnston, who would not give the unqualified assurance required to hold Atlanta, and hence his removal, and the appointment of General Hood to the command of the Army of the Tennessee.’

consideration had led him to adopt, and now, when the fruits of this long retreat were (as he fondly hoped) to be reaped, he was deprived of command, and a younger man appointed in his place. There may be many who will attribute the fatal events of the succeeding summer and autumn to the abandonment by Johnston of the hilly country of Georgia; there may be others who will explain them by the change of commanders, and the appointment of a rash *sabreur* in place of a scientific general; but few who read the annals of the campaign fought between the Tennessee and the Chattahoochee will fail to acknowledge that the game of war, as played between Sherman and Johnston, showed that both commanders were masters of their art, and that the well-organised retreat of the inferior army may be weighed in even scales with the magnificent advance of the larger force.

CHAPTER XVI.

AROUND ATLANTA.

THE passage of the Chattahoochee was effected by the Federal army on the 17th of July, and by the 19th Thomas, on the right, near the river, Schofield in the centre, and McPherson at Decatur, on the left, were in position about six miles from Atlanta, on the right bank of Peach Tree Creek, a tributary of the Chattahoochee. The several bridges over the river, and the roads to Vining's station and Marietta, formed the lines of communication with the railway; whilst Vining's station was well fortified and garrisoned, and an active engineer corps, expressly organised for the service, kept the railway in repair.

On the 20th July the three armies converged towards the city, crossing by means of trestle bridges the lower end of Peach Tree Creek. The line was somewhat extended, and was weakest between Thomas's army and Schofield, i.e., in the right centre. There Newton's division and Hooker's corps, having crossed the creek in the morning, occupied a line of low hills. They had thrown up slight breastworks similar to those which it had become the practice in both the armies of the East and of the West to erect at every halt, even on ground only temporarily occupied, and were resting after their

* *Vide* Map, p. 46.

morning's march, when the Confederate column of attack burst from the woods in their front, and advanced against them in imposing array.* Newton's men quickly sprang to their arms, lined the breastworks,† and poured in a destructive fire, whilst Hooker on the right brought his corps into action on more open ground. After a brief but fierce struggle the Confederates were repulsed, and retired to their entrenchments, leaving the ground thickly strewn with dead and wounded.‡

On the following day the movement of advance was continued, and the whole army, crossing Peach Tree Creek, found itself within three miles of Atlanta, and in front of a line of entrenchments which the enemy was busily engaged in completing. The left was extended beyond the Georgia Central railway, where McPherson on the extreme flank had gained possession of a high hill which overlooked the city, and which promised to be of importance in the prosecution of the left attack. But it was not the intention of the Confederate general to allow himself to be besieged within his entrenchments

* The attack of the Confederate army on Peach Tree Creek had been planned by General Johnston previous to his removal from command.—*Vide* General Johnston's report.

† The following extract from Colonel Bowman's and Lieutenant-Colonel Irwin's *History of Sherman and his Campaigns*, shows how infrequently battles were fought in the open, by the special notice taken of the conduct of Hooker's corps. Speaking of the Confederate assault, they say :—

'The blow was sudden and somewhat unexpected; but General Newton had hastily covered his front by a line of rail piles, which enabled him to meet and repulse the attack on him. General Hooker's corps, although uncovered, and compelled to fight on comparatively open ground, after a very severe battle drove the enemy back to his entrenchments.'

‡ General Sherman's loss in this action was about 1,500. He estimated the loss on the Confederate side to be somewhat higher.

without an effort to break through the lines which were gradually enveloping him. It was of importance to recover possession of the hill occupied by McPherson, and to regain the command of the railway to Augusta. Therefore against the left of the Federal line was an attack organised, for which preparations were made on the night of the 21st and 22nd of July by the march of Hardee's corps round the extreme outer flank of McPherson's army, whilst Cheatham, who had succeeded to the command of Hood's corps, and A. P. Stewart, who had been appointed to that of Polk's, engaged the enemy in front, and manned the entrenchments which faced Schofield and Thomas.

Not until noon on the 22nd did the sound of musketry among the woods on McPherson's left warn that general, who was in conversation with Sherman, that an engagement was imminent. He rode at once to his command, whilst Sherman, convinced by the heavy firing that a serious attempt was being made against his left, sent orders to Thomas to keep the enemy engaged by a vigorous movement against the entrenchments, and to Schofield to retain his corps well in hand, to act as a reserve as the incidents of the battle should become more fully developed. In the meantime Hardee had fallen furiously on Blair's corps, had captured the hill which his men were fortifying, and had forced his way through the wood between Blair's and Dodge's corps. There, McPherson, the noble leader of the Army of the Tennessee, met his death. Riding towards the sound of the firing, having already sent his aides-de-camp with orders to the several corps and divisions, he entered the wood, ignorant of the advance of the enemy. Coming suddenly on their skirmishers, he turned his horse to escape, but was shot down, and fell mortally wounded,

his horse returning riderless and wounded bringing back the first intelligence of the disaster. Sherman was immediately informed of the sad loss which the army had suffered, and sent orders at once for General Logan to assume the vacant command.

There was no time to pause ; the enemy was already pressing heavily on Blair's corps, whilst Cheatham had advanced from his entrenchments, and was moving along the road and rail to Decatur. Happily for the Federals the two attacks had not been simultaneous, otherwise it might have gone hard with the Army of the Tennessee. Already several guns had been captured, and Wheeler's cavalry had dashed into Decatur, where was stationed the waggon train, unprotected, through the absence of Geary's division of cavalry, detached on an expedition to Covington. The waggon train was with difficulty saved ; but the situation of affairs was critical. Cheatham was pressing onwards against the right of the Army of the Tennessee, weakened by reinforcements sent to the left ; the troops were retiring, and there was risk lest the line should be cut in two. Then Sherman, who was present on the spot, and saw the danger, called up several batteries from Schofield's reserve, placed them in position, and poured a concentrated fire on the gap through which the enemy was advancing. Logan was at the same time ordered to press forward at all hazards on the left, whilst Schofield's infantry was brought up to reinforce the troops yielding ground before Cheatham. The danger was averted, and the battle ended. The Confederates, on the score of their success and the capture of guns* and prisoners, claimed a victory ; but Sherman

* General Hood in his report claims to have captured 13 guns.

held his ground, and prepared by fresh combinations to press forward operations against the city, only second in importance to the capital of the Confederate States.

In the action the loss on the Federal side was estimated at 3,722, comprising the commander of the Army of the Tennessee. In the Confederate army Major-General W. H. T. Walker had fallen, three brigadier-generals were wounded, and the loss of a proportionate number of officers and men attested the severity of the battle.

Following on this action was a long series of operations which, although not strictly described by the term, may be called the siege of Atlanta. The city was not regularly fortified, but was covered by a considerable army, increased by reinforcements of Georgian militia, which protected its front with fieldworks, interposed a barrier to the enemy whatever flank he might threaten, and kept open communications with the South by means of the railways converging on the city from various directions. The surrounding country, hilly and thickly wooded, concealed from each other the movements and strength of the contending armies, inducing great caution, and, notwithstanding, occasioning frequent errors.

To storm the enemy's works, and to carry the city by an assault, was beyond the power of the invading army; to invest it, in the ordinary significance of the word, was greater than the numerical strength would allow, therefore there remained but the last resource of severing it from the means of supply by either the occupation or destruction of the lines of railway. The roads were of comparatively slight importance, as owing to the scanty population of the Southern States, food and stores were only to be collected from large areas,

which alone could be reached by railways. These railways, although apparently difficult to guard, from their great extent, yet possessed in some measure their own means of protection. To sever a line of railway by means of a hasty raid of cavalry was not difficult ; to burn a few bridges, to tear up rails, and even to render them useless by lighting fires and twisting the iron might be rapidly effected ; but to repair these damages was a work also requiring little time. The trains brought up engineers formed into corps for the especial purpose, they carried the tools and materials of repair, and they also conveyed the troops which on many occasions interrupted the work of destruction and inflicted severe lessons on the marauders. Therefore, permanently to injure these seemingly frail channels of communication, larger operations than mere cavalry raids were necessary. Sherman knew this well ; he had proof from the ease with which he repaired the damages inflicted on his own line of railway by Wheeler's horsemen, and he was well aware that to cut off Atlanta from its supplies it would be necessary either to hold permanently or destroy effectually the arteries which furnished it with the means of life.

The expedition of Geary's cavalry to Covington, which so nearly occasioned a serious disaster to the depôts of the Army of the Tennessee, was designed to prevent a force from assembling in his rear to interrupt the operations of his left attack. The bridges over two streams were burnt, the rails south of Covington torn up, and Geary rejoined the army. Thus securely established on the Georgia Central railway, Sherman cut off all supplies from the east, and there remained for the purposes of the Confederate army and of the city the two lines of railway which, after communicating with

Alabama to the west, and Southern Georgia and Florida to the south, unite at Eastport, a few miles south of the city, and enter it as one line. The rail to West Point and Alabama had already been partially, but not seriously, injured by Rousseau's cavalry; the south, and perhaps most important line, remained intact, and to destroy it and thus sever Hood from his supplies was now the object to which his antagonist resolved to devote himself.

The carrying out of this plan required the exercise of very considerable skill. General Hood was a formidable opponent; his army, although numerically but little more than half that of Sherman's, was strongly entrenched, was in the midst of friends, and was receiving reinforcements from the men of Georgia, now thoroughly aroused to the necessity of protecting their State. The success of the 22nd July had raised the spirits of the troops and excited the enthusiasm of the people; it had been telegraphed through the South, and the press, and even the President, allowing their hopes to influence their reason, announced it as a forerunner of the defeat and destruction of the invading host.*

Far other was General Sherman's opinion. Having, by the injury to the Georgia Central railway, provided for the security of his left attack, he determined to attempt the occupation or destruction of the other two lines of rail. Eastport, their point of junction, was to be occupied; and to effect this, an extension of his right wing round Atlanta became necessary. To push forward his left would endanger his communications, whilst to prolong his right would cover them. With this purpose in view he organised two formidable columns of cavalry, the

* See *Richmond Enquirer* of the 25th July.

first under Stoneman,* of about 5,000 troopers, to assemble on his left, the second under McCook, of 2,000, to operate from his right flank. These officers received orders to march round Atlanta in a wide circuit, and meeting on the 28th of July at Lovejoy's station on the Macon railway, about twenty-five miles south of Atlanta, to destroy the line effectually for several miles. This was to be the main object of the expedition ; to capture horses and mules, and to burn waggons, food and forage were occurrences incidental with such a march ; whilst to advance on Macon and Andersonville, and to liberate the Federal prisoners therein confined, was a climax which General Stoneman asked leave to attempt, receiving from General Sherman, after some hesitation, permission so to do.

Whilst the cavalry was thus employed, the Army of the Tennessee, under General Howard,† who had been appointed by the President to the command vacant through the death of McPherson, was ordered to move from the left along the rear to the right of the army, Schofield extending to the left to occupy the vacant space, and to cover the Georgia Central railway.

In the last week of July these several operations commenced. The cavalry were marched forward on their mission of destruction, and the infantry executed

* General Stoneman had served in the old regular army, and had distinguished himself during nearly all the campaigns of the Army of the Potomac. To the experience of American warfare, he added some knowledge of European armies, acquired during a year spent in Europe.

† On General Howard's appointment to the command of the Army of the Tennessee, General Hooker, feeling himself aggrieved that a junior officer should have been placed over his head, threw up his command ; General Palmer, at the same time, resigned the command of the 14th corps.

the prescribed movement. The fate of the former is soon told. McCook, after crossing the Chattahoochee, reached the West Point railway, tore up and injured the track, and continued his march to Lovejoy's station, where he arrived on the day appointed, having in his progress killed 800 mules and captured several prisoners. Hearing no news of Stoneman, and becoming aware that a considerable force was gathering against him, he retreated towards the West Point railway; but was there met by a detachment of infantry on their way from Mississippi to Atlanta, which had been stopped by the break in the rail. Finding his line of retreat closed, and threatened by a pursuing force in his rear, he made a bold attempt to cut his way through; but Wheeler had now come up, and acting with skill and vigour, completely routed him, capturing two guns, many officers and men, and releasing the prisoners. The remainder, with McCook, succeeded in rejoining the main army.

Stoneman's column was equally unfortunate. Marching from Decatur to Covington, he turned south, but failed, from a mistake in the direction of the roads, to effect the preconcerted junction with McCook at Lovejoy's station. Nevertheless, he pressed on towards Macon, urged forward by the hope of rescuing the prisoners therein confined. But when within about fifteen miles of that town, a mixed force of infantry and cavalry under General Iverson, acting in concert and with a complete knowledge of the country, surrounded him. Stoneman attempted to turn on his assailants, fighting his men now on foot now on horseback. All was in vain; the dismounted dragoons were driven back, and the horsemen attacked simultaneously in flank were routed. Stoneman then saw that he was in an evil plight. He gave permission to such of his officers as

might choose to attempt to cut their way through the surrounding enemy, and surrendered the remainder of his command, numbering about 1,500. The cavalry expeditions had failed, and it remained for the infantry to carry out more slowly, but more surely, the scheme of separating the army at Atlanta from its base of supplies.

The point to be gained was Eastport; but its occupation could only be effected by a gradual and careful extension of the right flank—gradual, as each successive step in advance was to be entrenched; careful, lest by exposing a weak place in the line to the concentrated attack of the enemy the army should be cut in two, taken in detail, and defeated.

On the morning of the 28th July the Army of the Tennessee (Howard) occupied a commanding ridge of ground across one of the principal roads leading from the Chattahoochee River to Atlanta. The men were actively employed in raising the usual breastworks, and a division of the Army of the Cumberland, under the temporary command of General Morgan, was making its way with difficulty towards the extreme left of the line, to form a reserve, and prevent a renewal of the tactics which had nearly proved fatal to McPherson during the battle of the 22nd. An attack had been anticipated by General Sherman, but the march of Morgan's men was delayed by bad information respecting the roads, and it remained for the Army of the Tennessee to resist the storm which at noon broke against it with almost overwhelming violence.

General Hood had watched with anxiety the gradual extension of the enemy's right wing, and was jealous of his communications with the Lower Chattahoochee. Therefore, wishing to retain possession of at least one

of these important roads, he had on the 28th July ordered General S. Lee, who had relieved Cheatham in the command of Hood's former corps, to advance, supported by Stuart, to protect or regain, as the case might be, a position regarded as of so great consequence, General Hardee remaining in charge of the eastern defences to observe Thomas and Schofield. The Federals had already ensconced themselves behind entrenchments which it became necessary to attack. From noon until 4 o'clock the engagement lasted ; Lee and Stuart advanced courageously, their men rushing up to the breastworks held by Howard's troops, but suffering so severely from the rifles of the defenders that the few who reached them were drawn in as prisoners. It is said that six times was the assault renewed, each time ineffectual in result, and at 4 o'clock both sides retained the positions they had occupied before the action. Sherman had extended his line to the right, but Eastport had not been reached, and until the destruction of the railway had been effected little hope could be entertained of the fall of the city.

The entrenchments raised by the besieging army, at first slight, had by this time developed themselves into works of profile equal to those held by Hood, consequently fewer men were required to garrison and hold them, and Sherman was enabled, by weakening his left, to extend his right, and replacing the Army of the Ohio on the Georgia Central railway by Garrard's cavalry, to move Schofield to the right of the Army of the Tennessee. Hood effected a counter movement, and although the Federal line reached to within three miles of Eastport, he so perfectly protected the railways as to make it apparent to General Sherman that some fresh combination of strategy would be necessary to force the enemy

to evacuate the town. Both armies were losing heavily. The operations above detailed were not prosecuted without continual skirmishing, on some days reaching to the dimensions of engagements. Each successive position was bravely defended, and had to be won by blood; whilst the heavy guns brought from Chattanooga now began to pour their shells into the devoted city. On the calm summer evenings, resting from the fatigues of the day, men and officers would assemble on a hill overlooking Atlanta, and watch each successive shell, speculating carelessly on its destination and effect; whilst within that city, helpless women and children, crowded into churches or huddled in cellars, awaited with horror and despair the death which seemed inevitable, and which presented itself in so many fearful forms.

Thus ended July, and thus commenced the month of August. In the meantime Hood, confiding in the strength of his defences, and anxious to turn the tables on his adversary, and to compel him by operating against his communications to raise the siege; believing also that the enemy's cavalry had been so broken by Wheeler and Iverson as to be no longer formidable, despatched the former officer with 4,500 horsemen* to fall upon the railway between Marietta and Chattanooga. The movement was most unfortunate in its consequences. By detaching his cavalry General Hood deprived himself of what may be termed the eyes of the army, and subsequent operations proved that this false step was the commencement of the disasters which shortly followed. Wheeler, doubtless, was enabled temporarily to interrupt Sherman's communications, and to inconvenience

* This is the number given in General Hood's report.

the Federal army by the capture of cattle and stores. But the railway was repaired almost as rapidly as it could be destroyed; the garrisons at the intermediate stations, such as Dalton, stood their ground; whilst General Steedman, at Chattanooga, quickly organised a force which compelled Wheeler to march on Eastern Tennessee, and eventually to retreat by a wide circuit to Northern Alabama. As affecting the result of the campaign his expedition was useless, and afforded another instance of the ill effects of detaching the cavalry of an army on separate enterprises in place of utilising it in conjunction with the other two arms.

That these tactics were too frequently pursued by American generals, especially by those on the Southern side, there is abundant proof. The raids of Morgan and Forrest were productive of little real benefit to the cause, whilst the absence of Stuart at the first day's battle of Gettysburg prevented General Lee from acquiring accurate knowledge of his adversary's movements, and thus indirectly led to the subsequent disaster. The earlier enterprises of that distinguished officer were so dazzling, and their results apparently so brilliant, that they induced himself and other cavalry leaders to repeat them when the better organisation of the Federal armies, and their consequent improved strategy and tactics, rendered the risks greater as they diminished the chances of real success.

Directly Sherman had assured himself of the departure of Wheeler and his cavalry, he proceeded to take advantage of their absence by again attempting, with his own cavalry, the operation which had resulted so unsuccessfully to Stoneman and McCook. Kilpatrick, not yet recovered from his wound, but burning with an enthusiasm which led him to forsake his home

and young wife on the banks of the Hudson, and against the advice of his surgeon again to take the field, had rejoined the army, and, although unable to sit on horse-back, was busily engaged in examining maps and re-organising the cavalry for fresh expeditions. It was again thought possible to effect by cavalry alone, what, failing this, General Sherman had determined to put forth the whole strength of his army to accomplish, and so Kilpatrick and his horsemen were directed to march on the railways, and, not content with merely suspending temporarily the communication, to destroy them so effectually as to prevent their further use as channels of supply.

Advancing from the Federal right wing, he soon reached the West Point rail, which he tore up and otherwise injured; then, continuing his march, he struck the Macon line at Jonesboro, obtaining some advantage over detachments of the Confederate cavalry. But, whilst engaged in destroying the rail, a large force of infantry, brought up rapidly on the cars, fell upon him, and nearly succeeded, with the assistance of the cavalry, in surrounding his detachment. He was compelled to forego his work, and to employ his whole energy to extricate himself from the perilous position in which he was now placed. Breaking through the encircling enemy, and capturing a few prisoners and a gun, he continued his march, and finally reached the Federal lines in the neighbourhood of Decatur, having made a complete circuit of the enemy's position, but failing to inflict any material damage on the railways.

Sherman now resolved to put into execution the great plan which he had already well digested, and to attempt, with reference to Hood at Atlanta, a strategy similar to that which had compelled Johnston to retreat succes-

sively from the many strong positions intervening between Tunnel Hill and the Chattahoochee. He determined to move with the whole of his army, excepting one corps, on Hood's communications, compelling him either to leave his entrenchments and to fight a decisive battle, or to retreat. Thus to cut himself loose from his own lines of communication, and to throw himself, with only the provisions and stores he could carry, into the heart of the enemy's country, with an opposing army inferior in numbers, but still unbroken and sufficiently formidable on his flank and rear, was a strategy which must ever be accounted extremely bold, but the success of which proved that the details had been carefully studied, and that what in a less experienced general might be accounted rashness, was, under General Sherman, the result of deep consideration and calculations based on preceding events, and on the knowledge he had acquired of his opponent's character.

Owing to Wheeler's absence, Sherman was superior to his adversary in cavalry; he could thus mask and conceal his movements, whilst the natural features of the country veiled the strength of the detachment which he left to cover his abandoned communications with Chattanooga. Orders were issued to the several commanders to send their sick, supplies, and baggage waggons* to the fortified position at the bridge over the Chattahoochee, and with fifteen days' provisions and

* The *United States Army and Navy Journal*, of September 24 1864, makes the following statement with reference to General Sherman's transportation train:—'Meanwhile transportation was reduced to 3,000 waggons and about 1,000 ambulances, the rest being moved to the rear on the 24th and 25th of August, taking the roads leading to the crossings of the Chattahoochee at Pace's Ferry, the railroad bridge, and Turner's Ferry. The movement of these wagon trains to the rear gave colour to the impression which the enemy had received that Sherman was retreating.'

ammunition, packed in their most serviceable waggons, to be prepared to march on the 25th August. The greatest secrecy was observed; the 4th and 20th corps of the Army of the Cumberland, as yet holding the lines on the left of the army, quietly withdrew from their entrenchments, and marched, the former to the rear of the Army of the Tennessee, the latter, under Slocum, to the bridges over the Chattahoochee. On the following night, a similar movement of the armies of the Tennessee and of the Cumberland (minus the 20th corps) was carried out under cover of the Army of the Ohio, which continued in the trenches on what had previously been the extreme right. On the 27th, the armies of the Tennessee and of the Cumberland were on the West Point rail, the Army of the Ohio having moved towards its own right, but still occupying a position on the left flank. On that day and the following the men were diligently employed in completely destroying the rail, the work being superintended and carefully inspected by General Sherman.*

In the meantime there was doubt in the camp of the Confederates. The withdrawal of the enemy from his lines was quickly discovered, but what route he had taken, and with what objects, were grounds of speculation rather than matters of calculation. A *reconnaissance* in force was pushed forward in the direction of the Chattahoochee, but, encountering the 20th corps strongly posted behind formidable entrenchments, was

* The following quotation from Colonel Bowman's and Lieutenant-Colonel Irwin's narrative describes the work :—

‘For twelve and a half miles the ties were burned, and the iron rails heated and twisted with the utmost ingenuity of old hands at the work. Several cuts were filled up with the trunks of trees, logs, rock, and earth, intermingled with loaded shells, prepared as torpedoes, to explode in case of an attempt to clear them out.’

driven back. The troops, accompanied by bands of citizens, delighted with the freedom from a state of siege, left the city to inspect the long lines of abandoned fieldworks, and to wonder at their strength. Hope succeeded to anxiety; the retreat of the invading army, at first only surmised, was now considered certain, and the much-enduring townsfolk and much-harassed soldiery looked forward to a period of rest, and to the excitement of pursuit in place of the dispiriting influence of continued retreat. The Confederate general, deprived of the main body of his cavalry, was, for four or five days, uncertain of his opponent's strategy, but at length ascertaining that at least a formidable detachment was menacing his rear, ordered Lee's and Hardee's corps to march, under the command of the latter, to Jonesboro. The movement was accomplished on the night of the 30th and morning of the 31st of August, and on the afternoon of the latter day both corps united were in front of Jonesboro.

Not too soon were these orders carried out, for Sherman, having destroyed a long extent of the West Point rail, was on the march to Jonesboro on the very day that Lee and Hardee entered the place. Acting under urgent and express orders from General Hood to attack and overwhelm the force in his front, Hardee led forward his men from the entrenched lines round Jonesboro, and encountered the Army of the Tennessee, which formed the right of the Federal army, Schofield being on the left, and Thomas in reserve. A sharp engagement ensued, in which the Confederates being the assailants, and advancing against the usual fortified lines, suffered severely, the loss falling with especial weight on Stevenson's division. Many superior officers were killed and wounded; General Anderson was numbered

among the former; Stevenson, although wounded, refused to leave the field; whilst General Cumming, commanding a brigade of Georgians, and leading them up to the enemy's works, fell close to their front. The Confederates were repulsed, Hardee retreated to his lines round Jonesboro, whilst Lee was drawn nearer to Atlanta to keep open the communication between the two flank corps. *

It was now Sherman's design to interpose between the garrison of Atlanta, comprised of Stuart's corps with the Georgia militia, and the troops against whom the Army of the Tennessee had been contending on the 31st. He therefore ordered Schofield, reinforced by a division from the Army of the Cumberland, to move as rapidly as he was able down the Macon railway, which he had already gained, and which he was desired thoroughly to destroy. Howard and one corps of Thomas's was at the same time to engage Hardee's attention in front, and the cavalry was designed to harass him in flank and rear. Owing, however, to the bad condition of the roads, Schofield and Stanley† did not arrive in time to take part in the action, which fell principally on Jeff. Davis's corps. An attack was made on Hardee's lines, and before nightfall a lodgment had been effected within his entrenchments, and many prisoners and some guns captured from Cleburne's division.

* General Hood attaches blame to General Hardee for this failure, alleging that the force under his command was considerably greater than that of the enemy. This could scarcely have been the case, since the whole Federal army, minus Slocum's corps, was on the march to Jonesboro, and, as it arrived by successive divisions on the field, was brought into action.

† On General Howard's promotion to the Army of the Tennessee, General Stanley succeeded him in command of the 4th corps.

During that night loud explosions were heard from the direction of Atlanta and Jonesboro. Hood—seeing that his flank had been completely turned, that his lines of communication had been cut, and that there was danger lest the detached corps at Jonesboro should be overwhelmed, fearing also that the large body of prisoners, 34,000 in number, at Andersonville, might be released by the Federal cavalry, and form an army for the devastation of Georgia—found himself compelled to yield the city for which so much blood had been shed, and on whose attack and defence so much skill and gallantry had been expended. Much of the machinery, and many of the locomotives, had already been sent farther south; the remainder of the stores, as far as was possible, were now packed in the army waggons; what could not be conveyed away were burnt, and, accompanied by a long train of sorrowing and helpless citizens, the portion of the army under Hood's immediate command fell back from Atlanta, uniting with Hardee, who had retired from Jonesboro, south of Lovejoy's station on the Macon line.

On the following morning, the 2nd of September, Slocum, who had seen and heard the explosions of the preceding night, pushed forward a strong *reconnaissance*, and discovering that the entrenchments had been abandoned, entered the city. A deputation of the mayor and citizens met the advancing troops, and formally surrendered the place, asking protection for non-combatants and private property. This was accorded, and the Federal forces entered Atlanta, behaving orderly and refraining from all acts of violence. A despatch was immediately sent to General Sherman, who had in the meantime followed Hardee's retreat to Lovejoy's station, where he had found him

strongly entrenched, in conjunction with Lee's corps, and expecting the arrival of Hood with the remainder of the army. It was near Lovejoy's station that Slocum's courier found the head-quarters, and satisfied with the final result of the campaign, and anxious, after so many battles and so great fatigues to give his men rest, Sherman determined to withdraw to Atlanta, and there, having in some measure recruited his army, and consolidated his conquests, to prepare for renewed operations and further enterprises. The Army of the Cumberland occupied Atlanta, that of the Tennessee held Eastport, that of the Ohio Decatur. Camps were formed, men were permitted to go on furlough, stragglers were collected, conscripts were drilled, and the army was recruited and reorganised in the fullest sense of the words.

By the capture and occupation of Atlanta, a great step had been gained towards the conquest of the South. Not that the city itself was important, either from its size, the number of its population, or the magnificence of its buildings; twenty years previous to its siege and fall the ground had been covered with forest: nor did any natural features in the surrounding country point it out as a place likely to be selected as the site of an important town. But the railways from various directions—connecting the sea-coast with the great navigable rivers, the grain-growing with the cotton-producing States, and again leading to the more southern lands, where rice and sugar form staple commodities—here meet and intersect each other, and creating as well as providing for wants, necessitated the presence of factories, and drew together a population of artisans useful in times of peace, and essential when war had cut off communication with the States on which the South

had previously leaned for the productions of machinery. Thus Atlanta became a place of great importance, which increased as the several strategical points to the north and west were wrested from the Confederacy.

For the conquest of the West two lines of operation had been open, one by the great river which intersects the Southern States, the other by the railways which alone afford means of overcoming their vast distances. The river, as has been already shown, was secured by the successive captures of New Orleans, Columbus, Island No. 10, Vicksburg, and Port Hudson. The railways were fast falling into the power of the North. The possession of Nashville, consequent on the fall of Forts Henry and Donelson, had given her armies the control of the lines through Kentucky and part of Tennessee; the occupation of Corinth had placed an important junction in their hands; the battles of Missionary Ridge had secured the hold already obtained of Chattanooga and its converging railways, and the capture of Knoxville had protected the left flank of the long chain of communication which afforded an entrance from Kentucky and Tennessee into the southern States of the Confederacy. The possession of these strategical points had only been attained after many campaigns and desperate battles; but each acquisition, as it fell into the hands of the Federals, weakened their adversaries to a degree not sufficiently appreciated at the time of its conquest.

As with individuals, so is it with nations. They put forth their whole strength for the attainment of an important object, and when they fail suffer from the reaction which always follows unwonted exertion. The portion of country ceded by Johnston in his retreat appeared narrow when compared with the vast extent

still owing allegiance to the Confederate government ; the possession of the small, and, in comparison with many, insignificant town of Atlanta, seemed but a feeble reward for the toil and bloodshed which had been necessary to attain it ; but its conquest was another and most important step towards the final subjugation of the Confederacy. The network of railways intersecting Georgia and connecting the Carolinas and Virginia with Alabama and the Western States was broken. The influence of the central government in the States far from its immediate control was shaken. Decisive proof of the vast power and resources of the North, as well as of the talent of her generals and the courage of her troops, had been afforded by the brilliant strategy and by the succession of battles which preceded and led to the fall of Atlanta. Corresponding dejection, which it required the presence of President Davis to check, was felt in the South-West. A salient point for the prosecution of an aggressive campaign had been obtained by the invader in the heart of one of the richest States of the Confederacy ; whilst for the defence of the remaining portion there existed only the army which, having been driven successively from the mountain barriers, now attempted with diminished forces to protect the fertile plains spread out before the invading hosts.

The operations of guerillas, and the raids of cavalry, on which so much stress had been laid during the earlier periods of the war, had proved abortive to hinder the steady onward progress of a well-disciplined army, under the command of a general who seemed to unite in himself the qualities for which the North had so long and so vainly looked. Of Sherman's genius for war there can be no doubt ; he could conceive as well as execute. He knew how to select and employ his

officers. He understood the discipline of armies in its fullest extent. He placed before himself a single object, viz., the prosecution of war for the sake of peace. He allowed no desire of fame, no fear of censure, no feeling of humanity, no consideration for either the losses of his own army or the sufferings of non-combatants, to interfere with the prosecution of his schemes. An enemy to luxury or display, he discouraged them in his generals and forbade them in his men. A man of strong constitution, he spared no personal fatigue, and demanded the utmost exertions from those under his command. Straightforward and honourable, he despised political trickery, hated jobbery, and fearlessly expressed and maintained his opinions to those who controlled the administration at Washington. The non-combatants who sought to accompany his armies were objects of his especial dislike; newspaper correspondents were forbidden in his lines; and the speculators who longed eagerly to trade in cotton, or to make fortunes out of the necessities of the troops and of the inhabitants, were deterred by threats of impressment from visiting his camps. Among his soldiers he permitted a licence, as regarded the treatment of the population of the conquered districts, which cannot be excused. His army became an awful scourge, and its general appeared indifferent so long as its excesses did not interfere with its efficiency in the field. This indifference to the conduct of his troops towards the conquered, showed itself to an even greater degree when resistance was less strenuous, and when therefore discipline, which must have suffered by these excesses, was of less importance. Not that General Sherman shared in either the hatred for the South or the fanaticism which urged

many of his fellow-countrymen to a disregard of the white population in their sympathy for the black, but that he appeared to be insensible to any objects excepting the prosecution of war for the restoration of the Union. That attained, he professed, and subsequently proved by actions, that he was influenced by no ill-will towards the population or armies of the Southern States.

His system of tactics was suitable to the troops he commanded, and adapted to their peculiar qualities. He carried on a war of offence on defensive principles, enabled to do so by his superiority of numbers. When his opponent entrenched, he also entrenched; and the better tools, and perhaps more practised workmen among his soldiery, gave him the means of soon rendering the newly-constructed fortifications equal in strength to those over which more time had been spent. He would then push forward his works, whilst he would send large detachments to outflank and turn the position in his front, thus, by operating on his communications, compelling the enemy to retreat, without hazarding the risk of a general assault. Once, as has been narrated, he diverged from this course, and the result was that his troops suffered a severe repulse. The rapid, well-sustained attack, which in many of the great European combats has led to important successes, does not appear adapted to the qualities of the Federal soldiery. Indomitable perseverance, cheerfulness under fatigue and hardship, diligence in entrenching, and stubbornness in defending these entrenchments, seem to be especial characteristics which render them, when well-armed and skilled in the use of their weapons, most formidable opponents. These qualities General Sherman knew well how to

utilise. He also knew, like many other of the greatest generals, how to forsake cautious operations for enterprises brilliant even to apparent rashness. His abandonment of his communications, and his flank march round Hood's army to Jonesboro, must take rank among the most skilful and most bold of the strategical movements of the war; and had his career terminated at the capture of Atlanta, he would still have held a foremost rank among the many Federal generals whom the shifting scenes of the great conflict brought successively to the front.

On the Confederate side, the fatal mistake of the campaign appears to have been the departure of Wheeler's cavalry. This General Hood does not acknowledge, alleging that he retained a sufficient force of that arm to serve his purpose. Nevertheless, the ignorance he displayed of Sherman's flank march would seem to prove that he was not well informed of his opponent's movements; as, had he been so, he would in all probability have fallen with his whole strength against Slocum's corps, left on the Chattahoochee; or in place of sending two corps under Hardee to fight the battle of Jonesboro, would have led his entire army, minus the garrison of Atlanta, against the main body of Sherman's troops, divided for the purpose of overcoming the natural difficulties of the march. The censure he passes on Hardee for his failure before Jonesboro appears little, if at all, merited. The evidence would seem to show that Hardee was inferior rather than superior to his adversary in numbers, in which case, and acting against the formidable troops of the Western army, fighting behind breastworks, there is little wonder that he suffered repulse.

But although there were doubtless mistakes in the

strategy of the Confederate general, yet the final withdrawal of the corps holding Atlanta, and the junction of the whole army on the Macon and Augusta lines, still covering the main roads to the South, were operations which evinced no common skill, and neutralised in some respects the value of the conquest. The Confederate army of the West was still formidable; and there may have been some colouring of truth in the boasts of the Southern press, that the barren conquest and occupation of an almost deserted town was a prize for which the price paid was exorbitant, and of which the value of possession was counterbalanced by the danger of retention.

To mitigate that danger, and at the same time to prepare his army for fresh operations, was General Sherman's care during the month following the conquest of Atlanta. He fortified the town on shorter lines than those previously held by Hood, in order that the task of defending them might be delegated to a smaller garrison. He added to the strength of the already entrenched positions on the line of communications with Chattanooga. He placed strong garrisons at that place and at Rome, and despatched Schofield to consolidate the but recently-acquired conquests in Eastern Tennessee. He issued strict orders that no interests, either political or commercial, should be allowed to interfere with the measures considered necessary for the safety and well-being of the army, and gave evidence how completely military considerations over-weighed the sentiments of pity, by directing the whole of the population of Atlanta, which still clung to their homes, to be prepared to make their choice either to proceed south or to be conveyed to the Northern States.

Sad was the fate of the citizens of Atlanta ; they had endured the horrors of a siege, they had seen their friends defeated, had watched the army which included within its ranks many of their nearest relatives depart, and now, having in some measure recovered from their fears, and become reconciled to the new condition of affairs, were called upon to leave their once happy homes and to seek shelter either among their enemies in the North, or among strangers already overtaxed to supply their own wants in the South. No respect was to be shown to age, sex, or condition of life ; all were to be driven from the town ; and the Confederate General was called upon to sanction an armistice in order to receive within his lines those who should elect to follow the fortunes of their relatives in the Southern States. General Hood remonstrated strongly against the cruelty of this order ; the mayor sent a touching petition showing the woe it would cause to helpless non-combatants, to women, children, and the sick. All was in vain : General Sherman replied at length, refusing to revoke his order, and alleging reasons in which it must be confessed there was much truth, and which those who think or speak lightly of war will do well to weigh. He[®] urged that 'war is cruelty, that you cannot refine it,' and that the object of war is peace, which can only be attained by its vigorous prosecution. He showed that Atlanta was required for military purposes, and therefore was not a suitable residence for non-combatants. To quote his own words : 'I want peace, and believe it can only be reached through union and war, and I will ever conduct war purely with a view to perfect and early success.'

This was General Sherman's answer to the petitions and expostulations with which he was addressed. There

was no hope for the inhabitants of Atlanta ; and with such of their household goods as they could collect and were able to transport, the miserable fugitives, mostly old men, women, and children, departed from their homes under charge of Federal officers, and were handed over to General Hood, who made such arrangements as were possible for their transport to the South. If one reflects on the probable fate of these unhappy people when their last refuges were subsequently overwhelmed by the still-conquering and onward-marching army, one forgets the brightness with which war is wont to be clothed, and remembers only the dreary embers that remain when that false halo, that brilliant conflagration, has passed over the land afflicted by its curse.

The ashes of former homesteads, from which rose brick chimneys which had defied the fire, alone marked the former presence of inhabitants between Atlanta and Chattanooga. The small country towns had become military posts, whilst the freshly raised earth on the slopes of the mountains and on the banks of the rivers attested the positions where men had met in deadly conflict, and where many sons of Georgia had fallen in the defence of homes now the property of the enemy.

The numbers who fell in that campaign may possibly never be known. Federal accounts estimated their own loss at 30,400, placing that of the Confederates at 42,000.* On the other hand, calculations based on captured muster-rolls enumerated the former at 60,000 ; whilst, arguing from the known strength of Johnston's and Hood's army, the number 42,000 must be considered as greatly overstated.†

* See *American Annual Encyclopædia*, 1864, *Army Operations*, p. 87 ; also letter to the *Times* of November 17th, 1864.

† According to General Hood's report, the total loss of the

Notwithstanding these losses, two formidable armies still faced each other; that of General Sherman, in which constantly-arriving reinforcements of conscripted men filled up the gaps caused by the wear and tear of war and by the expiration of terms of enrolment, and that of General Hood, with ranks thinned by the recent battles, but still replenished by the old men and boys of Georgia, bearing arms for the defence of their homes. The former held Atlanta, Marietta, Allatoona, Rome, Dalton, and Chattanooga; the latter, with its right on the Augusta rail, twenty miles to the south-east of Atlanta, its left on the Macon rail, thirty miles due south, covered the approaches to these important towns, and formed the bulwark of the Confederacy in the south-west, as Lee, with the Army of Virginia, 600 miles distant, protected it from the north-east.

Confederate Army of the Tennessee, between Tunnel Hill and Atlanta, amounted to nearly 28,000 men. On the other hand, General Johnston, whose estimate is probably more correct, places the total loss of his infantry and artillery, from the 5th of March to the date of his removal, at 14,700; whilst he states that the effective force transferred to Hood was 41,000 infantry and artillery and 10,000 cavalry. Many of the slightly wounded had rejoined their regiments, and the militia from Georgia had entered the ranks.

CHAPTER XVII.

FROM ATLANTA TO SAVANNAH.

NOTWITHSTANDING the slight importance with which, possibly from motives of policy, the Southern press affected to treat the fate of Atlanta, a feeling of anxiety and a want of confidence pervaded the south-western portion of the Confederacy. The change of commanders had not produced the anticipated benefit; more blood had been shed, but Hood like Johnston had been forced to retreat; whilst the condition of the Western army in respect of its *morale*, its confidence and unanimity, was far inferior to that of Virginia.

To consult on a fresh plan of campaign, to see with his own eyes the state of the troops, and to hear and redress evils, was President Davis's object when he undertook the long journey from Richmond to General Hood's head-quarters in the autumn of 1864. A plan of campaign was then discussed, the chief purport of which was to convert the defensive warfare hitherto pursued into a bold attack upon Sherman's lines of communication, transferring the seat of war northwards, to a country ill-fitted during the winter months for an active campaign; thus, irrespective of the direct injury to be inflicted on the enemy, obtaining for the sorely harassed Confederacy a much-needed period

* *Vide* Map, p. 46; also Map I., commencement of volume; and Maps, pp. 416 and 464.

of repose. In favour of this plan General Hood urged that the Federal army, more powerful than his own, would soon resume the offensive, and would force him to fall back through a country of no natural strength on Alabama; that the troops under his command, already injured in *morale* by the issue of the contest at Atlanta, would be much benefited, as regarded their fighting spirit, by an advance in place of a retreat; and supposing operations against the communications of the enemy to be advisable, that they must be undertaken by a joint force of cavalry and infantry, as the former had been proved to be perfectly incompetent to interrupt or destroy railway communication so decisively as to compel the enemy to abandon his position.* This scheme received the approbation of the President, who, passing through Macon on his road to Richmond, promulgated its main features in a speech which, quickly transcribed from Southern into Northern journals, is said to have given General Sherman warning of the impending storm.†

Probably in order to distract the attention of the Federal generals, and at the same time to interrupt communication between the primary base at Nashville and the secondary base at Chattanooga, Forrest (that most notable of cavalry leaders) took the field on the 20th of September. He crossed the Tennessee, cap-

* The author has consulted General Hood's official report, published in the *Richmond Enquirer*, March 25th, 1865, and has also received private information from an officer present with General Hood's army.

† General Grant, in his official report, says:—

‘During this time Jefferson Davis made a speech at Macon, Georgia, which was reported in the papers of the South, and soon became known to the whole country, disclosing the plan of the enemy, thus enabling General Sherman to fully meet them.’

tured Athens, with its garrison of five regiments of infantry (mostly negroes) and one of cavalry, on the 23rd, and, after threatening Pulaski, turned northwards, and attempted to break the railway between Tullahoma and Dechard, on the main line from Nashville to Chattanooga.* But the Federal officers were on the alert. Thomas, sent by General Sherman to command at Nashville, moved his detachments with rapidity and judgment; reinforcements were brought up from Atlanta; a body of cavalry was despatched from Memphis; and Forrest, with his gallant troopers, was forced, hardly pressed, to retire and recross the Tennessee, affording another instance of the insufficiency of cavalry alone to accomplish important operations.

The slight results following Forrest's raid increased General Hood's conviction of the necessity of employing his whole army if he wished materially to injure his opponent's communications. Therefore, after consultation with his three corps commanders, Cheatham, Stuart, and S. D. Lee, he prepared for the prosecution of his grand movement. Removing the rails from the Augusta and Macon lines, along a distance of forty miles, he repaired the West Point rail, and marching towards his left flank, covered it with his army, whose left rested on the Chattahoochee. After remaining in this position for ten days, to allow of an accumulation of supplies, the transport of which, often by long waggon trains, was necessarily slow, and for the building of a trestle bridge over the Chattahoochee, he crossed the river, marching with his infantry, covered by Jackson's cavalry, on Lost Mountain. His force consisted of about 26,100 regular infantry and artillery, as the militia, numbering about 3,000, had been temporarily disbanded by order of the Governor of

* *Vide* Map, page 416.

the State, and about 4,050 cavalry,* not including Wheeler's force of 4,500 which subsequently joined him. With this army, small when compared with the preponderating numbers which could be brought against him, he boldly threw himself on Sherman's lines of communication, sending General Stuart to capture the garrisons and destroy the rail between Allatoona and Kinnesaw Mountain, whilst Wheeler made his appearance in the neighbourhood of Resaca and Dalton.

Sherman was not unprepared. Anticipating an attack, but uncertain with what strength it would be made, he warned General Corse, stationed at Rome, to look to the defences of the place and to be in readiness to send succour wherever it might be needed. On the 1st of October, intelligence of the crossing of the Chattahoochee reached Sherman, and he at once made arrangements to move with the bulk of his forces to withstand Hood, leaving Slocum, with the 20th corps, to hold Atlanta and the bridges over the Chattahoochee. But, unwilling to commit himself by a march to the rear before his opponent's schemes were fully developed, and uncertain whether the damage done to the railway both south of Allatoona and north of the Etowah might not be the results of mere cavalry raids, he remained in the neighbourhood of Atlanta until the 4th of October, when, having fully assured himself of the departure of Hood's army from his right front, and receiving intelligence that at least a very large force was in his rear, he took with him five *corps d'armée* and marched to Kinnesaw Mountain. On the same day he signalled to General Corse, at Rome, by posts established on Kinnesaw and

* A brigade of cavalry, under General Iverson, was left to watch the force at Atlanta.

Allatoona Mountains and at other intermediate stations (for the wire had been already cut), to disregard Wheeler's movements, and to hasten with the whole of his division to the assistance of Colonel Tourtelette, threatened with attack at Allatoona Pass.

General Corse at once took measures to comply with this order ; he brought up every car that could be mustered from Kingston, and, although delayed by a railway accident, put about 1,050 men into the train, and in person set forth for Allatoona. He arrived there soon after midnight of the 4th of October, and sent back the cars for further reinforcements. These, however, again met with an accident, owing to the bad condition of the railway ; and therefore, with the previous garrison of Allatoona and his own reinforcements, numbering in all less than 2,000 men, General Corse prepared to offer resistance to the Confederate division which, at daybreak, made its appearance in front of his out-pickets. He drew up his small force on the heights overlooking from each side the railway cutting, manning the forts with his reserves, and keeping back the enemy's skirmishers by lines of infantry deployed along the lower ridges. The troops on the west of the cut he commanded in person, whilst to Colonel Tourtelette was entrusted the defence of the redoubt on the eastern side.

The action commenced soon after daybreak, and under cover of heavy skirmishing, the enemy, who was found to consist of General French's division of Stuart's corps, passed round the flank of the defences, and established himself on the rail between Allatoona and Rome. The Confederate general then sent a flag of truce to demand a surrender, on the ground that the place was surrounded, and that a needless effusion of blood would thereby be saved ; but to this General

Corse returned, in grim irony, the answer that he was prepared for the needless effusion of blood whenever it might be agreeable to General French. Then the attack was renewed : a brigade of Texans assaulted the heights occupied by Corse's men, from the West ; whilst a strong column advancing gallantly up the railway track from the north, and little affected by the flank fire poured on them from Colonel Tourtelette's batteries, drove back the regiments stationed on the side of the hill, and forced them to take shelter in the redoubt. There the Federals made a most firm and gallant stand ; General Corse knew the importance of the position he was defending—important not only as being immediately in the line of the communication of Sherman's army, but also as containing a vast amount of supplies. He had received a signal from Sherman, who, standing on the heights of Kinnesaw Mountain, eighteen miles distant, could distinguish the columns of smoke, and hear faintly the noise of the artillery, aware of the engagement on which so much depended, but unable to offer any assistance. It is said that the Commander-in-Chief watched anxiously the signal flags as they repeated the message from post to post ; but when the answer from General Corse was returned, proving his arrival at the post, he exclaimed : ' If Corse is there, he will hold out ; I know the man ! ' His hopes were justified. Although wanting in ammunition for the guns, and suffering severely from the well-sustained assaults of the enemy, the garrison continued its resistance ; General Corse was wounded, and for a time rendered insensible, but recovering consciousness, encouraged the troops with anticipation of succour from Sherman, and urged them to maintain the post. Men and officers responded well to his call ; about 4 P.M. a final attack was repelled, and then French, having suffered

severely in killed, wounded, and prisoners, and alarmed at a false rumour of a large body of the enemy marching to intercept his communications with the main army, retired. The post was saved; whilst Hood, deeming it unwise to hazard a general engagement with the now rapidly approaching Federal army, pushed forward across the Coosa towards Resaca, and Sherman, following in his track, passed through Allatoona Pass on the 8th, and reached Kingston on the 11th.

There he halted for a day, uncertain whether Hood was manœuvring to strike Rome or whether he was bent on continuing his march along the line of railway to Dalton and Chattanooga. He was not long in doubt; on the 12th of October, Hood summoned the garrison of Resaca, threatening, if the surrender was refused, to take no prisoners; but the commander, Colonel Weaver, unappalled by the large force of the enemy, returned for answer that he could and would hold the post: and Hood, unable, from the approach of Sherman, to submit to the delay of a siege, and unwilling to risk the losses attendant on an assault, contented himself with masking the forts with strong bodies of skirmishers, whilst the main column moved onwards to Dalton, destroying the railway and burning the cars in its progress. Occupying the hills round Dalton he compelled the surrender of the garrison, and passing through Tunnel Hill took up a position near Villanow.*

But Sherman was now close in his rear. He had reached Resaca on the 15th, and hoped to compel his opponent to fight among the Chattanooga mountains. With this intent he sent General Stanley, in command of the 4th and 14th corps, across the mountains, with orders to occupy the western end of Snake Creek Gap;

* *Vide* Map, p. 46.

whilst Howard, with the Army of the Tennessee, forced it from the eastern side ; but Hood, fighting with his rear-guard, protected by Wheeler's cavalry, which had now joined him, retreated rapidly, and holding Ship's Gap, a pass in a parallel range of hills between Villanow and to Lafayette, covered his entrance into Lafayette and the valley of the Chattanooga. Sherman, still pursuing, captured a portion of the rear-guard at Ship's Gap, and on the 17th entered Lafayette, Hood, little encumbered with baggage trains, marching quickly down the Chattanooga Valley into that of the Coosa, where he held a narrow gorge between the spurs of Look-out Mountain and the Coosa River.

Sherman was now in a position to cover Chattanooga, to protect Bridgeport, and to preserve communications with the garrisons of Resaca, Rome, Allatoona, and Atlanta. He continued to follow the enemy as far as Gaylesville, where, ascertaining that Hood had retired to Gadschen, seventy-five miles from Lafayette, he halted, and sent strong working parties to repair the damages inflicted on the railways. So vigorously did they perform their task, that by the 20th October trains were running between Resaca and Atlanta, and by the 28th all the repairs between Chattanooga, Rome, and Atlanta, were completed, and the lines were in working order. Their services were immediately employed in transporting stores and various supplies to Atlanta, where General Slocum had remained quietly during the pursuit of Hood, engaged in collecting forage and corn from the surrounding districts, and in preparing for future movements.

Hood's operations against Sherman's communications had failed ; he had seized on no important post ; Allatoona and Resaca had bade him defiance ; Chattanooga

was beyond his reach ; whilst his rapid retreat before Sherman's army proved that he was unable to meet his antagonist in the open field. General Sherman's own words will best describe the position of affairs. He thus writes in his report : ' Hood's movements and strategy had demonstrated that he had an army capable of endangering at all times my communications, but unable to meet me in open fight. To follow him would simply amount to being decoyed away from Georgia, with little prospect of overtaking or overwhelming him. To remain on the defensive would have been bad policy for an army of so great value as the one I then commanded, and I was forced to adopt a course more fruitful in results than the naked one of following him to the southwest. I had previously submitted to the Commander-in-Chief a general plan, which amounted substantially to the destruction of Atlanta and the railway track to Chattanooga, and sallying forth from Atlanta, through the heart of Georgia, to capture one or more of the great American seaports. This I renewed from Gaylesville, modified somewhat by the change of events.'*

Whilst, therefore, General Sherman, revolving these great schemes, remained at Gaylesville, contenting himself with detaching the 4th corps (Stanley's) and the 23rd (Schofield's) to Chattanooga, and placing them under General Thomas's orders for the protection of Tennessee, Hood, having crossed the mountains between the Tennessee and Coosa rivers, entered Warrenton, a small town on the left bank of the most southerly angle of the Tennessee River.

The second important phase of the Western campaign had thus closed ; the first had terminated with the capture of Atlanta, the second with Hood's retreat from

* See General Sherman's official account of the Great March.

the Coosa River and his abandonment of all intention of directly defending Georgia. General Sherman was, therefore, now at leisure to prosecute the plan of conquest which he is said long to have considered, and which the information and experience gained during his march into Mississippi in the earlier part of the year gave him sanguine hopes of successfully accomplishing. He was fully assured of the internal weakness of the Confederacy provided her outer barriers were once broken, and he meditated cutting her in two by a broad track of devastation through the heart of Georgia, as she had been already divided by the conquest and possession of the Mississippi River. Some town on the coast, probably Savannah, was to be the objective point, although it is said that, with far-seeing genius, he had already, among the mountains of Northern Georgia, traced out to his corps commanders a still longer march through the Carolinas. Preparations for the accomplishment of this great scheme were pushed forward with the most profound secrecy as well as with the most active diligence. To his corps commanders, and to Kilpatrick, (the general of cavalry), was alone confided the design of the expedition, and having delegated to Thomas the task of watching and confronting Hood, should he persist in his threatened invasion of Tennessee, General Sherman collected a well-chosen force of nearly 70,000 men, and made the last arrangements for his southward march.

His army was to be divided into two columns; the right under General Howard, the left under General Slocum, * who, having succeeded Hooker in command

* General Slocum, born in the State of New York, graduated at West Point in the year 1852. He resigned his commission in 1856, but at the outbreak of the war re-entered the army, and served with

of a corps, was now promoted to that of one of the grand divisions of the army. The right wing comprised the 15th corps (Osterhaus, formerly an officer in the Prussian service) and the 17th (Blair); the left wing included the 14th corps (Jeff. Davis) and the 20th (A. S. Williams). The whole infantry force numbered about 60,000, whilst the cavalry, under Kilpatrick, consisted of about 5,500 sabres, and the artillery was reduced to one gun per 1,000 men. Such was the formidable army which, partly cantooned in and about Atlanta, partly marching on that point from the Coosa River, was in readiness to execute Sherman's orders.

Giving up all idea of maintaining communications with his former basis of supply at Chattanooga and Nashville, Sherman directed the withdrawal of the garrisons from Kingston, Rome, Resaca and Dalton, the destruction or transportation northwards of all public and railway property, the tearing up of the rails between Kingston and Chattanooga, reserving them for future use, and the concentration of all troops north of Kingston in and around Chattanooga. Then marching with his army proper on Atlanta, and sparing for ulterior purposes the railway between the Oostanaula and Etowah Rivers, he destroyed completely the track south of the Oostanaula, heating and twisting the rails, burning the depôts, and, with them, possibly unintentionally as far as he was personally concerned, the still standing towns and villages as far as the Chattahoochee. All behind Sherman's army was a dreary wilderness. In his front stood, on the 12th November, when he

the Army of the Potomac through its several campaigns, being especially distinguished in command of the 12th corps at Chancellorsville. He subsequently commanded at Vicksburg, and was from thence transferred to the 20th corps, after Hooker's resignation.

finally cut the telegraph wire and severed communication with Washington, the town of Atlanta, and beyond it the smiling plains of Georgia ; but on the 14th of the same month Atlanta as a city had ceased to exist. Unable to hold it, unwilling to leave it in his rear to be converted into hostile purposes by the enemy, Sherman ordered its destruction, and by the light of its burning houses, with the sound of the explosions which completed the annihilation of its public buildings in their ears, the rear-guard of the Western army marched southwards to follow the already advanced divisions.

Whilst this devastation was occurring, and whilst preparations on so large a scale were being pushed forward for the advance into Southern Georgia, General Hood, unable to divine the strategy of the Federal general, was marching with the only army that could interpose between him and the heart of the Confederacy along the left bank of the Tennessee River, to Florence, where he was seeking to join Forrest, with the intention of invading Tennessee. General Beauregard, placed by the President in charge of the military division of the West, but not appointed to the direct command of the army, had communicated with him at Gadschen, and had sanctioned his plan of crossing the river. This General Hood had intended to have accomplished not far from Bridgeport, but owing to a want of co-operation with Forrest, who was at some distance lower down, the movement was delayed, and thus, at the time that Sherman was concentrating at Atlanta, Hood was moving his army in an opposite direction, leaving the Federal general to complete his arrangements for his seaward march.*

* General Hood gives the following account in his report :—

‘ Orders had been sent by General Beauregard to General Forrest

So well was the secret regarding the objects of General Sherman's preparations preserved, that not until after the burning of Atlanta, and until his columns were already some days' march south of the city, did news of the event reach General Beauregard at Tusculumbia,* where he was superintending the passage of the Tennessee. It appears to have taken both him and General Hood by surprise, and to have modified, although it did not prevent, the pre-arranged plan of the march to the North. To pursue General Sherman, who had now a start of 275 miles, over a country devastated by his troops, where the bridges had been burned and the rails and roads destroyed, would be obviously fruitless. Its result would be to open Alabama to Thomas, and probably to cause the fall of Montgomery, Selma, and Mobile; whilst by this apparently retrograde movement, the *morale* of Hood's army, already improved by the prospect of an aggressive campaign, would be greatly injured, occasioning it was feared, increased desertions.

Therefore, giving up every intention of following the Federal army into Georgia, General Beauregard, after consultation with Hood, agreed to permit him to prosecute his campaign, hoping that by a vigorous blow at Tennessee, Kentucky, and perhaps Ohio, he would compel Sherman to retrace his steps for the defence of those States, and thus render barren any advantages he might obtain by his southern conquests.

to move with his cavalry into Tennessee. Unfortunately, however, these orders did not reach him in time. As I had not a sufficient cavalry force without his to protect my trains in Tennessee, I was compelled to delay the crossing, and moved further down the river to meet him.'

* Tusculumbia is a small town, nearly opposite Florence, on the Tennessee River.

At the same time, he sent orders to Wheeler to harass the march of the Federal columns, detached a brigade of cavalry from Hood's army for the same purpose, and despatched telegrams to the governors of the States of Alabama and Mississippi, and to General R. Taylor, at Selma, directing them to call out and organise with all rapidity the State troops, and to march to the assistance of General Cobb, in command of the Georgia militia. General Beauregard under-estimated General Sherman's strength, and over-estimated the power of the States of Georgia and Alabama; he supposed the force under the former to number only 36,000 effective men, and hoped that an army of 30,000 could be collected for the defence of the menaced States.*

The Western campaign, which, since the advance of the Federal army from Chattanooga, had depended on the fortunes of the two principal armies, the one advancing, the other retreating along the Southern railroad to Atlanta, was now divided in its interests, as well as in its objects. Sherman, opposed by hastily-levied forces, was marching southwards through a country until now remote from scenes of war; whilst Hood, with the army of the West, was advancing over battle-fields famous during the earlier periods of the war, but long left behind by the steadily advancing flood of Northern conquest. The fate for good or evil of the two armies was now separated; and as the Federal general, in regard to the new campaign, was first in the field, it will be well to follow the narrative of his

* See General Hood's report. Also a letter written by General Beauregard to President Davis, regarding preparations and resources for meeting Sherman, for which the author is much indebted to Captain Hichens, R.E.

southward march before accompanying General Hood in his eventful advance on Nashville.

The invading army moved in two grand columns into the heart of Georgia, taking a direction between Macon and Augusta, and thus, by threatening both these important towns, compelling the Confederate generals to divide their forces. It was entirely composed of effective men; the sick and wounded had been sent back to Chattanooga, the cavalry had been remounted,* and only the best of the many waggons and teams had been selected to carry the ammunition and the forty days' bread, sugar, and coffee, with eighty days' salt, allotted as the reserve rations. The troops were to live on the country, the cavalry and artillery were to appropriate whatever horses and mules they might require, the cattle were to be driven with the columns, and only ammunition, a supply of which could not be procured until the sea-coast and the fleet had been reached, was to be carefully husbanded. The following orders for the march had already been issued on the 9th of November :—

1. The habitual order of march will be, whenever practicable, by four roads, as nearly parallel as possible, and converging at points hereafter to be indicated in orders. The cavalry, Brigadier-General Kilpatrick commanding, will receive special orders from the Commander-in-Chief.

2. There will be no general train of supplies, but each corps will have its ammunition and provision train, distributed habitually as follows : Behind each regiment should follow one waggon and one ambulance ; behind each brigade should follow a due proportion of ammunition waggons, provision waggons, and ambulances.

* See *Kilpatrick and Our Cavalry*, by James Moore, M.D.

In case of danger, each army corps commander should change this order of march by having his advance and rear brigade unencumbered by wheels. The separate columns will start habitually at 7 A.M., and make about fifteen miles per day, unless otherwise fixed in orders.

3. The army will forage liberally on the country during the march. To this end each brigade commander will organise a good and sufficient foraging party, under the command of one or more discreet officers, who will gather, near the route travelled, corn and forage of any kind, meat of any kind, vegetables and corn meal, or whatever is needed by the command, aiming at all times to keep in the waggon trains at least ten days' provisions for the command and three days' forage. Soldiers must not enter the dwellings of the inhabitants or commit any trespass; during the halt or at camp they may be permitted to gather turnips, potatoes, and other vegetables, and drive in stock in front of their camps. To regular foraging parties must be entrusted the gathering of provisions and forage at any distance from the road travelled.

4. To army commanders is entrusted the power to destroy mills, houses, cotton gins, etc., and for them this general principle is laid down: In districts and neighbourhoods where the army is unmolested, no destruction of such property should be permitted; but should guerillas or bushwackers molest our march, or should the inhabitants burn bridges, obstruct roads, or otherwise manifest local hostility, then army corps commanders should order and enforce a devastation more or less relentless according to the measure of such hostility.

5. As for horses, mules, waggon, etc. belonging to the inhabitants, the cavalry and artillery may appro-

priate them freely and without limit, discriminating, however, between the rich, who are usually hostile, and the poor or industrious, usually neutral or friendly. / Foraging parties may also take mules or horses to replace the jaded animals of their trains, or to serve as pack-mules for the regiments or brigades. In all foraging, of whatever kind, the parties engaged will refrain from abusive or threatening language, and may, when the officer in command thinks proper, give written certificates of the facts, but no receipts ; and they will endeavour to leave with each family a reasonable portion for their maintenance.

6. Negroes who are able-bodied, and can be of service to the several columns, may be taken along ; but each army commander will bear in mind that the question of supplies is a very important one, and that his first duty is to see to those who bear arms.

7. The organisation at once of a good pioneer battalion for each corps, composed, if possible, of negroes, should be attended to. The battalion should follow the advanced guard, should repair roads, and double them if possible, so that the columns will not be delayed after reaching bad places. Also, army commanders should study the habit of giving the artillery and waggons the road, and marching their troops on one side ; and also instruct their troops to assist waggons at steep places or bad crossings of streams.

8. Captain O. M. Poe, chief engineer, will assign to each wing of the army a pontoon train, fully equipped and organised, and the commanders thereof will see to its being properly protected at all times.

These orders gave sufficient latitude for extreme measures of military severity towards the population of the country through which the army was to march.

That they afforded exercise for the most vile system of plunder, devastation, and crime which ever disgraced the advance of a conquering army may have been the fault of General Sherman's subordinates, but of which the blame must in a great measure attach to himself. As in Hogarth's famous 'March to Finchley,' the main columns may and probably did move orderly, and with the regularity of disciplined soldiers; but the clouds of foragers, of camp followers, of absentees from their regiments, connived at by the officers, who should have restrained and punished their lawlessness, committed atrocities on the miserable and helpless inhabitants which can never be forgotten, and which affixes a stain on the otherwise fine army of the West. It is not from the Confederate accounts that the narrative of the spoliation of Georgia is to be gathered, but from books written by officers of the Northern armies, who, seemingly unconscious of the horrors they are narrating, jestingly describe scenes and incidents which in Europe can only excite wrath and disgust.* The advance from

* The following extract is taken from *Sherman's March through the South*, by Captain D. Conyngham :—

'War is very pleasant when attended by little fighting and good living at the expense of the enemy. To draw a line between stealing and taking and appropriating everything for the subsistence of an army, would puzzle the nicest casuist. Such little freaks as taking the last chicken, the last pound of meal, the last bit of bacon, and the only remaining scraggy cow, from a poor woman and her flock of children, black or white not considered, came under the order of legitimate business. Even crockery, bed-covering, or clothes were fair spoils. As for plate or jewellery, or watches, these were things rebels had no use for. They might possibly convert them into gold, and thus enrich the Confederate treasury. Men with pockets plethoric with silver and gold coin; soldiers sinking under the weight of plate and fine bedding materials; lean mules and horses, with the richest trappings of Brussels carpets, and hangings of fine chenille; negro

Chattanooga to Atlanta was grand. The campaign which preceded the fall of Atlanta was one of which the general and his troops may well be proud. The conception of the march to Savannah, and its pre-

wenches, particularly good-looking ones, decked in satins and silks, and sporting diamond ornaments; officers with sparkling rings that would have set Tiffany in raptures, gave colour to the stories of hanging up or fleshing an "old cuss" to make him shell out. A planter's house is overrun in a jiffy; boxes, drawers, and escritoirs were ransacked with a laudable zeal, and emptied of their contents. If the spoils were ample, the depredators were satisfied, and went off in peace; if not, everything was torn and destroyed, and most likely the owner was tickled with sharp bayonets into a confession where he had his treasures hid. If he escaped, and was hiding in a thicket, that was *prima facie* evidence that he was a skulking rebel, and most likely some ruffian, in his zeal to get rid of such vipers, gave him a dose of lead, which cured him of his secesh tendencies. Sorghum barrels were knocked open, beehives rifled, while their angry swarms rushed frantically about. Indeed, I have seen a soldier knock a planter down because a bee stung him. Hogs are bayoneted, and then hung in quarters on the bayonets to bleed; chickens, geese, and turkeys, are knocked over and hung in garlands from the saddles, and around the necks of swarthy negroes; mules and horses are fished out of swamps; cows and calves, so wretchedly thin that they drop down and perish on the first day's march, are driven along, or if too weak to travel, are shot, lest they should give aid to the enemy. Should the house be deserted, the furniture is smashed in pieces, music is pounded out of four hundred-dollar pianos with the ends of muskets, mirrors are wonderfully multiplied, and rich cushions and carpets carried off to adorn teams and war steeds. After all was cleared out, most likely some set of stragglers wanted to enjoy a good fire, and set the house, *débris* of furniture, and all the surrounding buildings, in a blaze. This is the way Sherman's army lived on the country. They were not ordered to do so, but I am afraid they were not brought to task for it much either.'

This account is corroborated by Major Nichols, in the *Story of the Great March* (who, however, seems to see little to regret in such deeds of spoliation), and by other evidence.

liminary arrangements, evinced genius of a high order ; but the march itself was disgraced by scenes in which Attila might have revelled, but which would sully the escutcheon of any civilised general.

The army commenced its march from the camps round Atlanta on the 14th November, Sherman himself accompanying the left column on the 16th. Howard, with the right column of the 15th and 17th corps, was to move due south, destroying, wherever the line of march approached it, the Macon railway, but leaving that town to the west, threatening it only with Kilpatrick's cavalry, supported by a brigade of infantry. Slocum, with the left column, was at the same time to menace Augusta, tear up and destroy the Georgia Central railway, especially the bridges over the Ocmulgee and Oconee rivers, and both columns were to unite in seven days at and around Milledgeville and Gordon.

All was accomplished with but little opposition on the part of the enemy. Howell Cobb and the Georgia militia did what lay in their power to harass the line of march, the cavalry keeping up an almost continuous skirmish with the Federal advanced guard, and the garrison of Macon sallying out and attacking vigorously Wolcott's brigade, inflicting and sustaining some loss. But what could 8,000 or 10,000 militia, although assisted by Wheeler's cavalry, do against Sherman's powerful army? They were brushed aside with little difficulty ; the bridges they had burned were quickly rebuilt by well-skilled engineers ; the roads, unfitted for the traffic of a large army, were rapidly corduroyed ; and the slight delays caused by skirmishes and their attendant hindrances merely afforded welcome halts to the main body of the advancing army. Milledgeville

was entered, disgracefully plundered, and destroyed. The State capitol was the scene of drunken frolic ; the museums, libraries, and private houses were devastated and robbed of their contents ; the public buildings and manufactories were burned, and the pleasant capital of Georgia, the seat of her legislature, the residence of men famous in the history of their country, was given over to rapine and became the scene of the saturnalia of intoxicated soldiers and of liberated slaves. Of these the able-bodied men and the younger females accompanied the troops ; the former to work, the latter, clad in the dresses of their former mistresses, enriched with the plunder of many a noble house, and ornamented with jewellery, to follow the course of the miserable women who attach themselves to an army. The old negroes and the children were left on the estates to perish of hunger with the families of their former wealthy masters, who, under Hood and Howell Cobb, were fighting hopelessly, but yet manfully, for their homes and firesides.

In the meanwhile, both in the South and North, Sherman's ultimate design, and even his present position, were matters for speculation rather than of knowledge. The extraordinary spectacle of the Confederate army advancing northwards, and of the Federal army marching southwards, was regarded, not unmixed with apprehension, by the uninitiated on both sides. Of the operations of Sherman's army, scanty reports, mostly rumours gathered from Southern papers, tended rather to excite the alarm than to allay the fears of the Northern people ; whilst the denizens of Richmond, Charleston, and of the towns removed from the scene of war possessed intelligence but little better authenticated. It would seem that Sherman's advance had

taken the Confederate authorities by surprise; they knew not what point he would strike, and consequently were ignorant where to concentrate the hastily collected troops assembled for the relief of suffering Georgia. A garrison was thrown into Augusta; Macon, as has been stated, received within rapidly-constructed fieldworks a force of militia; Wheeler endeavoured to hinder the advance, and discover the purposes of the invading columns; whilst Hardee at Savannah obstructed the roads leading towards the city, threw up works, and prepared to resist an attack from the river by the fleet, and from land by the approaching army.

On the 24th November, Sherman marched from Milledgeville and Gordon, the right wing attempting the passage of the Oconee River near the railway bridge, the left wing above Milledgeville. General Wayne with the militia endeavoured to defend the line of the Oconee, which is here bordered with swamps, intersected with bayous or creeks; but it was in vain. The superior numbers of Howard's column enabled him to turn the Confederate defences, and so, whilst demonstrating against General Wayne's front, to detach a strong force from Blair's corps, which, crossing in boats, formed into a flying ferry, threatened his right, and compelled him to retreat beyond the Ogeechee River. Wheeler at the same time fell back fighting towards Waynesboro, closely followed by Kilpatrick, who, transferred from the right to the left wing, was ordered to push forward rapidly, and, whilst threatening Augusta, to turn unexpectedly on Millen, and release the Federal prisoners collected from various places and confined therein.

Thus, whilst Sherman was rebuilding the bridges across the Oconee River, and moving leisurely down the Macon and Savannah railway, destroying it most

effectually, Kilpatrick entered Waynesboro and commenced tearing up the line which connected it with Augusta. Whilst thus employed, he heard that the prisoners had been removed from Millen, and that consequently one of the objects of his expedition had failed; fearing, therefore, to expose his cavalry to the danger of being cut off, he decided on retreating towards the main column of march, and thus covering its left flank from the incursions of Wheeler's horse. Retiring in echelon of two detachments, General Kilpatrick narrowly escaped a serious misfortune, and probably his own capture. Owing to a mistake in orders, the supporting brigade had not halted at the place assigned, and the general, with two regiments, was partially surrounded, and with difficulty forced his way through the enemy and rejoined his troops. Continuing his retreat across Buckhead Creek, a tributary of the Ogeechee, and repulsing Wheeler, who endeavoured to follow him, Kilpatrick joined the left wing of the army, which had also crossed the Ocmulgee, and had entered Louisville on the 28th November.

There he rested his tired horses, whilst the infantry columns marched leisurely onwards towards the Ogeechee River, the last great barrier which interposed between Sherman and the sea. The character of the country had greatly changed; in place of the cultivated farms and oak and chestnut woods of Northern and Central Georgia, the thinly-populated land was covered with a vast forest of pines, through which the troops moved easily, the bare stems of the trees hardly forcing them to break their ranks, whilst the sandy soil, quickly absorbing the rain, gave them a firm footing. There was a solemn grandeur, felt even by the soldiery, in these pine-woods, and the glaring contrast afforded by the

long array of troops, the trains of waggons, and the motley crowd of negroes, to the ordinary solitude of the forest, struck the imagination and impressed itself on the minds of those who witnessed the scene.

The line of march was encumbered with negroes, mostly women and children, who, exclaiming that the day of jubilee had come, hurried onwards with the army, thoughtless of themselves, and treated equally carelessly by those who avowed themselves their liberators. The younger women and girls were permitted and encouraged to ride in the baggage waggons and on the spare horses; but the others, the old, the feeble, and the children, deprived of their former protectors, and helpless in everything relating to their own means of support, followed the army as long as they could walk, and then falling through weariness, or left on the bank of some river over which the troops had crossed and afterwards destroyed the bridge, perished of hunger and exposure; learning, when too late, the falsity of the promises of their avowed friends. The sufferings inflicted by Sherman's army were indeed terrible; in his rear was a starving population, in his front was a small body of militia, comprising most of the men of the State capable of bearing arms, who, leaving their homes and families a prey to the invader, were falling back, under Hardee, Wheeler, and Wayne, to the fortifications of Savannah and towards the approaches to Augusta.

On the 3rd of December the two centre corps of Sherman's army (the 17th and 20th) were at or near Millen; the 14th corps, under Jeff. Davis, formed the left, and, supporting Kilpatrick's cavalry, demonstrated against Augusta; and the 15th corps, detached to the south of the Ogeechee, under Howard and Osterhaus, covered the right of the army, and sought to seize the

railway which runs due south of Savannah towards Florida. Sherman thus threatened from the central position at Millen the cities of Augusta and Savannah, keeping the Confederate generals in doubt as to which he would attack, and forcing them to divide their forces for the protection of these important places. Then turning southwards, and marching down the peninsular formed by the Savannah and Ogeechee rivers, his right thrown forward, and his rear covered by the 14th corps and the cavalry, he continued his march through the swamps and rice fields which border on the city of Savannah.

The weather, which, until now, had been fine and dry, changed; the rain fell heavily; and the labour of building bridges and corduroying the roads over the swamps became very severe. The approaches to the city had been obstructed with felled trees, whilst field-works, mounted with artillery, commanded the roads. But with little difficulty these were turned, and slowly, but surely, the troops continued their march, until the 10th December, when, after heavy skirmishing, the enemy was finally driven within his defences. The right of the Federal army under Howard now rested on the Florida railway, south of the Ogeechee, and the centre and left occupied the peninsular between the rivers, the extreme left holding a position on the Charleston rail, near the crossing of the Savannah River. 'Thus (to quote the words of an eye-witness of the march)* the enemy's forces under Hardee were driven within the immediate defences of Savannah, and Sherman's entire army, having leisurely marched over 300 miles in twenty-four days, with trifling opposition, through the vitals of the enemy's country, subsisting

* *Sherman and his Campaigns*, by Colonel Bowman and Lieut.-Colonel Irwin.

upon his stockyards and granaries, was massed in front of the city, entirely across the peninsular lying between the Ogeechee and Savannah rivers, and occupying all the lines of railway communication and supply.'

With very slight loss this great march had been accomplished ; the army was as efficient as when it left Atlanta, and was eager to crown its achievements by the capture of Savannah. This promised to be no easy task ; Sherman had brought with him only field artillery, whilst the Confederate defences were mounted with heavy guns. The enemy was concentrating a force in his rear, and an unsuccessful and bloody assault might not only deprive him of the fruits of his enterprise, but seriously endanger the safety of his army. He was still in possession of a large stock of supplies, numerous flocks of cattle collected on the march were grazing in the swamps and rice fields ; the latter furnished his men with food, and the country south of the Ogeechee was open to his foraging parties. For these reasons he was in no apprehension of a scarcity of means of subsistence, whilst his antagonist, hemmed in with a considerable garrison in addition to the population of the city, cut off from communication with the land by the army, and with the sea by the fleet, would, it was believed, soon suffer from want, and be compelled to surrender from the absence of supplies.

Influenced by these considerations, Sherman resolved to abstain from a general attack, confining his efforts to the completion of the investment of the city, and to the opening of communication with the fleet, which, by a previous arrangement, was expecting the approach of the army in some of the numerous sounds and inlets here indenting the coast. Already, on the 9th of December, an adventurous officer, Capt. Duncan, accom-

panied by two men, had floated in a small boat down the Ogeechee, and had carried a message to Admiral Dahlgreen advertising him of the approach of the Federal troops. Steamers were, therefore, on the look out ; but owing to the guns of Fort McAllister, which commanded the Ogeechee, could not enter the upper portion of the river.

To assail and capture this fort was now the task which devolved on the 17th corps, of which Hazen's* division, frequently distinguished in many former engagements, was selected for the work. It was to be accomplished under the eyes of Generals Sherman and Howard, who, standing on a hill situated among the rice fields on the left bank of the river, watched through their glasses the enemy's works, and saw beyond them a column of smoke which indicated the presence of a steamer. Soon the signal corps had opened communication with this steamer, and almost simultaneously with the inquiry which she telegraphed to know whether the guns of Fort McAllister had been silenced, the artillery of the fort, opening on Hazen's skirmishers, proclaimed the approach of the assaulting column.

It was evening, the sun was setting, and Hazen's men, transferred from the left to the right bank of the Ogeechee, had sustained a wearisome march. No artillery had accompanied the troops, for the soft and swampy ground would not bear the weight of the guns ; notwithstanding, in answer to Sherman's order to make the assault if possible on that evening, General Hazen telegraphed that he was ready, and at once commenced.

The work was a strong redoubt, manned with a garrison of about 200 men, under Major Anderson, and mounting

* General Hazen was educated at West Point, and was at this time about thirty-five years of age.

twenty-three barbette guns and one mortar. Covered by skirmishers, who poured in deadly rifle shots, inflicting heavy loss on the exposed artillerymen, Hazen's men moved steadily forward, suffering slightly from the fire of the guns and from the explosion of torpedoes buried in the surrounding fields. Notwithstanding, without wavering and with unbroken ranks they advanced, not rapidly, but firmly; and surrounding the works, and replying to the musketry fire which now opened on them, with a rush they entered the ditch, broke down the palisades, and swarmed up the parapet, engaging in hand-to-hand conflict with the still bravely resisting garrison. Numbers soon overcame further opposition. After a loss of 90 men in the attacking, and about 50 in the defending force, the garrison surrendered, and the shots fired in the air, followed by the raising of the Union flag, scarcely perceptible in the increasing darkness, proclaimed to General Sherman the success of the enterprise and the opening of the Ogeechee to the Federal fleet.

Many were the congratulations, and great was the enthusiasm in the Federal host, at this brilliant episode, which seemed to form a fitting termination to the adventurous march. There had been no contretemps, no delay; the assault had been well planned and bravely executed, exemplifying, in the smallness of the loss sustained, the advantage, even in respect to the economy of human life, of bold operations. A faulty construction in the work had given the Federal riflemen an advantage of which they were not slow to avail themselves, and a useful lesson may be learnt from the criticisms of the soldiers when they entered the captured fort. As they surveyed the position of the guns, and the dead artillerymen, they said 'if they (the

defenders) had had embrasures for their guns, we should have got hurt; you cannot defend a work of this sort with guns *en barbette*.*

The capture of Fort McAllister opened a direct communication with the fleet, and General Sherman, at once putting himself on board a small boat, descended the river to the steamer, and sent off despatches to the secretary of war, to Admiral Dahlgreen, and to General Forster, commanding the troops in that department. He made arrangements for a supply of ammunition and of heavy guns from Hilton Head, and reinforcing General Forster, desired him to occupy the railway between Savannah and Charleston, and advancing on the city, to complete the investment, which was perfect except on the northern side. The left of the Federal army now rested on the Savannah River, but was unable to extend beyond it, as General Hardee watched the stream with gunboats, prepared to destroy any boats or pontoons which should attempt the passage.

By the 17th December the heavy guns had arrived, and General Sherman sent a summons to demand surrender. This Hardee refused, stating that the investment was incomplete, and that he intended to defend the city. Preparations were then made for a bombardment and assault, whilst Forster landed his men in close vicinity to the Savannah and Charleston rail. In the meantime, there were engagements at the outposts; and judging by the apparent activity of the defence, a lengthened siege seemed to await the Federal troops. The inhabitants of the city shared in these expectations, which were confirmed by the heavy firing kept up

* See an interesting account of the storming of Fort McAllister, in the *Story of the Great March*, by Major Nichols, an eye-witness of the events he describes.

almost without intermission from the batteries and the gunboats on the river. They had watched the progress of the defences, and estimating the strength of their city from the numbers of the garrison and the weight of the guns, anticipated prolonged resistance and took no measures to secure or send away their property. The greatest secrecy regarding military movements was preserved; the newspapers, forbidden to publish any intelligence relating to the war, closed their offices; and only to General Hardee and his superior officers was the future plan of operations known.

Under cover of heavy firing, on the 20th December, preparations for the evacuation of the city had been completed. Profiting by the experience gained at Vicksburg, the Confederate authorities had decided against permitting large garrisons to be besieged in closely invested towns, however valuable those towns might be, and at the crisis which seemed to be impending over the country they could ill afford to spare the services of the troops which Hardee retained under his command. Moreover Savannah as a seaport had long been useless, nor had she, like other Southern cities, become of importance by the manufacturing of war materials. Therefore, although in point of size and wealth, one of the principal cities of the Confederacy, she was, considered in regard to warlike purposes, of comparatively little consequence, and the value of her retention could not be weighed against the risk of the loss of her garrison. The capture by the enemy of Fort McAllister had permitted communication between the Federal fleet and army, and it was apparent that in a few days the only line of retreat which remained open for the garrison would be finally closed. Therefore, no time was to be lost, and

during the night of the 20th December, Hardee withdrew his outposts, leaving the fires still burning, and quietly but rapidly carried his army across the Savannah River, marching it by a road through the swamps, with which his guides were well acquainted, into South Carolina. A strong wind prevented the sounds of movement from being heard in the Federal camp, and not until the following morning was it discovered that Savannah had been evacuated, and that its garrison had departed. Geary, who held the left of the lines, entered the city, and an aide-de-camp, sent to carry the intelligence to General Sherman, found him on his way from Port Royal, where he had gone to complete the arrangements for the attack. He entered the captured city on the 21st, and sent the following telegram to President Lincoln: 'I beg to present you, as a Christmas gift, the city of Savannah, with 150 heavy guns and plenty of ammunition, and also about 25,000 bales of cotton.'

So terminated the campaign which had commenced with the burning of Atlanta, and its progress and results are well summed up in the words of General Sherman's official report. After making allusion to the previous campaign in Northern Georgia, he writes:—

'I was left with a well-appointed army to sever the enemy's only remaining railroad communications eastward and westward, for over 100 miles, namely, the Georgia State railroad, which is broke up from Fairburn station to Madison and the Oconee, and the Central railroad from Gordon clear to Savannah, with numerous breaks on the latter road from Gordon to Eatonton and from Millen to Augusta, and the Savannah and Gulf railroad. We have also consumed the corn and fodder in the region of country 30 miles on either side of a line from Atlanta to Savannah; as also the sweet potatoes,

cattle, hogs, sheep, and poultry, and have carried away more than 10,000 horses and mules, as well as a countless number of their slaves. I estimate the damage done to the State of Georgia and its military resources at \$100,000,000, at least \$20,000,000 of which has been used to our advantage, and the remainder is simple waste and destruction. This may seem a hard species of warfare; but it brings the sad realities of war home to those who have been directly or indirectly instrumental in involving us in its attendant calamities.'

The casualties in the army had been very few—567 in killed, wounded, and missing making up the total loss. Thus the joy with which the final triumph of the Federal arms was received in the North was attended with little alloy, and the fall of Savannah following, as it did, so closely after the intelligence of the arrival on the coast of the army for which so great anxiety had been felt, aroused the utmost enthusiasm. The Southern papers depreciated the value of the conquest, asserting that Sherman's march had been merely a raid, that the damage inflicted would soon be repaired, and that his army was in a less menacing position on the sea coast than when in the heart of the country. This opinion, it is needless to say, was not shared by General Sherman. Whilst resting and reorganizing his army at Savannah, he was preparing for fresh operations, and with the advantage of the experiences of what may be termed the *promenade militaire* through Georgia, was collecting information for a similar movement against the State which, more than any other, was hateful to the North, and which hitherto had felt less than her companions the horrors of war. The facility with which Sherman had accomplished his march showed clearly that when once the armies on the frontier were

broken through, no power of opposition remained in the exhausted interior to any well-appointed force. The country—although producing sufficient to feed an army, was destitute of men ; and the militia—strong on paper—consisted of little else than those who were either too old or too young to be received into the regular forces. The march to Savannah had proved to be what, in asking permission to undertake it, General Sherman had stated that it would be—not purely military or strategic but calculated to illustrate the vulnerability of the South.

CHAPTER XVIII.

MINOR OPERATIONS OF WAR.

AS in the siege of a vast fortress the attack is pushed forward with extraordinary vigour on particular points, where either the features of the ground or the importance of gaining some bastion or other work, leads the besiegers to concentrate a preponderance of strength; so in the efforts made by the Federal armies to enter the Confederacy, either the natural peculiarities of the country—such as rivers, mountains, or cultivated land—or the importance of seizing some city which, either from political or military reasons influenced its welfare, induced the generals of the invading armies to direct their principal efforts on certain objective points, consequently investing them with considerable importance in the general view of the whole theatre of war. But as from other stations in the parallels of a besieging force saps are pushed forward against works of minor importance, either to draw attention from the main attacks, or to gain some lesser advantage; so whilst Generals Grant and Sherman were directing the two great armies of the North against Richmond and Atlanta, operations on a less grand scale were in progress at various points on the now curtailed frontiers of the Confederacy. A naval and military force was moving against Mobile. An expedition was about to set out from the Eastern

bank of the Mississippi, whilst the besieged sallying forth from Western Virginia and from the huge outwork of the trans-Mississippi States, were endeavouring to relieve themselves by drawing off forces for the protection of Eastern Kentucky and Southern Missouri.

The operations against Mobile and the threatened advance from Vicksburg were intended as diversions in favour of Sherman's army, whilst General Price's campaign in Missouri, and the expeditions of Morgan and Breckenridge into Eastern Tennessee were, on the other hand, undertaken to relieve and assist the Confederate army of the West.

Mobile, although in somewhat near proximity to New Orleans on the one side, and Pensacola on the other—both of which were garrisoned by large bodies of Federal troops—had hitherto escaped not only capture but even attack; the railways connecting it with other inland towns of the Confederacy were in working order, and although the store-houses on its quays were empty, and its harbour devoid of trading vessels, yet the general appearance of the town denoted peace, if not comparative prosperity. But now the admiral and the fleet, which had effected work of so great importance on the Mississippi, were free for other operations, and in conjunction with a military force from General Canby's command, were ready to attempt the capture of the forts commanding the entrance to the harbour, and to force their way into its inner waters.

The harbour of Mobile—at the head of which the town stands—extends for some forty miles from the three forts which guard the channels through the bar at its entrance. These forts, named Forts Powell, Morgan, and Gaines, formed its outer defences, but the inner and stronger line was some thirty miles

nearer the town, where Dog River-bar forbade the ingress to all ships drawing more than nine feet of water, and where a line of obstructions protected by two strong works, prevented the approach of vessels of lighter draught. Added to these defences, the presence of Admiral Buchanan—renowned for his action with the Federal fleet when in command of the *Merrimac*—seemed to promise that whatever might be the ultimate result, the small Confederate squadron would not be permitted to lie idle spectators of any attempt made by the enemy to force his way into the harbour.

On 5th of August, the attempt was made, and Admiral Farragut proceeded to the attack of Fort Morgan, preparatory to, and in conjunction with the passage of his fleet through the narrow channel which its guns commanded. Fourteen wooden steamers and four iron-clads constituted his command; the flag-ship was the old *Hartford*, so well known on the waters of the Mississippi. The ironclads were to engage the fort and to keep down its fire, whilst the wooden vessels, lashed together two-and-two, so that in the event of one being injured the other might tow her either in or out of action, were to steer on the port side of the iron-clads, interchanging shots with the fort as they steamed past its guns. The *Brooklyn*, lashed on the starboard side of the *Octorora*, led the attack, followed by the *Hartford*, from whose maintop, during the action which ensued, Admiral Farragut directed the movements of the whole fleet. The *Tecumseh* led the ironclads, and at 6.47 A.M. fired the first shot against Fort Morgan. The fort replied, directing its guns against the *Brooklyn*, which, by an accident, was detained under its fire, hindering the onward progress of the remainder of the fleet. At this moment the *Tecumseh* (ironclad) touched

a torpedo, and disappeared almost instantaneously beneath the waters, carrying with her her commander and nearly all her crew. Aroused to greater exertion rather than appalled by these hidden dangers, and vexed with the delay, the old admiral signalled to his own vessel to steam on past the Brooklyn. The order was obeyed, and pouring in a close fire from her broad-side guns, she drove the gunners from the parapet of the fort. But now a new danger awaited the Federal fleet. The Confederate ironclad Tennessee, built on a pattern somewhat resembling the Merrimac—with her three attendant gun-boats, came forward into action, which Admiral Farragut perceiving, signalled to his wooden vessels to cast off from their fastenings and, with the ironclads, to bring their whole strength to bear against this formidable antagonist. The three gun-boats were soon disabled by the superior weight of metal brought to bear against them ; but the Tennessee, commanded by Buchanan, steamed gallantly forward, disregarding the vast superiority of force on the side of the enemy, and confident in the strength of her plating, and the courage and conduct of her crew.

Then from all sides the large wooden vessels were urged with full force against the Tennessee, whilst the slower ironclads poured in their heavy shot, whenever an opening between the attacking vessels gave them an opportunity for so doing. The Monogahela, the Lackawanna, and the Hartford struck the ironclad with their full force, but retired injured from the impact, but without inflicting corresponding harm on her mailed sides. The Hartford poured in her whole port-broad-side within ten feet of her casemate, and the monitors Chickasaw and Manhattan pounded her with fifteen-inch shot. Still the brave vessel fought on, the shocks

from the various concussions made it almost impossible for the crew to keep their feet or to work the guns, but old Buchanan—a worthy opponent to Farragut—had no thought of surrender. He continued the combat until he fell severely wounded ; then others of the crew were killed, the after port became jammed by a shot and rendered useless, the wheel-ropes and the smoke-stack were shot away, and the Tennessee—becoming unmanageable and unable to reply to the fire of the enemy—lay like a log, helpless under the attacks of the many vessels that surrounded her. Nothing more could be done, further resistance was hopeless, and she surrendered, terminating the contest at 10 A.M.* Only one shot (a fifteen-inch solid shot) had penetrated the wooden backing of her casemate ; and had she been equally impervious in exterior but still vital places, she would have been able to have continued the contest, possibly with other results. Forts Gaines, Powell, and Morgan surrendered after but a feeble resistance, and the conquest of the outer harbour of Mobile rewarded Admiral Farragut and his companions in arms for their gallant enterprise, so well conceived and so ably executed. The navy had done its work right well, and Mobile was henceforth completely closed against the ingress or egress of blockade runners.

At sea the cause of the Confederacy had not prospered, her ports had been either captured or closed by a now strict blockade, and the vessels which had done so great injury to the Federal commerce either taken or sunk. The most noted of these, the Alabama, had, a month previous to the capture of the Tennessee,

* The account of the action at Mobile is taken partly from Admiral Farragut's report, partly from letters and articles (Confederate as well as Federal) published in the *United States Army and Navy Journal*.

succumbed before the guns of the Kearsage, and, after a gallant action, had gone down off Cherbourg; whilst the Florida, in defiance of international law, was captured shortly afterwards in a Brazilian harbour. On the inland waters, as well as on the sea, the Federal gunboats had quickly gained and had continued to maintain a supremacy, thereby converting the great rivers which intersect the Confederacy into valuable channels of communication for the Northern armies, and so partially overcoming the difficulties created by the vast distances which separated the various scenes of conflict. It was by the use of the Mississippi that troops were brought rapidly from their southern stations to repel the invasion of Missouri, and by the same means were they—when their services in that State could be dispensed with—transported to Tennessee.

This invasion of Missouri occurred about a month after the capture of the forts at Mobile harbour. It resulted from the successes on the Red River, and from the belief entertained in the trans-Mississippi States that exterior assistance might enable the Southern party in Missouri to gain the ascendancy, and so restore to the Confederacy that much divided State. The love of isolation, and the desire of accomplishing results with the trans-Mississippi forces which might directly benefit those States, may also have actuated General Kirby Smith, and his companions in council, in directing his strength towards Missouri rather than to the aid of the country now suffering under the immediate presence of the enemy. That the scheme was disapproved of by some of his generals there is reason to believe, and that its execution was abortive in results will be best gathered by a short narrative of its incidents.

Rumours of an intended advance of the Confederate

forces had been rife throughout Missouri during the summer of 1864, and General Rosecrans, in command of the department, had repeatedly called the attention of the Northern Government to the dangers from without as well as to the disaffection of many of the counties. Meetings of secret societies in the bush, guerilla warfare, and the triumphant words and looks of Southern sympathisers, gave warning of expected help from Arkansas, and an insurrection which broke out in July among the western counties was a forerunner of the invasion which commenced in the first week in September. The time of year was propitious, the corn was ripe, and the large mounted force which Price was assembling on the White River in Arkansas, would thus be able to move rapidly, subsisting itself on the country it overran. Having united with General Shelby, the Confederate army numbered about 15,000 men, of which the infantry formed but a small proportion; and it was hoped that as success inclined towards the Southern side, recruits would continue to swell its ranks.* To resist this danger, and to keep down the disaffected in the State of Missouri, General Rosecrans had but the remnants of the force which had been sent to augment Sherman's armies, and to furnish garrisons on the Mississippi. Missouri had thus been almost drained of regular troops, and until reinforcements from

* The *United States Army and Navy Journal* states that Price's army, after the campaign, consisted of 12,910 men, chiefly composed of cavalry and mounted infantry, i.e. :—

Marmaduke	5,000
Fagan	4,240
Shelby	3,670
						<u>12,910</u>

General Rosecrans in his report estimates the invading army at (at least) 15,000.

other quarters could be brought up, Rosecrans was forced to rely principally on newly-raised regiments of militia. But about this time General A. J. Smith, with his division of infantry, which had been employed on the Red River, was moving up the Mississippi, under orders to join Sherman, and these troops, in consequence of the imminence of the danger, General Rosecrans was permitted temporarily to divert to the defence of Missouri. By means of river transportation, A. J. Smith quickly reached St. Louis, and was pushed forward to the line of defence taken up to cover the city and the railways which led to it. Pilot-knob, Rolla, Springfield, and Jefferson City* were if possible to be maintained, but the safety of St. Louis was not to be endangered by a general action until the Federal army had been further strengthened. Help was known to be at hand. Mower's division—which had marched from Brownsville in Arkansas on the object of Price's movements being ascertained—was advancing towards Missouri. Volunteer regiments were crossing from Illinois. The State militia was in course of training; and although the position of affairs was critical, it was felt that any delay on the part of the enemy would add strength to the Federal cause. Troops were concentrated at Springfield to protect the south-western portion of the State, and Rolla and Pilot-knob were occupied as outworks to St. Louis.

During the three first weeks of September, Price occupied himself in marching leisurely through Southern Missouri; choosing the centre rout by Rolla, and so threatening Jefferson City, the State capital, in his front, and St. Louis, the principal city, on his right. He attempted, with a detachment, to take Pilot-knob by a *coup de main*, but was repulsed by General Ewing; and

* *Vide* Map I. commencement of volume.

then skirmishing with A. J. Smith's forces, approached within forty miles of St. Louis, leaving it still doubtful against which point he was about to direct his full strength. Had he then pushed forward vigorously, St. Louis might have fallen. The Federal forces were divided between Jefferson City, Rolla, and the immediate line of defence on the Meramec River. They were fewer in numbers than the troops under Price, and were harassed by efforts to suppress the guerilla warfare, which had broken out and raged furiously in the northern and western counties; whilst Mower, with the reinforcements, had only reached Cape Girardeau on the 5th October—where he awaited transports to convey his troops, almost worn out by their long marches, to St. Louis.

However, instead of marching on St. Louis, Price turned northwards, and advanced against Jefferson City, garrisoned by the troops from Rolla, and fortified by such entrenchments as could quickly be thrown up. On the 7th of October he appeared before the city; but, probably feeling that the description of force under his command was ill-adapted for an assault on fortified lines, withdrew and marched westward. This was the turning-point of the campaign. The Federal troops were united. Mower joined A. J. Smith, and Pleasanton, taking command of the cavalry, harassed the rear of Price's now retreating army. The troops from Kansas had also by this time taken the field; and Price, moving along the left bank of the Missouri River, was driven from Independence, and forced to retire southwards towards Arkansas. Pleasanton followed with his cavalry, outstripping the infantry supports, and doing good service in harassing the enemy in his passage across the rivers which intersected his line of march.

On the banks of the Little Osage, after a long pursuit of sixty miles, the Federal cavalry, on the 25th October came up with Price's rear-guard, composed of Marmaduke's horse, and charging them furiously, captured eight guns, several waggons, and nearly 1,000 prisoners, including Generals Marmaduke and Cabell. With this disastrous action terminated Price's campaign of Missouri. It had failed in all its objects. No permanent injury had been inflicted on the Federal cause. Neither in a political nor in a military point of view had the Confederacy been benefited. The troops withheld temporarily from joining Sherman's army were, after a campaign of forty-eight days, disposable for the defence of Tennessee, and the strength of the trans-Mississippi States had been wasted in attempting conquests remote from the vital scene of conflict. The dispositions made by General Rosecrans to defeat this invasion, met with a success which they seem to have merited. His tenacity in holding important strategical positions, the skill with which he, and those acting under him, avoided compromising their inferior forces by a decisive engagement, whilst manœuvring to cover St. Louis, and the energy shown in concentrating, and then pushing forward troops when the time for so doing had arrived, point clearly to the qualities which the conduct of the former campaign in Tennessee proved General Rosecrans to have possessed.

From henceforth Missouri remained under Federal rule; and in no future operations of the war did the trans-Mississippi forces of the Confederacy play any conspicuous part. The Mississippi River cut them off from the more Northern States, whilst the command of its waters enabled the Federal generals to transport troops from bank to bank, or using the many steamers which

navigated its stream to outstrip the slow march of armies on land. Thus had Mower's division been brought to St. Louis, and thus were reinforcements sent to the assistance of General Thomas, who, soon after the bootless invasion of Missouri, was hard pressed to resist another, and to themselves still more disastrous, advance of the Confederates into Tennessee.


CHAPTER XIX.

THE DEFEAT OF HOOD.

It is now time to inquire what had been the fate of the Confederate Western army, which, as Sherman was leaving the banks of the Chattahoochee for the South, advanced from the Tennessee with the design of renewing, with more permanent results, its earlier conquests.

It will be remembered, that when news arrived of the burning of Atlanta, Beauregard and Hood were at, or near, Tuscumbia and Florence. Then, the former having previously organised and effected the repairs of the Alabama railway from Selma to Corinth, and given final directions to General Hood, departed to the South to superintend preparations for the defence of Mobile, Savannah, and other important places. The latter, with a base of operations at Corinth and Florence, and having under him Lee's, Cheatham's, and Stewart's corps—comprising rather less than 30,000 infantry and artillery, with about 12,000 cavalry under Forrest—was engaged in completing his arrangements for the invasion of Tennessee. He intended to cut off the several detachments guarding the approaches to Nashville, and to overwhelm and capture the posts which protected the line of rail between Nashville and Chattanooga. Then, turning on either one or other of these fortified towns, he hoped to establish himself

SKETCH OF
Hood's advance on
NASHVILLE.



during the winter months in the heart of Tennessee ; and having augmented his force by recruits gathered from a State avowedly inimical to the Union cause, and only kept down by fear, to carry his victorious troops in the spring to the pastures of Kentucky, and even to the banks of the Ohio. Such a career offered a tempting prospect to the general and the army he commanded ; but it had been foreseen and provided against by Generals Grant and Sherman, who, satisfied with the precautions they had taken, looked with pleasure on what they considered to be Hood's rash enterprise.*

The defence of Tennessee had been (as has been already stated) confided to General Thomas, under whose command were placed the 4th corps, General Stanley, the 23rd, General Schofield, the several detachments at and north of Chattanooga, and two brigades of cavalry, making up a force of about 30,000 effective men, exclusive of some of the garrisons which could not be brought into the field. In addition to these troops, two divisions were on their march from Missouri, and a considerable number of dismounted cavalry were being rapidly organised and equipped for service. Not to risk a decisive battle before the arrival of the troops from Missouri, was obviously General Thomas's policy ; Chattanooga, Murfreesboro, and especially Nashville, had been strongly fortified and were safe from *coups de main* ; the winter had already

* General Grant, in his official report, thus writes :—

‘Hood, instead of following Sherman, continued his move northward, which seemed to me to be leading to his certain doom. At all events, had I had the power to command both armies, I should not have changed the orders under which he seemed to be acting.’ Sherman had expressed himself in somewhat similar terms when he exclaimed, halting at the last stage of his northward march, ‘If Hood will go to Tennessee, I will give him his rations.’

commenced, and the invading army in the field would necessarily suffer more from its rigour than the troops whose supplies were in comparatively close proximity. For these reasons, Thomas, remaining at Nashville, matured his plans ; whilst to Schofield, in command of his own and the 4th corps, together with two brigades of cavalry, was delegated the task of impeding the advance of the Confederate army, and of drawing in and collecting the small scattered garrisons and the government stores.

On the 21st November, Hood commenced his march, advancing on Waynesboro and Lawrenceburg, on the direct roads between Florence and Nashville. He had hoped to have cut off the garrison of Pulaski, but it evacuated the place and withdrew towards the Duck River. The rain and consequent mud, together with the absence of good maps, rendered the march of the Confederates slow, and Schofield, now certain in what direction the enemy was advancing, took measures to impede his progress. The garrisons from the detached posts along the Tennessee were withdrawn and concentrated at Chattanooga and Murfreesboro ; the Decatur and Columbia railway was abandoned, and the cavalry was ordered to hold Forrest in check, whilst Schofield concentrated the 4th corps, Stanley, and his own, the 23rd, now under Cox, behind the fortified lines at Columbia. Even these he did not consider that he was sufficiently strong to hold, and therefore, on the 27th, withdrew to the northern bank of the Duck River. But Forrest was not to be checked : he crossed the river a few miles above Columbia, on the night of the 28th, cutting off Schofield from the main body of his cavalry ; whilst Hood, leaving one division in Columbia to occupy the enemy's

attention, carried forward by a rapid march, without baggage and with little artillery (only one battery to a corps) the main body of his infantry, hoping to place himself on Schofield's direct line of retreat, and, after capturing his supply trains, to inflict on him a decisive defeat.

Very nearly did the enterprise succeed. Stanley, with one division detached to protect the waggon trains, arrived but just in time to repulse the Confederate cavalry, and when Cheatham with his corps came up, there seemed every prospect of an important success for the Confederate arms. The long trains, protected by but one division, were hurrying in confusion along the road to Franklin, Cheatham was on their flank, and the remainder of the Confederate army, minus one division, was advancing rapidly in support. But Cheatham did not attack : he awaited Stewart, and when Stewart arrived, and darkness had closed in, failed to fall on the disordered and retreating foe, the sounds of whose march were heard in close proximity to the woods in which the Confederate force was now bivouacking. The blame of this failure was attributed to Cheatham, whom Johnson, a general of one of the divisions, is narrated to have urged to make the attack, and whose men, hearing the rattle of the accoutrements, and even distinguishing the forms of the Federal soldiers as they marched through the darkness, saw and longed to seize the opportunity. It passed, and Schofield, harassed in rear, but not greatly incommoded by the division left to watch him in Columbia, effected his retreat to Franklin.*

* The account of this alleged failure on the part of General Cheatham is taken from Hood's report and from verbal information. The author has had no opportunity of seeing or hearing of any

At this time, from a captured despatch, Gen. Hood learnt that Schofield had received orders to entrench himself, defending the approaches to Nashville from Columbia, as the fortified town of Murfreesboro protected them on the great Southern road ; he therefore at once decided on attacking him before the works he was raising had assumed formidable dimensions, and on the 30th of November ordered his whole line to advance to the assault. The promptitude thus displayed was commendable for several reasons. First, General Schofield was within eighteen miles of Nashville, where he would receive support and be able to fight in a position of his own selection. Secondly, if compelled to retreat, it was an important object for him to do so in good order and discipline, preserving his artillery and baggage. This he had hitherto, with some slight exceptions, effected ; but since leaving Columbia, the pursuit had been very close, and some delay was necessary to enable his long trains to defile over the Big Harpeth River, on which the town of Franklin stands. Thirdly, and this reason was probably unknown to General Hood, on the night following the day that Schofield entered Franklin, the two divisions sent from Missouri to the assistance of General Thomas marched into Nashville.* If, therefore, Schofield could be defeated with a river in his rear, the bridge over which was encumbered with waggons, a disaster would in all probability occur which might even affect the safety of Nashville ; if, however, he

reply on the part of General Cheatham, who, whatever may have been his error in this affair, has proved on many a hardly-fought field his title to be included among the most distinguished of the Confederate generals of the Western army.

* See *United States Army and Navy Journal*, Dec. 10th, 1864.

could successfully withstand attack, and with his army in good order, retire on Nashville, and form a junction with General Thomas, all would probably go well with the Federal cause in Tennessee, and Hood, with a fortified town in his front, garrisoned by a force superior to his own, and far from his base of supplies, would be in a situation of considerable peril.

To attack vigorously was on all accounts the best course for Hood to pursue. Nevertheless, the position occupied by the Federal general was of great strength. It extended in a short and compact line from one end of the angle, here formed by the Big Harpeth River, to the other, covering the town and the bridge. The cavalry was on the flanks guarding the fords, the infantry (comprising Stanley's corps on the right and Cox's on the left), assisted by a numerous artillery, was posted behind freshly-constructed entrenchments, and the right bank of the river, which commanded the left, was crowned by a fort and batteries.

During the morning of the 30th of November, the advanced guard of the Confederate army had been engaged in continuous skirmishing, harassing the enemy in his endeavours to erect breastworks; but it was not until 4 P.M. that Hood had drawn up his forces in line of battle. Then, with Stewart's corps on the right and Cheatham's on the left, and Lee marching rapidly to arrive in time to act as support, the action commenced. The cavalry was on either wing, Forrest in person commanding on the right. The troops thoroughly appreciated the importance of the task before them; they perceived the opportunity, and knew that if it could be fully improved, winter quarters in Nashville, and a welcome from a people eager to be liberated from the Federal yoke, awaited them. They were superior in

number to the enemy, and many of them had deep injuries, in the shape of ruined homes and outraged families, to avenge. Thus every incentive was present to excite them to the utmost exertions and to the most determined courage.

Both of these qualities they displayed. At 4 p.m. the attacking lines, covered by a cloud of skirmishers, advanced into the open plain, driving back the Federal out-pickets, who, as they retired, unmasked the artillery and musketry of the first line of breastworks. Notwithstanding the terrible fire which immediately opened, Cheatham's men pressed onwards, and breaking through and over the entrenchments, reached the second and stronger works, where the reserves under Cox were posted. For a moment they paused, but only to reform, when with renewed impulse they again advanced, and after a desperate contest forced a way inside the second lines, and captured two guns. Then General Stanley, seeing the danger which menaced the very safety of the army, put himself at the head of two brigades, and leading them furiously against the Confederates, disorganised by success, retook the guns, and after a hand-to-hand encounter, drove them back from the inner defences. Again and again was the assault renewed; many men fell within the enemy's lines, some were captured, darkness did not separate the combatants, and almost until midnight was the struggle continued. But Schofield held his ground; he covered the retreat of his trains, and before daylight had placed himself on the north bank of the river, and had burned the bridge. The losses on both sides had been very heavy; General Hood acknowledged that his army was diminished by 4,500 in killed, wounded, and prisoners, and included in the first list was the gallant

Cleburne, one of the most renowned of the divisional leaders of the West, and four brigadier-generals; six generals were wounded, and one captured. The Federals suffered less severely, as the men had fought under partial cover, nevertheless General Hood claimed to have captured 1,000 prisoners, and Generals Stanley and Bradley were wounded.*

Undeterred in the prosecution of his plan by his severe losses at the battle of Franklin, and by the failure to cut off or overwhelm Schofield's army before its junction with the reserves, General Hood, having sent forward Forrest to harass the rear of the retreating enemy—after burying the dead and caring for the wounded—continued his march to Nashville, and on the 2nd of December took up a position within two miles of the city. There he entrenched himself, Cheatham's corps on the right, Lee across the Franklin road in the centre, and Stewart on the left, with the cavalry extending on either flank to the Cumberland River, and keeping open a communication with the batteries erected to command its lower course, in order to prevent the approach of gunboats or provision ships. He threw up strong works and counter batteries to those raised by Thomas, who held a line of fortifications running in a semicircle from the upper to the lower river, and enclosing the town on the south side. The troops from Missouri, under A. J. Smith, were in position on the right, the 4th corps (under Wood in consequence of Stanley's wound) in the centre, and the 23rd under Schofield on the left; and this force was further augmented by 5,000 men brought by rail from Chattanooga on the 1st of December.

* General Grant, in his official report, estimates Schofield's losses at 2,300.

With these reinforcements, General Thomas was more than equal to his opponent in infantry, whilst he was actively engaged in remounting and reorganising his cavalry, to enable him, as soon as the weather should permit, to take the field. General Hood's position was very critical. Although in a friendly country, he was far removed from his proper base of supplies; his successes had not been sufficiently decisive to bring many recruits to his ranks; the enemy, with a force superior to his own, well furnished with stores of all descriptions, and with a rail in his rear connecting him with the wealthy Western States, was in his front; and Murfreesboro with a garrison of 6,000 men was on his right flank, cutting him off from all communication with Western Virginia. Nevertheless, with an obstinacy which may almost be characterised as infatuation, he maintained his position, contenting himself, in place of leading his whole army against Murfreesboro or Chattanooga, with sending Forrest, in command of a mixed force of cavalry and infantry, to summon the former of these two garrisons. A reconnaissance in force was the result, when a division of Confederate infantry behaving ill,* the idea of an assault was abandoned, and Forrest, with one division of cavalry and two brigades of infantry, was left to watch the place, considerably weakening by this detachment the main army already overmatched by the garrison of Nashville.

From the 3rd to the 15th of December the hard frosts prevented further operations, but during this time Thomas pushed forward preparations to take the field. Volunteers from the various public departments were raised to man the works; a large waggon train

* See Hood's report.

was collected; the cavalry was organised in three divisions under General Wilson, and the total strength of the army was made up to 50,000 men. The Federal general was anxious to run no unnecessary risks, and undismayed by a threat of the Confederate cavalry to cross the Cumberland into Kentucky, remained strictly on the defensive until every preparation had been completed. This delay in attacking Hood was regarded with some apprehension by the Commander-in-Chief (General Grant), who was actually on his road to the West when a telegram reached him announcing the commencement of the much-desired battle.

On the 14th of December Thomas communicated to his corps commanders his plan of attack, which was to turn the enemy's left flank, capturing at the same time the batteries which commanded the Cumberland River below the town. In order to draw away General Hood's attention from that flank, he made a strong demonstration against his right on the same evening with the force brought from Chattanooga under Steedman, and then, still keeping these troops on his own left, and manning the inner line of defences with the volunteers, he directed Smith with the Missouri contingent, and Wood with the 4th corps, Schofield being in support, to hold themselves in readiness for a vigorous attack on the enemy's left as soon as daylight should open. The arrangements were completed; the troops, concealed by a thick mist, were drawn up in their respective places, under cover of some rising ground, and the battle commenced with the advance of Smith's divisions, Steedman at the same time making a feint against the right of Hood's lines.

Wheeling to the left, his own right or outer flank covered by cavalry, of which a large detachment was

also sent to assail the batteries on the Cumberland, Smith swept round the left of Hood's lines, apparently taking him by surprise, and capturing redoubts and guns. Schofield was then ordered to prolong his line to the right, and Wood with the 4th corps assaulted and carried Montgomery Hill, General Hood's most advanced post. The batteries on the river were captured by the dismounted cavalry, assisted by gunboats, and on the night of the 15th, Hood, with the loss of about 1,200 prisoners and 16 guns, withdrew to a line of hills a few miles in rear of his former position. There he concentrated his troops, and effected a new disposition, stationing Lee on the right, Stewart in the centre, and Cheatham, thrown back at an angle with the rest of the line, on the left. He placed his guns in position, and thinking the lines he occupied to be sufficiently strong to resist any attack, withdrew his artillery horses to the rear for better security. These arrangements General Hood had time to complete, as not until 3 P.M. were the Federal forces in readiness to renew the engagement. General Thomas designed to employ tactics similar to those of the preceding day. His right, under Schofield and Smith, with Wilson's cavalry thrown well off to the extreme flank with orders to gain possession if possible of the Franklin road, was to assail the enemy on his left, whilst Wood and Steedman were to assault him in front.

The 4th corps (Wood) and Steedman's troops commenced the action by a vigorous attack directed against Lee's corps, posted on strong rising ground and overlooking an open plain, across which the assaulting columns were forced to pass, and where they were exposed to a harassing fire. Nevertheless, they advanced boldly, and had almost reached the crest of the hill,

when Lee's reserves charged and drove them back in confusion to the plain, where they were rallied and reformed preparatory to a fresh attempt. These events happened between three and four o'clock, and Hood, seeing the check inflicted on the Federal troops on his right, and noticing the high spirits of his men, considered that the battle was progressing favourably, and that the repulse of the preceding day might be counterbalanced by a decisive success. But these hopes were not of long continuance, for Schofield and Wilson were now pressing onwards against his left, and advancing over ground of far less natural strength than that held by the Confederate right wing, were driving all before them. Then the same division which had misbehaved at Murfreesboro gave way; the position it had occupied was at once seized, and an enfilading fire directed against the troops which continued to stand firm. A panic seized the centre and left of the Confederate army; confusion ensued; the artillery, of which the horses had been sent to the rear, was captured; and the whole army, excepting Lee's corps, which happily preserved its organisation, hurried in total rout towards Franklin.

Four miles from the battle-field some order was restored, Lee's corps forming the rear-guard. An aide-de-camp was sent to General Forrest to inform him of the disaster, and the army commenced its retreat over the same ground it had traversed with exulting hopes three weeks previously. The enemy's cavalry pursued vigorously, penetrating the columns of infantry and sabreing the men; whilst Forrest, with the main body of the Confederate cavalry, was still absent, unable, owing to the swollen streams, to join and cover the retreating army. At one time General Hood hoped to

have made a stand, and to have held the line of the Duck River, but the pursuit was too vigorous, and his own troops were too demoralised to permit of a halt anywhere north of the Tennessee. Therefore, crossing the Duck River, and gaining time by the check it gave to the pursuing enemy, being assisted also by Forrest, who rejoined the army at Columbia, Hood reached the Tennessee on the 27th of December, and succeeded in placing its waters between his much-harassed troops and the enemy's infantry. The cavalry still followed, molested the line of retreat, and captured the pontoon train; but the real pursuit ceased on the 29th of December, when Thomas ascertained that the Tennessee had been crossed.

Fifty-four guns and 4,460 prisoners were captured by the Federals in the two days' battles of Nashville; nor did these trophies represent the extent of the victory. The Confederate army of the West had been destroyed, its confidence in its general was gone, and never again did it resume the offensive in the scenes of its former victories. Soon after these disastrous events, General Hood was relieved, at his own request, from the command, and was succeeded by General Taylor, transferred from the trans-Mississippi department.

Judging by results, the conception of the campaign was a mistake. The Federal power was too overwhelming, the talent of General Sherman and his subordinates too conspicuous, to allow of any enterprise that could savour of rashness. The devastation of Georgia, and the capture of Savannah, received but a feeble compensation in the march through Tennessee. Even if Nashville had fallen, it may be doubted whether the success would have been more than transient. But calculations based on such an event ought not to have

been made. Thomas's army, when concentrated, was at first but slightly less, afterwards more numerous, than that under Hood's command. He was able to organise and discipline it behind entrenchments, and when all was in complete order, to turn with full force on his antagonist, harassed by the winter's cold and the hard work of fortifying and guarding lines necessarily long and too extensive for the strength of the besieging force.

After Schofield's able and successful retreat, and his junction with the reserves under Thomas, it may be fairly urged that Hood should either have retired, or have turned on Murfreesboro' or Chattanooga with his whole force, and wintering there, have held his army in readiness for renewed operations in the spring. Probably this course would have been better than that which he pursued ; but it may still be questioned whether even then the result of the war would have differed from what it subsequently was. The capture of Atlanta, the march through Georgia, and the fall of Savannah, had strengthened the Northern cause as much or more morally than physically. The North was in a state of enthusiasm, which gave a renewed impulse to her already strenuous efforts. On all sides, and from every quarter, were her troops advancing ; and whilst Sherman and Thomas were contending against the main armies of the West, expeditions with varying but usually partially successful results entered Louisiana and Mississippi, from Baton Rouge, Vicksburg, and Memphis, destroying the railways and cutting off and appropriating the stores collected for the supply of the Confederate forces. No place, however apparently remote from the immediate scene of contest, was secure ; the Federal cavalry literally rode roughshod over the States, and the vast

tract of country between the Mississippi River and the confines of South Carolina was the scene of violence, misery, and depredation. Lee, with the soldiers of Virginia, still held his ground ; Beauregard was organising an army for the defence of South Carolina ; and a formidable force continued to occupy Texas, the greater part of Louisiana, and a portion of Arkansas. But the Confederacy was no longer a unit ; it resembled a vast entrenched city, through whose walls the enemy had broken, and against whose citadels he was now turning, dividing the garrisons from mutual succour.

Through the eastern frontiers of Tennessee, and into Western Virginia, had the Federal cavalry penetrated, converting the threatened offensive tactics of General Breckenridge into those of defence. Subsequent to his campaign in the Shenandoah Valley, General Breckenridge had taken command of the forces (principally cavalry) which guarded the rail from Lynchburg to the West, and had made preparations for carrying the war through Eastern Tennessee into Kentucky, for the purpose of distracting the attention of the Federal generals, and injuring their lines of communication. In one of these raids the noted leader of irregular cavalry, General Morgan, was surprised at his quarters, and killed whilst attempting, pistol in hand, to make his escape ; but other officers, in command of similar bands, succeeded him, and carried on the war with varying success in the much-suffering country of Eastern Tennessee.

To destroy the great saltworks near Abingdon had been the aim of more than one expedition despatched by the Federal generals commanding in that department. In October General Burbridge had been met and driven back by Breckenridge when he had nearly reached the works, and later in the year a more formidable force

under Stoneman left Knoxville to avenge his defeat and to destroy the line of railway which supplied provisions to the Army of Virginia from the fertile valley of the Holston.

General Stoneman, who, it will be remembered, had been taken prisoner near Atlanta in the preceding autumn, had been quickly exchanged, and reappointed to a command, and with three brigades of cavalry marched from Knoxville in the middle of December, and skirmishing and driving back the Confederate cavalry of Duke and Vaughan, under Breckenridge, destroyed the railway as far as Wytheville, and the saltworks at Saltville, near Abingdon. Then, content with these depredations, and with the injury he had inflicted on one of the principal channels of supply for the Confederate armies, he retired to Eastern Tennessee in order to rest and reorganise his cavalry preparatory to the great and final campaign of the following year.

So closed the operations of the year 1864. Political events, which exercised an important influence on the conduct of the war, had occurred during the period of time when men's attention was earnestly fixed on the campaigns of Virginia and of the West; and to those events, retrospective as regards the dates of the operations previously described, we must now turn, before proceeding to the great military successes which ushered in, as they occasioned, the termination of the struggle, and the final end to the hopes of one of the belligerent parties.

CHAPTER XX.

POLITICAL EVENTS IN RELATION TO THE WAR.

IT WAS fortunate for the final success of the Federal cause that the energy of the generals who commanded the armies of the North had not been diverted from their primary object by the influence of political strife. During the spring, summer, and autumn of the year 1864, the Northern States had been seething in elements of discord, caused by the approaching contest for the Presidency. In March of the following year Mr. Lincoln's term of office would expire ; in November of the present year was the virtual election of the new President to take place ;* and every wheel was put in motion, every effort strained by the respective parties to further the interests of their own candidate. The agitation had commenced previous to the great spring campaign of 1864, had continued with various phases during the summer, and culminated in intensity as the decisive time approached in the month of November.

Well may American writers assert that seldom or never has any country, similarly circumstanced in the throes of a civil war, been called on to endure the

* By the election of electors, who, being pledged as to their votes, announced the success or failure of the respective candidates by the results of their own election.

strain of political strife to such an extent as were the Federal States in the Autumn of 1864,* and with great justice may they congratulate their fellow-countrymen that they were enabled to pass through that trying ordeal without the convulsions of revolution being super-added to the horrors of war. The old battle of the Republicans and the Democrats was to be fought, embittered by the many questions which the acts of Mr. Lincoln's Government had brought prominently forward into the arena of strife. States' rights, slavery and abolition, the employment of negro troops, the terms to be offered to the seceding states, and above all the great question of peace or war, involving these and many other elements of discord, were the topics on which men differed, and which could hardly be included within the narrow limits of but two parties.

Therefore, as the combatants proceeded to range themselves under their respective banners, it was discovered that divisions would probably occur in each of the two opposing camps. The more violent of the Republicans were offended at the moderation of the party in power: they disapproved of the but partial abolition decree; they clamoured for increased vigour (i.e. violence) in the prosecution of the war; they wished emancipation and subjugation to be the battle cry rather than reunion; they ridiculed Mr. Lincoln and blamed the half-measures of his government, and looking round for some better representative, selected firstly Mr. Chase, then General Fremont, as men who would more properly carry out their views than the existing President.

On the other hand, the Democratic party, defeated in the last election, and weakened by the secession of the

* See the *Life, Public Services and State Papers of Abraham Lincoln*, by Raymond, p. 547.

South, anxiously endeavoured to unite its divided forces for a fresh onslaught. The leaders saw the difficulty under which they laboured: they could easily find occasion of blame in the arbitrary measures of the present government; they could inveigh against the conscription, the suspension of the habeas corpus, and the illegal arrests; they could warn the nation against the dangers of consolidated power; but when they came to the real point at issue, whether they should openly advocate peace under such terms as the South would accept, and should thus carry out to its fullest extent the doctrine of States' rights, they paused and hesitated, conscious of the differences of opinion in their ranks, and unable clearly to read the signs of the time or to foresee coming events so as to shape their course with decision and exactitude.

In consequence of this hesitation the Republicans were first in the field, but with divided forces, who, respectively ranging themselves under their leaders, prepared in conventions to be assembled at Baltimore and Chicago to put forward their candidates and endeavour by indications well known to political agitators to shape out their strategy. The more moderate men and those who feared the consequences of a change of rulers during a period of intestine war supported Mr. Lincoln for re-election; Mr. Seward, or rather his followers, going so far as to hint that an alteration in the constitution might be advisable, whereby the President's period of office should be extended for two years. The other Republicans and those personally inimical to Mr. Lincoln adjudged Mr. Chase, the secretary of the treasury, to be a more fitting representative of their views, whilst the Western States, especially the Germans, sought in Fremont a man who would carry out emancipation to its fullest extent, and who would be, by his talents and

personal qualities, more fitted to rule a great nation than the present occupier of the White House.

It was soon discovered that in the Republican camp the choice lay between Mr. Lincoln and General Fremont. Two conventions were therefore called, one in the West at Cleveland, Ohio, for the 31st of May; the other at Baltimore for the 8th of June; whilst the Democrats, waiting to see their adversaries' tactics, held back. At the Cleveland convention, a platform (Anglice, declaration of principles) was formed, containing resolutions favouring the suppression of the rebellion, the preservation of the habeas corpus, of the right of asylum, and the Monroe doctrine, recommending an amendment in the constitution to prevent the re-establishment of slavery, and to provide for the election of president and vice-president for a single term only, and by the direct vote of the people, and also urging the confiscation of the lands of the rebels.* General Fremont and General Cochrane were at the same time nominated as candidates for the offices of president and vice-president.

At the Baltimore convention, assembled on the 8th of June, a somewhat similar platform was organized, although it differed from that approved of at Cleveland, inasmuch as it expressed satisfaction with the acts of the present head of the State. It advocated a vigorous prosecution of the war. It recommended an amendment of the Constitution in order totally to abolish slavery. It expressed full confidence in Abraham Lincoln and his measures, especially as referring to his proclamation of emancipation, and to the

* Vide *Life, Public Services and State Papers of Abraham Lincoln*, by Raymond, to which the author is indebted for the synopsis of the Cleveland platform, and for other valuable information.

enrolment of negro troops. It put forward strongly the duty of the government to insist on the protection of the laws of war being accorded to all soldiers, whether black or white. It recommended the encouragement of foreign emigration, and the construction of the Pacific railway, and strongly insisted on the inviolability of the national faith pledged for the redemption of the public debt, recommending economy in public expenditure and a vigorous system of taxation; lastly it expressed its approval of a strict maintenance of the Monroe doctrine.

Such were the resolutions embodied in the Baltimore platform and submitted for the consideration and approval of Mr. Lincoln. He accepted them, expressing his gratification at the confidence shown towards him by the Union people through the convention, in proposing to nominate him for re-election to the presidency; and in a quaint but pertinent anecdote signified his opinion that a wise choice had been made. He said (in answer to a deputation of the Union league), 'I have not permitted myself, gentlemen, to conclude that I am the best man in the country; but I am reminded in this connection of a story of an old Dutch farmer who remarked to a companion once "that it was best not to swap horses when crossing a stream."' "

Mr. Lincoln was therefore nominated for president, and Mr. Johnson of Tennessee for vice-president, by that portion of the Republican party which supported the Baltimore platform; although it was felt that the ever-shifting events of the war might, before the day of the election, necessitate a change in the policy of the party, as well as in its candidates. It was acknowledged that military success would, in all probability, strengthen the hands of those who were ready to support Mr.

Lincoln's re-election, should it not bring too prominently forward some one victorious general who, carried on the tide of popular enthusiasm, would command the votes of the populace intoxicated with the glory of a triumphant termination of the war.

That there were grounds for such expectations may be gathered from the attempt to set up General Grant as an opposition candidate ; but whether from his want of success against Petersburg and Richmond, or from the character of the man, which led him rather to follow the career of the soldier than that of the politician, the attempt failed. Straws were indeed thrown up to test the currents of the air, and amongst them may be numbered the somewhat curious but characteristic proceedings at the great fair, held at New York for the benefit of the wounded soldiers and of the families of the slain.

At that fair a valuable sword, to be raffled for, was proposed to be given to the most popular general. Several names were at first inscribed, for whom those who chose to purchase tickets might vote. However, it soon became apparent that the contest would lie between General M'Clellan and General Grant, and gradually the rivalry assumed a political significance. Those who were in favour of the present administration, and were opposed to the Democratic party, whose favourite M'Clellan was supposed to be, voted for Grant, and every effort was made to secure the sword for the conqueror of Vicksburg. Notwithstanding, for a long time the balance of votes inclined to M'Clellan, and it was only at the close of the day, when several wealthy men came forward with large sums for the purchase of numerous tickets, that the sword was finally allotted to General Grant.

This happened as early as April ; subsequently the

heavy losses in the battles before Richmond, the failure to capture Petersburg, and consequently the renewed pressure put on the country to fill up the gaps in the ranks, inclined the nation towards peace. These hopes were further stimulated by an irregular attempt to induce Mr. Lincoln to communicate with some southern gentlemen assembled on the Canadian side of the Niagara River, who were considered to be unaccredited, but partially recognised, commissioners from Mr. Davis. Mr. Greeley, who seems to have been actuated by the sole desire of preventing further bloodshed, was the self-constituted channel of communication, and several letters on the subject passed between him and Mr. Lincoln. At length, however, the correspondence closed, and with it all hope of peace, by Mr. Lincoln formally declaring that he would treat only on the basis of the integrity of the whole Union and the abandonment of slavery.

These negotiations were on the whole unfavourable to Mr. Lincoln's cause; the ultra war party was opposed to all treaty with rebels, the moderate Democratic party, including that portion which supported the war policy, was alienated by the declaration that the abolition of slavery was a motive for the continuance of the struggle equally strong with the integrity of the Union, whilst the larger body of the Democrats viewed any interference with the system of slavery as a violation of the constitution.

Nevertheless, although these informal negotiations closed on the 18th of June, the leaders of the Democrats considered it better to postpone the meeting of their convention from the 22nd of June to the 29th of August. There were divisions in the party. The names of War Democrats and Peace Democrats were already given to the two factions. General M'Clellan was put forward

as the representative of the former, whilst the latter, not strong enough as yet to advance a candidate, and unwilling to cause a split in the party, was content to advocate its opinions in speeches delivered in the House of Representatives by Mr. Long, one of the members for Ohio, and outside the Houses of Congress by the openly expressed sentiments of Mr. Vallandigham, returned from exile and defiantly continuing in his former course.

At the meeting of the convention on the 29th of August, the war Democrats were sufficiently in the ascendant to secure the nomination of General M'Clellan as the Democratic candidate for the presidency, in opposition to Governor Seymour of New York, put forward by the peace party. Mr. Pendleton of Ohio, belonging to the peace Democrats, was nominated for vice-president. Thus a species of compromise was effected between the two factions, and a platform was agreed upon, assailing the administration for its arbitrary conduct, as shown by the interference of the military at elections, by illegal arrests and by the suppression of the freedom of the press, and declaring that as, after four years of war, the restoration of the Union was still uneffected, immediate efforts should be made for a cessation of hostilities, with a view to the ultimate convention of the States or other peaceable means, to the end that, at the earliest practicable moment, peace might be restored on the basis of the Federal Union of the States.

These were the principles involved in the Chicago Democratic platform, but a few days subsequent to their enunciation, news arrived from the Western armies which caused a revulsion in favour of a vigorous prosecution of the war. Atlanta had fallen, and great was the enthusiasm created by the success; a fresh burst of warlike spirit was aroused, and the new

Democratic candidate saw fit to follow his military instincts, and to explain away so much of the platform as spoke of a present cessation of hostilities. General M'Clellan proclaimed himself in favour of union and the constitution, but would listen to no negotiations for peace which would include the independence of the South. Therefore the battle now to be fought was between Mr. Lincoln, with the Union and abolition, and General M'Clellan with the Union and the constitution. General Fremont withdrew from the contest, and the two combatants alone occupied the arena.

Mr. Lincoln was decidedly the stronger; he was possessed of the influence afforded by the present possession of office and power; he had the sympathies of those who, attached strongly to neither party, were afraid of adding to the already sufficiently pressing difficulties of their country, by a change of rulers; whilst he was vehemently supported by the Republican and Abolition factions. General M'Clellan, on the other hand, had by his written opinions, embodied in a letter, lost the support of the peace party, and shaken the confidence of many in the stability of his political opinions. His name, although possessing weight with the soldiers, was yet beginning to be forgotten among the new levies which filled the ranks of the old Army of the Potomac, whilst some of his companions in arms felt disappointment at the course he had adopted, holding that, in war time it was more the duty of the soldier to support the administration with his sword than to embarrass it with his politics.

Nevertheless, the contest continued, each party bracing up its sinews for the struggle, and the administration developing an intention of employing a power

far more arbitrary than constitutional. Test oaths were enforced on the voters of Tennessee and Maryland, whilst Kentucky was ruled by the heavy hand of military despotism, and New York kept in awe by the presence of General Butler, withdrawn temporarily from his command on Bermuda Hundred, and sent with full powers to prevent and to crush any insurrectionary movements. A new state, that of Nevada, was admitted into the union, and the conquered portions of Louisiana and Arkansas received as representatives of the whole of the States. The clergy were not silent, and the pulpit, debased from its proper use, became a means of putting forward political opinions.* In fact, every effort was tried to secure Mr. Lincoln's re-election, and it was strongly and clearly enunciated by his supporters, that all who approved of the prosecution of the war until the final overthrow of the rebellion must give their votes in his favour. The Democrats, endeavouring to

* The following extract is taken from the *Times* of the 14th November :—

' On the evening of Sunday the 22nd, the Rev. H. Ward Beecher preached a political sermon, and, as it had been previously announced, pews, aisles, and lobbies were all crowded as soon as the doors were opened. The rev. gentleman took for his text the lamentation over Jerusalem, as not knowing in its day the things that belonged to its peace; but he soon proceeded to much more modern topics. He said that to have peace when war is necessary is a great crime, and the people should enquire whether the peace now proposed is not a mere sham, with "the Union as it was" with all its attended injustice and oppression. "You can't," he said, "have four years of war and then have things as they were, and if we sneak back into peace with all the former evils unredressed, we shall be worthy only of the world's contempt and scorn. An administration that would leave slavery as it was, would be no more free from responsibility for its guilt, than Pilate was for the death of Christ." Mr. Beecher closed with an earnest appeal to his audience to vote for the Union ticket.

reconcile their ideas of States' rights with a war of subjugation, were weak in principle, and consequently feeble in practice, and the events of the autumn, especially the victory of Sheridan in the Shenandoah valley, tended to exalt the war party, and depress the influence of those who advocated measures of reconciliation.

In September and October, there were many indications gathered from the State elections in Vermont, Ohio, Indiana and Pennsylvania; that the Republican party was in the ascendant, and when in November the final results of the elections became known, an enormous majority was found to be in favour of Mr. Lincoln; so great a majority that he could afford to dispense with the votes of those States where test oaths and military interference afforded grounds to his opponents for disputing the validity of his re-election. A complete triumph had been gained by the republican party, and General M'Clellan, who, on the day of the election had tendered the resignation of his military appointment, retired into private life, and ceased to exercise any influence, either political or military, on the future conduct of the war. The excitement caused by the canvass calmed down; there were congratulatory speeches, serenades, processions, and the ordinary signs of the triumph of party, but all passed off quietly. The minority submitted peaceably to the power of the majority, and the progress and results of the election afforded an instance of the good sense and love of order which predominated in the Federal States during times of trial seemingly as great as any nation has ever passed through.

The contest for the presidency had been watched with little interest in the Southern States; they saw that both candidates were equally vehement in protestations

of their intention to continue the war, and they felt that, by the substitution of General M'Clellan for Mr. Lincoln, they would be merely shifting their enemies, and might possibly find that the change had been disadvantageous to their interests, in placing an abler man at the head of the Federal government. The South had never entertained any hopes from the Northern Democratic party ; she mistrusted and despised it, and at this period of the war knew well that her final freedom must be the result of her own efforts and of her own arm. At one time she had looked for European help, but that had failed her, and she had learnt by bitter experience that success, and success alone, would bring her friends, and give her the place among the nations which she still considered to be her right.* But notwithstanding her indomitable resolution and courage the war pressed heavily on her. Her armies were diminishing in numbers, although a most stringent conscription act swept off her sons to replenish the thinned ranks. She longed for peace, but would consent to no terms which did not sanction her independence.

During the summer of 1864, the crops in the Southern States had been more than usually plentiful ; there was no lack of food ; the manufactories, commenced when the war broke out, were flourishing ; the negro population, emancipated from their accustomed control, was quiet and diligent, but there was a want of white men to fill the vacancies in the armies—vacancies caused not only by death and wounds, but by desertions, which increased as the Confederate forces in their retreat yielded up large territories, and even whole States, from which many of the soldiers had been recruited.

* See Mr. Davis's speech at Columbia, South Carolina, on October 4th, 1864.

Want of men was the vital element of weakness in the Confederacy, to which may also be added the difficulty of transport owing to the ruinous condition of the rails; but besides these physical causes of feebleness, there was another reason which prevented the South from bringing her whole strength into play at this important crisis of her fate. During her most severe time of trial, she had been careful to preserve the forms of government which she had undertaken to defend. The separate States were still under the control of their governors, who possessed the command of the local militia, and in some instances interfered with the authority of the generals, whilst prolonged debates were held in Congress upon questions which the necessities of the Confederacy required should be settled and acted upon with the utmost promptitude, and enforced with the most stringent rigour. Thus the militia of Georgia was withdrawn from Hood when he marched north of the State, and at a time when the prompt arming of the negro population appeared to be the only remaining means of providing a supply of fighting men, Congress debated, when the executive should have acted. To these causes, many attributed the final failure of the South to secure her independence. A dictator, they alleged, should have either been appointed, or should have seized the reins of power; every question not immediately bearing on the subject of defence should have been put aside, and no privileges, either on the part of individuals or of States, should have been permitted to interfere with a vigorous prosecution of hostilities.

Such were the opinions held at this time by many of the leading Southern men, especially among those connected with the army. There was a feeling of discon-

tent growing up against President Davis ; he was accused of regulating the appointments to high command in the army by personal predilections for and against particular men, and whilst some blamed him for too scrupulously observing the forms of constitutional government, others complained that his acts tended to deprive the people of the liberty for which they were fighting.

That he worked indefatigably and conscientiously for the good of his country, no one can deny ; that he was mistaken in his choice of men to command the Western armies, and that he interfered too dogmatically with the plans of the generals, some have asserted ; but his errors, when viewed in relation to the task he was called on to fulfil, were surely few, and if on the one hand he may be censured for preventing the execution of schemes which he considered rash, he may on the other be equally blamed for permitting the strategy which led Hood to uncover, by his disastrous march to the North, the heart of the Confederacy.

During the autumn he had visited the Western army, communicating in person with Generals Beauregard and Hood, and embodying in a speech delivered at Columbia, South Carolina, on his return journey to Richmond, his opinions on the state of the country. He told his hearers that every door of reconciliation had been closed by the Northern government, that intervention and recognition by foreign states, so long anticipated, had proved an *ignis fatuus*, and that by their own courage would their final freedom be alone attained. Now (he said) is the good and accepted time for every man to rally to the standard of his country, and crush the invader from her soil ; and this I believe is in your power. If every man fit to bear arms will place himself in the ranks with those who are there

already, we shall not battle in vain, and our achievements will be grand, final, and complete. Is this a time to ask what the law demands of you, to enquire whether or not you are exempt under the law, or to ask whether the magistrate will take you out of the enrolling office by a writ of habeas corpus? Rather is it not the time for every man capable of bearing arms to say, 'my country needs my services and my country shall have them.' He then spoke of his visit to the army of the Tennessee, and foretold (it is alleged somewhat unwisely) its march against Sherman's communications.

On his return to Richmond, at the opening of the session of Congress on the 7th November 1864, he more fully reviewed the condition of the country. Casting a retrospective glance at the results of the campaign, he congratulated Congress on the successes during the spring in the trans-Mississippi department, and on the freedom from the presence of the invader of many States and portions of States, which heretofore had felt his power. He disparaged General Sherman's victories, and denied the importance of his capture of Atlanta, stating that the Confederacy possessed no vital points. He urged greater stringency in the Conscription Act, showing that the exemption of certain specified pursuits and professions was unwise, and that to the military authorities alone should the discretion be vested of granting individual exemptions from actual service in the field. Although deprecating the policy of employing negroes as soldiers, he yet advocated the raising of a force of 40,000 to act as teamsters, pioneers and engineers, to receive present pay and future emancipation as a reward for their services, saying at the same time, that should the alternative ever be presented of subjugation or of the employment of the slave as a

soldier, there seemed no reason to doubt what would then be the decision of Congress. At present he dissented from those who advised a general arming of the blacks.

This proposition was the occasion of an animated debate in both Houses of Congress, in open as well as in secret session, and resulted in the passing of a bill to arm the slaves, in the House of Representatives, which was lost by one vote in the Senate. An amended bill was subsequently carried, which permitted the President to ask for and accept the services of slaves from their owners, and to organise them into military bodies, paying and feeding them as other troops. Failing to obtain the requisite number, he was allowed to call on each State for its quota of an additional 300,000 men, to be raised without reference to colour; but, providing that nothing in the act should be construed as authorising a change in the relation of the said slaves.

Such were the half measures which the Southern Congress passed at a time when all other considerations should have been set aside in favour of the best means of carrying on the war. The houses were sitting almost within sound of the enemy's guns, almost within reach of his shells; a feeble parapet manned by overworked soldiers, daily diminishing in numbers, alone held back the invading hosts. A formidable force was threatening the capital from the Shenandoah, whilst Sherman had already traversed Georgia, and was now in possession of one of the most important cities of the Confederacy. It was with difficulty and danger that the members from the more distant States could reach Richmond to take their seats, and passing through the long tracts of country they could not fail to perceive the scarcity of able-bodied men which proclaimed the drain of war on the white population.

Under such circumstances no sacrifices should have been too great, so that the armies might be replenished; but, actuated as men are by various, subtle, and often selfish considerations, it required some one preponderating power to overcome opposition, and to force measures which, however distasteful, were alone calculated to save the country.* Congress deliberated, and the armies suffered; suffered from over-work, from exposure, and from a want of the necessary supplies, whilst the enemy, backed by a rich and powerful country, by a numerous population, by the resources of Europe, and by an administration strengthened by the results of the elections, prepared for a winter campaign, when his advantages over an enfeebled antagonist would be even more preponderating than during the summer weather.

* Who among the leaders of the Confederacy would have best filled the office of dictator, must be a matter of speculation. General Lee's great talents and splendid achievements would have pointed him out for such a post, but it may be doubted whether his very nobility of character and highness of purpose would not have somewhat marred his success in civil government. General Johnston's unflinching firmness, or General Breckenridge's combined talents for both war and politics are said by some to have indicated men more fit for the office of dictator than the great Lee. Such speculations are however vain, and it may be even doubted whether the respect for civil rights so noticeable in Americans, would have permitted any man, however renowned, to have either seized or been appointed to unrestrained power.

CHAPTER XXI.

OPERATIONS ON THE COAST.

THE autumn and early winter of 1864 had assuredly been periods of disaster to the Confederate cause, and had been pregnant of events which, before the oak forests of Virginia had again put forth their leaves, occasioned and witnessed the subjugation of the people whose gallant resistance had extended over a term of upwards of four years. On the sea-coast as on the mainland, with one sole and short exception, the tide of success had turned in favour of the Federal arms; and the last of the seaports, still partially open by means of swiftly-steaming vessels to a restricted commerce with Europe, fell before the united naval and military force of the North. Plymouth, on the coast of North Carolina, captured from the Federals at the end of the year 1863, had already been retaken, or rather had succumbed, as a consequence of the destruction of the ironclad *Albemarle*, which guarded the stream of the Roanoke; and this exploit, the deed of a young officer of the name of Cushing, stands forward so conspicuously, even among the many gallant actions performed on both sides during the long course of the war, that it deserves especial notice.

Lieutenant Cushing had formed a scheme for blowing up the formidable ram at her moorings on the Roanoke

River ; and having submitted it to the admiral, and obtained his consent, constructed a vessel for his purpose, and selected a crew (six of whom were officers) with which to make the attempt. On a dark night in November he left the squadron in his small boat, and with the brave men who formed its crew, rowed as quietly as was possible up the Roanoke, passing without detection the guard ship and the numerous sentries and pickets on the bank of the river. He found the Albemarle moored alongside the wharf, and protected by a boom of pine logs, whilst a large fire threw a light across the water, discovering to a strong body of infantry the approaching boat. It was hailed repeatedly both from the shore and from the watch on the deck of the Albemarle, and as Lieutenant Cushing ran the boat bows on against the boom of logs, a volley of musketry greeted him from the shore, which was instantly replied to by a howitzer from the boat. With his own hands he then fixed the torpedo in its proper position ; but not before the crew of the Albemarle, thoroughly aroused to the danger, had commenced a rapid fire of small arms into the darkness which concealed the enemy. Cushing then pulled the string which fired the torpedo, almost at the same moment receiving a bullet in the wrist, whilst the boat, struck by a large shot or shell from the Albemarle, went to the bottom. But the torpedo had done its work. Through the iron armour of the vessel a large hole had been blown ; and as Cushing and his crew were endeavouring to save themselves from the double danger of drowning and of the enemy's musketry, the Albermale settled down and sunk.

Cushing escaped the death or capture which awaited all but one of his men, by floating down the river,

hiding himself among the woods on the bank, and finally by seizing and putting out to sea in a small boat, and so after eight hours' paddling reaching the squadron; not, however, before he had ascertained, by means of a negro, whom, whilst concealed in the wood, he had induced to enter Plymouth, that his enterprise had been successful; that the Albemarle had sunk; and that the stream of the Roanoke, and consequently the town of Plymouth, lay open to the Federal ships of war. The garrison, recognising the fact that with the destruction of the formidable ram their chief means of defence had fallen, after a short but stout resistance withdrew from the town, which surrendered to the Federal naval squadron on the 31st October.*

But the recapture of Plymouth was of slight consequence in comparison with the attack made two months later against the fort which protected the mouth of the Cape Fear River, and which sheltered with its guns the blockade runners seeking to enter the harbour of Wilmington, a port important not only as the most considerable inlet through which the Confederacy still continued to receive supplies from Europe, but as a place of great strategic value for operations directed against the interior of North Carolina, and against the communications between Richmond and the South. This port the navy had in vain tried to close, but had been baffled by the nature of the outlet of the Cape Fear River, which required watching for so great a distance that, without possession of the land north of Fort Fisher, it was found impossible entirely to shut the harbour against the entrance of ships.† To secure a

* For a narrative of Lieutenant Cushing's exploit see the *United States Army and Navy Journal* of January 21st, 1865.

† Vide General Grant's report, p. 27.

footing on the land a military force was furnished by General Grant to co-operate with the navy, and a detachment of 6,500 men, under General Butler, was sent to act in concert with Admiral Porter in such operations as would secure the end required, leaving the details to the discretion of the officer in command.

Owing to various delays, the whole of the expeditionary force did not reach the rendezvous off the mouth of the Cape Fear River until the 24th of December, although a sufficient number of vessels had shown themselves five days previously to cause considerable alarm to the garrison and inhabitants of Wilmington, and to lead to urgent applications for assistance from Richmond, applications which were immediately responded to.

Upon General Whiting, and Colonel Lamb, who had himself erected the greater portion of the work, did the responsibility of the defence of Fort Fisher fall; and with rather more than 900 men did they prepare to resist the mighty force which was preparing to assault their ramparts. It was not alone to the weight of their artillery or to the courage of their storming parties that the Federal officers trusted for success. A new experiment was to be tried, and, without risk to the assailants, the fort and garrison were to be overthrown and slain. The news of the great explosion of the powder mills at Erith had reached America, and, founded on the terrible effects of that catastrophe, an idea was conceived and entertained of destroying Fort Fisher by the blowing up of a powder vessel under its walls. With this intent, 215 tons of powder were stored on board the steamer Louisiana, which, disguised as a blockade runner, was brought within three-quarters of a mile of the fort, and there anchored. Then her crew, commanded

by Captain Rhind, and composed of men selected for the dangerous duty, after setting fire to the vessel, escaped in a small steam tug. The fleet stood out to sea, and anxiously awaited the explosion, of which the effects were in anticipation greatly exaggerated. The vessel blew up; but so little was the result that the concussion was scarcely noticed by the garrison, and, it is needless to say, was productive of no injury to the fort.*

The novel experiment had failed, and the old machinery of war was again resorted to. On that same morning (the 24th December) the most powerful fleet ever assembled in American waters stood in towards Fort Fisher, and commenced the action. At 11.30 A.M. the signal was made to engage the fort, and instantaneously a bombardment, more terrific than any work ever submitted to, commenced, and was continued during the whole day.† The fort replied but feebly, owing to the smaller number and calibre of its guns; whilst the garrison, almost stunned by the noise, and amazed at the awful and continuous fire, remained within the bomb-

* General Butler, in his evidence before the Court of Enquiry, endeavours to account for the non-success of the explosion. He states as follows:—

‘It was intended to ignite all the powder at once by putting instantaneous fuses (gomes) among the bags of powder, and firing it by means of certain apparatus, clockwork, electrical machines, etc. But all those contrivances failed of operation. The powder caught on fire at one end of the boat, and blew itself into the air and water by piecemeal, bags of powder being seen to explode in the air. It was proposed to explode all the powder at once. This was vital to the success of the experiment; but that was not done.’

General Butler had originated the idea of the powder-boat.

† Vide Admiral Porter's despatch, General Whiting's statement, and a most valuable account by the special correspondent of the *Times*, dated Wilmington, December 27th, 1864.

proofs, expecting instant death. Yet the injury inflicted was very slight ; only twenty-three men were wounded, and five gun carriages disabled, whilst, although the outward appearance of the fort was changed, no real damage had been sustained by its ramparts, where the shifting sand received, and, as it were, swallowed up, the numerous shot and shell.

On the following morning (Christmas-day), the bombardment was renewed, and a detachment of upwards of 2,000 men, commanded by General Weitzel, was landed under cover of the fire of seventeen gunboats which raked the woods and drove away those who would have opposed the disembarkation. During and after the landing of the troops, the fleet continued to rain shot and shell into the fort, keeping the defenders within their bombproofs, and allowing the skirmishers, without loss excepting from the shells from the fleet, to reach the glacis. But whilst the ships continued the bombardment, the troops could not enter the work, and as soon as the fire ceased, the garrison rushed to the parapet and manned the uninjured guns which commanded the approaches from the land side. General Weitzel reconnoitred the works, but warned by the former experiences of Forts Jackson, of Vicksburg, and of Wagner, reported to General Butler that it would be butchery under the circumstances to order an assault ;* and Butler, fearing to leave his men entrenched on the beach, exposed to the attacks of the troops which he knew had arrived as reinforcements from Richmond, and anticipating from appearances bad weather, which would render the landing of supplies difficult, ordered the re-embarkation of the land force, and its withdrawal to Fortress Monroe.

* Vide General Weitzel's and General Butler's reports.

Disappointment was keenly felt in the North at this failure of her great armada ; there were mutual recriminations between the army and the navy, and between the several generals ; General Butler was severely blamed, and the tone of his defence was not such as would secure the sympathy of military men. He was removed from the command of the Army of the James, and the proceedings of the attack on Fort Fisher submitted to a court of enquiry, who, after examination of various and voluminous evidence, acquitted him of blame.* But his career as a soldier had terminated ; the conduct and result of the second expedition became a severe comment on the failure of the first, and the President and nation, more disposed than heretofore to acknowledge the value of military instruction, preferred to trust in General Grant and his companions from West Point rather than to men who had acquired renown more from the strength of their character and the violence of their partisanship than from their knowledge of or their success in military operations.

Quickly following on the first attack on Fort Fisher, and whilst men were debating violently on the cause of failure, a second expedition was organised, and a military force under a different general, and with explicit directions to act in concert with the navy, despatched to the coast of North Carolina in the first week of January 1865. The troops were the same as had

* General Whiting's evidence, given in writing, as answers to several questions propounded to him by General Butler, goes far to acquit Generals Butler and Weitzel of blame in refraining from attacking the fort, and in withdrawing and re-embarking their troops.

Soon after giving this evidence General Whiting died, a prisoner, after the second attack on the fort.

been employed in the former futile attempt, with the addition of a brigade of 1,500 men, and the whole was placed under the command of General Terry, a young officer who, although not educated at West Point, had served his way up through the several grades of his profession, and had studied theoretically and practically the art of war. Between him and Admiral Porter there was complete accord; and the latter, profiting by experience gained during the previous attack, prepared to direct the fire of his ships with the more especial object of dismounting the artillery on the land face of the fort.

After assembling at Beaufort, and awaiting favourable weather, the expedition appeared off the Cape Fear River on the 12th of January, and under cover of the new ironsides and the monitors, who shelled the fort, and the gunboats that commanded the beach, commenced and finished the disembarkation of the troops between daylight and 2 P.M. on the 13th. Then began, with all its previous fury, and with far greater precision, a bombardment of the fort from all the vessels of the fleet, the ironclads approaching to within 1,200 yards of its batteries, and receiving little or no reply. The garrison were within the bombproofs, their guns being unfitted, from inferiority in numbers and weight of metal, to cope with the heavy artillery brought against them.* General Whiting and Colonel Lamb still commanded the garrison and superintended the defence. Bragg, with Hoke's division, was at Wilmington, but could afford little assistance beyond sending reinforcements, which, whilst augmenting the numbers of

* The armament of the fort had been little, if at all, increased since the former attack. Either from carelessness or from inability, rifled guns to oppose those of the ironclads had not been mounted in the casemates or on the ramparts.

the garrison, did not in proportionate degree increase its efficiency, as many of the men were but raw soldiers, the officers inexperienced, and the whole force wanting in that cohesive strength produced by long and successful service.

During the afternoon of the 13th, the whole fleet, comprising five ironclads and forty-three wooden vessels of war, were employed in shelling the fort and in covering the disembarkation of the field artillery; and when darkness closed in the ironclads still continued at their posts, preventing, by a slow but unintermittent fire, the repair of the parapets and the repose of the garrison. During the 14th the bombardment was continued, the efforts of the navy being chiefly directed to dismount the guns on the land face, a work which was performed by the smaller gunboats approaching the fort as closely as was possible, and firing slowly and accurately.* Preparations were meanwhile completed for the assault, to be made on the following day, the 15th of January, when the troops, recovered from their confinement during rough weather on board the crowded transports, should have been restored to complete efficiency. The time fixed was the afternoon, and during the earlier portion of the day, the fleet continued with its whole power a furious bombardment. The effect on the fort was far more serious than after the engagement of the previous month. Then the land face had received little injury; now the guns had been dismounted, the palisades torn away, communications with the mines cut off, and the rampart overthrown and rendered practicable for assault.†

* Vide Admiral Porter's official report.

† Vide General Whiting's evidence; Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War. For the assault see General Ames's

At 3 P.M. all was ready ; a party of sailors and marines had entrenched themselves near the beach to feint against the sea face, whilst the troops, in three brigades, under the immediate command of General Ames, were to assault the north-eastern rampart. As soon as the admiral had received the preconcerted signal, he turned his guns from the parapet against the batteries on the centre mound, or keep, and the troops, sailors, and marines rushed forward. The garrison, with a courage which elicited the praise of the enemy, mounted the parapet, unmindful of the fire from the rifles of the covering party, and drove back the sailors : but the troops had gained a footing on the rampart, the guns from the ships were turned against the traverses, which the defenders still held with pertinacity, and General Whiting and Colonel Lamb were severely wounded. The Federals fought with great courage, driving back the defenders from traverse to traverse, until these, dispirited by the loss of their leaders, fled to the inner work, or Lamb's Mound. Forcing them with little difficulty from this their last refuge, the Federals pursued the fugitives to the extreme end of the neck of land, where the remnants threw down their arms and surrendered. On the two following days, and consequent on the fall of Fort Fisher, the other works at the entrance of the Cape Fear were abandoned, the gunboats, after removing the torpedoes, entered the river, and as a port for commerce, Wilmington ceased to be of value to the Confederacy, although it continued to be held by a garrison until a later period of the war, when its

and Admiral Porter's reports ; the letter of the special correspondent of the *Times*, dated Charleston, January 23rd, 1864, and the *United States Army and Navy Journal*.

Admiral Porter states that during the bombardment he expended 50,000 shells.

possession as a strategical point became necessary to the Federal armies of invasion.

The triumphant conclusion to an operation which at one time threatened by its failure to throw a shadow over the almost undimmed splendour of Federal success, spread through the Northern States a feeling of joy and exultation, and led many to the belief that the power of the Confederacy was broken, and that the time had arrived when a generous offer of terms of peace would be accepted, thereby saving the lives of many brave men, and averting desolation from States which sincere Unionists were anxious again to regard as component parts of the great American nation.

In every quarter excepting in Virginia the Federal arms had been victorious, and although on the banks of the James River success and defeat had latterly been evenly balanced, yet even there the unwearied energy and preponderating power of the North were gradually sapping the strength of her weaker antagonist, whilst blows inflicted in other districts were indirectly telling on the vitality of the cause in the State which had proved its most firm supporter.

An effort made on the element which had ever proved so unpropitious to the fortunes of the Confederacy met with no better success than had rewarded former enterprises, and the ironclad squadron which, with great labour and cost, the city of Richmond had built and launched on the waters of the James, failed in a bold attempt to destroy the pontoon bridges and the transports of the invading army, and taking advantage of the absence of the enemy's fleet at Fort Fisher, to break, if only temporarily, the blockade of the river. On the night of the 24th of January, four ironclads and four small wooden gunboats endeavoured to force their way through the obstructions which the Federals had

placed across the river to protect their bridges and the works at Dutch Gap canal; but although one of the ironclads of lighter draught than her companions passed the boom, the three larger vessels grounded, and when daylight broke, and the shore batteries were able to direct their fire with better aim, the flotilla was withdrawn and the attempt abandoned.

Soon afterwards another vessel passed down the waters of the James with other and far different objects, but, as events proved, with as little favourable result. In consequence of an unofficial interview held between Mr. Francis Blair, an eminent Northern politician, and Mr. Davis, three commissioners were despatched from Richmond to debate with certain persons to be named by Mr. Lincoln on terms for securing peace. The conference was to be held at Fortress Monroe, and as the vessel conveying Messrs. Stephens, Hunter, and Campbell, steamed down the James River, the troops of both armies, leaving their encampments and running towards the banks, cheered those whose efforts they fervently hoped would be successful in terminating their labours and their sufferings, and in restoring to their long-abandoned homes many who, if the war continued, could scarcely hope to visit them again.*

* The following is quoted from the *United States Army and Navy Journal* of February 4th, 1865 :—

‘An interesting story from Petersburg says that when Messrs. Stephens, Hunter, and Campbell passed through their lines on their way to Washington, shouting all along the lines was prevailing, and it would indicate that they hoped for preparation of such terms of peace as would allow the armies to disperse. A fine military band played “Secessia,” “Yankee Doodle,” “Dixie,” and other tunes and national airs. They were acknowledged by the two armies alternately; but when the bands struck up “Home, sweet Home,” the opposing camps forgot their position, and united in vociferous cheering.’

Although the effort to obtain peace was probably on both sides made in good faith, yet, as no basis could be agreed upon on which to found the terms, the conference, as might have been expected, terminated unsatisfactorily. Mr. Lincoln expressly refused to treat 'excepting with the view of securing peace to the people of *our common country*. Mr. Davis, on the other hand, claimed a separate nationality. Thus, at the very outset, insuperable difficulties presented themselves. Notwithstanding, in consequence of an intimation from General Grant that he believed the commissioners were sincerely desirous of removing the difficulties to a cessation of hostilities, Mr. Lincoln in person went to Fortress Monroe, and on the 3rd of February, in company with Mr. Seward, met the commissioners; but, as he insisted on the complete restoration of the national authority, and the acceptance by the South of the emancipation proclamation, and as he refused to agree to a suspension of arms excepting on the disbandment of the forces of the Confederacy, the conference broke up, and the commissioners returned to Richmond.*

In some respects the result of the conference, and the

* In a note in Mr. Raymond's *Life of Abraham Lincoln*, the following quotation is given from an account of the conference published in the *Augusta Chronicle*, said to have been prepared under the supervision of Mr. Stephens:—

'Mr Hunter made a long reply, insisting that the recognition of Davis's power to make a treaty was the first and indispensable step to peace, and referring to the correspondence between King Charles I. and his Parliament as a reliable precedent of a constitutional ruler treating with rebels. Mr. Lincoln's face then wore that indescribable expression which generally preceded his hardest hits; and he remarked, "Upon questions of history I must refer you to Mr. Seward, for he is posted in such things, and I don't profess to be. But my only distinct recollection of the matter is, that Charles lost his head." That settled Mr. Hunter for a while.'

explicit declarations by Mr. Lincoln of the only terms on which the Northern government would treat, strengthened the hands of President Davis and silenced the party in the South who were disposed to oppose his war policy. It was apparent to all that victory, and victory alone, would secure the much-desired consummation of the war, and that terms such as those tendered by Mr. Lincoln could only be entertained when the armies of the Confederacy, still formidable, had ceased to exist. Those armies were, indeed, sadly diminished in numbers since the mighty battles of the preceding spring and summer, and although at length united under one command, and subject to the orders of the great general of Virginia,* were yet separated from each other by such vast intervals, and so divided by the intervening forces of the enemy, as to be beyond his control. Want of men, want of arms, and want of horses marred the efficiency of even the army stationed around Richmond, much more of the broken remnants of the Western force. To remedy the first, the enrolling of the negroes was advocated by General Lee, by the secretary of war (Mr. Benjamin), and by others immediately connected with the armies; whilst, to secure a supply of arms and horses, the patriotism of citizens, in addition to the pressure of government officials,† was invoked. But Congress deliberated, whilst men of action were impeded by constitutional restraints. The extreme emergency of the condition of affairs was not appreciated until too late to apply a remedy, and until

* General Lee was appointed to the command of the Confederate armies on the 1st of February 1865.

† Vide General Lee's address of January 25, 1865, calling on all citizens to give up saddlery and arms of all descriptions to equip a force of cavalry.


Sherman, with his victorious force, had broken through the very heart of the Confederacy. To follow his track, and to see the recent calamities of Georgia reproduced with even greater violence in South Carolina, we must now leave for a time the armies of Virginia and seek the Federal cantonments in Savannah.

CHAPTER XXII.

SHERMAN'S MARCH TO GOLDSBORO.

THE Confederate army of the West had been broken up. Thomas, in secure possession of Tennessee, was able to detach largely to the assistance of Canby, menacing Mississippi and Alabama; to direct Stoneman with the cavalry on Lynchburg, and to send Schofield, with 21,000 men, by a long circuit of railway and sea-transport to North Carolina. No force bearing any resemblance to the powerful armies which, in the previous year, the Confederate States had brought into the field, at this time existed between the Potomac and the Rio Grande, except the Army of Virginia, holding the trenches in front of Richmond and Petersburg, and Kirby Smith's forces, cut off from the States north of the Mississippi by the great river, watched and guarded by Federal gunboats.

To crush Lee was now the object which General Grant (the Commander-in-Chief) had chiefly in view. He proposed to assemble an overwhelming force on the James River, by adding Sherman's victorious army to those of the Potomac and the James, transporting it by sea from Savannah to the vicinity of Richmond, and so bringing the combined strength of the East and of the West to bear upon the sole remaining hope of the Confederacy.



SKETCH OF
Sherman's march from
SAVANNAH.

Although approving of the principle of the scheme, General Sherman objected to the method of carrying it out; he, as well as the Commander-in-Chief, looked to the possibility of leading his army to the confines of Richmond to take part in the final struggle, which he foresaw could not long be delayed; but it was by land and not by sea that he desired to make the journey. He knew by experience what his army could perform; he had seen in his previous passage through Georgia of how little resistance the interior of the Confederacy was capable; and he wished still further to injure the means of communication through the Southern States, and still more, by the desolating march of his army, to exhaust the country and to crush it under his heel. Well would it have been for South Carolina if General Grant's original plan had been put in practice, for then would she have been spared the terrible havoc of Sherman's hordes, and the misery which up to this time she had endured in a degree less than her sister States, but which she was about to suffer in augmented force. Her comparative immunity excited the peculiar hatred and animosity of the soldiery, who were determined to visit on the unarmed and defenceless inhabitants the sins of the State which had been the originator of secession.

There was no organised army to oppose the onward progress of the Federals. The remnants of Hood's forces were separated from South Carolina by many miles of desolated country. At Charleston and Wilmington were troops but barely sufficient to garrison the works, and, in the already depleted South, there were no materials from which to construct local forces for the purposes of defence; therefore, unless the Confederacy was prepared to make great sacrifices, little

beyond the natural difficulties of the country bordering on Savannah and the sea-coast could stand in the way of Sherman's advance. These obstacles were, however, formidable. To the distance of about one hundred miles from the coast extend vast swamps, interspersed with rice and cotton fields, and intersected by numerous rivers and inlets, the abodes of wild fowl and alligators. Through and over these swamps and rivers, long causeways and bridges form the sole communications between Savannah and the sandy and pine-covered hills of the interior, and these narrow roads were easy of defence, and could be held by resolute men against far superior numbers.

The nucleus of such a force existed, and was under the direction of General Beauregard, who, after Hood had crossed the Tennessee on his disastrous march to Nashville, had betaken himself to Augusta to organise an army for the defence of the interior. There he had found General D. Hill,* whom, with the sanction of the central government, he reappointed to a command, together with Wade Hampton, who was collecting men and horses for the Army of Virginia, and whom he also retained to serve as occasion might require, placing him over the whole of the cavalry. In January, General Beauregard was joined by 2,500 men, under Stevenson, from Taylor's, formerly Hood's, army, who with great difficulty had made their way from Northern Mississippi across the country devastated by Sherman. To this small force he proposed to add the garrison of Charleston, consisting of 11,000 men, under Hardee, and, taking up strong positions on one or more of the many branches of the Edisto River, to fall in succession on

* In consequence of some disagreement with General Bragg, General D. Hill had been deprived of his command.

Sherman's columns as they debouched by narrow causeways from the surrounding marshes. Holding the Federal army in check in this unhealthy and dismal country, he hoped to assemble the remaining two divisions of Hood's army, reduced to about 5,000 men, and proposed to draw from Lee's Army of Virginia a force of about 20,000, together with the garrison of Wilmington, about 9,000. This concentration of strength would have placed at his disposal an army of at least 50,000 men, and with the advantage of acting in a friendly country, he trusted that he would be able to render a good account of Sherman's still superior force.

To have carried out this scheme great sacrifices would have been necessary. Charleston, whose heroic defence had rendered her an object of pride to the whole of the Confederacy, and whom her citizens regarded with an affection proportionate to the dangers they had braved in her defence, must be given up; Wilmington must be surrendered; and if General Lee's army should be weakened by a number so considerable as that proposed, Petersburg, and, consequently, Richmond, would necessarily be evacuated, and the greater portion of the State of Virginia surrendered to the enemy. Such were the extreme but necessary measures proposed by General Beauregard; but to render them efficacious, rapidity of execution of at least a portion was absolutely necessary. The garrison of Charleston was not only required for immediate service in the field, but there was danger lest it should be cut off from both Augusta and Columbia by the rapid advance of Sherman, and consequently lest the concentration of forces at any point suitable for the protection of the South Carolina frontier should be prevented. To evacuate Charleston, and

march westwards without delay, was therefore the only true policy.

But neither would Hardee, influenced by the strong remonstrances of the magistrates and people of Charleston, decide on his own responsibility to evacuate the city: neither would President Davis take upon himself to issue the orders for so doing. Therefore, notwithstanding the influence and urgent remonstrances of General Beauregard, Hardee remained within the walls of Charleston until Sherman's columns, threatening to blockade the approaches from the land side, compelled the garrison to withdraw, but too late to render any service for the defence of South Carolina. For somewhat similar reasons, Wilmington was retained, and the troops lost in respect to an active campaign. Nor could the central government decide on taking the momentous step of surrendering Richmond, and thus reinforcing the Army of the West with that of Virginia. Consequently, the marshy streams which barred the progress of Sherman's army from Savannah, were watched, for they could scarcely be said to be defended, by Stevenson's division and Wade Hampton's half-organised cavalry. Wheeler observed the approaches to Augusta, and Cheatham, with his 5,000 men from Mississippi, struggled through the devastated country by roads almost impassable, by railways nearly useless from unintermittent traffic, joined to the absence of repair, and over streams flooded by the winter's rain, where broken and burnt piles marked the localities of former bridges. Thus feeble were the preparations for resisting the formidable army, rendered confident by success, which, under the leadership of the ablest of the Federal generals, was about to enter South Carolina.

With 60,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry, and a proportionate force of artillery, Sherman commenced his movement in the third week of January 1865. At Savannah he left a division of the 19th corps, sent from the Shenandoah Valley, and with his old Army of the West set forth towards the objective point he had selected, viz. Goldsboro in North Carolina. So sure was he of reaching this distant town, that he sent forward by sea to Newberne his quarter-masters and the superintendent of military railways, with orders to collect stores and to be in readiness to extend the railway from Newberne to Goldsboro by the 15th of March. Until that time he was prepared to cut himself off from communications with the North, forcing his way through the heart of South Carolina, and subsisting his troops on the fertile country which, hitherto distant from scenes of war, was still enjoying somewhat of its previous prosperity. The Savannah River, the Salkehatchie, and the several branches of the Edisto, were in turn to be crossed, and the danger avoided of being encountered and detained in that unhealthy and difficult country by even small bodies of an enemy, which delay might increase to formidable proportions. Then was Columbia, the State capital of South Carolina, to be occupied; but as it was important to deceive the enemy with respect to the objective point, the right wing of the army was ordered to demonstrate against Charleston, and the cavalry against Augusta, whilst the centre, pushing forward by painful marches along the causeways on the Columbia road, was to force its way to the higher country beyond the marshes of the sea-coast.

On the 1st of February the advance really commenced. The men, headed by their generals, who on

foot shared the hardships of the march, waded for miles through the swamps, rendered cold by the bitter weather of February, or worked with the perseverance of American soldiery on the repairs and construction of roads and bridges, or on the destruction of the railways on their flanks and rear. Vast crowds of pillagers preceded the army, burning and plundering without pity or discrimination, and perpetrating deeds which must ever bring disgrace on the Federal army of the West. The more disciplined soldiers, rendered brutal by previous familiarity with scenes of rapine, and excusing themselves by what they considered to be patriotic animosity towards South Carolina, followed in the wake of the pillagers, consuming and destroying what they had spared, and marking the line of march by the flames of burning houses at night, and by the clouds of smoke which by day hung over and obscured the suffering country. Not only were the barns and houses fired, but the woods, either from accident or design, were included in the conflagration; a love of destruction seemed to have gained possession of the troops, and the cabins of the negroes they professed to befriend, equally with the mansions of the planters they detested, were included in the common ruin.*

By the 12th of February, after encountering but little resistance from the enemy, the several branches of the Edisto were crossed, Wade Hampton was driven back on Columbia, and the detachments at Orangeburg and Branchville were cut off and forced to retire towards Charleston. The Congaree alone formed a bar-

* See *Sherman's March through the South*, by Captain D. Conyngham; and the *Story of the Great March*, by Major G. W. Nichols.

rier between Sherman's army and Columbia, and on the 16th the passage of this river was forced, and the town, having been evacuated by the Confederate cavalry, was surrendered by the civil authorities. Then followed one of those terrible scenes which rob war of the halo with which men have delighted to surround it, and show how horribly wicked human beings become when deprived of the restraints with which their actions are ordinarily controlled.

On the night of the 17th of February, the night following the occupation of the city by the Federal troops, Columbia was discovered to be on fire. Simultaneously from different places the flames broke forth ; private houses, hotels, shops, warehouses, and the charitable asylums were burning ; whilst in tumultuous crowds the Federal soldiers, the escaped prisoners of war, and the negroes, deprived of all control, and maddened by drink, rushed through the streets, robbing, plundering, and maltreating the inhabitants, spreading the conflagration, and perpetrating deeds which may be imagined but which cannot be described. Then might be seen the families of rich and poor flying from their burning houses, half naked, but endeavouring to save some remnants of their property and seeking refuge with neighbours whose houses, still standing, were soon to be involved in similar ruin. Nearly every house, excepting those retained as head-quarters by the superior generals, was first ransacked and then burned ; an insatiable lust of plunder had seized on the troops, whilst their evil passions had been stimulated by intoxication. Men were murdered in the streets, the rooms of the sick and dying were invaded, and the ornaments and even bedding carried away. The wives and daughters of the white population were insulted, and the greater portion

of the black domestic servants horribly maltreated. Some few of the officers and men tried to stop these disgraceful scenes; General Sherman, Howard, and others endeavoured to collect a disciplined force to extinguish the flames: but even the accounts of Federal writers acknowledge that no sufficiently energetic steps were taken to repress the vile tumult, or to protect the unarmed denizens of the city from the crowds of miscreants who, for a time, held absolute command over their lives and property.

The sack of Columbia must ever remain a standing disgrace on General Sherman's fame; nor can the statement made in his official report, but of which the truth is denied by General Wade Hampton, save him from the responsibility attending its incidents.* Granted

* The following is the statement made in General Sherman's official report:—

‘I disclaim, on the part of my army, any agency in this fire, but, on the contrary, claim that we saved what of Columbia remains unconsumed. And, without hesitation, I charge General Wade Hampton with having burned his own city of Columbia, not with a malicious intent, or as the manifestation of a silly “Roman stoicism,” but from folly and want of sense, in filling it with lint, cotton, and tinder. Our officers and men on duty worked well to extinguish the flames; but others not on duty, including the officers who had long been imprisoned there, rescued by us, may have assisted in spreading the fire after it had once begun, and may have indulged in unconcealed joy to see the ruin of the capital of South Carolina.’

The following extract is from Captain Conyngham's book (*Sherman's March through the South*):—

‘I trust I shall never witness such a scene again: drunken soldiers rushing from house to house, emptying them of their valuables, and then firing them; negroes carrying off piles of booty, and grinning at the good chance, and exulting like so many demons; officers and men revelling in the wines and liquors until the burning houses buried them in their drunken orgies.’

that neither he nor any of his superior officers gave orders for, or were cognisant of, the setting fire to the town ; granted even that bales of cotton were smouldering when his advanced guard entered the city ; conceding these points, it must still be held that a general in command of a disciplined army, and occupying a city with organised forces detailed for that especial purpose, must be considered responsible for the permission of acts committed by his own officers and men not on actual duty, and by the miscreants who form the camp followers of every large army. But, in truth, the previous licence permitted to the Federal soldiery sufficiently explains their acts when in possession of a large and rich city ; nor can it be a matter of wonder that men accustomed to consider every mansion, farm-house, and barn as lawful prey for plunder and destruction, should fail to distinguish between them and the buildings of a city which unhappily had fallen under their power. The depopulation and subsequent burning of Atlanta may be excused on military grounds ; the destruction of the resources of Georgia may possibly receive a similar defence ; but the sack of Columbia, an open city, where

The subjoined extract, on the same subject, is taken from *Sherman and his Campaigns*, by Colonel S. M. Bowman and Lieut.-Colonel R. B. Irwin, p. 353 :—

‘ While in South Carolina the troops exercised scarcely any restraint with respect to the property of the inhabitants, plundering and destroying without stint—they regarded the people of this State as a body, and practically without exception, as life-long enemies of the Union, and conceived that upon the army devolved the duty of punishing them for their sins. So general and deeply-seated was this impression, on the part of officers and men, that it was often impossible for their commanders to control the manifestation of it ; but from the moment of entering North Carolina, the whole demeanour of the army changed, and the men yielded with alacrity to the customary restraints of discipline.’

the inhabitants, after the retreat of Wade Hampton's cavalry, had shown no opposition to the entry of the Federal troops, must ever be numbered among the crimes which bring disgrace on armies, and, collaterally, on the nations in whose employ they are.

On the following morning little remained of the city but the few houses occupied as head-quarters by the superior officers. Rows of still smoking ruins marked the places where the shops, the mansions of wealthy citizens, and the schools once stood; the capital, including its library and State archives, was burned; General Wade Hampton's house, situated a short distance beyond the city, was wantonly fired; and the convent, where many of the daughters of Northern parents were receiving education, unable on account of the war to return to their homes, was consumed in the conflagration. On the two following days (the 18th and 19th of February) the arsenal, railway depôts, and factories were destroyed by regularly organised parties, and on the 20th, Sherman, abandoning the ruins of Columbia, and leaving behind him the miserable remnants of a once happy population, marched northwards to Winnsboro, where the infantry was concentrated prior to a further advance on Fayetteville.

The cavalry, under Kilpatrick, had, in the meantime, by feinting on Augusta, detained Wheeler in the vicinity of that city, and then keeping on the left and to the westward of the main column, had watched Cheatham's force coming from Mississippi, hindering its march, and causing it to diverge north of Columbia towards Charlotte, on which town Beauregard and Wade Hampton were retreating.

Contemporary with, and consequent on, these events, was the evacuation by General Hardee of the city of

Charleston.* As a result of the occupation by the Federal forces of Branchville, communication had been severed between that city and Augusta and Columbia. By the advance on Columbia, and the passage of the Congaree and Santee rivers, the roads into the interior had been intercepted, and the only remaining railway, viz. that to Florence and Cheraw, menaced. At this crisis in the fate of the Confederacy, to shut up 11,000 men within the defences of Charleston, even supposing they should be able to continue a resistance against attacks from the land as well as from the sea-side, would obviously have been most unwise ; therefore, no course remained for Hardee but to withdraw as speedily as was possible to Cheraw, in order to unite with Beauregard on some point well in front of Sherman's army, where a line of defence might be taken up to oppose the further advance of the invader from South into North Carolina. No time was to be lost, as the rapid march of Sherman's columns threatened soon to bring them on the railway to Cheraw, and, consequently, if the evacuation was to take place, it must be at once. Better would it have been had it been executed sooner.

It was on the night of the 17th of February, on the very night that the State capital of South Carolina was delivered over to the violence of the Federal soldiery, that the more important city of Charleston was in flames. Those flames were not kindled by the shells from the Federal batteries, but were the result of the determination of the remnants of the population, composed almost entirely of Hardee's soldiers, to leave

* The evacuation of Charleston was conducted under General M'Laws's superintendence, General Hardee being ill at the time. General Beauregard expressed his approval of the creditable manner in which the arrangements were carried out.

as little of the city as was possible to serve as a trophy to the enemy. The government stores, the railway depôts, the ironclads in the harbour, were fired or blown up, the guns on the ramparts were burst, and the upper portion of the city, which had escaped the shells from the Swamp Angel and other batteries, given over to the flames. Then, amidst the explosions of ammunition, the fall of burning houses, and the cries of such of the population, mostly negroes, who still sought shelter among the ruins of the houses of the once rich merchants, the rear-guard of Hardee's army departed by the railway to Cheraw. Only 9,000 men composed this small force; 2,000, mostly mechanics of the city, refused to leave, and remained concealed among the houses and the ruins until the arrival of General Gillmore's forces.

On the morning of the 18th February, the Federals, unaware until the sound of the explosions and the light of the conflagration gave notice of the event, that the garrison had withdrawn, entered the city, hoisted the stars and stripes over the *débris* of the Forts of Sumter, Moultrie, and Ripley, and at once endeavoured with praiseworthy efforts to subdue the flames. Thus, after four years' resistance, and after enduring a siege of more or less vigour for upwards of two years, fell the city of Charleston, a fitting prelude to the approaching dissolution of the Confederacy, which she had done so much to originate, and for which she had fought so well.* The garrison with difficulty escaped capture by

* Out of the ten officers of the original garrison of Fort Sumter which surrendered to General Beauregard on the 13th of April 1861, six had subsequently become Generals, viz., Major Anderson, Surgeon Crawford, Captain Doubleday, Captain T. Seymour, Fort Lieutenant Jeff. C. Davis, and Captain J. S. Forster.

Sherman's right wing, already pushed forward from Columbia; but ultimately, falling back on Fayetteville and Goldsboro, and uniting with the troops from Wilmington, effected a junction with the remnants of the Army of the West, now concentrated under the command of General Johnston.

Necessarily following on the determination to collect a force to oppose Sherman's onward progress, and to prevent his junction or co-operation with the armies before Petersburg, was the withdrawal of the garrison from Wilmington. As a seaport, the town had been rendered valueless by the fall of Fort Fisher, and its retention up to the present time had been the result of a disinclination on the part of the Confederate government to give up another of the few remaining towns which were still under its sway, and to surrender a position important as commanding the rail to Goldsboro and Raleigh. But notwithstanding these inducements to hold the place, Sherman's advance through the interior of South Carolina with the apparent object of reopening communications with the sea, together with the presence in front of Wilmington of Schofield's corps from the West, rendered the retreat into the interior of the troops under Hoke's command, as necessary as the withdrawal from Charleston of Hardee's force.

In mid-winter, with the whole of its artillery and horses, the 23rd corps, under Schofield, had been brought from Clifton on the Tennessee River, by water and by rail, to Washington, and from thence to the coast of North Carolina, affording an instance of the wonderful power of transportation possessed by the Northern States, and of the perfection to which their military organisation had attained. With this army, joined to the garrison of Fort Fisher, and to the troops

long stationed on the South Carolinian coast, Schofield prepared to carry out the portion of the plan which had been assigned to him, and by marching on Goldsboro, to make preparations, in anticipation of General Sherman's arrival, to open communication with it from the coast.

Thus, during the third week of February, the position of the contending forces in the Carolinas was as follows :—On the Federal side Sherman was pushing forward from Columbia, his real objective points being Fayetteville and Goldsboro, but disguising his design by threatening pursuit with his cavalry and left wing along the road to Charlotte; whilst Schofield, in command of the department of North Carolina, was besieging Wilmington, and preparing, when he had effected its capture, to open communication with Fayetteville by the Cape Fear River, and to move in two columns, one from Wilmington, the other from Newberne, on Goldsboro. On the other hand, the Confederate forces, separated by Sherman's rapid march on and from Columbia, were seeking some point of concentration where, under Johnston, reinstated at this extremity in command, they might deliver battle, and at one blow rob the enemy of the advantages he had gained by his bold and energetic operations. The railway from Columbia through Charlotte, Salisbury, Greensboro, and so to Raleigh and Goldsboro, gave them means of transport, which diminished the evils caused by the wide separation of the points from which their troops were converging. Cheatham, Wade Hampton, and Wheeler were moving on Charlotte; Hardee, informed as far as was possible by Beauregard of the onward progress of the enemy, was marching on Cheraw; Stevenson's small force was retreating before Sherman's

right wing in the same direction, and Hoke, by defending Wilmington and the rail from Newberne, to Goldsboro, was seeking to detain Schofield on the coast until the concentration of the Confederate forces had been completed near the frontiers of North and South Carolina.

But the energy evinced by Schofield in his previous campaigns, and in the prosecution of his journey from the Tennessee to the Cape Fear River, gave a promise which was not belied by his operations at Wilmington. As soon as each division of his corps arrived from Washington, or rather Alexandria, where the vessels which were to convey the troops had been detained by the ice on the Potomac, it was landed and pushed forward against the lines still held by the Confederate general near the mouth of the Cape Fear River, covering Wilmington. Cox's division, and the garrison of Fort Fisher, under Terry, were first employed, and being joined by Ames's division, succeeded in turning the first line of works, and in forcing Hoke to retreat to the inner defences on Town Creek. These, on the 20th of February, were in turn outflanked, and on the 22nd, Wilmington was entered by the Federal forces, Hoke retreating on Goldsboro after the destruction of the steamers, cotton, and government stores.*

Thus Schofield obtained possession of an important base of operation against Goldsboro, and of the channel of the Cape Fear River, which afterwards rendered service as a means of conveying supplies to Sherman's army. But although holding the terminus of the Goldsboro rail, he was unprovided with rolling stock, and almost devoid of waggons, his own having been left

* See *Sherman and his Campaigns*, by Colonel S. W. Bowman and Lieutenant-Colonel R. B. Irwin, for a more full account of the capture of Wilmington.

behind in Tennessee. Therefore he resolved to move forward in two columns, one from Wilmington, the other from Newberne, and transporting a portion of the 23rd corps to the latter port, ordered an advance as soon as the proper supply of transport could be received. General Cox, who had distinguished himself at Wilmington, was selected to command at Newberne, and General Couch appointed to lead the co-operating column from Wilmington.

However, notwithstanding every effort, February and the first week in March had almost passed before sufficient transportation had been obtained, and consequently before the columns could advance. In the meantime, Sherman, with the main army, was continuing his desolating march through South Carolina, meeting with but little opposition, excepting from the natural difficulties of a thinly-populated country, increased by the heavy falls of rain, which swelled the rivers and flooded the marshes. Having advanced northwards to Winnsboro, a small town where many of the refugees from the various cities occupied or destroyed by the Federal armies had sought a home, Sherman turned eastwards, directing his columns on Cheraw in place of on Charlotte. It had become necessary to reopen communications with the sea; the stores carried with the army were already nearly consumed, and the sparse cultivation among the pine forests of central South Carolina afforded the foragers but scant means of replenishing the supplies from the resources of the country. Then were the Federal troops called upon to tax their utmost energies; streams and rivers had to be bridged over, and long miles of marsh corduroyed with felled trees; forced marches had to be made, and obstacles which would have

afforded at other times excuse for delay overcome by extraordinary exertions. The Catawba River was crossed; the hilly country near Hanging Rock, famous as the scene of a battle in the old revolutionary war, passed; bridges were thrown over Lynch Creek, and on the 2nd and 3rd of March the left wing entered Chesterfield, the centre and right Cheraw. At this latter place were captured many of the guns (to the number of 25) which had been brought from Charleston prior to its evacuation, and which had been abandoned, together with a considerable store of ammunition, by Hardee on his retreat across the Great Pedee River.

For two or three days Sherman remained at Cheraw despatching parties of cavalry and infantry to destroy the railways on his flanks, which work was not performed without opposition, and sometimes disaster. The enemy's cavalry was alert, and in the case of the detachment sent to tear up the rail to Florence, gave a good account of the invaders, and, supported by the infantry of Hardee's force, repulsed them with considerable loss. But Hardee continued his retreat, burning the bridges over the Great Pedee River, and placing the Cape Fear River between himself and Sherman. As the latter advanced the point of concentration for the Confederate army was pushed further and further to the north, many defensible positions were abandoned, and vast tracts of country yielded up to the enemy. The means at the disposal of General Johnston would not permit him to hazard an engagement with any force less than the whole remaining strength of the old Army of the West, united with the garrisons of the seaports, and these scattered troops could not be collected south of the Cape Fear River.

Hardee therefore retreated; and Sherman having crossed the Great Pedee on the 6th of March, massed his columns on the left bank, and marched on Fayetteville, Kilpatrick with the cavalry continuing to protect the left flank. This duty he performed effectively; but in making an attempt to cut off Wade Hampton from Hardee's retreating infantry, involved himself in an engagement of which the consequences threatened to be most disastrous, and which only his own courage partially averted. Learning that the Confederate cavalry was at some distance in rear of the infantry, and hoping to intercept its march and prevent a junction, he divided his force into three detachments, and occupied, on the night of the 8th of March, the roads by which Wade Hampton would probably advance. But that officer was not unaware of the enemy's movements; he had discovered his intention, and determined to take advantage of the division of his forces. Whilst, therefore, attracting the attention of one of the detached brigades with his skirmishers, he united the larger portion of his cavalry on the most western of the three roads, and although only reaching the position, after a long march, at 2 A.M., prepared for an attack at daylight on the same day. Then putting himself at the head of Butler's division, Wade Hampton led his cavalry in person, and charging down the road surprised and routed the Federals, took possession of the head-quarters, captured Colonel Spencer and several of Kilpatrick's staff, and scattered in all directions the Federal horse. Kilpatrick on foot succeeded in reaching the camp of the cavalry in the rear, but only to find the men fighting, but fighting in retreat, for their guns and animals. In a swamp, five hundred yards further back, the general succeeded in

rallying the fugitives, and immediately led them forward against the enemy now engaged in plundering the tents. Animated by the presence and conduct of their commander, the Federals attacked vigorously, regained possession of the camp, retook some of their artillery,* and turning the guns on the enemy, surprised at this sudden reverse of fortune, in some measure restored the fortunes of the day. The position was then quickly entrenched and held until a brigade of infantry came to the assistance of the cavalry.† This was one of the last efforts of the Confederate horse. On both sides the action had been characterised by the courage of the combatants. Wade Hampton's advance was described by Kilpatrick as the most formidable charge he had ever witnessed, and was effective in breaking through the opposition to his march ; whilst, although scattered by the impetuosity of the attack, the manner in which the Federals rallied and resumed the offensive, proves them to have been possessed of the qualities of good and veteran soldiers, and their general to have been a man of considerable resource.

Encountering little or no resistance, the main army reached the right bank of the Cape Fear River on the 8th of March, from whence two couriers, despatched by General Sherman to Wilmington, conveyed to the Northern people the welcome intelligence of the safety and success of their Western army. Until the arrival of this authentic report, the vague and one-sided statements of Southern newspapers had alone given indi-

* It is a little doubtful whether the artillery was retaken by Kilpatrick ; probably only a few of the guns were recaptured.

† Vide *Kilpatrick and his Cavalry*, by James Moore, M.D. ; also *Sherman and his Campaigns*.

cations of the progress of the march, and deep was the joy, and fervent were the congratulations of those who, whether nationally or personally interested in the fate of the great army, now received the information that it was emerging uninjured and successful from the very heart of the seceding States.

Between the 8th and the 12th of March the several corps were occupied in throwing bridges across the Cape Fear River, and in concentrating on Fayetteville. Communication was opened with Wilmington by means of the river, and the army received supplies, and sent back in return the sick and wounded, together with large numbers of negro and other refugees who had joined, and who now encumbered, the line of march. Sherman knew that a considerable force in command of General Johnston was in his front, and that it would not be long before he would be called upon again to try strength with his old antagonist, whom, more than any other general of the Confederacy, he had learned to respect. As long as her armies remained in the field the power of the South was not broken: her territory might be wasted, and her seaports occupied, but whilst Lee and Johnston commanded forces which, although reduced in numbers, were still formidable, and from their near approach to each other might by rapid concentration become dangerous, the conquest of the Confederacy was unaffected and the prospects of peace remote.

By the destruction of internal communication, by the capture of Charleston and Wilmington, and by the moral effect produced on both North and South by the almost unopposed march of the Western army through Georgia and the Carolinas, an important advance towards ultimate triumph had been made; but the finishing

stroke which was to perfect the work, required the exercise of the greatest care, and necessitated a combination of wise caution and energetic action, together with a perfect accord between the generals of the several armies and the commanders of the frequently detached corps. On the Confederate side, the junction of Hardee from Charleston, and Hoke from Wilmington, had been nearly effected ; whilst in the vicinity of Raleigh, under Johnston in person, was concentrating the infantry of the old Army of the West, Beauregard being engaged in pushing forward the several divisions as they arrived at Charlotte. The preponderance of numbers was largely in favour of the Federals, but General Johnston possessed the advantage of interior lines, interposing between Sherman at Fayetteville, on the Cape Fear River, and Schofield in front of Goldsboro, on the Neuse River ; and it only remained to be seen whether he could concentrate a force sufficient to prevent the junction of these two armies.

The march from the sea-coast to Kingston on the Neuse River had been performed by General Schofield between the 6th and 11th of March. Couch with two divisions had advanced from Wilmington, and Cox, with a mixed force of about equal numbers, had moved from Newberne. But the passage through the forests and swamps of North Carolina had not been effected without great difficulty, and to the natural obstacles of the country had been superadded the formidable opposition of Hoke's forces.* On the 8th, as the column from Newberne was approaching Kingston, Generals Hoke and D. H. Hill had attacked it vigorously in front and on its left flank, and cutting off the advanced.

* General Hoke's forces, including Whiting and the Wilmington garrison, numbered little over 4,000 men.

brigade, had captured 1,500 prisoners. But Schofield, who was present with Cox's column, although checked, was neither defeated nor disheartened. He entrenched himself strongly, awaiting the arrival of the co-operating column from Wilmington; and when Bragg in person led forward against him Hoke's and Hill's forces, reinforced by portions of the Western army, he encountered them behind his breastworks, and repulsing them with heavy loss, forced them to retire across the Neuse River, and to burn the bridges to delay his onward march.* On the following day, Couch, with the column from Wilmington, arrived, and on the 14th of March Schofield entered Kingston, Bragg having retired towards the position occupied by Johnston, who was preparing to oppose Sherman's advance from Fayetteville.

To reach Goldsboro, to unite with Schofield, and to reopen easy communication with the sea, were Sherman's present objects. Goldsboro had been the point indicated before he had left Savannah, and thither he was now prepared to advance. By means of the Cape Fear River and Wilmington he communicated with Schofield, ordering him to press forward to Goldsboro, and to meet him there on the 20th of March, and then having completely destroyed the arsenal at Fayetteville,† he abandoned the town and recommenced his march. The weather continued very bad, and to use the words of his report, 'the roads had become mere quagmire and almost every foot had to be corduroyed to admit the passage of wheels.' He

* See an article in the *Army and Navy Journal* of March 18, 1865; also General Schofield's report, and *Sherman and his Campaigns*.

† The arsenal was removed in 1861 from Harper's Ferry to Fayetteville, when the armoury at the former place was burnt.

expected an attack on his left flank, and thither he despatched Kilpatrick, supported by Slocum (who commanded the infantry of the left wing), whilst he held the right wing in readiness as a reserve, sending the heavy trains under a strong escort by the direct road to Goldsboro on the right of the main columns of march. These precautions were not unnecessary.

Hardee was on his left front prepared to delay his progress until Johnston, having united his forces, could bring the whole strength of the Confederate army to dispute his further advance. But the weather, although so far serviceable to the Confederate cause—inasmuch as it delayed the march of Sherman's columns—was equally unpropitious to General Johnston, who, from various and distant points, was collecting an army unprovided with depôts, arsenals, or the means of repairing arms, gun-carriages, saddlery or clothes. The various cities in the interior and on the sea-coast, which had hitherto supplied the troops, had successively fallen into the hands of the enemy. Richmond and Lynchburg were taxed beyond their strength for the Army of Virginia, and for the Western army no town remained which could furnish the requirements so essential to the well-being and even to the existence of modern armies. Nevertheless, active operations, and those without delay, were absolutely necessary, otherwise Sherman, united with Schofield, would be firmly established on a new base, where every supply needful for his troops could be brought from the wealthy North, and where in direct communication with Grant he could organise a plan for a combined campaign. Therefore Hardee stationed his small force between the Cape Fear and the South River, on Sherman's left flank, and the latter, advertised of his presence by

Kilpatrick's cavalry, which had been skirmishing with the rear-guard during the 15th, determined to attack him, with the double purpose of securing the possession of the westernmost of the Goldsboro roads, and of leading Johnston to suppose that Raleigh, rather than Goldsboro, was his objective point.

The engagement of Averysboro, so called from the vicinity of the small town of that name, was fought on the following day, the 16th of March. The left wing of the Federal army (viz. two divisions of the 20th, and one of the 14th corps) was alone engaged, and its efforts were directed to force the several breast-works erected and held by the old garrison of Charleston. There Rhett's artillery, serving as infantry, distinguished themselves, and the action continued during the whole day, Hardee maintaining his position until nightfall, and covering the passage of his trains which were engaged in crossing the Cape Fear River, on their march to Raleigh. During the night he retired, and united with Johnston near Smithfield, between Raleigh and Goldsboro.

On the following day, one division of the Federal left wing (Ward's) was pushed forward through Averysboro to keep up a show of pursuit in the direction of Raleigh, whilst the remainder of the wing moved slowly towards Bentonville, covering the march of the right wing and of the long baggage trains, wearily struggling through the mud to Goldsboro. The movement was continued during the 18th of March, and the head-quarters, which were with the left wing, encamped at night on the cross roads to Goldsboro and Smithville, at the distance of twenty-seven miles from the former place. Then Sherman, supposing that no further opposition would be offered

to his march, and leaving Slocum with the left wing to cover the passage of the remainder of the army over the Neuse, joined General Howard, whose advance had reached the river, but whose rear, owing to the condition of the roads, was some miles further back in the direction of Fayetteville. He was anxious to communicate with Schofield, who was already at Kingston, marching on Goldsboro.

Well was it for him that, although not expecting an attack, he had yet made preparations to receive one. Whilst he was conversing with Howard, the sound of artillery on his left rear gave notice that Slocum was engaged. At first it was reported that it was only an affair with the enemy's cavalry, but soon staff officers riding up announced that the left wing had been attacked by a heavy force, that its advanced brigades had been driven back, and that three guns were lost. Johnston with his concentrated force composed of Hardee's and the Western troops, numbering in all with the cavalry less than 20,000 men,* had made a fierce attack from Bentonville, and Slocum, perceiving that an affair of importance was imminent, had deployed the four divisions immediately at hand, and strengthened his position with the usual breastworks. With these troops he repulsed six successive attacks, inflicting heavy loss on the assailants, and employing his artillery, which far outnumbered that of the enemy, to good purpose. Until nightfall he held his ground, and then two divisions of his own

* Viz. Stuart's and Cheatham's corps of about 4,000, Hardee's corps 8,000, and Hampton's cavalry 5,000. Hoke's forces did not join General Johnston until after the engagement at Bentonville, and Hampton's cavalry was scattered over a wide extent of country. —Information derived from General Beauregard.

wing and one of Howard's coming up in support, he raised more formidable entrenchments and rendered his position secure.

On the morning of the 20th of March, whilst the left wing thus stood at bay, the right under Howard leaving the trains in charge of Terry's division of Schofield's army, moved up the right bank of the Neuse River, and connected itself with Slocum's left. Johnston, who had failed in his design of overwhelming the left or exposed wing of Sherman's army, had assumed a strong defensive attitude, with his own left thrown back and both flanks resting on marshes. Thus the two armies were entrenched in front of each other; but whilst Sherman's army proper outnumbered considerably that under Johnston's command, Schofield, who had already reached Goldsboro, and had thrown a bridge across the Neuse River ten miles above the town, now brought up as a strong reinforcement the two corps under his especial command.

To deliver battle was not however General Sherman's intention; his men required rest, and his supplies needed replenishing. The object of the campaign had been attained, and safely posted on a new and secure base, he was in a position to act in direct combination with the forces on the James River, and to prepare measures for the final campaign. Therefore he was contented so to operate as to compel the enemy's retreat, and on the 21st of March directed Mower's division of the 17th corps to threaten General Johnston's communications, whilst he engaged his attention by a somewhat ostentatious attack against his front. During the whole day, in the midst of pouring rain, the action was prolonged; Mower nearly succeeded in gaining possession of the bridge at Mill Creek in the direct rear of

the Confederate army; and General Johnston, perceiving his line of retreat to be threatened, withdrew during the night to Smithfield, abandoning his pickets and his wounded. On the 22nd of March the pursuit was pushed forward for a short distance, but discontinued by order of General Sherman, who, satisfied with the results of the campaign, withdrew his army to Goldsboro, encamped it in the vicinity of the town, and took measures for repairing the rails and bridges to Newberne and Wilmington, as also for collecting supplies in view of renewed operations. He himself, leaving General Schofield in command, proceeded at once to City Point, where, in conjunction with the President, Generals Grant, Meade, Ord and others, the spring campaign was debated on, and measures arranged for the final overthrow of the Confederate power.

The results of the operations in the Carolinas may be best summed up in the words of General Sherman's report, who writes:—'In general terms we have traversed the country from Savannah to Goldsboro, with an average breadth of forty miles, consuming all the forage; cattle, hogs, sheep, poultry, cured meat, corn meal, &c. The public enemy, instead of drawing supplies from that region to feed his armies, will be compelled to send provisions from other quarters to feed the inhabitants. Of course the abandonment to us by the enemy of the whole sea-coast, from Savannah to Newberne (North Carolina), with its forts, dockyards, gunboats, &c., was a necessary incident to our occupation and destruction of the inland routes of travel and supply. But the real object of the march was to place this army in a position easy of supply, whence it could take an appropriate part in the spring and summer campaign of 1865. This was completely accomplished

on March 21st, by the junction of the three armies and occupation of Goldsboro.'

Thus in a few words does General Sherman recapitulate the results of a campaign which, whilst bringing renown to himself and his troops, had carried ruin, misery, and desolation to the inhabitants of the country in a degree seldom equalled in modern times. Political hatred had been added to military licence in the dealings of the soldiery with the people of South Carolina ; and Sherman, whilst careful of his own troops and personally just in his conduct even as regarded the enemy, exercised little control over the men under his command, apparently satisfied if the end proposed—viz., the complete destruction of the country as a means of supply for the forces of the Confederacy—should be attained, at whatever cost to the *morale* of his troops, or to the welfare and even existence of non-combatants.

Whether, as is usually held to be the case, the Western army had degenerated in its fighting qualities from its unbridled licence, there is little means of judging. From Savannah to Fayetteville Sherman had met with but slight resistance ; Beauregard, unable to collect an army, had been obliged to abandon the most defensible positions, and to yield a country which might possibly have been disputed, if not occupied, had more energetic and vigorous measures been adopted by those who ruled the Confederacy. The evacuation of Charleston was deferred too long, consequently the Edisto was undefended, and Sherman, marching through the heart of South Carolina, had compelled the Western forces and those from the sea-coast to form a junction far north of the country, which, had it been possible to defend, might have claimed protection as a right due

to a State which had sacrificed so much for the cause. Even supposing Charleston to have been sooner evacuated, and its garrison added to Beauregard's forces, it may still be questioned whether Sherman's march could have been long hindered. His numbers were so large, his army so well commanded and organised, that the power at his disposal would seem to have been sufficient to sweep back any opposition which Beauregard might have been able to organise; whilst the Federal occupation of Charleston, in a minor but somewhat similar degree to that of Wilmington, would have allowed a flank attack against the defenders of the Edisto and Santee rivers.

In truth, at this period, the South was exhausted in men and means, whilst of her citizens many had lost heart. In her finances she was hopelessly insolvent. Her means of communication with Europe had been cut off; her cities and manufactories for warlike stores had been captured; her railways had been broken up; her provisions, cattle and horses almost exhausted, and her once united territory divided into several fractions by the march southwards of the Federal armies of the Mississippi and of the Ohio. The resources, still great, of the trans-Mississippi States were, from distance and the absence of communication, valueless; and from a want of decision and vigour in her government, carried on in the trammels of constitutional restraints, she was deprived of the assistance of a large portion of her population, and was forced to listen to the debates of theorists when her whole strength should have been concentrated in vigorous action.

The later incidents of Sherman's march, when he had reached the confines of North Carolina, may be usefully studied, as showing the unabated care, watch-

fulness and energy which a great general will continue to exercise even when success seems to have crowned his efforts ; whilst Schofield's co-operating movements from Wilmington and Newberne afford evidence of the unity of action which at this time existed in the several departments of the grand army under Sherman's control.

The character of the Commander-in-Chief of the West had impressed itself on the officers who served under him, and his tireless energy, his impatience of difficulties, and singleness of purpose, had communicated themselves to the component parts of the forces which, led by men trained in his school, co-operated with his main army. On the other hand, the last efforts of Beauregard and Johnston, the self-sacrifice of Cheatham's, Hardee's, and Hoke's troops, their laborious marches, and continuous fighting in retreat, must ever excite the admiration of those who can appreciate high qualities in the vanquished, and can turn from the brilliant glare of success to seek for apparently fruitless heroism in the shadows of disaster.

And now, to complete the circle of events, we must leave the Army of the West cantoned around Goldsboro, whilst we follow the fortunes of those of the Potomac and the James, still beleaguering the two cities which had so long repelled their efforts, and occupying ground which, since the very commencement of the war, had been the scene of repeated battles and of the ever-varying phases of victory and defeat.

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE FINAL CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA.

IN the positions of the armies facing each other on the banks of the James there had been little or no changes since the last days of the old year witnessed the sanguinary conflicts in the woods around the Weldon railway. More than one attempt had been made by General Grant to extend his left, and to gain possession of the Danville rail, whilst Warren with the 5th corps had been employed in destroying for eighteen miles to the southward the Weldon railway, which, although held in certain places by the Federals, had continued to be of service for the conveyance of provisions to Petersburg, the waggons meeting the trains at points below the Federal posts.

During the first days of February there were signs in the camps of the Army of the Potomac that active hostilities, which had almost ceased for two months, were about to recommence on an extended scale. The railway from City Point was diligently employed in carrying warlike stores to the front and towards the left, the cars bringing back in their return journeys the sick and the surplus baggage; and these preliminary measures were followed on the 5th of February by a heavy bombardment which was kept up along the lines held by the 6th and 9th corps. At the same time the 5th corps (Warren), the 2nd (Humphries),† and Gregg's dragoons

* *Vide* Map II., commencement of vol., and Map, p. 258.

† General Hancock had been sent north to raise a fresh corps

were detached, following the plan of former expeditions, to turn the Confederate works at Hatcher's Run. Then were renewed the tactics which characterised nearly all operations around Petersburg. The cavalry, acting dismounted, made a wide circuit around the left, until Hampton's men interposed to bar further progress. The infantry forced the passage of Hatcher's Run with little opposition, but becoming entangled among the numerous but bad roads, the thick second growth of pines, and the swamps and half-cleared fields, offered points of attack to their more active opponents, who, falling on an exposed flank, or forcing a way between disconnected divisions, inflicted severe loss, themselves suffering greatly as they emerged into the open, or arrived, disorganised by success, in front of the quickly-raised entrenchments of the reserves. Thus the Federals, attacked by portions of Hill's and Gordon's commands, were repulsed and driven back from the vicinity of the Boydton turnpike to Hatcher's Run, losing many officers, and about 2,000 in killed, wounded, and missing, the enemy suffering considerably, but, according to the Federal accounts, in proportion to their own troops of about one half. In this engagement, whilst leading the attack, fell General Pegram, as well known and as highly esteemed in the Army of Virginia, as he was deeply regretted by all ranks of society in Richmond.*

d'armée, and had been succeeded in command of his own corps by General Humphries, an officer formerly of the topographical engineers, and who, it will be remembered, had greatly distinguished himself at Fredericksburg.

* The following extract is taken from the letter of the special correspondent of the *Times*, dated Richmond, February 16:—

‘But in this opening skirmish of 1865 there fell an officer whose death has plunged the whole of this affectionate little city into unusual grief. General John Pegram, formerly of the old United States army, had served throughout the war both with the Eastern and

Although to meet these assaults against his right, General Lee had been forced considerably to diminish the defenders of the lines nearer Petersburg, nothing excepting a bombardment had been attempted by the 6th and 9th corps ; a few miles of country gained by the Federal left wing being considered sufficient recompense for the efforts made and the loss sustained. The troops entrenched themselves strongly in the new position, and erected tall observatories in the woods to overlook the country, which, owing to its difficult character, could not be explored by *reconnaissances*. Then the armies lapsed into their former state of inactivity, the cold and rain of February precluding any desire for active campaigning, and the Federal war policy pointing rather to the advisability of retaining, with the forces before Petersburg, a strong defensive attitude, whilst the Western army marched forward in its more brilliant career of conquest.

Nevertheless the cavalry of Sheridan could not be suffered to remain idle ; 10,000 well equipped horsemen were encamped in the lower Shenandoah ; the greater portion of the defenders of the valley had been withdrawn to counterbalance the reinforcements furnished to the Army of the Potomac by the 6th corps, and there was other work to be performed by this formidable force of cavalry, than that of devastating an unresisting country, or guarding a territory no longer exposed to

Western Confederate armies, had proved himself a brave soldier, and was specially dear to the people of Richmond as one of the members of a family long resident in this city, and esteemed wherever it is known. Upon the 19th of January all that was gay and bright in Richmond flocked to his wedding ; three weeks later many a sorrowful and anguished mourner followed his body to its honoured and glorious grave.

the danger of attack. Whilst, therefore, Hancock was placed in command of the lower Shenandoah, with headquarters at Winchester, Sheridan and his troopers rode rapidly up the valley, struck the Richmond and Lynchburg rail, which they thoroughly destroyed, routed Early, who with little more than 1,000 men tried to bar their progress, captured large numbers of prisoners, comprising several soldiers on furlough from Lee's army, who were scattered throughout the country, broke down the locks on the James River canal, and found supplies for man and horse in the fertile districts from which Richmond and its defenders were mainly provisioned.

Thus far the preconcerted scheme had been successfully carried out, but the sudden rise of the James River, and the destruction of the bridges by the Confederates, prevented Sheridan from extending his raid southward, and joining Sherman's army in North Carolina; therefore abandoning a further advance, and satisfied that once and for ever he had dispersed all aggressive power in the Shenandoah, he turned his horse eastwards, marched on the Pamunkey, and finally joined Grant's army on the James on the 24th of March.

Now could all men perceive that unless some great and unexpected stroke was dealt by the Commander-in-Chief of the Confederacy, the ultimate defeat, destruction, or surrender of the two great armies of the South must be at hand, and this notwithstanding the still bold front which Johnston continued to present to Sherman, and Lee to Grant. The several converging armies of the Federal States were encircling the last strongholds of the Confederacy. Sherman was already at Goldsboro, Schofield was marching on the same point, Stoneman was advancing towards Lynchburg,

whilst Sheridan, by his destruction of the Lynchburg rail and James River canal, had deprived Richmond of its principal channel of supply.

One last hope remained. Could the two armies which, although few in numbers, included in their ranks the ablest officers and staunchest men of the South, unite, and taking advantage of their position and their interior lines of communication, fall in turn now upon the troops of the West, then upon the Army of the Potomac, possibly even at this last hour victory might again crown the colours of the Confederacy, and peace on better terms than those usually awarded by conquerors to the conquered might be obtained.

But to effect this, risks must be encountered, sacrifices must be made. In the presence of overwhelming forces, to withdraw either the Army of Virginia or that of the Carolinas for the purpose of effecting the junction aimed at, was an operation of danger, whilst such a retreat would open a considerable extent of country to the enemy, and, in the case of the Army of Virginia, would entail the evacuation and surrender of Petersburg and Richmond. Nevertheless the present position of affairs could not be maintained. The troops during the winter had been on short rations, and Sheridan's raid had still further tended to isolate Richmond and Petersburg from their means of supply; desertions were of frequent occurrence, and owing to the intersection of the Confederacy by the armies of the North, recruits could not be obtained, whilst even if General Lee might still continue to present a firm front to the armies of the Potomac and the James, there seemed little or no reasonable hope that Johnston would long be able to resist the converging forces under Sherman's command. The

roads were improving, the winter weather was giving place to spring, and one obstruction to the movement of armies, especially to those poorly furnished with draught and artillery horses, was removed. Could a heavy blow be inflicted on Grant, and his forces be so crippled as to delay pursuit, the withdrawal of the Army of Virginia from Petersburg and Richmond might be safely effected and a junction made with the Army of the Carolinas, which would thus again bring into the field a formidable force for an active campaign. Lee and Johnston combined might be able to deal with Sherman and Schofield, and then turn with the prestige of success on the armies under Meade and Ord.

Such seemed the last hope for the Confederacy, and taking advantage of the spring weather, whilst the Federal troops were parading for reviews in honour of a visit from President Lincoln, Lee commenced the final campaign by a bold and vigorous assault against the strong forts of the besieging army. For this work he selected the troops recently with Early in the valley, placing them under the command of Gordon, a man who with Mahone divides the glories of the last campaign of the Army of Virginia. It was resolved to assault Fort Steadman, the second work from the extreme right of the Federal defences resting on the Appomattox, and then sweeping the lines to the right and left to break the communication with City Point, destroy the depôts of the army, and force Grant to withdraw the mass of his forces which were concentrating in imposing strength opposite the Confederate right wing. This effected, an important road south of the Appomattox would be open for the march of Lee's army, and a safe means of communication gained, by

which he might arrive within easy distance of Johnston's forces.*

The point of attack presented features of imposing strength. Redoubts connected by parapets formed the first lines, whilst other forts and batteries in rear, armed with mortars, afforded effective support. For thirty miles these works extended; commencing on the right, north of the James, they stretched across Bermuda Hundred, where Ord, with the Army of the James, manned the parapets, then away south of the Appomattox as far as Hatcher's Run, where the 9th, 6th, 2nd, and 5th corps guarded the long line, whose flanks were protected by strong detachments of cavalry, of which the main body was held in reserve, husbanding the strength of men and horses for the spring campaign.

At dawn on the 25th of March, Lee made his attack. The opposing works were within one hundred and fifty yards of each other, and Gordon, with his own and Bushrod Johnson's divisions, was formed in rear of and concealed by the parapet, whilst all the disposable troops that could be gathered in from the feebly manned lines were drawn up in support. Passages through the obstructions in front of the Confederate works had already been cut, and soon after daybreak Gordon's men, having crossed the parapet and cautiously made their way through the *abattis*, with a rush dashed at the fort, completely surprised the garrison, captured it, and then, seizing the artillery, turned the guns on the flying Federals, on the troops manning the flanking parapets, and on the works in rear. Two mortar batteries were also taken, and Gordon at once moved forward to the assault of Fort Hascall, a work connected with the second line.

* See *Army of the Potomac*, Swinton, where the details of the operations are given very fully and accurately.

But although one brigade had been surprised, the other divisions of the 9th corps were alert and ready to defend their posts. The impetus of attack had been expended against Fort Steadman, the Confederate supports were slow in coming up, and after a feeble endeavour to carry Fort Hascall, Gordon withdrew to his first conquest, and endeavoured to reply to the concentrated fire now poured into the redoubt. Under cover of this fire, Hartranft's division advanced to the assault, determined to regain the work, and to wipe out the slur affixed on the 9th corps. Then Gordon's men, opposed by fresh troops and harassed and almost overwhelmed by the heavy artillery fire, sought to yield their conquest and to retire to their own lines, but the storm of shot, shell, and grape swept the approaches to the fort, and many, it is said to the number of nineteen hundred, unwilling to face the danger of retreat, surrendered themselves prisoners. Not content with recovering the lost fort, Meade, taking advantage of the *élan* induced by success, threw forward the 2nd and 6th corps, and succeeded in driving back the Confederates from their outer works, and in establishing himself in a position advantageous for future operations. Thus was a primary advantage converted into misfortune, whilst, in the incidents of the engagement, there were indications that the martial spirit of the Confederate troops was yielding to the constant and unintermittent strain to which it was exposed.

Two days after these occurrences, Sherman, who had united with Schofield at Goldsboro, and regained communication with the sea, arrived at City Point to consult with his Commander-in-Chief and old comrade in arms, on future and combined movements. In front of Petersburg, Mr. Lincoln, the president, General Grant, the

Commander-in-Chief, General Sherman, the victorious leader of the Western armies, General Meade, commanding the Army of the Potomac, and General Ord that of the James, met in conference to debate how the final campaign of the war should be conducted. The strength of the Federal armies they knew to be overwhelming, they saw that the power of the Confederacy, represented by the forces of Lee and Johnston, must inevitably fall, but to shorten the last efforts, to avoid further bloodshed, further expenditure and further desolation, they perceived that the junction of these two armies must be prevented, or that otherwise, with a compact force falling back on Lynchburg, General Lee might still present a formidable front and prolong the war through another summer.

General Sherman's army, concentrated around Goldsboro, was actively engaged in repairing the wear and tear of its long marches, and in perfecting its but recently opened communications with the sea, and although men and officers, imbued with their general's energy, were exerting themselves to the utmost, preparations for a forward movement could not be completed sooner than the 10th of April. Before that time the junction between Johnston and Lee might be effected. The former at and around Raleigh (North Carolina) was in possession of railway communication with Richmond, which would assist him in the transport of his trains; although for other purposes the Southern lines were now of little service. Supposing, therefore, he should fall back on Richmond and unite with Lee, what would be the result?

Grant, in command of numbers superior to both armies combined, could with ease hold his strong lines until Sherman, following Johnston, or marching by the

shorter road through Weldon, should bring the Western army on the flank of the Confederate forces at Petersburg. There, even if the difficulty of provisioning the combined army had not already obliged it to retire, the preponderance of force on the side of the Federals would necessitate a retrograde movement.

But the junction of Johnston with Lee was far less probable, as being less feasible or advantageous than the uniting of Lee's army with Johnston's, in the comparatively uninjured country around Lynchburg. To prevent this combination was General Grant's duty, and the fear lest his opponent, giving up his lines around Petersburg, should march by the Danville rail, and, uniting with Johnston, should necessitate new arrangements for a prolonged campaign, was the source of much anxiety to the Commander-in-Chief. To take the initiative and force Lee from his present position, so that, following the retiring troops; he might find opportunity for launching on them his numerous cavalry, seemed to General Grant the most sure means of preventing the enemy from choosing his own time and manner of retreat, and possibly of thus eluding the pursuit for a brief but important period. Could he follow Lee's army sufficiently rapidly to engage him before his junction with Johnston, the event could scarcely fail to be favourable to the Federal arms, and then Sherman, equipped for a renewal of his campaign, would be free to deal with the Army of the West, when a like result might, by all calculations based on numbers and power, be confidently expected.

For these reasons, General Grant determined to adhere to the day he had already fixed, the 29th of March, for the commencement of the Spring campaign.

Like a net, the converging forces of the North were encircling the seat of government and the last remaining forces of the Confederacy. Around Richmond and Petersburg were the armies of the James and the Potomac; on the Neuse River was Sherman, reinforced by Schofield, cutting off all communication with the Carolinas; and on the prolongation of the Danville rail at Greensboro was Stoneman, sweeping forward with his cavalry in front of Thomas and the army of Eastern Tennessee. Thus the only country open to the two remaining armies of the Confederacy was comprised between the Alleghany Mountains, the James River, and the Roanoke, intersected by the Danville railway and its branches. Here was the scene of the last campaign, whose commencement may be fixed as dating from Grant's operations of the 29th of March.

Five days previous, the orders for the movement of the troops were issued from the head-quarters at City Point. A plan similar to those which had produced such slender results in the past autumn and winter was to be tried on a grander scale. Sheridan's cavalry were to attempt the destruction of the Southside and Danville rail, whilst the infantry was to gain the right of the enemy's position, and, if possible, to drive him out of Petersburg. The Army of the James, under Ord, leaving the lines north of that river and those of Bermuda Hundred to be occupied by small garrisons, was to join the Army of the Potomac, taking position on the left of the 6th corps. The 9th corps, under General Parke, was to hold the works in the immediate front of Petersburg, and protect the rail and depôts between them and City Point; and the remainder of the army, comprising the 6th corps (Wright), the Army of the James (Ord), consisting of three infantry and one small

cavalry division, the 2nd corps (Humphries), and the 5th (Warren), with the cavalry of Sheridan, were to be free for a movement against the Confederate right. Other minor operations were at the same time to bear a part subservient to the grand scheme. A detachment of cavalry from Suffolk was to move on Weldon, doing all possible damage to the rail and the supplies there collected, and the small force of that arm still north of the James was to mask the departure of the main body, and prevent Longstreet from sending reinforcements to the right wing.

Lee had but 37,000 infantry and artillery, and the small remnant of his former famous cavalry, wherewith to oppose this large and well-equipped force. On the left bank of the James was Longstreet, with two divisions. Mahone held the lines at Bermuda Hundred; then Willcox, Pickett, and Bushrod Johnson, under A. P. Hill's command, together with the feeble remains of Ewell's corps under Gordon, guarded the long line of works extending from the Appomattox to the Danville rail. By the use of quick intelligence and rapid marches, to bring a concentrated force against any detached corps as it pushed its way laboriously and carefully through the forests, had been, and still was, the principle of Lee's strategy; any failure in perceiving the bent of the enemy's design, any misconception in the direction of his attack, would be fatal. If once the chain of defence was broken, the whole must give way, and then woe to the small and feeble army retreating before the well-fed and well-appointed infantry and powerful cavalry which would assuredly be launched against it.

When the extent of the enemy's lines, his facilities of communication, and numerous cavalry are considered,

it must be a matter of admiration, that for so long a period General Lee had been able to anticipate and guard against his attack, by a corresponding concentration of force. Now, when his right was threatened by Warren and Humphries, and warnings came from Fitz Lee's cavalry of the presence of Sheridan at Dinwiddie Courthouse, he collected every soldier he could spare from A. P. Hill's and Ewell's corps, and leaving but what may be termed a line of sentries to man the Petersburg works, marched during the night of the 29th and 30th of March, with about 15,000 men, towards his extreme right.

Warren and Humphries had in the meanwhile crossed Hatcher's Run, and during the 29th, after much toil in forcing their way through the forest, had arrived in front of the Confederate breastworks. They had met with opposition first from skirmishers, afterwards from more formidable bodies of troops, but had succeeded in maintaining their ground and in occupying the position assigned to them by the Commander-in-Chief. Then General Grant, who until the night of the 29th seems to have looked forward to the possession of the Danville rail with the possible contingency of the capture of Petersburg as the result of his combinations, resolved to put forth his entire strength, and making a vigorous attack as opportunity might offer along his whole front, to end the campaign by a decisive blow. He therefore communicated with Sheridan on the night of the 29th, sending information of the success of the preliminary engagements, but directing him to change his plan of movement, in so far as to act in conjunction with the main army, and not to cut loose from it for the purpose of operating against the enemy's rails and roads of communication. He was, if possible, to turn his right

and attack him in rear, whilst the whole line from the Appomattox to far beyond Hatcher's Run was to advance against his front.*

But now heavy rain succeeded to the previous fine weather, the Federal troops, more encumbered with the *impedimenta* of war than their antagonists, moved slowly and painfully, whilst Lee with his lightly equipped brigades was concentrating on his extreme right. Thus was a day gained, and the Confederates on the morning of the 31st of March were in strong force opposite to and on the left front of Warren, whose outer flank was *en l'air*, Sheridan being about nine miles to the left rear. Then Lee prepared by a sharp counter blow to prevent his opponent's slow and ponderous stroke, but unfortunately he was not in possession of the whole of the force with which he might have been supplied. Longstreet, ignorant of the transfer of Ord's army from the north to the south bank of the James, and supposing that the Federals were still in strong force in his front, detained his two divisions to guard the lines round Chaffin's Bluff and protect the direct road to Richmond. Thus the proportion of troops on the north of the James was too great as compared with the numbers around Petersburg, and it was not until the evening of the 1st of April that this error was repaired, when Longstreet, becoming aware of the diminution of force in his front, marched with all speed to the help of his chief,

* The order sent to General Sheridan by the Commander-in-Chief is curious from the homeliness of its language. General Grant writes:—'I now feel like ending the matter, if it is possible to do so, before going back. I do not want you therefore to cut loose and go after the enemy's roads at present. In the morning push around the enemy, if you can, and get on to his right rear. We will act all together as one army here, until it is seen what can be done with the enemy.'

sorely harassed by the events of the two preceding days.

On the 31st of March, at 10 A.M., General Lee made his attack and drove back two divisions of Warren's corps with heavy loss, but encountering Griffin's division supported by the 2nd corps, was in turn forced to yield ground and to re-seek the shelter of the breastworks, repulsing a counter attack directed against him by General Humphries. Then again resuming the offensive, but in a different direction, he turned furiously on Sheridan, who had gained a position in front of Dinwiddie Court-house at the Five Forks or cross roads, and hurling against him Pickett's and Bushrod Johnson's divisions, obliged him to yield ground, and threatened to overwhelm him. But he, dismounting a large body of troopers, manned the breastworks previously erected, and at the same time taking the assailants in flank with two brigades of horsemen, compelled them to suspend the attack, which darkness finally terminated.

Sheridan's position was a source of much anxiety to General Grant during the night of the 31st. He foresaw that a check would injure not only the symmetry of his operations, but possibly the *morale* of his troops, and would probably defer for some time the final consummation of the campaign. It was therefore with considerable relief that he received a despatch from Sheridan announcing his successful resistance, and the ultimate withdrawal of the enemy from his front. Lee could not afford to allow any part of his small army to remain so far detached from his principal lines of defence. Marched from point to point and incessantly engaged with fresh enemies, his harassed troops were now forced to retrace their steps, and as the advanced guard of the left division of Warren's corps, sent to the assistance

of Sheridan, arrived at daybreak on the 1st of April near Dinwiddie Court-house, it descried the rear files of Fitz Lee's cavalry retiring along the road to the Five Forks. It was then that Sheridan, in command of his own cavalry and Warren's corps, assumed the offensive, and skilfully handling his mixed force, overwhelmed, after hard fighting, the remains of Pickett's and Johnston's divisions, who, keeping up their renown to the last, had offered so strenuous an opposition as to compel the general of the 5th corps to place himself at the head of the assaulting division, and in person to lead forward the attack. But numbers backed by skill and courage prevailed, the Confederates retreated in disorder, and Grant, advertised of the success, opened a furious bombardment along his whole line, directing the three fresh corps of Wright, Parke, and Ord, to be ready to attack Petersburg on the following morning.

The assault was delivered on Sunday the 2nd of April, and whilst the citizens of Richmond, assembled in their churches, were praying for the safety of their relatives and friends, whom they knew were battling against terrible odds only a few miles distant, a message was handed to the President, himself forming one of the congregation, conveying intelligence which, communicated in whispers from man to man, brought grief, anguish, and almost despair to those who had so long withstood the trials of war, and who, accustomed to its near proximity, had yet failed to conceive the idea that it would ever force its way into their city and their homes. The message was from General Lee, who announced that Richmond must be immediately evacuated, that his lines had been forced, and that only for a few hours could the remnants of his noble army withstand the numerous *and converging hosts pressing forward against it.*

At dawn on that day Parke, Wright, and Ord, had assaulted the Petersburg lines, where but one hundred and fifty yards interposed between their own and the enemy's works. Quickly crossing the narrow belt, the Federals swept over the feebly guarded entrenchments, whilst Humphries, on the left beyond Hatcher's Run, drove back into the inner works the troops which fronted his position. Like a dammed-up river when the banks are broken, the Federal host poured with irresistible force through and over the long defended works. Heth's division was driven back in confusion. Mahone, Gordon, A. P. Hill, and others exerted themselves to the utmost to stem the tide, and Longstreet coming up with Benning's brigade from north of the James, threw himself into the forts of the inner line. Almost hopeless did the disaster appear. It seemed probable that conquerors and conquered would enter Petersburg together, and in that case, whether the Appomattox could be crossed and the Confederate army retain its organisation, was a matter on which even the most fearless might entertain doubts. Cavalry, artillery, and infantry were hurrying to the rear in confusion and rout. The more energetic officers tried to gather fragments of the scattered regiments to man the still uncaptured forts. Colonel Walker, of Longstreet's corps, collected together a few teamsters, and selecting a sergeant who by his appearance showed intelligence and resolution, ordered him to take the detachment to the assistance of the officer,* who with the 4th Maryland Artillery held the important post of Fort Gregg. There two hundred and fifty men, composed of dismounted drivers (known as Walker's Mules), some of Harris's Mississippians, a few

* Captain Chew by name.

North Carolinians, and the Maryland Artillery, stood firmly to their guns, and with rare and noble courage interposed a barrier to the onward progress of the victorious troops.

During that terrible morning this brave garrison, assisted by Fort Alexander, firmly resisted the repeated onsets of Gibbon's division. Two three-inch guns alone formed the artillery of the fort, but making good use of their rifles, the mixed force continued to man the parapet until, by a vigorous rush, Gibbon carried the work at 2:30 p.m., and captured the few remaining defenders, only thirty in number.

The prolonged defence of Forts Gregg and Alexander, and the position taken up by Longstreet's men in the inner works immediately surrounding the town, enabled Lee and his subordinate generals to rally the disordered troops and even to resume the offensive. Then fell one, whose name is associated with nearly every battle fought in Virginia. A. P. Hill, leading forward an attack against the 9th corps, who occupied some commanding and important ground in the vicinity of the town, was killed in his endeavour (which nearly proved successful) of partially retrieving the fortune of the day. This last effort and the firm front presented by Field's division of Longstreet's corps gave time for the leisurely evacuation of the town of Petersburg, which was effected during the night without hindrance from Grant's army, the troops marching in good order and with full confidence in their chief by the road to Amelia Court-house.

On the same point was also concentrating the force still north of the James; and during the night of the 2nd, the tramp of Kershaw's divisions and of the local militia was heard by the few remaining citizens of

Richmond as they marched through the deserted streets towards the bridges. The city was lighted up by the flames of the conflagration, already rising from the great storehouses on the banks of the river, and by large fires kindled in front of the government offices to consume the masses of papers which could not be conveyed away, and which might if captured compromise the safety of many of the citizens of the Confederacy. The President and the members of the government, accompanied by those who preferred flight to falling into the hands of the Federals, had already departed by rail to Charlotte in North Carolina. The families who could not leave the city remained shut up within their houses looking in dread and terror to the future, and only the lowest classes of the population, a mixed crowd of negroes, Irish, and the refuse of a great city, drunk with whisky, which was pouring through the gutters, revelled in unbridled licence amidst the burning storehouses and otherwise deserted streets.

The noise of explosions, and the red flames which illuminated the sky, gave notice to General Weitzel, who occupied the works north of the James, of the evacuation of the city. At 8.15 on the morning of the 3rd of April, the advanced guard of the Federal army entering Richmond took possession of the capital, and at once proceeded to restore order and to extinguish as far as was possible the fire which threatened to involve the whole city in a common and universal ruin. The news was telegraphed to Washington, and on the following day Mr. Lincoln arrived at Richmond, and occupied the house belonging to Mr. Davis, which was converted into the head-quarters of the Federal garrison.

But even the capture of the Southern capital and of the seat of government was of slight importance compared with the annihilation of the army on which depended the maintenance of the Confederate cause and the prolongation of the war. General Lee was still at the head of upwards of 20,000 men. By a rapid march and by the destruction of the bridges over the Appomattox and the James, he had gained sixteen miles on his pursuers ; if he could subsist his army and unite with Johnston's forces he might still continue the struggle, and with Lynchburg and the fertile valley of the Upper James for his base of operations, he might prolong the war far into the summer months, and await a turn in the tide of fortune latterly so unpropitious to his arms. To prevent this was General Grant's determination. He was resolved, by rapidly pushing forward his superior forces, to oblige General Lee to turn and engage him singlehanded, and at the same time by occupying the Danville rail to sever communication between his army and Johnston.

Already, on the evening of the 2nd, Sheridan with his cavalry and the 5th corps had advanced as far as the Southside railway, the 2nd corps was marching to reinforce him, whilst the remainder of the army still around Petersburg was held at bay by the defences of the inner line. On the morning of the 3rd, after the evacuation of Petersburg by the enemy; the whole force was in motion, marching parallel to, but slightly in rear of, Lee's army, which was retreating by the north bank of the Appomattox. Burksville junction, where the Richmond and Danville and the Lynchburg rail intersect each other, was the objective point, and there seemed much probability that Lee, with his smaller force, and with the start he had gained from

Petersburg, might first reach and occupy it. But the Confederate troops were almost devoid of supplies ; the men carried rations for but one day, and it was at Amelia Court-house that General Lee had ordered and hoped to find commissariat stores sufficient to provision his army for the onward march. Then, having reunited the force from Richmond with the army from Petersburg, he intended to seek an opportunity of falling on one or more of the enemy's columns separated for the purpose of rapid pursuit.

On the morning of the 4th of April, he reached the Court-house, but only to learn that by a mistake in orders, the stores so absolutely necessary for the very existence of his army had either not reached the depôt or had been sent to Richmond, where they had perished in the general conflagration.* Then but little hope remained that the Army of Virginia would survive its disasters. On the afternoon of the same day (the 4th), Sheridan had cut the rail to Danville, between Amelia Court-house and Burksville, with 18,000 of the flower of the Federal cavalry and infantry, and combining the enterprise of a dashing cavalry officer, with the wisdom acquired in many campaigns, entrenched himself strongly and awaited the arrival of the main army from Petersburg. Lee had not sufficient force to attack him. Want of rest, scarcity of food, the depression engendered by defeat and retreat, were telling heavily on his troops,

* A letter, purporting to be from an eye-witness of the last six days, signed Miles, states that the order for the despatch of 100,000 rations from Danville, had fallen into the hands of Sheridan, and therefore did not reach its proper destination. On the other hand, Swinton informs us that the rations did arrive, but owing to a mistake, were conveyed from the Court-house to Richmond, where they perished in the conflagration.

especially on the younger soldiers. Many deserted ; some, lingering on the road, were captured ; others, detached as foragers, or undertaking the office for their own benefit, were swept away by the enemy's cavalry ; and Meade with the Army of the Potomac was rapidly closing on Sheridan in preparation for a decisive battle. To escape to Lynchburg and the mountains was now the last remaining chance for the remnants of the Confederate army. Thither on the night of the 5th they directed their march ; but Sheridan with his horsemen already almost enveloped the enfeebled columns, capturing supply trains and driving in the foragers ; whilst Ord with the Army of the James was pressing onwards with all rapidity through Burksville junction to intercept the line of retreat.

On the 6th of April, the advanced guard of Ord's army placed itself across the roads by which Lee was marching, and endeavoured to delay his progress until the bridges over the Appomattox were destroyed. Gallant as was the attempt it was unsuccessful ; the small force was defeated, General Read, who commanded it, was killed, and the retreat was continued. But the sufferings of the Confederate soldiers were now almost beyond human endurance. Since the 4th the rations had been exhausted ; men subsisted on what they could gather by the roadside ; companies were sent into the woods to cut down trees in order to feed on the young shoots ;* the horses and mules were so weak from want of food that they were unable to drag the guns and waggons ; many of the former were buried, and of the latter there were frequent conflagrations to prevent them from falling into the hands of Sheridan's ever-present cavalry.

* This fact was told to the author by an officer of General Longstreet's staff.

Most of the baggage, together with the records and papers connected with the army, were burned; the energies of the transport train were devoted to save the ammunition tumbrils, but even of these as they lagged behind many were taken. By night the army marched, by day the weary soldiers threw up and guarded the slight entrenchments necessary to enable them to repel the attacks of the advancing foe.

Ewell's corps, reduced to 4,200 men, and Pickett's division of 800, formed the rear-guard, whilst Gordon's division was more especially employed in protecting the waggons. It was on the 6th that Sheridan, with the 6th corps and the cavalry, attacked the column of march, capturing large numbers of waggons, and interposing between Ewell and the remainder of the army; Pickett, still further in rear, being at the same time assailed vigorously by the 2nd corps. Pickett's small force was overpowered, and the remnants of Ewell's corps surrounded. Still the infantry—for with this corps there was no longer any artillery—maintained a stubborn and valiant resistance, inflicting heavy loss on their far more numerous assailants. But when the men saw that retreat was cut off, that from every side overwhelming numbers were preparing for a final attack, and that General Ewell had already been captured, they knew that further resistance would only lead to complete annihilation, and, giving way after so long endurance to the last instincts of self-preservation, threw down their arms and surrendered.

In the meantime, General Lee, with little more than 8,000 infantry still bearing arms, and 2,000 cavalry under Fitzhugh Lee and Rosser, had recrossed the Appomattox, and thus obtained a slight period of respite. The ultimate fate of the army appeared

desperate; the superior officers saw that no alternative remained but surrender, and, through General Pendleton, represented their opinion to the Commander-in-Chief. But he, still hoping to reach Lynchburg, where supplies had been collected, and considering that the condition of his army was not yet sufficiently desperate to warrant an abandonment of the cause, continued the retreat, delaying the advance of the pursuers by destroying the bridges over the Appomattox, and occupying with the rear-guard defensive positions on the left bank. Notwithstanding their sufferings, notwithstanding the disproportion of numbers, the remnants of the Confederate army—those indomitable men whose spirit no hardships could quell nor danger appal—fought valiantly, and at times successfully, repulsing with the rear-guard the attempts of Humphries' leading brigade to force the road to Lynchburg, and dispersing and capturing detachments of Sheridan's cavalry which, moving in advance, endeavoured to cut off their retreat.

But these last efforts could not blind General Grant to the fact that the end was approaching, and, on the 7th of April, anxious to save further effusion of blood, he sent a communication to General Lee proposing a surrender. To this, as to the former representations of his own generals, Lee returned a courteous refusal, and pressed onwards to Lynchburg. Then Sheridan, seeing that if the road to that last refuge could be barred the army must yield or be destroyed, hastened by forced marches to Appomattox station, placing himself across the line of retreat, and capturing four trains laden with provisions which were approaching the starving army from Lynchburg. To cut his way through the cavalry before the infantry could arrive was Lee's

only chance of safety, and Gordon, brought from the rear to the front, was ordered to force a passage. He attacked with his old energy; the cavalry retired, but the infantry of the Army of the James had already come up in support, and Gordon, too weak to engage this fresh force, fell back on the waggons. Then Sheridan gave orders to mount and charge; but as his horsemen were on the point of riding into the mass of armed and unarmed men surrounding the few remnants of the army trains, a flag of truce was seen approaching. Lee had received Gordon's despatch announcing that he was being driven back. He perceived that Longstreet with difficulty held his ground against the force accumulating in his front, and discerning that at length the end had come, sent a letter to General Grant requesting an interview preparatory to a surrender.

The last battle had been fought; the last effort made by the noble Army of Virginia. But 8,000 armed men, and 18,000 too weak to carry their muskets, remained out of the force which for four years had manfully defended the northern confines of the Confederacy. Fitzhugh Lee and Rosser, with the cavalry, unwilling to be included in the surrender, had already forced their way to the mountains; but Generals Lee, Longstreet, Gordon, Mahone, Pendleton, and others, with the last remnants of the army they had so long commanded, capitulated, giving their paroles not to take service against the United States until regularly exchanged. The terms were arranged between Generals Lee and Grant, who met at a small house near Appomattox Court-house. The surrender was to include all the forces operating with the Army of Virginia on the 8th of March. The arms, artillery, and public property were to be given over to the United States.

The officers were to retain their side arms, and they and such of the cavalry as owned horses were to keep them for their own use.

Throughout and subsequent to the arrangements for the surrender, the conduct of General Grant and his officers was characterised by great kindness and consideration. They admired the valour of their now conquered foe. They looked with respect on the men who had retained their discipline and organisation through the sufferings of that terrible retreat. They were happy to renew their acquaintance with many an old comrade of the Mexican and Indian wars, from whom four years of strife had separated them, and they were eager to show that if reconciliation between North and South depended on the military there would be no difficulty in effecting it. The soldiers influenced by similar feelings shared their rations with the starving Confederates, and on the night of the 9th of March both armies bivouacked side by side, happy that for the present the strife had ended, and that their repose would not be disturbed by a sudden call to arms. General Lee, after a sorrowful parting with his troops, who loved him as a father as much as they respected him as a general, departed with an escort of the Federal cavalry for Richmond, where, having first visited the quarters of his most trusty lieutenant, General Longstreet, he took leave of his staff, and retired to his own home.* The men dispersed in different directions,

* The account written by the Honourable F. Lawley, and published in the *Fortnightly Review*, under the title of 'The Last Six Days of Secession,' is so graphic, that the author must be excused for quoting the latter portion, describing General Lee's parting with his troops:—'In the meantime, immediately that General Lee was seen riding to the rear, dressed more gaily than usual, and begirt

many to their far-off homes in Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, encountering dangers and difficulties on the long journey almost equal to the perils of the campaign.

with his sword, the rumour of imminent surrender flew like wildfire through the Confederates. It might be imagined that an army which had drawn its last rations on the 1st of April, and, harassed incessantly by night and day, had been marching and fighting until the morning of the 9th, would have welcomed anything like a termination of its sufferings, let it come in what form it might. . . . As the great Confederate captain rode back from his interview with General Grant, the news of the surrender acquired shape and consistency, and could no longer be denied. The effect on the worn and battered troops—some of whom had fought since April 1861, and (sparse survivors of hecatombs of fallen comrades) had passed unscathed through such hurricanes of shot as within four years no other man had ever experienced—passes mortal description. Whole lines of battle rushed up to their beloved old chief, and, choking with emotion, broke ranks and struggled with each other to wring him once more by the hand. Men who had fought throughout the war, and knew what the agony and humiliation of the moment must be to him, strove with a refinement of unselfishness and tenderness which he alone could fully appreciate, to lighten his burden and mitigate his pain. With tears pouring down both cheeks, General Lee at length commanded voice enough to say: "Men, we have fought through the war together. I have done the best that I could for you." Not an eye that looked on that scene was dry. Nor was this the emotion of sickly sentimentalists, but of rough and rugged men familiar with hardship, danger, and death in a thousand shapes, mastered by sympathy and feeling for another which they had never experienced on their own account. I know of no other passage of military history so touching, unless, in spite of the melodramatic colouring which French historians have loved to shed over the scene, it can be found in the *Adieux de Fontainebleau*.'

CHAPTER XXIV.

THE LAST SCENES OF THE WAR

SUBSEQUENT to the surrender of the Army of Virginia little remains to be told of the military operations of the Confederacy. All hope of prolonging resistance in the States north of the Mississippi had disappeared. The members of the Confederate government after the abandonment of Richmond had fled to Danville, where the news reached President Davis that Lee had been forced to yield, and that soon the armies under Grant, effecting a junction or co-operating with Sherman, would bring their strength to crush General Johnston, unable to hold his own against the Army of the West. From the West and South the intelligence was not more reassuring. Stoneman, with a large force of cavalry, had been marching hither and thither through the skirts of North Carolina. He had torn up the track and burnt the bridges on the railway from Eastern Tennessee to Lynchburg, approaching within five miles of that town. He had then turned south to Greensboro, and after destroying the bridges between there and Danville, had marched on Salisbury, where he captured guns and prisoners and burned depôts of stores ; from whence, moving on Statersville, he was prepared to take part, if required, in the final consummation of the Confederate armies.

Through Alabama and into Georgia, Wilson, with the cavalry of the Army of the Tennessee, had ridden,

marching across a fertile country, hitherto spared by invading armies, defeating Forrest, capturing Selma, with its arsenal, armoury, and depôts, crossing the Alabama, and advancing on Montgomery. From Mobile likewise came news of disaster and surrender, and before President Davis took his journey from Danville to Johnston's camp near Smithfield and Goldsboro, he had become aware that no hope could be entertained that any army, excepting Kirby Smith's forces in the trans-Mississippi, would long acknowledge the sway of the Confederate government.

The fate of the old Army of the West was not long delayed. On the 10th of April, the day previously fixed by General Sherman, his forces, marching in two columns by both banks of the Neuse River, advanced on Johnston, and sweeping aside without difficulty the cavalry rear-guard, entered Smithfield on the 11th, to find that the enemy had crossed the Neuse and to learn that General Lee had surrendered. Fired by this intelligence, and eager to terminate the war by enforcing the capitulation of the companion Army of the West, Sherman's troops pressed rapidly forward, abandoning their trains and other *impedimenta*, and passing through Raleigh, crossed the Cape Fear River and followed the enemy now retreating on Greensboro. Johnston, ill supplied with waggons and draught animals, was forced to cling to the railway, whilst Sherman, with better means of transport, and anxious to cut off his retreat from Charlotte, designed to press onwards by the road through Ashboro, and so notwithstanding the almost incessant rain hastened forward his several corps, and prepared means for crossing the *Cape Fear River*. Then General Johnston, seeing the hopelessness of further resistance, on account of the

numerical inferiority of his force, and the absence of arms, food, and money, knowing also the misery which would arise should his army disband and without discipline scatter through the country in guerilla bands, and encouraged by the terms accorded to General Lee, proposed a temporary cessation of hostilities as a preparatory measure for the termination of the war. The letter conveying these propositions was despatched to the Federal camp, and a meeting was arranged between the two great generals.

On the 17th of April, at noon, Generals Sherman and Johnston, with their respective staffs, and accompanied by Kilpatrick and Wade Hampton, rode up to a small farm-house at Durham station on the North Carolina railway. Although both generals had been officers of the old army, and opponents in so many engagements, they had never previously met; but their respect for each other was mutual, and quickly laying aside the constraints of diplomacy, they conversed frankly and openly on the position of affairs. General Johnston acknowledged the desperate condition of the Southern armies, and his inability any longer to carry on the war with forces sufficiently numerous or well organised to protect the country; whilst General Sherman, ever magnanimous towards a defeated enemy, and equally anxious to spare his own army the harassing duty of pursuing southwards an ever-fleeing and scattered foe, as to avert from the country soon to be subjected to the Federal rule the evils entailed by the presence of his not over-scrupulous soldiery, agreed to a temporary truce, and arranged a meeting for the following day, when the conditions of a more extended suspension of hostilities, and even the preliminaries of peace, might be discussed and drawn up.

On the 18th of April the generals again met, but this time General Johnston was accompanied by the Confederate Secretary of War, General Breckenridge, to whose orders the trans-Mississippi forces and General Dick Taylor's army, not under the command of General Johnston, would accord obedience.

After a short conference, a basis of agreement was signed by the two generals, and submitted by General Sherman for approval to Washington. But in the short period of time which had elapsed between the surrender of General Lee's army and the proposed surrender of General Johnston's, an event had happened in the North which exercised a baneful influence over the minds of one of the contracting parties. President Lincoln had been assassinated. Men were aghast at the awful calamity, and in their rage and terror were inclined to throw blame on those who, opposed in open war to Mr. Lincoln and his policy, were equally horrified at the terrible crime, as grieved that at so critical a period fresh incentives for anger should be super-added to those already existing, and that a man friendly by nature and rendered moderate by sound sense and experience should be removed from the head of affairs.

Happily for the future fate of both North and South, the armies and the generals did not share in so great a degree the resentment and fury which raged among the non-combatant classes of the North. They had learned to respect their enemy, and with true soldierly instinct to forget their animosity when no longer opposed to him in the field. They also, harassed with long marches and ever-recurring battles, and anxious to return to their homes and families, were very desirous of peace, and in the case of General Sherman's army, were unwilling to recommence a weary journey through the

pine forests and swamps of the Carolinas under the hot summer's sun. Not blinded by political passion, they could believe in the truth of the sorrow and abhorrence with which Mr. Lincoln's death, and the crime which caused it, were regarded in the Confederate army, and conquering any bitter feelings which might still exist, fully endorsed the terms of the treaty agreed on by Generals Sherman and Johnston, and submitted for approval to the supreme authorities at Washington.*

* Memorandum of a basis of agreement, made this, the 18th day of April, A.D. 1865, near Durham's Station, in the State of North Carolina, by and between General Joseph E. Johnston, commanding the Confederate army, and Major-General W. T. Sherman, commanding the army of the United States, both present.

First.—The contending armies now in the field to maintain the *status quo* until notice is given by the commanding general of any one to his opponent, and reasonable time, say forty-eight hours, allowed.

Second.—The Confederate armies now in existence to be disbanded and conducted to their several State capitals, there to deposit their arms and public property in the State arsenals; each officer and man to execute and file an agreement to cease from acts of war, and to abide the action of both State and Federal authorities. The number of arms and munitions of war to be reported to the chief of ordnance, at Washington city, subject to the future action of the Congress of the United States, and in the meantime to be used solely to maintain peace and order within the borders of the States respectively.

Third.—The recognition, by the executive of the United States, of the several State governments, on their officers and legislatures taking the oath prescribed by the Constitution of the United States; and when conflicting State governments have resulted from the war, the legitimacy of all shall be submitted to the Supreme Court of the United States.

Fourth.—The re-establishment of all Federal courts in the several States, with powers as defined by the Constitution and the Laws of Congress.

Fifth.—The people and inhabitants of all States to be guaranteed,

These terms, it must be confessed, went far beyond the powers usually delegated to generals commanding armies in the field, and disposed of so many questions still under dispute in the Northern States, granting conditions very favourable to the South, that it cannot be wondered that the Secretary of War, who, during the convulsion attending Mr. Lincoln's death, virtually exercised the chief power in the government, should have refused to confirm them. The manner in which they were rejected, the insults heaped on General Sherman, the virulence of the Republican press, the false and contemptible reports spread abroad respecting General Sherman's motives, are matters which prove how short-lived the greatest popularity may be, and on how little

as far as the executive can, their political rights and franchise, as well as their rights of person and property, as defined by the Constitution of the United States, and of the States respectively.

Sixth.—The executive authority or government of the United States not to disturb any of the people, by reason of the late war, so long as they live in peace and in quiet, and abstain from acts of armed hostility, and obey the laws in existence at the place of their residence.

Seventh.—In general terms it is announced that the war is to cease: a general amnesty, so far as the executive of the United States can command, on condition of the disbandment of the Confederate armies, the distribution of arms, and the resumption of peaceful pursuits by officers and men hitherto composing the said armies. Not being fully empowered by our respective principals to fulfil these terms, we individually and officially pledge ourselves to promptly obtain authority, and will endeavour to carry out the above programme.

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General,
Commanding the Army of the U. S.
in North Carolina.

J. E. JOHNSTON,
Commanding Confederate States Army
in North Carolina.

he who trusts in the applause or gratitude of the people has to rely.

Within a few days the general most admired in the Northern States had sunk to the lowest depth of unpopularity. His powers were diminished, and it was even threatened to break by force the truce which he had pledged his honour to uphold. Happily, General Grant was a man of moderation, of firmness, and of high feeling, and exercising as he did the supreme command of the armies, was possessed of power sufficient to cause his authority to be respected. He repaired, by order, to General Sherman's head-quarters, and directed hostilities to be recommenced at the termination of the notice agreed on, but left their conduct, as well as the control of all matters connected with the armies in North Carolina, in the hands of General Sherman. That officer felt deeply the animus displayed against him by the Secretary of War, but far too good a soldier to dispute superior authority, at once prepared to put his army in motion to follow up his previous success.

General Johnston was, however, in no position to offer further resistance, and to a demand for a surrender on the same terms as those granted to General Lee accorded his assent. Therefore, on the 26th of April, the second great army of the Confederacy—the remnants of the troops which had fought step by step from the Ohio to the Cumberland, from the Cumberland to the Tennessee, from the Tennessee to the Chattahoochee—who had defended Charleston and Wilmington during four years of war—laid down their arms, and following their comrades of the Army of Virginia, disbanded and returned to their homes. A few of the cavalry endeavoured to make their way to Mississippi; a few, following the fortunes of President Davis, escorted

him in his flight, but through the Carolinas, Georgia, and Alabama, resistance to the Federal authority had ceased.

The motives which induced General Johnston to lay down his arms were given by himself in a letter addressed to the people of the States of North and South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. Want of men, want of supplies, the total absence of money or credit, and the fear of adding to the already terrible sufferings of his country, by the horrors of guerilla warfare, were the avowed and the real reasons of his surrender. In all circumstances, whether in brave resistance, or in unselfish and wise submission to circumstances, the Confederate States were happy in the men at the head of their armies, whilst it must be freely acknowledged that the magnanimous conduct of Generals Grant, Sherman, and other officers high in command, did much to secure peace as well as to avert unnecessary bloodshed and further and worse disaster from the non-combatants and helpless inhabitants of the Confederacy.*

* The following is quoted from General Johnston's statement of the reasons which induced his surrender :—' On the 26th of April, the day of the Convention, by the returns of three lieutenant-generals of the army of Tennessee (that under my command) the number of infantry and artillery present and absent was 70,510; the total present, 18,578; the effective total or fighting force, 14,179. On the 7th of April, the date of the last return I can find, the effective total of the cavalry was 5,440. But between the 7th and 26th of April it was greatly reduced by events in Virginia and apprehensions of surrender. In South Carolina we had Young's division of cavalry, less than 1,000, besides reserves and State troops—together much inferior to the Federal force in that State. In Florida we were as weak. In Georgia our inadequate force had been captured at Macon. In Lieutenant-General Taylor's department, there were no means of opposing the formidable army under General Canby, which had taken Mobile; nor the cavalry under General Wilson, which had

Whilst the negotiations which ended in the surrender of General Johnston's army were still pending, General Wilson had pressed forward in his conquering career to Macon, where he received the surrender of General Cobb. He had then opened communications with Savannah, and was at present engaged in patrolling the roads and in scouring the country to intercept the flight of the President and members of the late Confederate Government, and to prevent their escape into the trans-Mississippi States where Kirby Smith still commanded a formidable army.

Mobile had likewise been captured by General Canby. Since the 25th of March the siege, which may be said to have opened with the capture of the harbour forts, had been prosecuted with vigour, the land force having been greatly augmented by troops brought from General Thomas's command, released from duty in Tennessee by the defeat of Hood. It consisted of two corps, besides a division of blacks and one of cavalry, whilst a powerful fleet co-operated in the harbour. Maury, who commanded the town, had but a feeble garrison to oppose to this large force, and to man the

captured every other place of importance west of Augusta. The latter had been stopped at Macon by the armistice as we had been at Greensboro, but its distance from Augusta being less than half of ours, that place was in its power. To carry on the war, therefore, we had to depend upon the army of Tennessee alone. The United States could have brought against it twelve or fifteen times its number in the armies of Generals Grant, Sherman, and Canby. With such odds against us, without the means of procuring ammunition or repairing arms, without money or credit to provide food, it was impossible to continue the war except as robbers. The consequence of prolonging the struggle would only have been the destruction or dispersion of our bravest men, and great suffering of women and children, by the desolation and ruin inevitable from the marching of two hundred thousand men through the country, &c.'

line of works which required a far larger number of defenders than he could furnish. Notwithstanding these disadvantages, and in despite of the news of defeat and surrender which continually reached him, he loyally maintained his post, holding against attacks from land and sea Spanish Fort, the outwork of the chain of defences. But the Federals prosecuted the siege without intermission, cutting off communications with the interior with their cavalry, which had marched by land from the neighbourhood of New Orleans, and threatening the city from the eastern as well as the western side by the movement of a strong column from Pensacola. This last attack, combined with the hopelessness of maintaining the town when the other positions on the coast had been abandoned, and when the great armies of the Confederacy had surrendered, induced General Maury to order its evacuation, which was effected on the 8th of April; the garrison of Spanish Fort and of the outer lines sacrificing themselves to cover the retreat of the remainder of the troops, and the escape of the ironclads, which were thus enabled to find refuge for a time in the upper waters of the Mobile River.

Their safety was only temporarily secured, for after the surrender of the larger armies of the Confederacy, the disposal of the remainder of the forces east of the Mississippi could be only a matter of time, and on the 9th of May General Taylor agreed to lay down his arms on conditions similar to those already granted to Generals Lee and Johnston. Thus all opposition between the Mississippi and the Potomac ceased. The circle of the hunters had gradually closed around the prey, the vast net had been completed, and the total annihilation of all means of further resistance was the result.

The efforts of the Federal government were now directed to prevent a prolongation of the war in the trans-Mississippi, and by the arrest of President Davis and other members of his cabinet, who were known to be journeying southwards, to hinder the re-formation of a government in the vast and rich country still held by Kirby Smith. For this purpose General Wilson was ordered to use the utmost diligence and to watch every road with his cavalry to prevent the escape of the fugitives. Irrespective of the object of securing the person of President Davis, the desires and exertions of the would-be captors were further stimulated by the report, that a vast treasure had been conveyed from Richmond, and, transported in the waggons which accompanied President Davis, was on its way to the trans-Mississippi States. Consequently, the roads were watched, and the Federal cavalry pushed forward into the country which, forming a part of General Johnston's command, was supposed to have been included in his surrender.

Had the terms first proposed between Generals Sherman and Johnston received the assent of the Northern Government, it had been President Davis's intention to have remained in the country,* sending his family from some port in Florida to Cuba; but on learning that the treaty had been rejected, and that hostilities were about to recommence, he mounted his horse and, accompanied by a small force of cavalry, attempted to make his way through South Carolina to Georgia. Near Washington,

* President Davis disapproved strongly of the conduct of those who after the subjugation of the Confederacy fled to Mexico, thus depriving their fellow-countrymen of their services at a time when they were much needed to reconstruct what had fallen during the war and the conquest.—See *Prison Life of Jefferson Davis*. Lieut.-Col. T. Craven, M.D.

in Georgia, he rejoined his wife and family, whom he had not seen since they had left Richmond, and, believing that the terms of General Johnston's capitulation were still in force as far as the Chattahoochee River, considered that until he had passed that boundary he was secure from molestation. He had formed a plan of joining General Taylor, who had not yet surrendered, and who held the country south of the lines watched by Wilson's cavalry, and then, crossing the Mississippi with this force, to unite with Kirby Smith, and so, at the head of a still formidable army, to negotiate for terms more favourable than would be granted to the Confederacy, if completely at the mercy of its enemies.

To evade the enemy's cavalry with his family, and the waggons containing their personal property, was impossible. To leave those he best loved in a country infested with marauders of all descriptions, was more than he could bear; therefore, having first placed them in a neighbourhood of comparative safety, he determined on horseback to attempt to cross the Chattahoochee, and then to join General Taylor. The escort which he had brought with him from North Carolina had abandoned him on the news of General Johnston's capitulation, and a few paroled men, who had volunteered to protect the exiled family, alone formed the guard of the late President of the Confederacy.

For some days after leaving Washington Mr. Davis accompanied his family, the roads being so unsafe that they needed his protection, and it was only when they were approaching the vicinity of Macon that he considered that the country was sufficiently tranquil to allow him to leave them, and to pursue alone the course which he considered it his duty to adopt. On the evening of the 9th of May he had determined to bid

farewell to his wife and children, but was detained by a report that a body of guerillas were threatening an attack, and consequently postponed his departure until the following day. But it was then too late. The Federal cavalry was approaching, and on the following morning Mr. Davis was awakened by his servant, who reported that the camp was surrounded by the enemy. Still desirous of escaping, he rose quickly, and hastened out in the grey dawn to seek for and to find his horse. But the time for escape had passed. The horse was in the hands of the cavalry, and President Davis, unarmed and incapable of resistance, surrendered to Lieutenant-Colonel Pritchard, commanding the 4th Michigan Cavalry. He, his wife, and children, together with Postmaster Reagan, Colonel Harrison, his private secretary, and his aides-de-camp, were taken under escort to Macon, and from thence were conveyed to the coast, and so by sea to Fortress Monroe.*

Thus terminated the political existence of the man who, elected by the universal consent and vote of the Confederate States, had laboured ably and conscientiously to carry out the task which he had been called upon by the deed of his fellow-countrymen to fulfil. He had not initiated Secession. After its commencement he had still retained his seat in the Congress of the United States, and only when compelled to choose between his allegiance to his State and his obligations to

* The narrative of the flight and capture of President Davis has been taken from the account given by himself to Lieut.-Col. T. Craven, M.D., and published in the *Prison Life of Jefferson Davis*. This book, compiled by one who differed strongly with Mr. Davis in political opinions, contains a most interesting collection of conversations held with the ex-President, and shows his character in a light which cannot fail to arouse respect for himself and sympathy for his reverses and his sufferings.

the United States, did he elect the former, thus following in the track which the best and noblest of the Confederacy believed to be that of rectitude. During the continuance of his administration, he had shown none of the violence too common amongst men who in turbulent times attain to high power. He had governed only too closely within the limits set by the Constitution, and had shown by acts of firmness, called obstinacy by those who either disapproved of them or judged by after events, that he was not restrained within these boundaries by fear of responsibility, but from a sense of duty. Possibly, nay probably, in his administration there may have been flaws, and these flaws have not been gilded over by after success. In his choice of men he may have been mistaken, being, it is said, too often governed by preconceived or rapidly-formed opinions of character. In avoiding the folly and weakness of sacrificing the unsuccessful to popular clamour, he may have given insufficient weight to true complaints, and have failed to comprehend how failings in men who command may create more abundant evil than serious faults. To his obstinacy or tenacity of purpose in matters of administration, and to his firmness in upholding certain men and in displacing others, some of the misfortunes which led to the fall of the Confederacy have been traced, but when passion has subsided, when the bitterness of political strife has been assuaged, and when calm judgment has replaced party feeling, the character of President Davis will be more fully appreciated, his singleness of purpose and rectitude of administration more admired, and his patriotism to his country, i.e. that portion of the United States which alone he considered as his country, estimated at its true value. Then the connection of such a man with the base plot of assassinating President

Lincoln, or with the details in the management of the prisons where Northern soldiers were confined, will be regarded as an instance of the virulence of party feeling in warping men's judgments, and may possibly be condemned as an evil scheme for exciting a people to vengeance under the guise of punishment or retaliation, and thus excusing the insults and cruelties which in the prison-house of Fortress Monroe were inflicted on a man whose high station, whose but recent position in respect to the government of the Northern States, and whose age and infirmities ought, even if imprisonment had been considered necessary, to have mitigated its rigours. What these insults and cruelties were, and how the unjust severities and arbitrary acts of despotic governments can be imitated, and perhaps excelled, by States possessed of republican institutions, may be learnt by those who think fit to read the diary of one who, always politically, at first personally inimical to President Davis, yet learnt to appreciate his character, and had the courage to declare openly the secrets of his prison. The treatment of President Davis will ever be a blot on the people and government of the United States, and contrasts most unfavourably with their usually generous conduct towards the leaders of the Confederacy.*

* The following extract is taken from the book quoted, viz., *The Prison Life of Jefferson Davis*, and gives the religious side of his character:—‘There was no affectation of devotedness or asceticism in my patient, but every opportunity I had of seeing him convinced me more deeply of his sincere religious convictions. He was fond of referring to passages of Scripture, comparing text with text, dwelling on the divine beauty of the imagery, and the wonderful adaptation of the whole to every conceivable phase or stage of human life. Nothing that any man's individual experience, however strange, could bring home to him, but had been previously foretold and described, with its proper lesson or promise of hope, in the Sacred

It was but a few days after President Davis's incarceration in Fortr ss Monroe that the last army of the Confederacy laid down its arms. Even after the surrender of the forces of Lee, Johnston, and Taylor, Kirby Smith had signified his intention of holding such portions of the trans-Mississippi States as were under his control. There were meetings in the various towns of Texas to approve his policy, and to organise a stout resistance to the full weight of the Federal power which, it was felt, would now be launched against the contumacious State. It was expected that many of the officers and men who had evaded or who disregarded the terms of surrender would seek refuge in Texas, and would help to swell the ranks of his army, whilst it was hoped that the natural wealth of a State whose prosperity had increased during the war by the brisk trade which had flowed through her territory, would enable her to continue a successful resistance, if not to lend aid to her groaning but subjugated sisters. But these expectations and these hopes were quickly found to be fallacious. The soldiers, weary of the war, and

volume. It was the only absolute wisdom, reaching all varieties of existence, because comprehending the whole; and beside its inspired universal knowledge, all the learning of humanity was but foolishness. The Psalms were his favourite portion of the Word, and had always been. Evidence of their divine origin was inherent in their text. Only an intelligence that held the life-threads of the entire human family could have thus peeled forth in a single cry every wish, joy, fear, exultation, hope, passion, and sorrow of the human heart. There were moments, while speaking on religious subjects, in which Mr. Davis impressed me more than any professor of Christianity I had ever heard. There was a vital earnestness in his discourse; a clear, almost passionate grasp in his faith, and the thought would frequently recur, that a belief capable of consoling such sorrows as his, possessed, and thereby evidenced, a reality—a substance—which no sophistry of the infidel could discredit.'

whose pay was in arrears, deserted in great numbers, returning to their long-abandoned homes, and by their departure more than counterbalancing the recruits which, eluding the Federal gunboats, effected a passage across the Mississippi. Kirby Smith, Generals Walker and Magruder, preferring exile to surrender, sought refuge either in Mexico or Europe, and to Brigadier-General Brent fell the duty of obtaining from General Canby terms for the trans-Mississippi forces similar to those awarded to the other armies of the Confederacy. These terms were accorded, and on the 26th of May, the last of the great armies surrendered, peace reigned from the Rio Grande to the Potomac, and the war, which had raged with almost unparalleled violence for more than four years, terminated in the complete subjugation of the thirteen seceding States.

CHAPTER XXV.

CONCLUSION.

THE United States were again under one government, but he whose career as President had commenced when Secession was yet young, who had continued in office during the whole course of the great struggle, and who, hating war and its desolations, had hoped to have seen a reunited country in the enjoyment of the blessings of peace, had perished, when the final blow was dealt to the Confederacy, by the hand of an assassin. When all seemed prosperous, when his work appeared to be crowned with success, when the nation as a unit, was re-established, and Slavery was dead, President Lincoln had fallen, and his death was regarded with deep sorrow and violent anger by his friends, and with horror and regret by those who had been his enemies. It was on Friday the 14th of April, the fourth anniversary of the surrender of Fort Sumter, the day fixed by the Government for re-hoisting with much ceremony the Union flag upon its ruined walls, that President Lincoln met his death. He had returned from Richmond and, together with General Grant, had attended an important meeting of the Cabinet. In common with the bulk of the Northern people, he rejoiced at the final termination of the war, looking forward to a return of prosperity and to the re-welding

of the disjointed fragments of the Union ; and although warnings are said to have reached him, that his life was in danger from assassination, he had put them aside ; in the simplicity and kindliness of his nature unwilling and almost unable to conceive evil.

On the evening in question, he had arranged to go to Ford's Theatre in Washington, where he was to be joined by General Grant ; and, accompanied by Mrs. Lincoln, Major Rathbone, and Miss Harris, occupied a box overlooking the stage, and in front of which an American flag had been hung in honour of his presence. What followed is best described by Mr. Raymond, in his *Life of President Lincoln* :—‘At fifteen minutes after ten John Wilkes Booth, an actor by profession, passed along the passage behind the spectators in the dress circle, showed a card to the President's messenger, and stood for two or three minutes looking down upon the stage and the orchestra below. He then entered the vestibule of the President's box, closed the door behind him, and fastened it by bracing a short plank against it from the wall, so that it could not be opened from the outside. He then drew a small silver-mounted Derringer pistol, which he carried in his right hand, holding a long double-edged dagger in his left. All in the box were intent upon the proceedings upon the stage ; but President Lincoln was leaning forward, holding aside the curtain of the box with his left hand, and looking, with his head slightly turned, towards the audience. Booth stepped within the inner door into the box, directly behind the President, and, holding the pistol just over the back of the chair in which he sat, shot him through the back of the head. Mr. Lincoln's head fell slightly forward and his eyes closed, but in every other respect his attitude remained

unchanged. The report of the pistol startled those in the box, and Major Rathbone, turning his eyes from the stage, saw, through the smoke which filled the box, a man standing between him and the President. He instantly sprang towards him and seized him; but Booth wrested himself from his grasp, and dropping the pistol, struck at him with the dagger, inflicting a severe wound upon his left arm near the shoulder. Booth then rushed to the front of the box—shouted *Sic semper tyrannis!* put his hand upon the railing in front of the box, and leaped over it upon the stage below. As he went over his spur caught in the flag which draped the front, and he fell; but recovering himself immediately, he rose, brandished the dagger, and facing the audience, said, *The South is avenged!* He then rushed across the stage towards the passage which led to the stage door in the rear of the theatre, mounted his horse, and escaped temporarily into Lower Maryland. As soon as the audience at the theatre had recovered from the surprise and horror which followed so terrible a deed, surgeons were sent for, the theatre was cleared, and Mr. Lincoln, who was still breathing, was conveyed to a house hard by. Here, apparently unconscious of anything that had passed since he had been struck by the assassin, he died at twenty-two minutes after seven o'clock on the following morning, the 15th April.'

Simultaneously with the assassination of the President, the ablest member of his cabinet, Mr. Seward, narrowly escaped a similar death. A short time previous, he had been thrown from his carriage, and was lying in his bed suffering from the effects of the accident. Within five minutes of the time when the President was shot, a man by the name of Payne (or Payne Powell) came

to the door of his house and requested admission on the plea of bringing medicine. Being refused, he rushed up stairs, knocked down with his pistol Mr. Seward's son, who endeavoured to stop him, entered the room, and throwing himself on Mr. Seward, stabbed him in the throat three times with his dagger. An invalid soldier (named Robinson), who was acting as nurse, endeavoured to drag him from his victim, and received several serious wounds in so doing. Then Payne, freeing himself from Robinson, escaped from the room, stabbed Major Seward, another son of the Secretary's, and also an attendant, Mr. Hansell, and escaping into the street, mounted his horse, and rode leisurely away.

The horror and dismay which spread through Washington, on the news of these atrocious deeds, may well be imagined. Mr. Staunton and General Grant at once took measures for securing the safety of the city; not only from conspirators, but also from the violence of the populace, excited almost to madness against all who were in any way connected with the South. The persons of the Vice-President (Mr. Johnson) and other members of the government were protected by guards, as were also the Confederate prisoners in the Capital prison, and so, owing to these and other measures, and to the good sense of the people of Washington, tranquillity was preserved, the machinery of government was not deranged, and to President Lincoln, succeeded, according to Constitutional law, the late Vice-President, Mr. Johnson. Mr. Seward, although wounded almost to death, recovered, and continued to perform arduous duties in the service of his country.

As intelligence of these dire events was flashed by the electric wire through the Northern States, the rage

and the grief which they aroused were intensified by the contrast presented to the joyful feelings which triumph and the return of peace had excited in the breasts of men long suffering under the hardships of war. The violent became more violent, excusing their hatred to the South under the pretence of just vengeance and deserved retribution. The wise and moderate trembled, lest a hasty passion should hurry the Northern people into acts which would endanger the fruits of their success, and hinder the reuniting of the country, and the consolidation, into one nation, of the conquerors and the conquered. All, of whatever party, or however opposed in political opinions, regretted Mr. Lincoln, and lamented the death of one whom they had learnt to esteem for his sincere honesty, and to confide in from a sense of his moderation and experience. Mr. Johnson, his successor, was a new and hitherto untried man; he had risen by his own exertions and ability from the obscurity of poverty; he was uneducated, and, consequently, from failings in manner and other disadvantages, was not considered fitted to represent a powerful nation, and from his antecedents in political life, was regarded as unsuited, at this crisis of the national existence, to the task of assuaging party feeling, and by moderation, of gradually restoring what the passions of men and the turbulence of war had broken down.

Thus did the gloom which enveloped the future, increase the sorrow of the nation for the loss of the ruler in whom it had reposed its trust, whilst the terrible incidents of his death tended to shed a halo round his past life and to lead men to forget his faults and failings, and to exalt as heroic what was only good and true. Mr. Lincoln's integrity of purpose and of

conduct, together with his unselfishness and fearless devotion to his duties, must ever command admiration. Not possessing the attributes of greatness, he increased in wisdom and vigour, as the important events with which he was surrounded exercised their influence over his character. He possessed the talent of leading, by partially following the current of opinions and circumstances. As the war developed its gigantic proportion, his mind, incapable of foreseeing, was yet ready for adaptation. As the objects for which men contended changed with the various phases of the strife, Mr. Lincoln altered his policy. The cry of the Union and the Constitution gave place to that of Reconstruction and Abolition, and Mr. Lincoln, following rather than guiding public opinion, floated with the tide, keeping clear by rectitude of purpose and shrewdness of intellect; from the rocks and dangerous eddies which beset his course. From hardly-earned experience he learned the evil of permitting politics to intermingle with matters of military importance, and, in common with the nation which he represented and ruled, became aware that the frequent change of generals was often more injurious to armies than the retention in command of men who, although unsuccessful, were often the victims of circumstances over which they had little control, and whom a people smarting under defeat and eager for a sacrifice, were not seldom disposed unjustly to condemn. Mr. Lincoln possessed an eminently honest, shrewd and kindly nature; he had the wit to recognise, to appreciate, and to retain in office men of ability, and, disregarding the ambitious projects of individuals of his cabinet, to make use of their services, so long as they proved beneficial to the country and the cause.

Happily for the interests of humanity, and for the future well-being of the American nation, the men at the head of affairs, especially the two most prominent generals, were moderate and firm. As has been narrated, terms similar to those accorded to the Army of Virginia by General Grant, and sanctioned by President Lincoln, were granted to the troops which surrendered after the assassination; and although base rumours were circulated, and even encouraged by men in high station, implicating the noblest names in the Confederacy with cognisance of the plot, the good sense of the great mass of the nation regaining its influence, quickly prevailed, and content with the death and execution of the direct agents, was satisfied in the belief that they, or a few men equally obscure, were the sole conspirators. Booth, injured by his fall in leaping from the box, was overtaken and shot by the detachment sent to capture him; four others were condemned and executed by a military tribunal, and some, less implicated, were sentenced to imprisonment. Unhappily, the virulence of a portion of the Northern people was permitted to exercise itself on Mr. Davis, the cruelties of whose captivity were excused by a groundless and most unfounded suspicion of complicity in the plot.

Now that the war had terminated, the task of pacification and of reconstruction commenced. The armies of the Confederacy were paroled and dismissed; those of the North, after passing in review before President Johnson, were quickly reduced in number, and, as peace appeared more firmly settled, in great measure disbanded. Officers and men on both sides returned to the ranks of the people, and with the elasticity of Americans re-adapted themselves to the

peaceful pursuits which they had abandoned when called upon to take up arms. The great military leaders of the Confederacy were unmolested, and the majority, considering it to be their duty to remain with their people, in place of seeking refuge and fortune in foreign lands, returned to their, in many instances, desolated homes and ruined properties, and either endeavoured to collect from the remnants sufficient to maintain life, or sought in apparently uncongenial employments the means of existence and utility. General Lee became the head of a college at Lexington, Virginia, General Johnston the manager of a despatch company, General Beauregard of a railway, Longstreet and Hood became partners in business at New Orleans, and Mosby and Semmes returned to their former practice at the bar. Breckenridge, Benjamin, and others, holding places in President Davis's cabinet, against whom greater severity was exercised than against the military officers, fled the country, seeking refuge and means of livelihood in Canada and England. In the North, immediately following the surrender of General Lee, the most vigorous measures were commenced and continued for disbanding the army. Seven months afterwards, the Secretary of War stated in his report that 800,963 men had already been mustered, paid off, and disbanded, and that further reductions were contemplated. The vast territory comprised in the United States absorbed without difficulty the great influx of additional labour, and the men, laying aside their arms, became the useful citizens of a country happy enough to have employment, land, and means of support for numbers far larger than those whom peace had freed from the destructive work of slaughter.

The political questions, complex before the war, and

rendered still more difficult of solution by the changes which had since passed over the country, were less easy to deal with. But to Mr. Lincoln had succeeded a man who, disappointing the hopes of his enemies, and calling forth the admiration and wonder of those who were best acquainted with him, showed, and is showing, a firmness of principle, a rectitude of purpose, and a clearness of judgment, which may possibly go far towards repairing the shattered fabric of the State, and, if it may be done, of uniting in feeling the people of a territory which has by force of arms again been brought under the same laws and government.

To check the pride and violence of the triumphant, to calm down the angry and sullen spirit of the vanquished, to hold a just balance—on the one hand firmly supporting the laws and securing the fruits of victory, on the other maintaining for the conquered their constitutional rights, and upholding them against oppression—is the task which President Johnson is endeavouring to fulfil. The real extent and definition of States' rights remain unsettled. Slavery, although abolished, has left, in an uneducated and inferior race, thrown suddenly on its own resources, questions which are used as party cries rather than as ground of wise and impartial debate. The miserable and ruined condition of the Southern States, where families once rich are reduced to absolute poverty and almost starvation, where ruined towns, broken bridges, and railways torn up and forsaken seem to evidence the destruction of the exterior aids of modern civilisation, claims the fostering care of a ruler sufficiently wise and just to work for the interests of his country rather than for the temporary applause of party, or the maintenance of his own popularity or power.

His difficulties are and must be very great; the Southern States, submitting to circumstances, still hold themselves apart from their conquerors, and considering their interests to be opposed to those of the North, afford excuse for that party, who, bitterly inimical to their white population, endeavours to prevent their restoration to the Union, and the consequent reconstruction of the American nation. Hitherto almost every prophecy rashly hazarded at the commencement during the continuance, and at the termination of the war, has proved false. Few in Europe understand American feelings or politics—it may even be doubted whether they are understood in America itself—but the confidence of the nation in its own strength, its material prosperity, and the good sense which seems to actuate the larger proportion of the people of both North and South, may enable it to surmount difficulties and evade dangers which at present appear to bystanders almost overwhelming.

Possibly the nation may recover its former prosperity, and even in time the fair States of the South may regain somewhat of their previous wealth; but long must it be ere the miseries of the great war will be forgotten, and ere the gallant people who, having fought against overwhelming odds, and with a courage which the world has seldom previously witnessed, have yielded to the arbitration of the sword, will cease to mourn for their noble dead, their lost hopes, and their ruined cause. Gallantly did those who boast to be descended from the best blood of England maintain their asserted rights in the battle-field, courageously have they supported individually and collectively their misfortunes and their fall, and well will it be for the American nation, if the section which by conquest has

attained power, knows how to secure for the services of a common country the talents of the men who, having supported with council and with the sword the cause they believed just, have now submitted to the inevitable, and might by conciliatory measures be enlisted for the great work of reconstruction.

THE END.

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